Racine County, Wisconsin - Chapter 20: The A. E. F, in Action, 1920

Chapter 20: The A. E. F, in Action

THE American Expeditionary Forces in Europe consisted of 2,079,880 men, all of whom had been transported from the United States after May 1, 1917. It was by far the largest army ever sent so far from its home base of supplies and its organization involved many new and difficult problems of warfare.

Some of these difficulties may be realized from a brief statement of conditions confronting the Army and Navy. First of all, it was necessary to provide the arniy itself, and the manner in which this was done has been recounted in previous chapters. The movement of 2,000,000 men across the Atlantic would be a big job at any time, but it was an enomious one when thei'e was a shortage of suitable transports, and enemy warships menaced every mile of the sea paths.

After the army arrived in France, it had to be clothed and fed. Provision for this must be made before the men landed, because the submarine warfare might at any time sever the lines of communication for days or weeks at a time. It was the policy of the government to send to Europe at least a month's provisions for every man at the same time as the man himself embarked, and thereafter maintained a reserve supply in France equal to that amount. Of course it was necessary to ship the supplies for the normal automatic issue of rations and equipment, also.

To land the men and supplies it was necessary to provide ports, and vast wharves and warehouses were constructed by the Americans at the points designated as debarkation points for the Yanks. These were St. Nazaire, Nantes, Brest, Bordeaux and La Rochelle. Ti'oops were also landed at Le Havre from England, but no American tenninal facilities were provided there.

French I'ailroads offered no possibility of transporting the needed men and supplies to the training centers and the front line sectors, so an Amoican railroad system was constructed from the west coast right through to Verdun. Rails, spikes and rolling stock all had to be shipped from here. France could furnish little excepting wooden ties, and even these were scarce.

Huge refrigerating plants were installed - the largest in the world, in fact. Vast supply depots were built. Training camps were consti-ucted. Artillery ranges were laid out. Officers' schools were opened.

As soon as war was declared, Gen. Pershing was sent to France to perfect the organization of this Sei-vice of Supply and plan for the utilization of the combat forces which the United States would send as soon as possible. Almost immediately there arose hundreds of exasperating questions, due to the ancient laws and customs of Europe. It was a difficult matter for the government of France to condemn land quickly for use of the Allied annies. Obtaining rights to build a railroad, American fashion, involved more red tape than our State Department ever saw in its palmiest days. Legal restrictions surrounded every step connected with the purchase of timber and other supplies. Eventually Pershing arranged to smooth out what difficulties he and his staff could, and then proceed to do what he wanted to on the assumption that claims could be made for damages later on. What could be brought fi'om America was brought. The troops first arriving were used mainly in the work of constraction for several months, and several boatloads of ci\'ilian mechanics were brought from the United States to supervise the tasks of construction. Regiments of troops were formed of volunteers from many trades, such as railroad men, foresters, etc., and these pei'- formed gigantic tasks with a skill and ease which caused the more conservative Europeans to gasp in astonishment. The miles of wharves, warehouses and railroad yards at Bordeaux were constructed by American workmen in less time than the French engineers had estimated

The British and French high commands proposed that American units be not utilized as parts of an American army, but be used as replacement units to supply the Allied ranks as they became depleted through death, wounds and illness. The plan had merit only insofar as it provided a quick way of training soldiers. Fortunately Gen. Pershing knew his countrymen well enough to be sure nothing but trouble could result from placing American soldiers under foreign commissioned and non-commissioned officers. He insisted American troops fight under their own flags and under their own officers. Beyond this, he was willing to send them wherever they were needed, either acting as a separate force or sen'ing under British or French troops commanders when the latter were in danger of defeat. He urged that all the Allied armies be put under one commander-in-chief, so that they could act in harmony at all times. Failure to do so had been one of the contributing causes of the low ebb of the Allied cause in the spring of 1917. Partly as a result of the American views, the plan was adopted and Field Marshal Foch of France was chosen to fill the important post. Prior to this time, the plan of unified command had been side-tracked for months because each of the Allies wanted its own army commander to be made generalissimo. America had no candidate for the job and favored Foch partly because of his known skill as a tactician, and partly because he represented France, on whose soil the war was being fought to a decision.

For the puipose of training troops, Gen. Pershing obtained the sei'vices of numerous British and French instnactors. In artillery, particularly, it was necessary to depend upon the French as they were to furnish guns for the first contingent of Yanks and no American officei's were familiar with the now famous 75 millimeter and 155 millimeter field pieces. At first, American quartenmaster department officers were placed in charge of the oi'ganization of the Sei-xdce of Supply in France, but Gen. Pershing soon saw that while West Point turns out good soldiers it doesn't necessarily equip a man for a business career, and this was essentially a big business proposition. So America was drawn upon for some of its most famous engineers, bankers, contractors, merchants and other civilian leadei's to take charge of the work. They were given army rank and they showed the world what speed meant when applied to construction and distribution.

buildings for hospitals, and furnished all surplus cars for use of the American transportation service but the demand was far greater than the supply.

As many troops would be sent to France via England, arrangements had to be made there for the care of men in transit. Lines of communication were established from Liverpool, London and Southampton to numerous rest camps, training camps and ports, and across the Channel to France. All of this not only requires time and material but meant the detachment of many army officers and men for the operation of the sei-\-ice and to maintain laisson with the Allied governments and officials.

The spot in France where the first contingent of American soldiers set foot in 1917 is not Brest, or St. Nazaire, or Bordeaux. It is not even on the seacoast of France. To find the landing place of the fii'st of the two million, you must go one hundi'ed miles up from the mouth of the river Seine, one hundred miles as the river winds through one of the most beautiful valleys in the world, until you come to the ancient town of Rouen, capital of the one-time province of Nonnandy, where Joan of Arc was burned at the stake.

The stone quay that is the north bank of the river in the shadow of Rouen's Grand Pont was made historic on May 25, 1917, by the unannounced coming of the first boatload of Americans. That pilgrim band was not the vanguard of the First Division. It was not a Regular Anny detachment rushed over to buoy up the hopes of the Allies, for it was almost a month later that General Pershing and his escort of troops landed at St. Nazaire. That first band at Rouen was composed of soldiers who had been civilians twenty days before. It was Base Hospital No. 4 which had been assembled at Cleveland, Ohio, on May 5, 1917.

When, at 7 o'clock of the long spring twilight of May 25, the British transport Western Australia swung to in the river channel in Rouen, there were strange unifomis at her rails. While the transport was edging toward her moorings, the word spread among the crowds at the tables under the trees of the terrasse of the Cafe Victor Hugo that the Americans had come. That crowd of the Rouen waterfront terrasses was indisputably the most cosmopolitan in all the world at that time, for Rouen was the place of all places in France where the conglomeration of i-aces fighting under England's flag i-ubbed elbows and at the same time mingled with the native

Home Again After Nearly Two Years Of War Service

The whole cosmopolitan mass came to the waterfront to greet the Americans. Out from the cafes, out from every building, out of the street ends they hurried until the broad, cobblestoned roadway was filled witli them. Ropes were stretched to keep them from crowding too closely, and from the boat decks it looked as if the first line behind the ropes was composed exclusively of mesdemoiselles, waving the earliest welcome. And behind the mesdemoiselles was the mixed mass of the British Army - for Rouen was the biggest B. E. F. base in France.

Yes, and there was a platoon of German prisoners that stopped under escort. Such was the crowd which extended an impromptu welcome to the first of the A. E. F., a welcome that rang tnae despite the fact that Rouen had long before grown dulled to the unifonn and the march of men.

Sergeant R. C. Madden, of Brooklyn, who had been two years in the Regular Army, had the honor of being the first man ashore. After him came the score of medical officers, thirty nurses and one hundred and fifty enlisted men who composed the unit.

The record of organizing this first unit and landing it in France within twenty days is one of the unusual stories of the war. In addition to being the first in France, the unit also was the first to land in England, racing with the HaiTard unit to win the honor.

Assembled in Cleveland on May 6, the outfit proceeded to New York on a special train, enlistment papers being completed on the train. On May 8 it sailed from New York on the Cunard liner Orduna. Losses from submarines in the week before the Orduna sailed had been heavier than in any other week of the war, and it was generally known aboard the boat that American destroyers were waiting off the coast of the British Isles to convoy the Orduna through the danger zone. On May 18 the Orduna sailed quietly into Liverpool.

It was on board the Orduna that the enlisted men of the unit began their training as soldiers. There had been no time to obtain and put on unifoiTns before sailing, so while the men were marching aboard in their civilian clothes great packing cases full of blouses and breeches, leggins and shoes and other equipment were being stowed on the lower decks.

Several days out at sea, while the medical officers were still busy distributing shots-inthe-arm, while seasickness was still more powerful than the top-sergeant, the unit was introduced to the ways of the supply sergeant

- and the recruit who had that job wished upon him had a hard time living down the memories of that first "issue" day. Clothing crates were knocked open and the men lined up to "take what you can get." The depot quartennaster at Philadelphia had thrown together an assortment of sizes based on average AiTny requirements, so that Boy Scout sizes and 42-stouts predominated.

The transfonnation from civilian clothes into uniform under the circumstances outraged the sartorial sense of 150 men, and it was only by days of exchanging that the average appearance approached presentability.

Never was drilling done under more unusual circumstances. On tetering decks the entire command marched and counter-marched, first by squads, and then as a detachment. The proportion of men with at least a smattering of di-ill knowledge was so large that after seven days of continuous drilling the commander pronounced the unit as well drilled as the average recruit organization after three months.

All the time the Cunarder kept zig-zagging in her course, and the strain of the submarine menace was as obvious in the boat crew as among the military passengers. Then, with the real danger zone several days ahead, came an ominous order. By command of the British captain of the boat, all Americans in uniform must take them off and keep them off until the ship had met her convoy. In case the ship were torpedoed and those aboard had to abandon her, the Gei-mans certainly would shell the lifeboats if they saw them filled with uniformed men, and the captain didn't want to take any chances of a new sea horror in which women civilian passengers might be victims.

So off came the uniforms. Followed hasty bargaining with the British sailors who already had come into possession of scores of Yankee suits and shirts and civilian shoes, and the ship I'etumed to the civilian aspect it had when it sailed from New York. About the same time, the captain of the ship gave orders that all bugling must stop.

A real jolt came, however, when the word was spread about the ship that the Gei-mans had tried to lead the Orduna into a U-boat trap - that in order to escape, the ship had turned and was even then heading far north on her course. The Germans had sent a wireless message, so the report was, pui-porting to arrange a meeting with the United States destroyer which was to convoy the Orduna to port. But they had slipped up. They had gi\en the name of the destroyer as the "Wadsworth" and none of the British officers could

S. A. Titus

COUNTY AND CITY ADMINISTRATIVE HEADS DURING THE WORLD WAR S. A. Titus was chairman of the County Board and Mayor T. W. Thiesen was head of the City Government.

The lot of the public official during war time is not an enviable one. With public feelinRs running hiph, and every action subjected to the test of its value in winninp the war, a decision by any responsible official was likely to be "viewed with alarm" by a large portion of the population. Durint? the recent war, too, it was customary to cry "pro-German" at any who might entertain views contrary to one's opinions. The county government was less in the limelight than the city, but even it had some troubles.

Mayor T. W. Thiesen was elected mayor of Racine in 1915 and re-elected in 1917. He had proven a very capable executive and his administration had resulted in much work on the part of the city government.

One of the first matters presented to him was the problem of finding an office for Local Board No. 1, and he solved this by giving the draft board the use of his rooms in the city hall. A good deal of the mayor's business was transacted in the city hall corridors thereafter. During the war he was called upon daily by the relatives of men in service to obtain information regarding them, and it later became his duty to notify families of deceased soldiers of the deaths of these men. When the Transport Tus- 'Cania was sunk, and it was known that Lieut. Salbreiter and several Racine ambulance company men were aboard, he was in communication with Washington day and night until definite information could be obtained regarding these soldiers. When notified of the death of Sargeant Hawley it took considerable work to locate his relatives, who were in Milwaukee.

Families of men in service appealed to him for all sorts of assistance, and on one occasion when two men called to the colors and dreaded leaving because their parents had no fuel in the house, the Mayor had to find a way to get it. He offered to give them half of the supply in his cellar but this was prohibited by the rules of the fuel administration and might open him to the "pro-German" accusation. Eventually he was able to divert to the desired goal a wagon load of coal intended for a friend of his who still had a ton or two on hand. Upon another when the fuel administrator wanted all city teams for hauling coal, there was quite an argument as to whether it would be of any use to utilize them thus until they had been used to haul enough snow from the istreets to allow coal wagons to travel. Finally the teams

When the first thrift stamp campaign started, the state directors proposed that high school students conduct the drive. The boys and girls had just finished a drive for the Red Cross and Mayor Thiesen protested against keeping them from their studies again. He said that as it was desired to subscribe more than a million dollars it would be better to have an adult committee and he offered to take the chairmanship. The state officers would not give up their idea, however, and the school chilidren were enlisted. In the course of this. Mayor Thiesen was denounced as pro-German by a Milwaukee newspaper because of his opposition to the scheme. It aroused lots of talk and much bitterness. However, the results vindicated his stand as it was necessary to get the grown-ups at work to make the campaign a success.

The mayor had other disagreeable experiences whenever the city outlined any policy, such as discontinuing construction, etc. Whatever decision touched the pocketbooks of some class of people, gave cause for criticism and charges which sounded very bad in wartime. Mr. Thiesen's former residence in Germany made his position particularly difficult, and the fact tiiat he was able to conclude his administration without doing anything which would subject him to criticism founded upon cool consideration of the circumstances is greatly to his credit.

One of his final acts as mayor was the supervising of the armistice celebration, and his responsibilities on that day were not light, in view of the exuberance of spirits of the citizens. As an example of the mayor's duties in those days, it is recalled that on the armistice day. he had to arrange for the departure of two draft contingents in the morning while he was also considering petitions of ministers and others asking that saloons be kept closed all day. Seeing no authority for closing the saloons, he delegated men to help keep the crowds moving all day and provide attractions to keep them outdoors. By night everyone was so tired from the long celebration that they went home shortly after the supper hour. The firts word of the signing of the armistice came to Mayor Thiesen in the form of a telegram from the Chicago Herald-Examiner, and after he had verified it by a message from Washington he ordered all whistles to be blown and bells rung. This was at 4 a. m., November 11th.

find such a boat listed. Inquiries were made quietly among the Americans, and someone was found who thought that "Wadsworth" was the name of a boat to which a friend of his in the Navy had recently been assigned as purser. Then, in violation of Admiralty orders, the Orduna's wii'eless sending apparatus was unsealed and a message flashed out to the Wadsworth asking the name of her purser. Back came the answer, confirming the conjecture. The Orduna turned back into her course, and next morning, on the edge of the new graveyard of the Atlantic, the Wadsworth came bobbing over the horizon.

After landing in Liverpool on May 18, the men of Base Hospital No. 4 electrified little groups of English civilians by a rapid march through the streets from the dock to the Yorkshire and Lancashire railroad station, but the secrecy of the arrival was maintained until London newspapers were allowed bi'iefly to note the occasion when the unit was given a tremendous welcoming at Blackpool, the Atlantic City of the British Isles.

During June a few combat troops arrived in France. These were small detachments of the Regular ai'my. Eventually all the Regulars were organized into regiments and brigades in France and by adding a brigade of Marines, two divisions of about 20,000 men each, were organized. These were the First and Second divisions, the Marine brigade being a part of the Second. When the new tables of organization were prepared to make our units more like those of the French and British aiTnies, other contingents were added, most of the new men being trained soldiers from National Guard divisions. The ultimate number of men included in a division was about 27,000. Infantry companies were increased to 250 men. Ten companies constituted a regiment, and two regiments a brigade. A division consisted of two infantry brigades, one artillery brigade consisting of three regiments, a battalion of engineers, a signal corps battalion, a trench mortar company, a quartermaster company, two or three ambulance companies, a field hospital, medical detachments assigned to each combat regiment, machine gun companies, bakeiy companies, headquarters companies and a few other organizations necessary to making a division a self-supporting unit in the field. Balloon companies and aerial squadrons were occasionally attached to divisions but more often functioned in connection with corps or ai-my headquarters. The same is ti-ue of railroad and forestry regiments, intelligence departments, heavy artillery, mobile repair shops.

divisions, were perf"ected in the field in the spring of 1918. The American First anny was in action as a unit in the late summer of 1918. The Second army was formed just before the ai-mistice was signed, and was preparing for a drive through Lorraine. The size of a corps and an army was not a rigid matter. Generally a corps included about 100,000 men, and an army might include from .300,000 to .500,000 or 600,000. All of these units were much larger than ever before in American history, and they were supposed to be kept in full strength by the providing of replacements as rapidly as the ranks of any company or regiment were depleted. This system was a vast improvement over former methods. In the Civil war, for instance, the normal strength of a company was 100 men and of a regiment, 1,000 men. But due to the depletion from death and disease, a company would often be in the field for months with only twenty-five or thirty men answering to roll call, and a regiment which had been in action a few times could seldom muster as many effectives as an infantry company had present continuously during the recent conflict.

The war upset completely all the previous estimates as to the length of time it requires army hostilities to train soldiers in large numbers. While most military text books and critics had maintained that an efficient soldier required two years of intensive training, in this war the average American soldier who went to France received six months of training in the United States before he sailed and but two more months of training in France before he went into the battle line. This fact is deduced from a study of data on the training of the 1,400,000 men who actually fought in France. One month in a quiet sector before entering battle was also a part of the average experience of America's fighting men.

War Record of A. E. F. Divisions - How lon^ tliey trained, \\o\v long tliey fouglit ; A comparative Study of the character of service rendered by Regular, National Guard and National in June, 1918, cut down the average training period of the American soldier. After the starting of the drive in March American divisions were rushed to France after they had been filled out with best trained men, no matter where they could be obtained. Divisions called to France in July had to meet numerical shortages vdth men called to the colors in the spring. By November the average of training in the United States had been cut to four months, and the average for the whole five months preceding the armistice probably was five months.

After reaching Fi-ance men on the average received two months' training before entering the front lines, but this period was cut greatly for men in certain divisions which were made replacement outfits. At replacement centers in France a part of the effort made to prevent untrained men being sent to the front consisted in picking out the less skilled and putting them through a ten-day course of intensive rifle and bayonet work.

The infantry soldier was trained in the division, which was our typical combat unit. Training and sorting organizations of about 10,000 men, known as depot bi'igades, were also utilized, but as far as possible the recruits were put almost immediately into the divisions which wei'e the organizations in which they would go into action.

Before the signing of the armistice there were trained and sent overseas forty-two American divisions. The training of twelve more was well advanced, and there were four others that were being organized. The plans on which the army was acting called for eighty divisions overseas before July, 1919, and 100 divisions by the end of that year.

To carry forward the training progi-am, shelter was constructed in a few months for 1,800,000 men. For the national guard and national army divisions, sixteen camps and sixteen cantonments were built in America.

About 4,000,000 men served in the army of the United States during the war (April 6, 1917, to Nov. 11, 1918). The total of men serving in the armed forces of the country, including the army and navy, the marine corps, and the other services, amounted to 4,800,000. It was almost true that among each 100 American citizens five took up arms in defense of the country.

During the civil war 2,400,000 men served in the northern armies or in the navy. In that struggle ten in each 100 inhabitants of the northern states served as soldiers or sailors. The American effort in the war with Germany may be compared with that of the northern states in the civil war by noting that in the present war we raised twice as many men in actual numbers, but that in propoi'tion to the population we raised only half as many.

More than 500,000 came in through the regular army. Almost 400,000 more, or nearly 10 per cent, entered through the National Guard. Jlore than three-quarters of all came in through the selective service or National army enlistments. Of every 100 men ten were National guardsmen, thirteen were regulars and seventy-seven belonged to the national army, or would have if the services had not been consolidated and the distinctions wiped out on Aug. 7, 1918.

About 200,000 commissioned officers were required for the army. Of this number, less than 9,000 were in the federal service at the beginning of the war. Of these, 5,791 were regulars and 3,199 wei'e officers of the national guard in the federal service.

Figures show that of every six officers one had had previous military training in the regular army, the national guard, or the ranks. Three received the training for their commissions in the officers' training camps. The other two went from civilian life into the army with little or no military training. In this last group the majority were physicians, a few of them were ministers, and most of the rest were men of special business or technical equipment, who were taken into the supply service or staff corps.

When combat troops first arrived in France, it was deemed advisable to let them learn something about the methods used in this war, from actual observation. For this reason after each division had spent a couple of months in training camps to receive instruction from French and British officers, they generally were sent into comparatively quiet sectors in Alsace-Lorraine to get their first experience in the trenches. It was especially important that they learn how to execute relief of troops in ti-enches at night, and how to carry out raids and scouting expeditions through No Man's land. The Americans, most of whom had read everything ever written on these subjects and had practiced the movements in training camps, felt ready for any sort of battle after a few days of the trench experience. Incidentally, most of them determined they never would remain stationary in those muddy, smelly, vennin-infested trenches if they could obtain permission to attack and advance the lines.

the American troops as individuals were ready to fight and win long- before they were permitted to attempt it. High officers, particularly the European commanders, simply would not believe that soldiers could be made in such short time and they were terribly afraid that a defeat to the Americans might upset the growing morals of the Europeans, who wei'e depending entii-ely upon our ultimate strength.

The newly commissioned American officers probably would have benefited from a longer course of training, but the line officers were generally able to handle small units efficiently in battle, and the intelligence of the American soldier was such that no such leadership was required for them as was needed in European armies.

Some American officers and detachments, particularly the higher staff officers, visited the various fronts during the summer of 1917, but it was October 21, 1917, when the first Yankee artillery and infantry took their places at the fi'ont as units, under the direction of French and British officers. They had "gone in" near Seichepi'ey, in a quiet sector. On January 19, 1918, the First division took over this Toul district as an exclusively American sector. On Sept. 12, 1918, the same division went over the top near the same spot at the beginning of the successful St. Mihiel battle.

In June, 1918, the Thirty-second division went into the trenches east of Belfort in Alsace, and from that time on, the Alsacian sector which had been ruled by Germany since 1871 became another American headquarters to hold during the war.

The First division was completely organized during the winter of 1917-18 and functioned as a combat division at Cantigny on May 28, when this town was captured from the Germans in a brief but bitter night battle. Previous to this it had been in one or two minor defensive operations. The Twenty-sixth division had repelled a German raid in strength at Seicheprey in April. Scattering Yankee medical detachments had been with the British at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917.

Up to the first of June, 1918, the American casualty lists remained quite small, as neither side desired a battle during the winter, and while the Allies were waiting the completion of the American army the Germans were quietly preparing for a huge offensive which they hoped would bring them victory early in 1918. For a time it seemed as if they might succeed.

the imperial great general staff' sought to break the allied line and end the war. These five drives took place in five successive months, beginning in March. Each drive was so timed as to take advantage of the light of the moon for that month.

The first drive opened March 21, on a fifty mile front across the old battlefield of the Sonime. In seventeen days of fighting the Germans advanced their lines beyond Moyon and Montdidier and were within twelve miles of the important railroad centers of Amiens with its great stores of British supplies. In this battle, also known as the Picardy offensive, British and French troops were engaged.

The attack upon Amiens had been but partly checked when the enemy struck again to the north in the Armentieres sector and advanced seventeen miles up the valley of the Lys. A small number of Americans, serving with the British, participated in the Lys offensive.

For the next attack (May 27) the Germans selected the French front along the Chemin des Dames, noi'th of Aisne. The line from Rheims to a little east of Moyon was forced back. Soissons fell, and on May 31 the enemy had reached the Marne valley, down which he was advancing in the dii'ection of Paris. At this critical moment our Second division, together with elements of the Third and Twentyeighth divisions, were thrown into the line. By blocking the German advance at Chateau- Thierry, they rendered great assistance in stopping perhaps the most dangerous of the German drives. The Second division not only halted the enemy on its front, but also recaptui'ed from him the strong tactical positions of Bouresches, Belleau Wood and Vaux.

The enemy had by his offensive established two salients threatening Paris. He now sought to convert them into one by a fourth terrible blow delivered on a front of twenty-two miles from Montdidier and Noyon. The reinfoi'ced French army resisted firmly and the attack was halted for an initial advance of about six miles. Throughout this opei-ation (June 9-15) the extreme left line of the salient was defended by our First division. Even before the drive began the division had demonstrated the fighting qualities of our troops by capturing and holding the town of Cantigny (May 28).

There followed a month of comparative quiet, during which the enemy reassembled his forces for the fifth onslaught. On July 15 he attacked simultaneously on both sides of Rheims, the eastern corner of the salient he had created in the Aisne drive. To the east of the city he gained little. On the west he crossed the Marne, but made slight progress. His path was everywhere blocked. In this battle 85,000 American troops were engaged - the Forty-second division to the extreme east of Champagne, and the Third and Twentyeighth to the west, near Chateau-Thierry.

The turning point of the war had come. The great German offensives had been stopped. The initiative now passed from Ludendorff to Marshal Foch, and a series of allied offensives began, destined to roll back the German armies beyond the French frontier. In this continuous allied offensive there may be distinguished six phases of major operations in which the American expeditionary forces took part. In four of the six operations the American troops engaged were acting in support of allied divisions and under the command of the generals of the allies.

The moment chosen by Marshal Foch for launching the first counter-offensive was on July 18, when it was clear that the German Champagne-Marne drive had spent its force. The place chosen was the uncovered west flank of the German salient from the Aisne to the Marne. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second American divisions, together with selected French troops, were employed. When the operation was completed (Aug. 6) the salient had been flattened out and the allied line I'an from Soissons to Rheims along the Vesle.

Two days later the British struck at the Somme salient, initiating an offensive which, with occasional breathing spells, lasted to the date of the armistice. American participation in this operation was intermittent. From Aug. 8 to 20 elements of the Thirty-third division, which had been brigaded for training with the Australians, were in line and took part in the capture of Chipilly ridge. Later the Twentyseventh and Thirtieth divisions, who served throughout with the British, were brought over from the Ypres sector and used in company with Australian ti-oops to break the Hindenbui'g line at the tunnel of the St. Quentin canal (Sept. 20-Oct. 20).

In the meantime simultaneous assaults were in progress at other points on the front. On Aug. 18, Gen. Mangin began the Oise-Aisne phase of the great allied offensive. Starting from Soissons-Rheims line, along which they had come to rest on Aug. 6, the French armies advanced by successive stages to Aisne, to Laon, and on Nov. 11 were close to the frontier. In the first stages of this advance they were assisted by the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second and Twenty-seventh American divisions, but by Sept. 15 all of these were withdrawn for the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive of the American army.

The day after the opening of the Oise-Aisne offensive the British launched the first of a series of attacks in the Ypres sector which continued with some interruptions to the time of the armistice and may be tenned the 'Ypres- Lys offensive.' Four American divisions at different times participated in this operation. The Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth were engaged in the recapture of Mount Kemmel from Aug. 31 to Sept. 2. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first were withdrawn from the Meuse- Argonne battle and dispatched to Belgium, where they took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys offensive (Oct. 31 to Nov. 11).

With the organization of the American first army on Aug. 10, under the personal command of Gen. Pershing, the history of the American Expeditionary forces entered upon a new stage. The St. Mihiel (Sept. 12-16) and Meuse-Argonne (Sept. 26-Nov. 11) offensives were major operations planned and executed by American generals and American troops.

In addition to the twelve operations above mentioned, American troops participated in the battle of Vittorio-Veneto (Oct. 24 to Nov. 4), which ended in the rout of the Austrian army in Italy.

The first distinctly American offensive was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient carried through from Sept. 12 to Sept. 15, largely by American troops and wholly under the orders of the American commander-in-chief.

The attack began at 5 a. m., after four hours of artillery preparation of great severity, and met with immediate success. Before noon about half the distance between the bases of the salient had been covered and the next morning troops of the First and Twenty-sixth divisions met at Vigneulles, cutting off the salient within twenty-four hours from the beginning of the movement.

Two comparisons between this operation and the battle of Gettysburg emphasize the magnitude of the action. About 550,000 Americans were engaged at St. Mihiel; the union forces at Gettysburg numbered approximately 100,- 000. St. Mihiel set a record for concentration of artillery fire by a four-hour artillery preparation, consuming moi'e than 1,000,000 rounds

The St. Mihiel offensive cost only about 7,- 000 casualties, less than one-third the union losses at Gettysburg. There were captured 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. A dangerous enemy salient was reduced and American commanders and troops demonstrated their ability to plan and execute a big American operation. The object of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, said Gen. Pershing in his report of Nov. 20, 1918, was "to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them." This sentence expresses better than any long description not only the object but also the outcome of the battle. Every available American division was thrown against the enemy. Every available German division was thi'own in to meet them. At the end of forty-seven days of continuous battle our divisions had consumed the German divisions.

The goal of the American attack was the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, the main line of supply for the German forces on the major part of the western front. If this line were cut, a retirement on the whole front would be forced. This retirement would include, moreover, evacuation of the Briey iron fields, which the Germans had been using to great advantage to supplement their iron supply. The defense of the positions threatened was therefore of such importance as to warrant the most desperate measures for resistance. When the engagement was evidently impending the commander of the German Fifth army sent word to his forces, calling on them for unyielding resistance and pointing out that defeat in this engagement might mean disaster for the fatherland.

On the first day, the twenty-sixth of September, and the next day or two after that, the lines were considerably advanced. Then the resistance became more stubborn. Each side threw in more and more of its man power until there were no more reserves. Many German divisions went into action twice, and not a few three times, until, through losses, they were far under strength. All through the month of October the attrition went on. Foot by foot American troops pushed back the best of the German divisions. On Nov. 1 the last stage of the offensive began. The enemy power began to break. American troops forced their way to the east bank of the Meuse. Toward the north they made even more rapid progress, and in the seven days reached the outskirts of Sedan and cut the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, making the German line untenable.

In the meantime (Oct. 2 to 28) our Second and Thirty-sixth divisions had been sent west to assist the French who were advancing in Champagne beside our drive in the Argonne. The liaison detachment between the two armies was for a time furnished by the Ninety-second division.

The battle of the Meuse-Argonne was beyond compare the greatest ever fought by American troops, and there have been few, if any, greater battles in the history of the world.

The aggressive tactics of the Americans and their constant superiority over the German soldiers are shown easily enough by the bare facts that no American unit ever lost a foot of ground which was not regained within twenty-four hours; that practically every American division which was in action at all had to its credit a considerable advance made against actual opposition by the enemy; that the American army gained every objective laid out for it by the high command, and while it had heavy casualties due to being constantly on the offensive, the American army lost only 2,082 prisoners as opposed to more than 60,000 captured from the enemy. Fully as significant, is the fact that the number of German dead

During their operations in France, there never was a time when any American soldier felt any doubt, or had any real reason to have any doubt, as to his superiority over the German soldiers.

"The total battle deaths in the recent war were greater than all the deaths in all wars for more than 100 years previous," says Col. Leonard P. Ayi'es in "The War With Germany."

"Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors, who sei'ved in the world war, two were killed or died of disease during the period of hostilities.

"Russian battle deaths were thii'ty-four times as heavy as those of the United States, those of Germany thirty-two times as great, the French twenty-eight times, and the British eighteen times as large.

"The number of American lives lost at home and abroad was 122,.500, of which about 10,000 were in the navy, and the rest in the army and the marines attached to it.

"Of each 100 cases of venereal disease record in the United States, ninety-six were contracted before entering the army and only four afterwards.

Corrected figures a year after the war ended showed that the army abroad and marine corps units attached, had a total of 116,492 killed and 205,690 wounded, a total of 322,182. These figures include losses to army and marine units on all fronts. Killed in action totaled 35, .585, or 11 per cent of the entii'e list; died of wounds, 14,742; died of disease, 58,073;

Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000, and of these 1,390,000 saw service at the front.

Of the forty-two divisions that reached Fi'ance twenty-nine took part in active combat service. Seven of them were regular army divisions, eleven were organized from the national guard and ele^'en made up of national army troops.

On the first of April the Germans had a superiority of 324,000 in rifle strength. Due to American arrivals the allied strength exceeded that of the Germans in June and was more than 600,000 above it in November.

In the battle of St. Mihiel 550,000 Americans were engaged, as compared with about 100,000 on the northern side in the battle of Gettysburg. The artillery fired more than 1,000,000 shells in four hours, which is the most intense concentration of artillery recorded in history.

seventeen miles, nearly all of it against desperate enemy resistance. They captured 63,- 000 prisoners, 1,378 pieces of artillery, 708 trench mortars, and 9,650 machine guns.

In June and July the American army helped to shatter the enemy advance toward Paris and to turn retreat into a triumphant offensive. At St. Mihiel they pinched off in a day an enemy salient which had been a constant menace to the French line for four years. In the Argonne and on the Meuse they carried lines which the enemy was determined to hold at any cost, and cut the enemy lines of communication and supply for half the western battle front.

American troops saw sei'vice on practically every stretch of the western front from British lines in Belgium to inactive sectors in the Vosges. On Oct. 21, 1917, Americans entered the lino in the quiet Toul sector. From that date to the armistice American units were somewhere in the line continuously.