Allen County, Indiana - Chapter 1, 1880

As a natural sequence of the hostile attitude maintained by the leading spna s ot the fndmn tr'bes of the Northwest during the few years anterior to 1 1 J , just before and immediately succeeding the organization of the « Territory Northwest of the Ohio, the Government of the United States, having become satisfied of the inefficiency of pacific measures in securing safety and peace to her border settlements began to put in ac.ion the milliard power of the nation as the best means of enforcing obedience to the laws of justice and humanity. Accordingly, I resident V ashington, in his message to Congress, on the 3th of January, 1790, directed the attention of that body to the failure of the pacific measures before adopted " with regard to certain hostile tribes of Indians" who were committing depredations against the inhabitants of the Southern and West¬ ern frontiers and suggested " that we ought to be prepared to afford protection to those parts ot the Union, and, if necessary, to punish aggressors."

" It has been heretofore known to Congress that frequent incursions have been made on our settlements by certain banditti of Indians from the northwest w 1 n i 0 "°' rhcse' Wltb SOme of the Uibes dwelling on and near th Wabash, have, of late, been particularly active in their depredations ; and, bein emboldened by the impunity of their crimes, and aided by such parts of th neighboring tribes as could be seduced to join in their hostilities or afford them retreat tor then- prisoners and plunder, have, instead of listening to the human, invitations and overtures made on the part of the United States, renewed thei violences with fresh alacrity and greater effect. The lives of a number of vain able citizens have thus been sacrificed, and some of them under circumstance, peculiarly shocking, while others have been carried into a deplorable captivity.

" These aggravated provocations rendered it essential to the safety of tin Western settlements that the aggressors should be made sensible that the Govern, rnent ot the Union is not less capable of punishing their crimes than it is dis posed to respect their rights and reward their attachments. As this object could not be effected by defensive measures, it became necessary to put in force the act which empowers the President to call out the militia for the protection of the bonder. I have, accordingly, authorized an expedition in which the regular tioops in that quarter are combined witli such draughts of militia as were deemed sufficient The event of the measure is yet unknown to me. The Secretary of War is directed to lay before you a statement of the information on which

Prior to the inauguration of the expedition against the Wabash Indians »jen. Harmar had been operating with the troops at his disposal against the Indians on the Scioto River, with only partial success. Upon the return of his forces to Fort Washington, after consultation with Gov. St, Clair, an expedition was fitted out against the Maumee towns, of which he was placed in chief com¬ mand. Simultaneously with the formation of this expedition, a call was issued by the Governor to the militia officers of the adjacent States of Western Penn¬ sylvania, Virginia and Kentucky, requesting the co-operation of the militia of those States with the regular troops sent out under the direction of the President. Since it had been currently understood by the military authorities of the United States that the British Government was largely responsible for the Indian atrocities on the frontier, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of the Purpose of the Expedition on the part of the British, a letter, embodying the purposes contemplated, was issued from Fort Harmar on the 19th of September. 1790, and addressed to the British Commandant at Detroit. The following extract from that document fully expresses its import :

" I am commanded by the President of the United States to give you the fullest assurances of the pacific disposition entertained toward Great Britain and all her possessions ; and to inform you explicitly that the expedition about to be undertaken is not intended against the post you have the honor to command, nor any other place at present in the possession of the troops of His Britanuic Majesty ; hut is on foot with the sole design of humbling and chastising some of the savage tribes whose depredations are becoming intolerable, and whose cruel¬ ties have of late become an outrage, not on the people of America only, but on humanity ; which I now do in the most unequivocal manner. After this candid explanation, sir, there is every reason to expect, both from your personal charac¬ ter and from the regard you have for that of your nation, that those tribes will meet with neither countenance nor assistance from any under your command, and that you will do what in your power lies to restrain the trading, from whose instigations, there is too good reason to believe, much of the injuries committed by the savages has proceeded."

The plan of the campaign contemplated that, of the militia, 300 were to rendezvous at Fort Steuben (Jeffersonville), march thence to Fort Knox (Vin¬ cennes), and joining Maj. Hamtramck in an expedition up the Wabash from that point. Seven hundred, also, were to rendezvous at Fort Washington (Cincin¬ nati), and 500 below Wheeling, to join the regulars in the expedition to the Maumee towns. The following was the make-up of the expedition as it was mustered into service :

"The Kentuckians composed three battalions, under the Majors Hall, McMullen and Bay, with Lieut. Col. Commandant Trotter at their head. The Pennsylvanians were formed into one battalion, under Lieut. Col. Trubley and Maj. Paul, the whole to be commanded by Col. John Hardin, subject to the orders of Gen. Harmar."

The necessary supplies bavin" been forwarded, the regulars moved out and were "formed into two small battalions under the immediate command ot Mag.

rmmand ofPM4 Fontaine." The whole force as thus - :e cons 1 of three battalions of Kentucky militia, one battalion of 1 eonsylvama nimua one battalion of Kentucky mounted riflemen, amounting to . eleven hundred and thirtv-three men and two battalions of regulars, amounting to three hu dud ana twerny men The whole force of the expedition consisted, therefore, ot fourteen hundred and fifty-tlu'ee^menf^ ^ #f applicable to this body of men and the nature of their equipments, it would seem that the mater, al of Gen. I-Iarmar's command would constitute a most formidable un itary ^"1 lost any contingency in Indian warfare The sequel stows. 1 - ^ " tbPrp were not only incongruous elements, but a general want ot the neee..saiy impieunmts of war, which detracted greatly from their prospect, vc cftcency.n ,heP enemy's country. One of the chief difficulties ,n the way of sucees ' the indisposition on the part of the militia to co-operate with the regula ' P which manifesting itself especially in the effort ot the gcoeral officer to organise and discipline the forces under his command, proved most unsatisfactory, an operated seriously to promote inharmony of action.

From Fort Washington the route pursued by the army ot ton. Uarmai . northward, hearing to the northeast, pacing the Indian village the Little Miami, on the 6th of October. From there it moved in a motherly dirccL, crossing'.!, c Pickaway Fork of the Great Miami

From that point the course was toward the northwest, crossing the main blanch of the Great Miami on the 10th, afterward bearing more to the westward. C the 14th when about thirty miles from the Miami towns, Col. Hardin, with one company of regulars and six hundred militia, was detached from the man, army and sent forward to the Indian village, at the confluence of the mer St . o;ep s with the St, Mary's, forming the Maumee, This detachment reached the village on the afternoon of the loth, and took possession of it, the Indians *, vacated a short time previously. In the mean time, the_ main army, havm pur¬ sued its line of march, was in the immediate vicinity, and on the t moinffig when the work of destruction commenced. By the 21st. the chief town, five to. c villages and nearly twenty thousand bushels of corn in ear, had been dcstloyc .

CUpon the arrival of the main body of the army, when ,t had been ascer¬ tained that there were no Indians, it was contemplated for a time by Gen Haiiuar to press forward and attack the Indian settlements on the \\ ca and at other points in the vicinity of .the Wabash, but the project was abandoned, and Gen. Hotter, , with three hundred Kentuckians, was sent forward to roconnolter and scour the [ woods adjacent in search of the Indians who had so recently vacated their towns. This reconnaisaoce, which took place on the 1 8th, was without, any effectual result , | and as a consequence, unsatisfactory to the general in chief, who, on the following i day placed Col Hardin in command of the detachment, with additional instructions. 1 \s on the previous day, the force placed at his disposal, consisting of about three hundred men. included thirty regulars, flirty light horse and two hundred and thirty active riflemen. Leaving camp on the morning of the l.Hh , the line of march taken was along an Indian trail, hearing to the northwestward in he direction of the Kiekapoo towns. When about five miles from the head ot the | Maumee, the detachment was halted, and divisions of it placed in eligible posi¬ tions in readiness for an attack, should one be made. Subsequently, no enemy , appearing, it moved forward about three miles, when two Indians were discovered, on foot, who, owing to the thick underbrush surrounding, escaped unhurt " Some time after," says Capt. Armstrong, who closely observed the details ot passing events, " a gun had been fired in our front, which might be considered as an alann gun, and I saw where a horse bad come down and returned again ; hut the [ Colonel still moved on, giving no orders nor making any arrangements tor an attack ' *> Sometime after. I discovered the enemy's fires at a distance, and informed the Colonel, who replied that they would not fight, and rode in front of the advance, until fired on from behind the fires, when lie, the Colonel, retreated, and with him all the militia except nine, who continued with me, and were instantly killed, with twenty-four of the Federal troops. Scerng my last man fell, and, being surrounded by the savages. I threw myself into a thicket, and remained there three hours in daylight. During that time, I had an oppor¬ tunity of seeing the enemy pass and repass, and conceived their numbers did not amount to one hundred men. Some were mounted, others armed with rifles, and the advance with tomahawks only."

Speaking of the operations on the preceding day, Capt. Armstrong further says; "I am of opinion that had Col. Trotter proceeded on the 18th, agreeably to his orders, having killed the enemy's sentinels, he would have surprised their camp and, with ease, defeated them ; or, had Col. Hardin arranged his troops or made any military disposition on the 1 9th, that he would have gained a victory. Our defeat I therefore ascribed to two causes ; the unoflicer-like conduct ot t. ol. Hardin (who, I believe, was a brave man), and the cowardly behavior of the militia - many of them threw down their arms, loaded - and 1 believe that none, except the party under my command, fired a gun." Resuming his narrative, he continued : _ , _ . 4 , ,

"On the 10th, Col. Hardin commanded in lieu of Col. Trotter. Attacked about one hundred Indiana about fifteen miles west of the Miami village, and,

Ivom the dastardly conduct of the militia, the troops were obliged to retreat. I lost one sergeant and twenty-one out of thirty men of my command. I he Indians, on this occasion, gained a complete victory, having killed, in the whole, 'ear one hundred men, which was about their number. Many of lie militia threw away their arms without firing a shot, ran through the federal roops and threw them in disorder. Many of the Indians must have been killed, ,s .. my men bayonet many of lib. They fought, and died bard.

least, that officers of the known courage and experience of CM Trotto > md Capt. Hardin charged with the execution of an enterprise involving interests of such vast moment, would not fail to maintain the integrity of their reputations and accomplish all within the range of possibility, with the surrounding* present. It will bcP remembered by the careful reader that, in the organization of the army rmfhrinto the sendee Voluntarily and illy provided with jhe implements of war entertainin'' feelings of jealousy amounting almost to antagonism against the smaller proportion of regular troops, officered by men of experience and dis¬ cipline ami completely armed. It has been stated b, a historian of lngl, repute that " At this time, probably, the jealousy between the regulars and militia, which had been anticipated, and which had threatened trouble at Fort Washmgtm, bc-an effectually to work mischief; the regular troops disliked to be commanded'by Trotter and Hardin; Ihe army officers despised the : m.htia, and the militia hating them, were impatient under the control of Hairnat and his stall. Acain, the rivalry between Trotter and Hardin was calculated to make the ele¬ ments of discord and disobedience yet more widespread, so that all true between officers and men was destroyed, and with it, of necessity, all true

"C ""'But though the troops had been disappointed and defeated, the houses and crops had been burned and wasted ; and upon the 21 st of October, the army com¬ menced its homeward march. But Hardin was not easy under h.a defeat, and the night of the 21st being favorable, lie proposed to Harinar to send back a detachment to the site of the village just destroyed, supposing the savages _viunld have already returned thither. The General was not very willing to tiy fui t e experiments, hut Hardin urged him, and at last obtained an order for ^ dml and forty militia, of which forty were mounted, and sixty regular tumps the former under Hardin, the latter under Maj. Wyllys. How they fared shall be told by Capt. Ashton, an actor in the affray. . ,

" 1 The detachment marched in three columns, the federal troops m the ecuter. at the head of which I was posted, with Maj. Wyllys and CoL Hhrfg m my front : the militia formed the columns to the right and left. I rom delays occasioned by the militia's halting, we did not reach the banks of the 1 Omee ( Maumee) tin some time after sunrise. The spies then discovered the enemy and reported to Maj. Wyllys, who halted the t, deral troops and moved It mm nluu o s inio distance in front where he cave Ins orders and plan of attack to the se\cral commandin'- officers of the corps. Those orders were not communicated to me. Maj. Wyllys reserved the command of the federal troops to himself.

' ."Mai Hall with his battalion, was directed to take a circuitous route around the' bend of the Omee River, cross the Pickaway Forks (or St. Mary s) which brought him directly in the rear ot the enemy, and there wait until the attack should commence with Maj. McMullen's battalion, Maj Fontaine s cavalry mid Mai. Wyllys with the federal troops, who all crossed the Umee, at or n a the common fording-place. After the attack commenced, the troops J r'° means to separate, but were to embody, or the battalions to support each other, as

" From this disposition, it appeared evident that it was the intention of Maj. Wyllys to surround the enemy, and that if Col. Hall, who had gained his ground , undiscovered, had not wantonly disobeyed Ids orders by firing on a single Indian, Ihe surprise must have been complete. The Indians tl.en fled with precipitation, Ihe battalions of militia pursuing in different directions.

« - Maj. Fontaine made a charge upon a small party of savages ; lie tell at tlie first fire! and the troops dispersed. The Federal troops, who were lei unsup¬ ported became an easy sacrifice to much the largest party of the Indians that I had been seen that dav. It was my opinion that the misfortunes of that day 1 were owin'- to the separation of the troops and disobedience ot orders.

nearly ceased Col. Hall and Maj. McMullen, with the,,' battalions met m the town and after discharging and fresh loading their arms, which took up about half an hour, preceded to join the army, unmolested. I am convinced that the detachment, if it had been kept embodied was sufficient to have I fullest expectations of the General, and needed no support ; but I was informed I a battalion, under Maj. Ray, was ordered out for that purpose

Unon the return of Col. Hardin to the camp, being dissatisfied with the issue of this last action, and desiring to recover advantages lost by precipitation and disobedience of orders, requested of Gen. Harinar to return with Ins te entire force, to the village, anil thus make tlie enterprise a success Ihe Gen¬ eral being short of supplies and the means of transportation, declined compliance witli the request, and, on the morning of the 23d of October putting lus army in motion took up the line of march back to Fort Washington, the expedition having proved, essentially, a failure in the attainment of its purpose. The loss was IK'1 killed and 31 wounded, the death list including Maj, Wyllys and Lieut Frothingham, of the regulars, and Maj. Fontaine .Cauls. Thorpe, McMnrty and Scott, Limits. Clark and Rogers, and Ensigns Bridges, Sweet, Higgins and Thiclkcld, of the militia. The loss of the Indians was estimated as nearly equal to that of the whites. Notwithstanding this estimate, the Indian account differs greatly from it, fixing their loss at a far less number. Their account was as fol¬ lows :

" There have been two engagements about the Miami towns between the Americans and the Indians, in which, it is said, the former had about five hun¬ dred men killed, and that the rest' have retreated. The loss was only fifteen or twenty on the side of the Indians. The Shawanocs, Miamis and Pottawatomies were, I understand, the principal tribes that were engaged ; but I do not learn that any of the nations have refused their alliance or" assistance, and it is confidently reported that they are now marching against the frontiers on the Ohio."

This account, also, while it may contain many of the elements of truth, the reference to numbers killed of the whites, is, no doubt, as largely overstated as their own loss is below the truth.

The following account of the expedition of Gen. Harmar, written in 1791, and published in the Philadelphia Daily Advertiser of that date, gives some items of information concerning that disaster, perhaps nowhere else to be found :

" There were, at that time, seven towns on the three rivers in the vicinity of the confluence of the St. Joseph's and St. Mary's. The principal Miami village was called Omee Town, among the inhabitants of which were a considerable number of French traders. It stood upon the east bank of the St. Joseph's, or north side of the Maumee, directly opposite the mouth of the St. Mary's River, and had been burnt before Col. Hardin's arrival. Another Miami village of thirty houses stood on the bank opposite the Omee town. The Delawares had three villages; two upon the St. Mary's, about three miles from its mouth, with forty-five houses in all ; and the other on the east bank of the St. Joseph's, two or three miles from its mouth, with thirty-six houses. The Shawanoes had two villages, about three miles down the Maumee, and one called Chillicothe, on the north bank, with fifty-eight houses, and the other on the opposite side of the river with sixteen houses. The army burned all the houses at the different villages and destroyed about twenty thousand bushels of corn which they discov¬ ered in various places, where it had been hidden by the Indians, and, also, considerable property belonging to the French traders."

One of the principal elements of value in this statement is that which gives the relative locations of the Indian towns in this vicinity, and fixes the exact situation of the several Omee towns - the large one on the bottom between the Maumee and the St. Joseph's, at the junction, and the other over on what was afterward called the "Wells' Pre-emption," between Spy Run and the St. Joseph's. Again, it renders certain the location of Chillicothe, on the north bank of the Maumee, three miles down, the point from which Gen. Harmar issued his orders on the 20th of October, 1790, before taking up the line of march on his return to Fort Washington. It is probable that the Delaware towns referred to in the account as being located on the St. Mary's River, are the " Pickaway " towns of history, because the upper St. Mary's was long known as the Pickaway fork of the Maumee.*

Some other interesting details of the proceedings on the 19th of October are given in an account somewhat amplified from that given by Col. Armstrong, which has been cited above.

Col. Hardin, on the morning of that day, having pursued the same route as that taken by Col. Trotter on the day preceding, in pursuit of the savages, " finding himself in their neighborhood, he detached Capt. Faulkner, of the Pennsylvania militia, to form on his left, which he did at such a distance as to render his company of no service in the approaching engagement. Hardin's command moved forward to what they discovered to be the encampment of the enemy, which was flanked by a morass on each side, as well as by one in front, which was crossed with great promptness hv the troops, now reduced to less than two hundred, who, before they had time to form, received a galling and unex¬ pected fire from a large body of savages. The militia immediately broke and fled, nor could all the exertions of the officers rally them ; fifty-two of those dispersing being killed in a few minutes.

" The enemy pursued until Maj. Fontaine, who had been sent to hunt up Faulkner and his company, returned with them, compelled them to retire, and the survivors of. the detachment arrived safe in camp.

"The regulars, under Armstrong, bore the brunt of this affair, one Sergeant and twenty-one privates being killed on the battle-ground, and, while endeavoring to maintain their position, were thrown in disorder by the militia running through their lines, flinging- away their arms without even firing a shot. The Indians killed in this affair nearly one hundred men."*

The site of this sanguinary affair was, from the best information now attain¬ able, by observation, and deductions from the observation of others, in the south¬ western part of Eel River Township, not far distant from where Eel River crosses the county line. Indeed, there are numerous points within an area of less than three miles along Eel River, which bear unmistakable evidences of a terrible con¬ flict at arms.

In the engagement that took place on the morning of the 22d, there are some details in the account before us not found in the more general yet mainly official narrative, from which we have before liberally quoted, but which, it is thought, contains some facts of interest not contained in the other.

The detachment sent out under Col. Hardin, being formed in three divisions, with militia on the right and left and regulars in the center, the left, under Maj. Hall, was ordered to pass round the bend and cross the St. Mary's in rear of the Indian towns on the St. Joseph's, and remain there until the battalion of Maj. McMullen, occupying the right, should cross the Maumee lower down, and commence the action by attacking the Indians on the east side of the St. Joseph's. This latter movement was to be the signal for the regulars, under Hardin and VVyllys, who occupied the center, with Major Fontaine's cavalry, to cross the

Maumee at the old ford and attack the enemy in front, and thus surround the Indian camp. Contrary to orders, however, Maj. Hall, instead of waiting for the signal, permitted some of his men to fire upon a straggling Indian, which, alarming the Indians in the town, they attacked the troops on the left. The con¬ sequence of this was the discovery by the Indians' of Hardin's men, on the oppo¬ site side of the Maumee, who immediately began to cross over, Major Fontaine being in advance. Before this division had crossed, it was attacked in front, on the north bank and in the river, the cavalry having, in the mean time, gained a footing in the borders of the town. The fight, soon became general, the Indians having the whites at a disadvantage. The contest was terrific, the savages beinowrought up to a pitch of desperation seldom equaled, perhaps never excelled" Owing to the premature engagement on the left, the whole plan was so much dis¬ arranged that no two divisions could execute orders in concert ; thus divided, defeat was inevitable. Though the regulars and cavalry bore the brunt of battle with the most heroic fortitude, they were finally overcome by superior force.