Madison County, Illinois - Chapter 39: The Alton School Case, 1912

This celebrated case involved the constitu- ' tional rights of colored children to attend the same public schools as the whites. The issue involved was an important one. The suit was commented on all over the country and the de¬ cision thereon formed a precedent. In telling the story I shall be guided as to the facts by the final brief of Col. J. J. Brenholt of Alton and the decision of the supreme court. Colonel Brenholt was the attorney for the colored people through all the eleven years of litiga¬ tion which followed the institution of legal proceedings. This brief and argument were on "the original petition for mandamus" brought in the supreme court of the state at the February term, 1908, which eventuated in the granting of "a peremptory writ of manda¬ mus according to the prayer of the petition."

For many years the colored children of Al¬ ton, of school age, had attended all depart¬ ments of the public schools, but in the years 1896-7 a scheme was concocted by the city authorities, abetted by rrtany patrons of the schools, to shut out the colored children from all public schools below and including the eighth grade, and provide separate schools for their accommodation. This was done in the face of the state law which provides that "all boards of education, school directors, or school officers, whose duty it now is or may hereafter be to provide within their respective jurisdictions, schools for the education of children between the ages of six and twentyone years, are prohibited from excluding, di¬ rectly or indirectly, any such child from such school on account of the color of such child."

At the time the exclusion scheme was con¬ ceived the city was divided into five school dis¬ tricts, under a special charter, the children in each district being required to attend the school located in such district. To annul these limitations the ordinance dividing the city into such districts was repealed and a new ordi¬ nance adopted making the entire city a school district. In furtherance of the scheme, and as a part thereof, the erection of two new school houses was ordered so that the three hundred colored children of school age might be forced to attend them without regard to place of residence within the lines of the old districts. The new buildings were designated, with grim irony, the (Fred.) Douglass and Lovejoy schools, and orders were issued by the authorities that all colored children, under and including the eighth grade, must attend the new schools, it being promised that they would receive the same instruction, in the various grades, as formerly in the other schools. It was later placed in evidence that the opening of the public schools in Septem¬ ber, 1897, was postponed for the sake of com¬ pleting the Douglass and Lovejoy schools. It was also in evidence that when the schools were opened the police force of the city of Al- ton was engaged for from two to three weeks in standing at the doors of the public school houses, except the Douglass and Love joy schools, and driving back the colored children of school age into the street and directing them to attend the Douglass or Lovejoy school, and, at the same time, permitting the white chil¬ dren to pass in. The colored people resisted this action of the City Council and Board of Education and filed a petition in the supreme court to compel the authorities to permit the attendance of the colored children in the white schools, nearest their place of residence as heretofore. The petition for a writ of man¬ damus was in the name of Scott Bibb who in October, 1897, sued to compel the city to admit his children to the Washington school, with¬ in two blocks of his house, the same being the school and district where they formerly at¬ tended, whereas the next nearest of the colored schools was fourteen blocks from his resi¬ dence. The suit which followed was entitled "The People vs. the Mayor and Council of the City of Alton." The colored people raised a fund to prosecute the suit and employed Gen. John M. Palmer, Springfield, and Colonel Brenholt as their attorneys. General Palmer died before engaging actively in the case and the burden fell upon the junior counsel who prosecuted it through eleven years of bitter litigation to a final successful termination in the supreme court, there being, during the prosecution, eight different lawyers pitted against him, in addition to the city counselor.

The brief and argument of Colonel Bren¬ holt, in the final hearing, are fully reflected in the review of the case by the supreme court which is quoted below in part : "This proceeding was commenced by the filing in this court, in pursuance of leave granted for that purpose, of the petition of Scott Bibb for a writ of mandamus commanding the Mayor and City Council of the city of Alton to admit Minnie Bibb and Ambrose Bibb, chil¬ dren of the relator, to the Washington school, or the most convenient of the public schools of said city, without excluding them, or either of them, on account of their color or descent. Issues of fact were made up and certified to the circuit court of Madison county for trial. This was done in the exercise of discretion as to the mode of trial and for the purpose of making the practice conform as nearly as practicable, to that adopted in similar cases in trial courts, although the provisions of the statute regulating practice have no application to proceedings in this court. No rule has been established concerning the method of trying issues of fact in mandamus cases, and the court has generally adopted the practice of certifying such issues to a trial court, with a direction to return a verdict to this court.

"The issues in this case have been tried seven times by juries in the circuit court, and in two of them the juries disagreed. Upon the first where there was a verdict it was in favor of the respondents, and it was certified to this court. That verdict was set aside for manifest error prejudicial to the relator in the rulings of the court in the admission of evidence. There was another trial resulting in a verdict in favor of the respondents, which was set aside on account of a misdirection of the court in submitting to the jury a question of law. Upon another trial there was a third verdict in favor of the respondents, which this court set aside because clearly contrary to the facts proved and without any support in the evidence. It was proved at that trial, beyond dispute or controversy, that the re- . spondents were guilty of the charge contained in the petition, and the evidence introduced by them had no tendency to prove that the inten¬ tion clearly manifested by their acts did not exist. The verdict could only be accounted for as the product of passion, prejudice or hostil¬ ity to the law." spondents says we ought to approve this ver¬ dict for the reason that the question of fact has been tried seven times in the circuit court; that the juries have twice disagreed and five juries have decided in favor of the re¬ spondents, and all the trials have been pre¬ sided over by learned judges.

"We should be remiss in our duty to en¬ force the law and would forfeit the respect of all law-abiding citizens if we should ap¬ prove this verdict for no other reason than because it is one of a series which represent, not the enforcement of law or the discharge of duty, but a deplorable disregard for the law and for the rights of. citizens.

The court then argues this question and concludes that the effort to obtain a fair trial before a jury has been utterly futile and there¬ fore that the issues will not be again certified to the trial court but will now be finally dis¬ posed of.

"We therefore find that all the material facts alleged in the petition are true as therein stated and that the relator is entitled to a writ of mandamus as therein prayed, and it is there¬ fore ordered that a peremptory writ of man¬ damus issue according to the prayer of the petition, that the respondents pay the costs, and that execution issue therefor."

The above opinion was delivered by Jus¬ tice Cartwright for the majority of the court. Justices Scott and Farmer dissented, and said, in part: "We regard the opinions filed in this case prior to the foregoing as correctly stating the law. We dissent from the judgment now entered because we believe this court is without power to render that judgment in the absence of the verdict of a jury in favor of the relator, and we do not join in the criticisms of judges and jurors found in the majority opinion.

the judges who preside in the circuit courts of that county, as unfitted by prejudice to try the questions of fact that have been certified to that court, this court possesses the undoubted power to make an order submitting the same issues for trial to the circuit court of any other county in the State."

Thus ended the long-drawn out litigation. In the opinion of the majority of the supreme court the verdicts in the circuit court were "the offspring of passion and prejudice," and not creditable to the trial juries nor to certain judges. But now as to the practical results of the protracted litigation: When the final decision was rendered the children of Scott Bibb, the relator, had attained to adult years and the decision of the supreme court was of no benefit to them. It is true the decision also meant that no colored children can be ex¬ cluded from the public schools on account of color ; but the race affected in Alton has not availed itself of its rights under the decision. The colored children still attend the Lovejoy and Douglass schools, set apart for them, ex¬ cept those who have passed the eighth grade who are admitted to the High School. At first the attendance at the colored schools was small, but as the litigation wore tediously on with no prospect of speedy termination, the colored people, weary of the struggle, lost heart, and rather than that their children should fail of an education, sent them to the prescribed schools where the attendance is now about normal, with colored teachers in charge. Notwithstanding the final decision of the high¬ est tribunal in their favor the actual status of the colored children in the schools is prac¬ tically that provided for them by the City Council and Board of Education, eleven years ago, in direct contravention of the law. It shows the strength of popular prejudice and also indicates that no law is stronger than popular sentiment as regards its practical en¬ forcement. It must be admitted that many good friends of the colored race, as well as those less friendly, hold that it is for the best interest of both races that their children be educated separately. They also claim that the separation gives colored pupils an incentive to pursue the higher studies and thus become qualified for teachers, as the existence of colored schools furnishes them with openings and positions they could not otherwise obtain. All of which is true, at the same time the alleged advantages do not satisfy the law.

There is another reason why, after the de¬ cision of the supreme court in their favor, the colored people made no attempt to send their children to the white schools. It has been a hidden chapter, never made public, but which the historian has no right to ignore. Briefly told it is this : About the time the decision of the supreme court was rendered, the terrible race riots at Springfield took place with their accompaniments of murder, bloodshed and destruction of property, and for which the city of Springfield has just paid out over $36,000 in settlement of damage suits brought against it. In view of the fearful outrages at the state capital, the result of passion and prejudice, the leaders of the colored men in Alton, be¬ lieving that the majority of the populace was still hostile to the coeducation of the races, advised their people to make no effort to take advantage of the supreme court's decision in their favor but to submit quietly to existing conditions, fearing a similar outbreak to that at Springfield if they attempted to send their children to the white schools. The advice was taken, the existing status of the colored chil¬ dren remained unchanged and the victory in court was a barren one. It is hardly conceiv¬ able that such an outbreak would have taken place, the races in Alton, having dwelt together in amity, but the spectre of the Springfield riots hung over the colored leaders and they counseled prudence and submission. I have recorded the facts. It is not probable that had the colored children attempted to enter the white schools, under the provisions of the man¬ damus, that the city authorities would have made any resistance. It was popular prejudice that they feared. It will be for the future historian to record whether that decision ever became effective in Madison county. Other state enactments are also ignored especially in the case of the state liquor laws and that with the connivance of county and municipal authorities.