Henry County, Indiana - Chapter 5: Negro Soldiers Ix the Civil War, 1906

Value of Slavery to tlie Confederate Cause - The Emancipation Proclamation, A War Measure - Northern Opposition to Enrollment of Negroes as Soldiers - The First Colored Regiments - Change of Sentiment in the South as to Employment of Slaves in Confederate Armies - Jefferson Davis, General Lee and Other Southern Leaders Favor Employment of Negro Soldiers and Gradual Emancipation.

During the progress of the war a marked change was brought about in the attitude of the people of both North and South, not only as to the question of freeing the negroes, but also of arming them. It was, however, a change caused by the exigencies of the war, rather than by any change of sentiment in regard to the moral aspects of slavery. At the beginning of the war the radical element in the North would have preferred to let the seceding states go rather than that they should remain in the LTnion with slavery ; before the war closed the radical leaders in the South would have preferred to let slavery go if by so doing they could have remained out of the Union. The evidence is abundant and convincing that, before the close of the war, many of the radical leaders of the South would willingly have consented to universal emancipation if bv so doing thev could have saved the Confederacy. The study of the causes operating" to produce such a revolution of ideas is both curious and interesting.

The value of the services of the slaves to the Confederate cause was manifest from the beginning. Jefferson Davis, in the "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. I, p. 303, says :

''Much of our success was due to the much-abused institution of African servitude, fc^r it enabled the wdnite men to go into the army, and leave the cultivation of their fields and the care of their flocks, as well as of their wives and children, to those who, in the language of the Constitution, were 'held to service or labor.' "

This fact was soon perceived in the North. At an early stage of the war the slaves were also employed in building forts and breastworks and in various places at first filled by white men, thus relieving an equal number of white soldiers for service in the Confederate ranks. This also was seen and' its significance was appreciated in the North and especially in the northern armies. It was obvious that whatever would weaken the allegiance of the slaves to their masters and induce them to favor the Federal cause would weaken the Confederate armies and the Confederate cause. The emancipation proclamation was, therefore, a logical war measure, and it was on this ground that many in the North and in the northern armies, at first hostile to emancipation, were at a later period induced to favor it.

If the first step in severing the allegiance of the slave to his master was to declare his freedom, then obviously the next step was to arm him so that he might fight for it; because, in fighting for his freedom, he was not only directly aiding the Federal armies, but was inspiring his fellow-slaves to do likewise. Thus a dangerous enemy of the South and a zealous ally of the North was developed in the very heart of the Confederacy.

But, when it was first suggested, the idea of arming negroes and enrolling them as soldiers in the Federal armies aroused violent opposition in the North and furnished new arguments to those who denounced the prosecution of the war as an Abolition crusade.

The first act of Congress authorizing the enlistment of colored soldiers was passed July 17, 1862, after very bitter opposition, particularly from the members representing the border states, but this act discriminated between the slaves of loyal and those of disloyal citizens. Few colored men enlisted, and the first order for raising colored troops was issued by the War Department August 25, 1862, to General Saxton, in command at Hilton Head, South Carolina, authorizing him to enlist and equip "such number of volunteers of African descent as he might deem expedient, not exceeding five thousand." When the order was issued it was accompanied with the remark, "This must never see daylight, because it is so much in advance of public sentiment." It was not until 1863 that the work of enrolling colored troops in the Federal armies was begun in earnest. The first order for raising colored troops in the free states was issued from the War Department January 20, 1863, to Governor Andrew of Massachusetts. It was not until March 3, 1864, that Congress passed an act making free the families of colored soldiers, and not until later in that year that colored soldiers were allowed the same pay and emoluments as white soldiers.

The first colored regiment mustered into the United States service was the First Louisiana Native Guard, raised by General Butler in New Orleans and recruited chiefly among the free blacks. It was mustered in September 27, 1862. Another, organized in Kansas but recruited chiefly from ]\Iissouri slaves, was mustered in January 13, 1863, as the First Kansas Colored Volunteers, but the name was afterward changed to that of 79th U. S. Colored Infantry. The first colored regiment raised in a seceding state from former slaves was recruited in South Carolina, of which T. W. Higginson was commissioned colonel. Its organization was begun by order of General Hunter in May, 1862. but not completed until January 31, 1863. It was at first called the First South Carolina but afterward the 33d U. S. Colored Infantry. The first colored regiment raised in a northern state and recruited from free blacks was the 54th Massachusetts, organized in Massachusetts, but recruited from several northern states. Its organization was begun in February and completed in i\Iay, 1863. The total number of colored troops enrolled in the Federal armies during the war was 178,975, of whom 99,337 were recruited in the southern states.

The idea of enlisting negro soldiers was not at first favorably received in the northern armies. The opposition was plainly manifest in the Army of the Potomac during McClellan's command of that army. Nor was the idea generally favored in the Army of the Cumberland. There were never many colored soldiers in that army. They were at first viewed with curiosity by the white troops, but all finally came to the conclusion that the black man might quite as well help the

Union cause by fighting for his freedom and that, in so doing, he was far better employed than he was when helping to construct Confederate forts and breastworks.

So vindictive was the feeling inspired in the South by the enrollment of negroes in the northern armies, that, in 1863, the Confederate Congress passed an act providing that "every white commissioned bfficer commanding negroes or mulattoes in arms against the Confederate states shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection and shall, if captured, be put to death or be otherwise punished at the discretion of the court," and also providing that the negro and mulatto soldiers so captured should be delivered to the authorities of the states wherein captured, "to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such state or states."

During the first tw^o years of the war few could have been found in the South bold enough to advocate the dangerous experiment of arming the slaves and putting them into the Confederate armies. In the North, even at this day. many would probabh" be surprised to learn of the gradual change of sentiment in the South on this proposition. It aflrords most striking proof that, long before the close of the war, the desperate nature of the contest was appreciated by the southern leaders ; for, in their eagerness to save the Confederacy, they were ready to throw overboard slavery itself.

The first significant evidence of this change of sentiment is found in the proceedings of a meeting of the officers of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee at Dalton, Georgia, January 2, 1864. The meeting was attended by Joseph E. Johnston, the general commanding, Generals Hardee, Walker, Stewart, and others. Patrick Cleburne, one of the most noted generals of the army, read an elaborate paper prepared for the evident purpose of being circulated in the army, if approved by the meeting.

The paper set forth the depletion of the Confederate armies, the constantly increasing number of desertions, and the discouragement of the Confederate soldiers, who were "growing weary of hardships and slaughters" which promised no results, and portrayed in strong language the impending danger of "subjugation." One of the three great causes "operating to destroy" them was alleged to be slavery, which from being one of their "chief sources of strength at the commencement of the war," had now become, '^in a military point of view, one of their chief sources of weakness." The paper emphasized the reasons for regarding slavery as a source of weakness to the Confederacy :

"Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, whether by the actual presence or the approach of the enemy, or even by a cavalry raid, the whites can no longer, with safety to their property, openly sympathize with our cause. The fear of their slaves is continually haunting them, and from silence and apprehension many of these soon learn to wish the war stopped on any terms. The next stage is to take the oath to save property, and they become dead to us, if not open enemies. To prevent raids we are forced to scatter our forces, and are not free to move and strike like the enemy ; his vulnerable points are carefully selected and fortified depots. Ours are found in every point where there is a slave to set free. All along the lines slavery is comparatively valueless to us for labor, but of great and increasing worth to the enemy for information. It is an omnipresent spy system, pointing out our valuable men to the enemy, revealing our positions.

purposes, and resources, and yet acting so safely and secretly that there is no means to guard against it. Even in the heart of our country, where our hold upon this secret espionage is firmest, it waits but the opening fire of the enemy's battle line to wake it. like a torpid serpent, into venomous activity."

In order, therefore, to fill the ranks of the Confederate armies, to insure the sympathy- of foreign nations, and to infuse new life into the decaying Confederacy it was proposed "that we retain in service for the war all troops now in service and that we immediately commence training a large reserve of the most courageous of our slaves, and further that we guarantee freedom within a reasonable time to every slave in the South who shall remain true to the Confederacy in this war."

Cicneral Cleburne recognized, not only the absurdity, but the danger, of arming the slaves without freeing them. It would be preposterous, he argued, to expect the negro to fight against the hope of freedom with any degree of enthusiasm :

"Therefore." he adds, "we must bind him to our cause by no doubtful bonds : we must leave no possible loophole for treachery to creep in. The slaves are dangerous now, but armed, trained, and collected in an army, they would be a thousand-fold more dangerous; therefore. when we make soldiers of them we must make free men of them beyond all question, and thus enlist their sympathies also. "

General Patton Anderson, who attended the conference, felt moved to write General Leonidas Polk a confidential letter on the subject of Cleburne's "monstrous proposition" and his own feelings "on being confronted by a project so startling in its character - may I say, so revolting to southern sentiment, southern pride, and southern honor." He adds : "Not the least painful of the emotions awakened by it was the consciousness which forced itself upon me that it met with favor by others, besides the author, in high station then present."

Somehow the matter reached the ears of Jeflferson Davis and thereupon his Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, wrote a letter to General Johnston expressing the earnest convictions of the President that "the dissemination or even promulgation of such opinions under the present circumstances of the Confederacy, whether in the army or among the people, can be productive only of discouragement, distraction, and dissension," and General Johnston was requested to communicate the President's views to the officers present at the meeting "and urge on them the suppression, not only of the memorial itself, but likewise of all discussion and controversy respecting or growing out of it."

The question of arming the slaves continued to be agitated in the South, and was favorably considered, though public sentiment never quite reached the point of universal emancipation. The Richmond Enquirer, in an editorial, October 6, 1864, said :

"Whenever the subjugation of Virginia or the employment of her slaves as soldiers are alternative positions, then certainly we are for making them soldiers and giving freedom to those negroes that escape the casualities of battle."

"Should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems to be no reason to doubt what should then be our decision."

General Lee also became a convert to the proposition for arming the slaves, and, in a letter written January ii, 1865, to Andrew Hunter, expressing his views on the subject, he said :

"I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social institutions. My own opinion is that we should employ them without delay. I believe that, with proper regulations, they can be made eiTective soldiers. They possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled with that moral influence which in our country the white man possesses over the black, furnish the best foundation for that discipline which is the surest guarantee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be to secure their fidelity. There have been formidable armies composed of men having no interests in the country for which they fought beyond their pay or the hope of plunder. But it is certain that the best foundation upon which the fidelity of any army can rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar hardships and privations, is the personal interest of the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an interest we can give our negroes by granting immediate freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of the war to the families of those who discharge their duties faithfully, whether they survive or not, together with the privilege of residing at the South."

On February 7, 1865, a letter from General Lee to General Wise was published, thanking the latter's brigade for resolutions adopted declaring that they would consent to gradual emancipation for the sake of peace. Jefferson Davis, in the "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. I, pp. 515-519, explaining his own change of mind, says : ''Subsequent events advanced my views from a prospective to a present need for the enrollment of negroes to take their place in the ranks." On February 8, 1865, Senator Brown, of Mississippi, introduced a resolution in the Confederate Senate that, if adopted, would have freed 200,000 negroes and put them into the army, but this was defeated the next day in secret session. On February 11, a bill was introduced in the Confederate House of Representatives, authorizing the enrollment of 200,000 slaves with the consent of their masters. While it was pending, General Lee wrote a letter to E. Barksdale of the House, urging its passage. On the subject of emancipation he said, "I think those who are employed should be freed. It would be neither just nor justice, in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves." The proposed bill was defeated February 23 by the vote of Senator Hunter, of Virginia, who, while it was under discussion, made a bitter speech opposing it, in which he said :

"When we left the old government we thought we had got rid forever of the slavery agitation^; but, to my surprise. I find that this (the Confederate) government assumes power to arm the slaves, which involves also the power of emancipation. This proposition would be regarded as a confession of despair. If we are right in passing this measure, we are wrong in denying to the old government the i-ight to interfere with slavery and to emancipate slaves. If we offer the slaves their freedom as a boon, we confess that we were insincere and hypocritical in saying slavery was the best state for the negroes themselves. I believe that the arming and emancipating the slaves will be an abandonment of

The negro soldier bill passed by the Confederate Congress March 9, 1865, authorized the President of the Confederacy "to ask for and accept from the owners of slaves the service of such number of able-bodied negro men as- he may deem expedient for and during the war, to perform military services in whatever capacity he may direct." It also provided for the organization of such troops into companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, and that while in the service they should "receive the same rations, clothing, and compensation as allowed troops in the same branch of service."'

A proviso was added to the bill before its final passage, providing that "not more than 25 per cent, of the male slaves between the ages of 18 and 45 in any state should be called for under the provision of this act."' Section 5 of the act expressly provided "that nothing in* this act shall be construed to authorize a change in the relation of said slaves."

On February 25, 1865, the legislature of Virginia also passed an act autliorizing the governor of the state "to call for volunteers from among the slaves and free negroes of the state to aid in the defense of the capital and such other points as may be threatened by the public enemy."

It will be observed that there was nothing in either the act of the Confederate Congress or in that of the Virginia legislature providing for emancipation, immediate or gradual. But, as had been pointed out by Generals Cleburne and Lee, it was futile to arm the slaves without giving them their. freedom; it was worse than futile - it was suicidal. Nevertheless, the negro soldiers' bill held out some hope, and Mr. Jones, a Confederate in Richmond, Virginia, during the Civil War, records in his Diary under date of March 17 :

"We shall have a negro army. Letters are pouring into the department from men of military skill and character, asking authority to raise companies, battalions, and regiments of negro troops. It is the desperate remedy for the very desperate case - and may be successful. If 300,000 efficient soldiers can be made of this material, there is no conjecturing where the next campaign may end."

It was then too late to raise an army of Confederate negroes, with or without emancipation. There were not arms enough for them; there was not time sufficient to organize and drill them. The Confederacy was in the throes of dissolution. Pollard speaks with bitterness of this last puerile attempt of the southern leaders to galvanize into life the dying Confederacy :

"Such paltry legislation, indeed, may be taken as an indication of that vague desperation in the Confederacy which grasped at shadows ; which conceived great measures, the actual results of which were yet insignificant; which showed its sense of insecurity - and yet, after all, had not nerve enough to make a practical and persistent effort at safety."

Calling on the negroes at this stage of the war to enlist in the Confederate armies was like calling spirits from the vasty deep. They did not come. A few were gathered together in Richmond, about twenty all told, including three slaves of Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, and these were paraded through the streets as an illustration of the loyalty of the southern negroes to the cause of their masters and as an inspiring example to their fellows. The loyalty of the slaves or that of their masters had waned, and a draft was ordered. The 3d day of April, 1865, was appointed to begin the conscription of negroes for the Confederate armies.

But there were to be no more drafts in the South for either black or white men. Before the 3d day of April arrived, Lee had evacuated Richmond, Jeflferson Davis and his cabinet had fled ; the members of the Confederate Congress were fugitives, the Confederate government had disappeared, and the city of Richmond was on fire. On the day set for the draft, amidst the smoke and flames of the burning city, 10,000 black soldiers were marching through the streets singing "^John Brown'' and scattering broadcast the emancipation proclamation, and thousands upon thousands of the resident Richmond negroes were joining in the joyful chorus :

The black soldiers who marched were not Confederate conscripts ; they wore the blue and carried the stars and stripes. Elsewhere in this history will be found a roster of the colored soldiers from Henry County who served in the Civil War, including those who served from other States and have since moved to Henry County.