Delaware County, Indiana - Chapter 4, 1881

Expedition of Gen. Harmar against the Miumis - His Defeat and its Consequences - St. Clair's Expedition and Defeat - Disasters Attending Wayne's EHxpedition and Victory - Indians Demoralized - T reat Sor Peace.

ROM the date of the failure of Pontiac's conspiracy until the commencement and during the progress of the American Revolution, but little more than local protection was afforded the frontier settlements against the depredations of Western Indians. Indeed, it was a part of the policy of the British Government to maintain an alliance with belligerent tribes, for the purpose of using them, when opportunity offered, in its offensive warfare against the colonists. It was not until the close of the Revolution, the success of the colonial arms and the establishment of a permanent government by the people of the United States, that any formidable movement was inaugurated against them, notwithstanding frequent and startling incidents of merciless Indian warfare were common. When, however, the machinery of government was put into operation, and the power to meet force with force, if need be, was adequately established, - President Washington called tlie attention of Congress to the necessity of effective measures in the premises. At first a pacific policy was adopted, and all reasonable means to establish and maintain the same applied, but without satisfactory results. Hence, Washington, in his message of the 8th of January, 1790, directed the attention of Congress to the matter, using this language: "There was reason to hope that the pacific measures adopted with regard to certain hostile tribes of Indians, would have relieved the inhabitants of our Southern and Western frontiers from their depredations ; but you will be laid before you [comprehending a communication from the Commonwealth of Virginia], that we ought to be prepared to afford protection to those parts of the Union," and, if necessary, to punish the aggressors." Again, in his second annual message, on the 8th of December, in the same year, he submitted the following : |

"Tt has been heretofore known to Congress that frequent incursions have been made on our frontier settlements by certain banditti of Indians from the northwest side of the Ohio. These, with some of the tribes dwelling on and near the Wabash, have of late been particularly active in- their depredations, and, being emboldened by the impunity of their crimes, and aided by such parts of the neighboring tribes as could be seduced to join in their hostilities or afford them a retreat for their prisoners and plunder, have, instead of listening to the humane invitations and overtures made on the part of the United States, renewed their violences with fresh alacrity and greater effect."

"These aggravated provocations rendered it essential to the safety of the Western settlements, that the aggressors should be made sensible that the Government of the Union is not less capable of punishing their crimes than it is could not be effected by defensive measures, it became necessary to put in force the act which empowers the President to call out the militia for the protection of the frontier. I have, accordingly, authorized an expedition in which -

Pursuant to the authority above referred to, Gen. Harmar, having been placed in chief command of the expedition, left Fort Washington on the 4th of October, 1790, at the head of the army, the route being to the northward, bearing to the northeast, passing the Indian village of Chillicothe, on the Little Miami, on the 6th. From there, the route lay to the northward and westward, in 'the direction of the Miami towns at the head of the Maumee. On the 14th of October, when about thirty miles from the objective point, Col. Hardin, with one company of regulars and 600 militia, was detached from the main army and sent forward to reconnoiter the position of the Indians, their number and apparent intentions.

vacated it a short time previously. In the meantime, however, the main body of the army, having pursued the regular line of march, arrived on the morning of the 17th, and crossed the Maumee to the village above, at the junction of the St. Joseph's with this stream. Then the destruction of the village commenced, and before the 21st the destruction was complete, the chief town and five subordinate villages, with nearly twenty thousand bushels of corn found in the vicinity, had been reduced to ashes.

A general reconnaissance of the surrounding neighborhood having been determined upon to ascertain the whereabouts of the absconded savages, Gen.

isfactory to the General-in-Chief. On the morning of the following day, Gen. Trotter's command was transferred to Col. Hardin, with instructions as on

Indian trail, bearing to the northwestward, in the direction of the Kickapoo village. A halt was called, when about five miles from the head of the Maumee, and positions assigned to different divisions, anticipating an attack, but, none being made, the detachment moved forward about three miles, when two Indians were discovered on foot. These escaped unhurt, owing to the thick underbrush 'surrounding, though a gun had been fired at them. A little further on, a more formidable body of Indians were discovered with camp-fires in front of them. A fire was at once opened by these Indians upon Col. Hardin's detachment, which, without waiting to return the fire, hastily retreated with great loss, the regulars alone remaining to continue the fight against fearful odds. The result was most digastrous. © his line of march back in the direction of Fort Washington, after much persuasion, induced the commanding General to give him another opportunity to vindicate himself, by sending him back to the site of the village just destroyed. Accordingly, though Gen. Harmar was unwilling to try further experiments, having already suffered greatly, he received an order for a special detachment of 340 militia, of which forty were mounted, and sixty regular troops, the former to be commanded by himself, and the latter by Maj. Wyllys. The detachment marched immediately, forming in three columns, the regulars in the center, commanded by Capt. Asheton, with Maj. Wyllys and Col. Hardin in front, the militia forming the right and left. The Maumee was reached about sunrise on the morning of the 22d, when the spies, discovering the enemy on the opposite side of the river, reported to Maj. Wyllys, who halted the regulars, and gave his orders and plan of attack to the militia in front, with the commanding officers of the several divisions. These orders, however, were not generally communicated, leaving those uninformed officers in doubt. Divisions were sent to the left with instructions to cross the St: Mary's in rear of the village, and to the right; crossing the Maumee at the old ford in advance of the - regulars, to cut off the retreat of the Indians below the village, while the center was to move forward, cross the Maumee near the same point, ands attack the enemy in front. Premature firing from the division sent to the Re of the village disarranged the order of attack, and the Indians, being apprise of the situatidn, attacked the entire body almost simultaneously, and forced the*center an inferior force, were unable to afford any assistance in repelling the principal attacking force of the enemy. The engagement was short, sharp and decisive, the slaughter terrible. The loss to the whites was 183 killed and 31 wounded. The Indian loss was not so great.

The failure of the expedition of Gen. Harmar against the Wabash Indians naturally induced a continuance of the hostile spirit manifested by the savages of that locality, and, indeed, of the whole territory northwest of the Ohio. The leaders of these hostile bands, whenever opportunity offered, never failed to exereise their warlike propensity. Hence, the Government of the United States found it necessary to adopt other measures for the relief of the frontier settlements. Accordingly, Gov. St. Clair was directed to prepare for such defense with all possible dispatch. Hence, on the 28th of March, 1791, he left Philadelphia and proceeded thence to Pittsburgh, arriving there on the 16th of April following. From Pittsburgh he repaired to Lexington, Ky., where he remained a few days and departed for Fort Washington, arriving "there on the 15th of May. The garrison at the latter point consisted then of seventy-nine commissioned officers and privates fit for duty. At Fort Harmar, "the garrison consisted of forty-five, rank and file; at Fort Steuben, there were sixty-one regulars; and at Fort Knox eighty-three." On the 15th of July following, the whole of the First Regiment of United States Infantry, " amounting to 299 non-commissioned officers and privates, arrived at Fort Washington, under orders from Gov. St. Clair, Commander-in-Chief." This force was subsequently increased under act of Congress to raise the number of regulars to complete the quota, drawn principally from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.

- Karly in September, the army took up its line of march in the direction of the Miami towns at the head of the Maumee; halting on the site where Fort Recovery was afterward erected. On the 3d of November, the army, consisting of about fourteen hundred effective men, enéamped on the head-waters of the Wabash, among a number of small creeks. The right flank lay in front» of a creek about twelve yards wide, and constituted the 'first line, while the - left wing formed the second line. Between these two lines there was a space of about seventy yards, which was all the situation would allow. © The right flank was supposed to be protected by the creek, while the left was covered by» a steep bank, a corps of cavalry and some pickets. The militia passed over the creek and encamped in two lines about one quarter of a mile in advance of the main army. Snow was on the ground, and two rows of fires were made between Butler's and Darke's lines, with two: rows -also "between the lines of the militia. wee : |

At the same time, and while the army was thus encamped, Little Turtle and Buckongahelas, with other chiefs of less distinction, with about twelve hundred warriors, were lying only a few miles distant, awaiting a favorable opportunity to commence the attack. This opportunity was presented about 4 o'clock on the morning of the next day, and the attack was made accordingly, with a suddenness and effect seldom equaled, just as the army had been dismissed from parade ina state bordering on disorganization. The résult was a most sanguinary and disastrous defeat to the white people, the details of which were almost incredible in the degree of barbarous atrocity. The loss was stated to have been thirty-nine officers killed, and 593 men killed and missing. The wounded, twenty-two officers and 240 men. The loss of the Indians did not exceed 150 killed and wounded. |

The Government, then, in view of the situation, seeing that a larger, better-_ provided and better-disciplined army was necessary to give confidence to the

'When the outlines of a re-organization had been fully matured, Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne, a native of Chester County, Penn., was placed in chief. command, Gen. St. Clair having resigned. Gen. Wayne at once proceeded to arrange preliminaries in such manner as to insure the most auspicious results.

the enemy were in full force in front, in possession of their favorite ground and endeavoring to turn our left flank. I therefore gave orders for the second line to advance and support the first, and directed Major General Scott to gain and _ turn the right flank of the savages, with the whole of the mounted yolunteers by a circuitous route; at the same time I ordered the front line to advance and charge with trailed arms and rouse the Indians from their coverts at the point of the bayonet, and, when up, to deliver a close and well-directed fire on their backs, followed by a brisk charge, so as not to give them time to load again. " * . From every account, the enemy amounted to two thousand combatants. The troops actually engaged against them were short of nine hundred. This horde of savages, with their allies, abandoned themselves to flight and dispersed with terror and dismay, leaving our victorious army in full and quiet possession of the field. 2 ss ? We remained three days and nights on the banks of the Maumee, in front of the field of battle, during which time all the houses and cornfields were consumed and destroyed

While he was taking these preliminary steps, the Government of the United States was making efforts to establish treaties of peace and alliance with the hostile Indians of the Northwest. To do this, and to acquire the information pertinent to a knowledge of the movements and designs of these hostiles, mes- 'Sengers with " talks," delegated with authority to that end, with Commissioners emipowered to make treaties with them, were appointed for different localities. It was especially enjoined upon these Commissioners and messengers, to assure the Indians that it was not the purpose of the Government to take thejr lands without a satisfactory consideration therefor, nor without their entire consent, the failure to observe which had before been the occasion of so much bloodshed. Conformably with this idea, Gen. Wayne was instructed, in April, 1792, to issue a proclamation informing the people along the frontier of the measures in contemplation, and that it was their duty to refrain from any acts calculated to oceasion distrust on the part of the Indians te - be treated

! . . * * 4 | ' ry i . - , " ill a | "On the 28th of July, 1794, the troops under his command having been | for a considerable distance both above and below -Fort Miami, as well as within 4 joined, two days previously, by Maj. Gen. Scott, with about sixteen. hundred | pistol-shot of the garrison, who were compelled to remain tacit spectators to | | mounted volunteers from Kentucky, Gen. Wayne, with this united force, com- | this general destruction and conflagration, among which were the houses, menced his march for the Indians on the Maumee River. Ata point on the stimulator of the war now existing between the United States' and the

St. Mary's River, about twenty-four miles to the northward of Fort Recovery, he erected and garrisoned another post, which he called Fort Adams. Movy-

'The loss of the Indians can only be estimated by the number of their dead left on the field, and, upon that basis, it would be safe to fix the number of killed at little less than eighty, and about two hundred wounded, for, when the battle was ended and the Indians had withdrawn, forty of their dead remained on the field, in addition to the large number necessarily taken off the field during the progress of the engagement, according to their universal usage, until their compulsory retirement - the wounded being more than double their death loss." According to the official report of Gen. Wayne, in the War Department, his loss was twenty-six regularsand seven Kentucky volunteers killed, while of the wounded, there were eighty-seven regulars and thirteen volunteers. Subsequently, nine regulars and two volunteers died from the effect of their wounds - at the date of the report, August 28, 1794.

and Auglaize,on the 8th. The capture of the post at this point is best | described in the language of Gen. Wayne's report to the Secretary of War, { dated August 14, 1794. He says: 'I have the honor to inform you that the army under my command took possession of this very important post on the : morning of the 8th inst. - the enemy, on the preceding evening, having abandoned all their settlements, towns, and villages, with such apparent marks of surprise and precipitation, as to amount toa positive proof that our approach be | was not discovered by them until the arrival of a Mr. N ewman, of the Quar- 7 termaster General's Department, who deserted from the army near the St. Mary's.. * »** © °T had made such demonstrations for a length of time previous to taking wp our line of march, as to induce the Savages to expeet our ~ advance by the route of the Miami vill ges, to the left, or toward Roche de Bout, by the right - which feints appear to have produced the desired effect, by drawing, the attention of the enemy to those points, and gave an opening for the army to approach undiscovered by a devious (7. e.), in a central, direction. Thus, sir, we have gained possession of the grand emporium of the

{ hostile Indians of the West, without loss of blood.' " ;° _ After the capture of the post at the mouth of the Auglaize, Gen. Wayne completed a strong stockade fort at that, point, which, from the character of the | . structure and his purpose in erecting it, he called Fort Defiance. Then, desir- T this portion of Indiana Territory, there was comparative peace with the ing still to spare the effusion of blood and carry out literally the instructions Indians, except from marauding parties, who not unfrequently, in the acreceived from the hands of President Washington, he made overtures for peace | complishment of their mischievous purposes, committed murders and other acts with Indians, sending messengers with conciliatory talks. These efforts, how- | of violence, which, in the course of time, became unbearable - from the date of ever, were unavailing ; the Indians, from their former successes, anticipating an | the treaty, at Greenville, Ohio, until in the fall of 1812, after and during the easy victory, determined for war, notwithstanding Little Turtle and some other | second war with Great Britain, in which the Indians, through the agency of of the principal chiefs, in council, advised otherwise. In the mean time, how- | English emissaries, were induced to participate, according to the prospects of | ever, while these efforts were in progress, Gen» Wayne, watching with sleepless military advantage, or from motives of plunder. These movements, in the 1 vigilance every movement of the Savages, was active in his preparations for | course of time, began to be intolerable, and decisive steps were taken to meet