Racine County, Wisconsin - Chapter 12: American Protective League, 1920

DETECTIVE stories have a fascination for most red-blooded people. Some day the full story of the secret service work of the American government in war time may be published. That it will be intensely interesting is beyond any question.

Just as the voluntary organization of exemption boards throughout the country made the successful operation of the selective service law possible within a short time, so a voluntary society of American business and professional men, serving without pay and receiving not even public credit for their work, performed the work of seeking for enemy agents; aiding draft boards; discounting enemy propaganda; enforcing the laws against sabotage and espionage; investigating the character of applicants for military and civil offices, and performing numerous other functions generally placed in the hands of the investigation division of the United States Department of Justice.

The name of this organization of civilian agents was the American Protective League. It had 300,000 active members in the country. It had half a hundred local agents in Racine county. It was the "eyes and ears of the government." A. Bruce Bielaski, chief of the bureau of investigation. Department of Justice, declares that the United States was the best policed country engaged in the war, and that in spite of the fact that the outbreak of the war found the government with only a few score operatives in the secret service branch.

The national organizers and directors of this league were A. M. Briggs, Charles D. Frey and Victor Elting. They got into communication with a few men of prominence and of unquestioned loyalty in each state. These men were asked to head a state division of the league. The state was then divided into local districts and a man chosen in each to act as local chief. He was told of the purposes of the organization and asked to name an assistant chief, and half a dozen captains who would be in charge of the operatives. Each captain then recommended names of from ten to twenty operatives and a lieutenant or two. If they were approved by the chief, they were given necessary instructions and credentials after taking the oath of service.

This work of organization proceeded very rapidly. Soon every important county in the country had representatives at work. The opperatives and local officers reported to the local chief. In many instances the operatives knew no members of the league other than those in his own squad.

The local chief reported directly to the government department of justice office in his district, or to the national headquarters of the league at Washington, according to the nature of the matter in hand. Mail and telegrams were franked. The league's telephone messages to headquarters took priority over all private calls.

It is a matter of regret that the membership of the Racine organization cannot be made public even yet. The chief is a prominent business man whose connection with the league was quite generally known or suspected. Some of the operatives were known as a result of their activities in specific cases. But many of the most effective workers were men in shops, or even members of alien societies and clubs whose efficiency was due to the fact that their connection with the league was never suspected. Some allowed themselves to become objects of suspicion. It is contrary to the policy of the government to permit publication of names of persons engaged in such work.

A brief recital of conditions at America's entry into the war will explain the necessity for a large secret service force of some kind in this country.

nations. The legality of such sales could not be questioned under international law, but the Central Powers were proceeding on the principle that necessity knows no law. When the submarine blockade, so-called, did not prevent these shipments from reaching England and France, it was decided to have secret agents destroy machinery, burn factories and ships, create discord among workmen, "corner" raw material and interfere with transportation service. This disregai-d for the rights of a friendly people was one of the causes of our entry into the war.

In our own population were many families of German birth or descent who sympathized with the Fatherland to some degree early in the war, and most of them had been taught from childhood to hate Great Britain and France. When the Central Powers appeared to be gaining a military victory, they were pleased and said so. While not entirely proper in a neutral country like ours, there was no way of preventing this. The right of free speech is guaranteed to all in times of peace. Funds were raised for German Red Cross work and for German charities in America, just as they were for French and Belgian charities. This sort of thing tended to solidify the German-American element and encouraged many of them to express openly their hopes for a German victory in the war. When America was forced into the war, this situation immediately assumed a grave character. Those who had been shouting for Germany did not feel like changing their tune at once. Besides those who were actually enemies at heart, and perhaps under pay of the German government, there were many who were on record as being anxious to see the Kaiser victorious.

It was essential that reports be made upon every one of these men and women; that the traitors and spies be jailed or interned; that other pro-Germans be warned and made to keep quiet; that the many rumors about German-Americans be investigated and the truth sifted from the falsehoods. It was, obviously, too big a job for the small secret service force. It was also realized that there would be soon a tremendous work in sight in connection with the enforcement of the selective service law and registration of aliens.

When the American Protective league offered its service to the Department of Justice, the offer was accepted. As a result, they later put on the job a quarter of a million high-class, intelligent men eminently suited for the work, and yet they were the sort who in ordinary circumstances could never have been hired by

Operatives scattered in every shop and office, in hotels and banks, working on railroads and boats, and members of lodges and societies, quickly made reports on all seditious utterances. They investigated complaints against alleged German sympathizers. They passed upon the loyalty of all candidates for commissions and government positions. They traced to their source the numerous stories circulated with intent to injure the morale of army and citizens. They prepared evidence regarding suspects. They inquired into the business of men travelling from place to place for mysterious purposes. They unearthed the names of all who had contributed to German war work, and of German reservists in America.

When their facts were assembled and written - and only provable facts were accepted - they transmitted them through their local chiefs to the governmental agencies. The chief often added his recommendation as to desirable action. The government then concluded the case - procured an indictment, released a suspect, published facts to counteract some enemy lie, interned an enemy alien, or continued the investigation through other channels, as the case might be. The league members did not make arrests; they gathered evidence.

Aside from the actual work done the league had a tremendous effect upon enemy activities in this country because it soon became apparent that the government had "eyes and ears" everywhere; that it was dangerous to indulge in seditious remarks anywhere. No one knew who the federal agents were, but it was evident that they were numerous and in every conceivable place.

The reports sent out from the Racine branch to the department of justice were numbered in the hundreds. A few examples of the duties of operatives may be cited:

A circular from headquarters asked all local operatives to be on the lookout for a foreigner wanted elsewhere. He was suspected of seeking information in factories making products for the government. It was found that this man had been in Racine, stopping at a local hotel. The suspect had paid a bill with a check. Inquiry at a bank here showed he had deposited $5000 in a lump at that bank. The league arranged to watch that account. A few days later a check for the total balance was drawn on the local bank in favor of a bank in an Ohio manufacturing town. The local league chief notified the department of justice. It notified the Ohio league agents. They located the man and put him under surveillance. Evidence was found that he was using the money for bribing employes of factories engaged in war work. The secret service was given the evidence. They siezed the man. His fate is not known here. The ultimate outcome of but few cases was known to the league members, as the government did not often report results to the organization.

Late in July 1918, the league branches were told to take steps to round up all slackers and draft evaders; to carry out the "work or fight" rule. The Racine branch chose thirty citizens to act as squad captains, and one hundred state guardsmen and fifty Spanish War veterans to assist. They were summoned quietly to the court house, and the squads formed. The three companies of men supposed they were to take part in a parade to greet a visiting notable.

On the night of August 3, all these men were ordered to report at the Lakeside auditorium. Thirty automobiles were waiting near the junction, supposedly to meet a delegation of Great Lakes Jackies and band. The raiding squads were told that they were to pick up slackers. Each squad had certain blocks in which to operate. All instructions were given quietly. The autos then came to the auditorium, picked up the raiders and carried them to their scenes of operation. Within fifteen minutes the roundup had commenced. Every man of draft age who did not have a registration card with him was taken to the auditorium. There he was examined, and if he could not produce proof of his identity and of being properly registered, he was required to produce the necessary witnesses or was turned over to the police.

Many humorous and semi-tragic incidents occurred. For several days the newspapers had carried notices that all men within the draft age should carry their cards with them at all times, so no excuses were accepted. Men coming from theaters were taken away from the sides of girls they had escorted. One man stepped from an automobile containing his wife and baby, to do some shopping. He was nabbed and unable to return to his waiting and much worried spouse for nearly two hours. A blonde young man wept copiously as he told the investigators that he was "in bad" with his wife and had only been allowed to go down town that evening on his promise to be back at 10 o'clock. He feared he never would be allowed to go out of the house alone again. He didn't get home until midnight, but a league representative went with him to explain to the wife that her recreant husband had

Congress provided the Department of Justice with efficient instruments when it passed the espionage act and the anti-sabotage act. These made it a crime to assist an enemy, talk against the government, discourage enlistments, interfere or attempt to prevent bond sales, attempt to prevent manufacture of goods needed by the government in the war, interi-upt transportation service, or otherwise hamper the carrying on of the war. With these definite laws on the books, the operations of enemy sympathizers slowed down to a marked degree, and it was possible to promptly arrest and punish violators. Reports were made on the character and activities of almost everyone in Racine suspected of enemy sympathies. These reports were favorable to the suspect in many cases, but frequently they resulted in having the man called "on the carpet," at Milwaukee or Chicago and warned by a United States district attorney as to what was expected of him. In a few instances Germans or Austrians were taken from the city in custody of secret service agents and never returned again.

A fruitful source of information relative to men's views on the war was the reports from civilian committees selling government securities - Liberty Bonds and Savings Stamps. Frequently men would supplement their refusal to buy bonds with some remark to the effect that they didn't "propose to give money to help England oppress poor Germany," or that "America has no business in this war." Occasionally boys who were planning to enlist would repeat the story of how some one advised them not to enter the army or navy "because Germany was sure to win, and American transports were certain to be sunk." All these things were followed up to see whether the man making the comment was inspired by real feelings of treachery to America, or whether he merely had expressed himself more emphatically than was intended, due to some temporary excitement.

Enemy propaganda was the most difficult thing with which to deal. No satisfactory method could be found to reach it without curtailing freedom of press and speech. Warnings from the department of justice generally had a salutary effect upon persons circulating harmful stories.

trolling the menace of I. W .W. agitators and a few other anarchistic and revolutionary workers during the course of the war. Such menaces could be reached only through some such organization, which would be able to place agents on the inside of secret societies and gain the confidence of the promoters. After this was done, the task of scattering the members and breaking up their organizations was not impossible.

The American Protective league remained in effect after the armistice. It was disbanded officially on February 1, 1919, when it received the thanks of the department of justice and the military intelligence department of the army. Most of the members will never receive any public acknowledgment of their valuable work. At the most they will only have as souvenirs the little badges which were used in emergencies to identify the wearers to members of police departments or government secret service bureaus. These agencies placed full confidence in the league and acted hand in hand with it.

"The mainspring of action of the American Protective league has been voluntary subordination to authority, and strength rather than weakness has developed. The unquestioning perfoi-mance of arduous tasks; the cheerful acceptance of rulings on debatable questions of policy and the complete self-effacement of most of the members contribute an inspiring chapter to the league's work in the war. We admire beyond words the spirit that endured in silence when everywhere about was the excitement of work in the open, crowned with public praise. Other citizen leaders and workers were known in their communities and rewarded with open gratitude of their neighbors. Others marched with waving flags or spoke from the public platform. Not so with members of the league. So far as their daily work in the public view was concerned, their lives gave no answer to the question, 'What are they doing to win the war?' But their spirit endured and they should have the thanks of a grateful country."

The very fact that unseen forces were busy in Racine to root up enemy works and silence enemy advocates was sufficient to start the "rumor factories" working overtime. Almost the first week of the war, stories spread like wild fire affecting the avirful fate of certain prominent citizens of German extraction. So rapidly did these tales spread that there was no chance to stop them. In April, 1917, a man went to Milwaukee to buy a suit of clothes. He returned the same evening, and before he reached home had been told by no less than seven persons of a generally-credited report that he had been taken to Ft. Leavenworth prison that afternoon by agents of the government.

A real estate man with relatives in Germany finally had to ask the assistance of the newspapers in squelching a tale to the effect that he had been "beaten to a pulp" for expressing pro-German sentiments and was even then under arrest awaiting trial for his life as a spy.

During the war rumors constantly sprang up regarding the fate of soldiers in France. At one time, the story spread over night that Battery F had been wiped out in one day's fighting near Chateau-Thierry and it was a long time before parents of boys in the battery were entirely convinced that there was no basis for a story which was retold by hundreds. Mail service was so slow to France that similar stories had plenty of time to go the rounds before they could be disproved. Use of cables for private messages was almost entirely prohibited and the censorship made news dispatches generally indefinite when dealing with the identity of units in action.

Along in May, 1917, a report became current that a certain Racine man who was bom in Germany, was preparing to raise a regiment of his former comrades and march against Canada. The story gathered momentum as it travelled, until it carried such details as the point of rendezvous for his troopers near the Canadian border; the amount he was paying for horses with which to equip his cavalry troop; the hiding place of old army rifles and shot guns with which he would arm his forces, etc.

When someone finally confronted him with all these "facts" and denounced him as a traitor in our midst, he was probably the most astounded man in the community. He had never heard a single whisper of the story until it was put up to him in the most damning form, with all details complete and seemingly accurate. Fortunately he was able to prove his innocence of the charge. It is doubtful if his accuser would have been satisfied with the mere knowledge that the old gentleman was in no physical condition to ride from here to Canada, much less to mount a fiery steed and lead his army across the country to attack Winnipeg.

T. W. Thiesen of Racine. Mayor Thiesen was in New York when the two local batteries received order to board the transport Leviathan on March 4, 1917. Troop movements were supposed to be kept secret, of course, and the fact that the 57th Field artillery brigade was to sail that day was not known to many persons outside of Camp Merritt.

The Leviathan was a big ship, however, and it had a big crew. It was known in New York city that she was in the Hoboken slip across the river and was the object of great interest to passengers on the ferries. The fact that she was to sail that week was quite generally known throughout the city, because even sailors talk sometimes. The writer, for one, was told by a total stranger on the streets of New York that the transport would sail on March 3 or 4.

Mayor "Bill" Thiesen was told by some of the people at the camp that the 121st F. A. was to go on the boat. He was asked not to say anything about it until they left, and he agreed, or course.

The day of sailing came. Battery C had embarked March 2 and Battery F on March 3, and on March 4 the great vessel backed out of the slip, and steamed down the bay past the Statue of Liberty, while thousands upon thousands of men and women cheered her from office windows, ferry boats and housetops along the shore. Aeroplanes escorted her, whistling tugs accompanied her for a ways, and an observation balloon preceded her, high in the air. Early in the afternoon the Leviathan was out of sight beyond the eastern horizon. That night Mayor Thiesen decided that he owed it to the anxious parents and friends of the Racine soldiers to let them know that the boys had sailed, for the rules prohibited them notifying their parents in advance. He could see no harm in doing so then, as the facts were well known by everyone in New York.

He therefore sent three telegrams to Racine telling of the batteries' departure. They were addressed to city officials, and one suggested that the newspapers be informed of the big news next day. They were.

Then the storm broke. Someone suggested that the Germans, reading the news, would send a submarine out to sink the Leviathan. Everyone knew the Germans would do it if they could, and didn't stop to think that all the German agents in New York saw the ship sail twenty-four hours before anybody in Racine heard of it and they could communicate with Berlin rather more easily than a spy could from Racine.

It was reported that the telegrams from the Mayor were signed with various names. This was substantiated. One had been signed "Bill," one "Thiesen" and one "Prexy," a nickname acquired by Mr. Thiesen when he was president of the city school board. Added to all this evidence was the undoubted fact that the mayor was of German parentage.

When Mr. Thiesen arrived home, expecting to cheer up the soldiers' parents by telling how nicely the boys got away on their long journey, he was met with icy stares. Argument availed nothing. The fact that the sailing of the Leviathan was public knowledge all over the country didn't help him. That he was one of the most patriotic of war workers couldn't offset his German name. The fact that almost everybody in town was in the habit of calling him by one or another of the names signed to the telegrams could not discount the statement that the use of those different signatures "looked mighty suspicious."

A Racine man wrote a highly colored account of the matter to the United States district attorney. The mayor heard of it and hastened to Chicago prepared to be thrown in jail as a spy. He related the whole story frankly. He was told to return home and "forget your trouble; we don't want you."

But it will be a long time before "Bill" Thiesen forgets the outcome of his efforts to spread good cheer and comfoi-t to the friends of the Battery boys.

"If the U-boats had ever sunk the Leviathan, I would have been strung up to a lamp post before I could have said a word," said Mr. Thiesen a year later in recounting the episode. "I don't know yet how they figured that there could be anything suspicious in my perfectly plain telegrams, which were accepted without question by the government telegraph company at New York, but I guess some people thought the messages proved me to be the head of the enemy intelligence service in America."

Nothing was more significant of the tense nerves of the nation than the uncanny speed with which rumors of tragedies and catastrophes spread from coast to coast, from the Canadian border to the gulf.

All that was necessary was for some person to pass some remark, such as "I guess that tuberculosis is taking a heavy toll of lives among the soldiers in France," and if two or three persons heard it, the idea would gain ground until within a week almost everyone in the United States would be repeating the s.ory of terrible lists of deaths as gospel truth, whether there was any foundation for it or not.

There is hardly a person today who does not remember the story that a shipload of Belgian children had arrived in New York, all of them with one or both hands cut off by Germans. The government press bureau declared that the source of the story could not be traced, although hundreds of intelligence officers and A. P. L. agents tried to locate its origin. There is a question whether any Belgian children ever had their hands cut off by Germans. If they did, they probably died as a result. None came to America.

There was a rumor current that hundreds of American soldiers had returned minus both legs and both arms and that, classified as "basket cases" because they were kept in a sort of clothes basket arrangement, the gruesome company occupied one entire floor of a New York hospital. Plenty of people had "talked with those who had seen them." But no such case was ever recorded in the annals of the army medical department during the war. To a person who took time to think about

Almost every civilian in the country "knew a friend who saw" trainloads of Japanese soldiers going across this country on their way to France. But none ever went.

In regions from which certain army divisions came, there would come occasional reports that entire organizations were drowned at sea or killed in battle. The war department felt morally bound to deny these fabrications. These were the only "wireless rumors" which the government felt might have eminated from enemy agents. The purpose may have been to get the government to disclose the location of organizations in order to correct the falsehoods. This would have given the foe valuable military information. If this was the plan, it failed as the location of units was never given until it was known that the Germans were aware of the fact through other sources.