Saline County, Missouri - Chapter 1: Missouri, the Heart of the Louisiana Purchase, 1910

Chapter 1: Missouri, the Heart of the Louisiana Purchase

The State of Aiissouri embraces within its boniularies the most valuable area of the Louisiana Purchase, the vast region purchased by the United States from France in 1803. That is to say, Missouri excels any other part of it in its vast and various natural wealth and resources. No other part of this great domain equals it. Look at the great mineral wealth of Missouri, the gTeat timbered resources, her immense area of fertile soil - in all of these she excels. low-a perhaps equals her in productive soil and Montana perhaps in mineral wealth, but the former does not compare with Missouri as a timbered state nor the latter as an agricultural state.

Saline county, Missouri, is unsurpassed as an agricultural region, being perhaps the most favored in this respect of the entire state of Alissouri, or of the vast Louisiana Purchase. Therefore, we believe the history of the Louisiana Purchase a proper prelude to the "Past and Present of Saline County."

At the present time, 1909, there are none to question the propriety of the Louisiana Purchase nor the immense advantages that have accrued to the people of the United States through its acquisition. It was, in reality, one of the rare accidents of international intercourse, without precedent or example, brought about by a very complex political situation existing in Europe, such as had never existed before and in all probability will never exist again. No government had ever before made the disposition of a vast region of valuable territory a matter of bargain and sale : such changes of ownership having hitherto been the result of conflicts of great armies.

Louisiana has this signal value : It was not won at great cost of human blood and tears, as many another country of far less value has been won.

times, and existing under circumstances and surroundings the most remarkable. Napoleon Bonaparte, the master spirit of this consulate, had no regard for precedents, and the idea of selling Louisiana originated in his brain, and in his only.

a\Ir. Livingston, the resident American minister at Paris, had been, for two years, talking and writing about arranging for an exit, from the Mississippi river to the Gulf, for the commerce of our western people of the Ohio vallev ; but the purchase or acquisition of Louisiana, in its entirety, had never occurred to him. Li this matter, as in other mercantile transactions, the party desiring property belonging to another must, as a rule, have some intimation of a disposition or desire on the part of the owner to sell, before beginning negotiations as a purchaser. No "David Harum" ever undertook to purchase a horse without some intimation from the owner that he would sell the animal.

When Marbois, the minister of the treasury, therefore, told Li\ingston that his master, the First Consul, would sell the whole region, his surprise was complete and his astonishment great. It was so sudden and unexpected. He had no immediate answer when he was asked how much he would give for Louisiana. The New Yorker, true to his trading education and instincts, and the disposition to purchase at the lowest price, thought his government might pay twenty-five million francs for the country. This offer struck Marbois as being entirely too low ; for his master, the First Consul, had fixed or estimated the value at one hundred and twenty-five million francs. So, at first, they were not "very close together in the transaction." But the longer the matter was considered by the First Consul, the more anxious he became to sell Louisiana.

It is evident from all the authorities on the subject that the main trouble with Air. Livingston was, where the money was to come from and how it was to be obtained ; and it is easy to imagine how a civilian would feel when trading with a great military chieftain, who was then rapidly developing into the most powerful warrior and statesman of modern times. Li\'ingston thought, and it was a reasonable conclusion, that it would be highly injudicious and dangerous for him, as the representative of his countr}\ to enter into any contract for the payment of a large sum, without knowing- where and how the money was to be obtained to make the payment. He knew that it would be impossible for his government to pay any large sum in cash, and the ordinary expenditures of the country were about equal to the revenues, while the credit of the country was neither very strong, good nor extensive, as was soon afterwards fully disclosed during- the war with England in 1812-T4.

From all the historical accounts, it appears that the First Consul did not discuss the subject personall}' with the American minister at first, the negotiations being conducted solely by the two heads of departments, Tallerand and Marbois, and therefore, everything we know concerning it is derived at second hand, mainly through Tallerand and Marbois on the part of the French, and Mr. Monroe and Mr. Livingston on the part of the United States.

Marbois, nearly twenty years afterwards, gave to the public, in his "History of Louisiana," his account of the con\ersations of the First Consul on the subject of Louisiana and the cession of the country to the United States. Mr. Livingson had been, as our resident minister at Paris, negotiating mainly for two years for indemnity for maritime spoliation, or, in plainer language, for the destruction of the property of Americans on the high seas and in their ports; the matter reaching the ear of the First Consul mainly through his brothers. Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte, both of whom were ver}- much opposed to the sale of Louisiana. Mr. Monroe was sent to assist Mr. Livingston in his efforts to adjust and settle the spoliation claims, and, in addition, to purchase New Orleans and a part of the adjacent territory, so as to enable the people of the United States to own and control an outlet to the sea at the mouth of the ]Mississippi.

Napoleon had, about this time, been thrown into a violent fit of exasperation, an involuntary, irrepressible storm of passion, by the message of the King of England to the British Parliament, conveying information that. "As considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he had deemed it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution," thereby conveying a want of confidence in his. Napoleon's, professed desire for peace and the continuance of peaceful relations between the French and Fnglish.

The First Consul was then, in fact, exercising all the powers and functions of an emperor. The second day after the reception, at Paris, of this message of the King - the news reaching there on the nth dav of ^Larch. 1803, it being the day on which the First Consul received the diplomatic body - he gave vent to his anger in a personal conversation with the English minister, saying to him, in a loud voice, easily heard by all in his presence. "You are bent on war then ; we have been fighting these ten vears ; do vou desire that we shall fight ten years longer?" He regarded England his most formi(la1)le opponent, and it is highly probable that while so enraged at the English, the idea occurred to him to dispose of Louisiana by ceding it to the United States, as one of the numerous measures conceived in preparation for the war he thought then inevitable and unavoidable. He could see from the King's message that he would not be permitted to send the troops to occupy Louisiana, and, although these troops were then on board ships, they were ordered to be disembarked.

Just before Mr. Monroe had arrived at Paris, Napoleon, the First Consul, who had already probably come to a decision in his own mind, said to Marbois, "I know the value of Louisiana and I have wished to repair the error of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1762. I have recovered it on paper through some lines in a treaty ; but I have hardly done so, when I am about to lose it again. But if it escapes me, it shall one day be a dearer cost to those who force me to g^ve it up, than the cost to those to whom I shall surrender it. The English have successively taken from France, Canada, the Isle Royal, Newfoundland, Acadia, and the richest territory of Asia. They are intriguing and fomenting disturbances in San Domingo. They shall not have the Mississippi, which they covet. Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their aggrandizement in all parts of the globe. I contemplate turning it over to the United States. I should hardly be able to say I ceded it to them, for we are not yet in possession. But even a short delay may leave me nothing but a vain title to transmit to these republicans, whose friendship I seek. I need money to war on a nation which has it in abundance.

"Perhaps it will be objected that the Americans will be found too powerful for Europe, in two or three centuries. But my foresight takes no account of terrors at a distance. Moreover you may look to the future for dissensions in the bosom of the Union. The confederations, which are called perpetual, only endure until one of the parties to the contract finds reason to break it. I know the value of what I abandon. I renounce it with the greatest regret."

"To emancipate nations from the commercial tyranny of England," Napoleon said further, according to Marbois, "it is necessary to balance her influence by a maritime power that may one day become her rival. That power is the United States. The English aspire to dispose of all the riches of the universe. I shall be useful to the whole world if I can prevent their dominating America as they dominate Asia." In short, Napoleon took a more comprehensive view of the cession of Louisiana than any one connected with the transaction on either side of the Atlantic. But he conducted his government from a standpoint altogether different from that of Mr. Jefferson, the President of the United States.

Continuing, he said to Marbois : "Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede; it is the whole country, without reservation.

"If I should regulate my terms according to the value of these vast regions to the United States, the indemnity would have no limits. I will be moderate, in consideration of the necessity in which I am of making a sale. But keep this to yourself. I want fifty million [of francs] and for less than that sum I will not treat. I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep these fine countries. Tomorrow you shall have full powers."

Finally the First Consul said to Marbois: "Mr. Monroe is on the point of arriving. To this minister, going two thousand leagues from his constituents, the President must have given, after defining the objects of his mission, secret instructions, more extensive than the authorization of Congress for the stipulation of the payments to be made."

Mr. Livingston had no authority nor power to make such a purchase of territoiy, and had by this time become suspicious of the ministers the First Consul had around him, if not of the First Consul himself, and up to that time had neither the sagacity nor discernment to discover that the First Consul was not governed by the advice of any, or of all, of his ministers of state, but acted on his own judgment in this business as in all other public matters. Fortunately, at this juncture, Mr. Monroe arrived, with additional powers conferred by his papers, and he, although he was equally surprised when informed of the proposal to sell Louisiana in its entirety, and while his authority did not embrace the power to make such an extraordinary contract as the purchase of Louisiana, yet he was not embarrassed for that reason ; at once declared that he would conclude a treaty for the whole country, subject to ratification by his government.

It is evident that Monroe did have additional powers to those of Mr. Livingston and was in fact a "minister plenipotentiaiy and envoy extraordinary," and this fact, although denied by some writers, is clearly shown by the letter of the President, notifying him of his nomination, dated January 13, 1803. This letter is exceedingly complimentary to Mr. Monroe, and is considered as having such particular and important bearing on this point as to entitle it to incorporatioji here in full :

"Dear Sir: - I- dropped you a line on the loth, informing you of a nomination I had made of you to the Senate, and yesterday I enclosed you their approbation, not then having time to write. The agitation of the public mind on occasion of the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans is extreme. In the \\'estern countrv it is natural, and grounded on honest motives. In the seaports it proceeds from a desire of war, which increases the mercantile lottery; in the federalists generally, and especially those of Congress, the object is to force us into war if possible, in order to derange our finances, or, if this cannot be done, to attach the w^estern country to them, as their best friends, and thus get again into power. Remonstrances, memorials, etc., are now circulating through the whole of the western country, and signed by the body of the people. The measures we have been pursuing, being invisible, do not satisfy their minds. Something sensible, therefore, has become necessary ; and indeed our object of purchasing Xew Orleans and the Floridas is a measure liable to assume so many shapes, that no instructions could be squared to fit them. It was essential, then, to send a minister extraordinary, to be joined with the ordinary one, with discretionary powers ; first, however, well impressed with our views, and therefore qualified to meet and modify to these every form of proposition which could come from the other party. This could be done only in full and frec[uent oral communications. Having determined on this, there could be no two opinions among the republicans as to the person.

''You possess the unlimited confidence of the administration and of the western people ; and generally of the republicans everywhere ; and were you to refuse to go, no other man can be found who does this. The measure has already silenced the federalists here. Congress wull no longer be agitated ])y them, and the countr}- will become calm as fast as the information extends over it. All eyes, all hopes are fixed on you ; and were you to decline, the chagrin would be universal, and would shake under your feet the high ground on which you stand wnth the public. Indeed, I know nothing which would produce such a shock. For on the event of this mission depend the future destinies of this republic. If we cannot, by a purchase of the country, insure to ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, then, as war cannot be distant, it behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course, without, however, hastening it ; and it mav l)e necessary (on. your failure on the continent) to cross the channel. W'e shall get entangled in European politics, and figuring more, be much less happy and prosperous. This can only be prevented by a successful issue to your present mission. I am sensible after the measures you have taken in a different line of business, that it will be a great sacrifice on your part, and presents for the reason and other circumstances serious difficulties. But some men are born for the public. Nature, by fitting them for the service of the human race, has stamped them with the evidences of her destination and their duty.

"But I am particularly concerned, in the present case, you have more than one sacrifice to make. To reform the prodigalities of our predecessors is understood to be peculiarly our duty, and to bring the government to a simple and economical course. They, in order to increase expense, debt, taxation, and patronage, tried always how much they could give. The outfit given to ministers resident to enable them to furnish their house, but gi\-en by no nation to a temporary minister, who is never expected to take a house or to entertain, but considered on the footing of a voyager, they gave to their extraordinary ministers by wholesale. In the beginning of our administration, among other articles of reformation in expense, it was determined not to give an outfit to ministers extraordinary, and not to incur the expense with any minister of sending a frigate to carry or bring him. The 'Boston' happened to be going to the Mediterranean, and was permitted, therefore, to take up Mr. Livingston and touch in a port of France. A frigate was denied to Charles Pinckney, and has been refused to Mr. King for his return. 'Mv. Aladison's friendship and mine to you being so well known, the public will have eagle eyes to watch if we grant you any indulgences out of the general rule ; and on the other hand, the example set in your case will be more cogent on future ones, and produce greater approbation to our conduct. The allowance, therefore, will be in this and in all similar cases, all the expenses of your journey and voyage, taking a ship's cabin to yourself, nine thousand dollars a year from your leaving home till the proceedings of your mission are terminated, and then the quarter's salary for the expenses of your return, as prescribed by law. As to the time of your going, you cannot too much hasten it, as the moment in France is critical. St. Domingo delays their taking possession of Louisiana and they are in the last distress for money for current purposes. You should arrange your affairs for an absence of a year at least, perhaps for a long one. It will be necessary for you to stay here for a few days on your way to New York. You will receive here what advance you choose. Accept assurances (^f my constant and affectionate attachment.

Now, while this letter was not written by Mr. Jefferson with any knowledge that his minister would be confronted with the offer of the whole of Louisiana, yet it shows he was to be prepared for any emergency that might arise in the negotiations with France or Spain. He considered ]Mr. Monroe better qualified and informed as to all the views of the pending controversies than anv other statesman and he was authorized to "meet and

Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to his friend, M. Dupont, at Paris, informed him that Mr. Monroe had been sent as minister to meet the great diplomatic emergency ; a man whose "good disposition cannot be doubted and multiplied conversations with him, and views of the subject taken in all the shapes in which it can present itself, have possessed him with our estimates of everything relating to it with a minuteness which no written communications to Air. Livingston could ever have attained. He goes therefore with Livingston to aid in the issue of a crisis the most important the United States ever met since their independence, and which is to decide their future characters."

Li a few days the treaties - three of them; the first being called the treaty of cession, the other two designated as ''conventions" - were reduced to writing and signed by the French minister of the public treasury, Marbois, and Mr. Monroe and Mr. Livingston, the joint, or two ministers of the L^nited States.

Thus, divided responsibility between Mr. Monroe and Mr. Livingston seems to have braced them up for action. The papers were signed on the 30th day of April, 1803. Napoleon, the First Consul, said - and it will be noticed, in all the reports of this transaction he used the personal pronoun - 'T have a title to this vast country in some lines in a treaty," and he might have added, a bare paper title, without having possession, in any sense, of the country he was in the act of ceding, not a single French soldier occupying it, and none nearer than San Domingo. Louisiana, while it contained not a single French soldier, and the inhabitants, though of partly French origin, had little attachment to France, or in fact any other country, having so frequently changed masters.

Napoleon lost faith in systems of government early in his wonderful career, but notwithstanding he always entertained a friendly feeling for the people and government of the United States, and so expressed himself at various times. When finally driven from power, he looked to the United States as a haven of rest and refuge. On receiving the news of the death of Washington, he issued a general order to the army commanding that banners and standards be draped in mourning.

"That great man," the order stated, "fought against tyranny; he consolidated the independence of his country. His name will ever be dear to all the free men of both worlds, and especially to the French, who. like him and his American soldiers, are fighting for liberty and equality." Addressing the Corps Legislatif in February, 1813, he said: "America has had recourse to war in order to enforce respect for her flag. The good wishes of the world are hers in this glorious contest. If this contest ends by obliging the enemies of the continent to recognize that the flag covers the merchandise and the equipage, and that neutrals ought not to submit to a paper blockade, as stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht, America will have deserved well of all nations. Posterity will say that the old world has lost its rights, and that the new world has recovered them."

And then again, when in exile at Elba in 1814, he said to Niel Cambell, an Englishman, who reproduced his conversations in his journal : "America behaved with spirit in the matter of search," and laughingly twitted the Englishman, saying : "Oh, you always treat the Americans as though they were still your subjects." Showing further the trend of his thoughts, he said to Niel Cambell, who writes : "When I informed him that some regiments were about to be sent to America, he inquired whether it was intended to conquer a part of the American states. He was extremely inquisitive as to the force sent to America. AA^hen Captain Usher told him that twenty-five thousand men were sent from Lord Wellington's army, and that the Americans had lost in him their best friend, he asked whether it was intended to subjugate them entirely, for such a force could not be meant only to oblige them to make peace. He again expressed his opinion that our ministers intended to take Florida and Louisiana. He said that England had not acted generously in prosecuting the war against America, but showed a spirit of inveterate revenge. It weakened her voice at present at the Congress (Congress of Vienna), so great a portion of her force being absent from Europe. She had not occupied Louisiana, nor acquired any great or permanent object. The Americans would gradually improve, and we should have to be satisfied to make peace without having gained any accession of 'strength or power. Our character, after standing lately so high in the eyes of all Europe, would diminish by the sort of warfare in which we indulged against private property, trading vessels, and so forth."

Again, in a curious pamphlet published in London in 18 18 by an anonymous American, who, in July, 18 14, describes an interview he had with Napoleon at Elba : "He approached me and said in a sharp tone. 'What is it has brought you hither?' 'Sire, I am traveling for my instruction. I have a desire to become acquainted with the Isle of Elba.' 'There is nothing very curious in it. Who are you?' 'Sire, I am an .American.' 'Ah, you are an American! The Americans are the only people who have ne\-er 1)een my enemies.' By degrees I observed that his countenance assumed a more complacent expression, which was a great relief to me, for I felt myself ill at ease when he spoke so harshly. T answered with a gentle inclination of the head. He added: 'You are still at war with the English?' 'Yes, sire, but I hope peace will be concluded without delay.' 'That will be well. Now that I am no longer in the way to occupy the English, you could not contend against them. The Americans are a brave people.' "

After W^aterloo, de Chaboulon, in his memoirs, narrates the interview he had with the fallen chief at Malmaison, in 1815: "I will go to the United States. They will give me lands, or I will purchase some, and cultivate them. I will end where man began ; I will live on the produce of the earth and my flocks." "But do you think that England will allow you to culti^"ate your fields in peace?" asked the secretary. *A\'hy not? What harm could I do there?" "What harm, sire? Has your majesty forgotten that you have made England tremble? As long as. you live, sire, or as long as you are free, England will fear your efforts and your genius. You were perhaps less dangerous to her on the degraded throne of Louis XVHT than you would be in the United States. The Americans love and admire you ; you might exercise influence upon them ; prompt them, perhaps, to enterprises fatal to England." Napoleon here interposed with objections. "What enterprises?" he asked. "The English know^ well that the Americans would all allow themselves to be killed in defense of their native soil, but they do not at all like to enter upon warlike enterprises abroad. They have not yet arrived at the stage of seriously alarming the English. Some day, perhaps, they will become the aveng-ers of the seas. But that time, which I might have hastened, is now remote. The Americans are growing but slowly."'

When held a prisoner at St. Helena, Napoleon frequently talked to his attendants and friends of America; to Las-Cases and O'Meara, saying to Las-Cases, "America was our true asylum, looked at from every point of view. It is an immense continent, where there is an especial degree of freedom. If you are melancholy you can get into a wagon and ride thousands of miles. You are an equal there of anyone, ^^ou lose vourself at will in the crowd. See how everything prospers in the United States, and that without elTort. See how happy and tranquil people are there. That is because the public interest is supreme there." "What a pity I could not reach America ! From the other hemisphere I would have protected France against the reactionaries. The fear of my reappearance would have kept in check their violence and their folly."

On another occasion, speaking of Washington to Las-Cases, he said : "When I reached power some wished that I should be a Washington. Words cost nothing, and assuredly those who so smoothly uttered that wish did so without knowledge of time, the place, men and circumstances. If I had been in America I would willingly have been content to play the part of Washington, and I should have merited little credit, for I do not see how it would have been reasonably possible to play another role. But if Washington had found himself in France, with disintegration going on within and invasion menacing from w^ithout, I w'ould have defied Washington to be himself, or if he had tried to be so, he would have been nothing but a fool. As for myself, I had to be no more, no less than a crowned Washington.'' Tlicn again he expressed himself to O'AIeara, the English surg-eon attending him : "Your nation," said the exile to the surgeon, "called Washington a leader of rebels for a long time, and refused to acknowledge either him or the constiUition of his country, but his successes obliged them to change and acknowledge both. It is success which makes the great man."

B}- the cession of Louisiana, Napoleon evinced his friendship for the United States, and it was the greatest and most \aluable emblem of fidelity ever passed between two nations.

It is difficult to understand that ^Monroe and Livingston had the temerity to ask Napoleon to insert and fix more definitely the boundaries of Louisiana, after he had acted with such magnanimity and generosity, but they did, calling for metes and bounds. At the close Napoleon treated Monroe with great cordiality as the latter took his departure, saying, "My good w'ishes to yourself and your President. You must not give your flag to Great Britain."

The purchase was the most illustrious of achievements in that line, before or since. By ceding Louisiana, Napoleon enhanced his reputation as a prophet, if not as a ruler. After the close of the negotiations he remarked to Marbois : "This accession of territory strengthens forever the power of the United States ; and I have just given to England a maritime rival, that will sooner or later humble her pride." To abate the pretentions of England became the main object of Napoleon's foreign policy.

Spain, of course, objected to the cession of Louisiana, protesting that it was in violation of her treaty with France, by which she had transferred the cohmy to France; but Spain, even at that date, was rapidly becoming an outpost of Napoleon's. In a few years afterwards he had established his brother at Madrid, as king of Spain. Mr. Madison answered that Spain and France could settle the dispute between themselves.

England was not at all pleased with the transaction. The ministry had ascertained that Mr. Monroe w'as credited with authority to obtain an outlet at the mouth of the Mississippi for American commerce, but had no intimation of Napoleon's design to transfer the whole of Louisiana to them. On being informed of the object of Mr. Monroe's mission, the EngHsh ministry made some indefinite ofifers to Mr. King, the American envoy at London, to undertake the conquest of Louisiana, with the concurrence of the United States, agreeing to retrocede the country to the United States whenever peace should be made with France. If this proposal had been accepted, our acquisition of Louisiana would, in all probability, have been delayed until after the battle of Waterloo had been fought in June, 1815, for England had no permanent peace with France until after that battle. But the English government was so much absorbed with the continental affairs of Europe just at this juncture, as to give little attention or attach great importance to the transfer, informing Mr. King (a Federalist not yet recalled by Jefferson) of the acquiescence of that government. In fact, the English government then felt that they held a sort of unforeclosed governmental mortgage on the whole of the United States, and as soon as they had gotten rid of their most troublesome antagonist, Napoleon, they would set about making vigorous efforts to foreclose it, in the meantime disregarding the rights of the people of the L^nited States in many cases where there was a conflict of rights or interests. Besides, English statesmen looked upon the people of the United States as their wayward, disobedient children, many of whom they thought (and they had some ground for the belief) yet regretted the revolt against the mother country and would ultimately be inclined, if not anxious, to renew their allegiance to her.

The treaty of cession and the two correlative documents called "conventions" were at once set off from Paris, but they did not reach Washington until the 14th of July.

It was at this stage of the proceedings, the consummation of which resulted in the acquisition of Louisiana, that Mr. Jefferson's shrewdness, good sense and admirable statesmanship fully developed, shining out in the strongest light and brilliancy, exhibiting to his countrymen and the civilized world great pre-eminent, practical statesmanship. Looking back at the embarrassing situation, now at the expiration of a century, it is really astonishing that he acted with such resolution and becoming promptness.

These treaties, though vague and uncertain as respects the boundaries of the vast country, gave to the United States a good color of title to the territory; and a sufficient color of title is a requisite of importance in a contest over the ownership of lands.

As soon as the information became public great opposition sprang up. mainly from Federalists, and even to this day the descendants of those Federalists are unwilling to grant or acknowledge any credit to ]\Ir. Jefferson for the purchase of Louisiana. Even though so manifestly advantageous, ratification of the treaties and the measures necessary to carry out the transfer of Louisiana, and pay the purchase price, might never have been taken by Congress, but from the fact that Mr. Jefferson was then the real, undisputed head of his party, as well as the chief magistrate of the nation. He had organized, built up and consolidated the Jeffersonian Republican party, and held it at his back, never at any time calling for its support in vain. At no time in the history of the United States have party leaders in Congress been so devotedl}^ attached and loyal to their chief magistrate. It was only necessary for them to know that a measure was recommended by Jefferson, or had his approval, to insure its passage. During his administration Air. Jefferson never exercised the veto power.

Mr. Jefferson, believing as he did in a strict construction of the constitution and the exercise by the federal government of only such powers as were clearly granted to it, thought that the proposed purchase of a great territor}' was not included, and was without clear and positive constitutional authority ; but thought the defect might be supplied by an amendment to the constitution. It is not strange that he should hesitate on this question ; but of the immense advantages to be gained by the purchase, or the propriety of it, he did not hesitate. The acquisition of Louisiana would at once settle the question of the outlet for the commerce of the western people of its tributaries, and of the great Mississippi itself.

On the other hand, the purchase was denounced by the opposition or Federal party, as not only being unconstitutional and unauthorized, but injudicious, unwise and inexpedient - a project really designed to furnish additional territory in the West, of which to erect and establish an independent and rival government - and finally that the transaction \\3.s really brought about by what would now be called a "graft," the price to be paid for the country, they asserted, being greatly in excess of its real value. At best, things can be made out but a little way ahead; usually not even that. It is not within the vision of statesmen to tell or judge precisely what will turn out ultimately to their advantage. The political horizon is always enveloped in the impenetrable mist of fate ; the results of treaties are no exceptions, all matters of this character being, to a greater or less degree, tentative.

However, the cession and transfer of Louisiana to the United States was attended by many fortuitous circumstances. It has often been said that providence has always been on the side of the United States. The rapidly rising power of Napoleon had the effect to insure and secure the approval of a treaty made by him with any power on either side of the Atlantic that might have

Two days after the treaties reached Washington Mr. Jefferson issued his proclamation convening- Congress, stating that there were "great and weighty matters claiming the consideration of the legislative body. '

The Congress assembled on the 17th day of October, and on that day received the message of the President on the subject of the purchase of Louisiana, in which he set forth his views on the subject.

The treaties stipulated for the payment of the eighty millions of francs for Louisiana by the United States, sixty millions of that sum to be paid to the French government in the stock of the United States, bearing six per cent. interest, the other twenty millions of francs to be applied b}' the United States to the payment of the spoliation claims due citizens of the United States by France. The stock was issued and delivered to France, in accordance with the treaty, but the contract to pay the spoliation claims has never been carried out or fulfilled by the government of the United States, not- W'ithstanding the spoliation claimants and their descendants have made great efforts for satisfaction, which have thus far proved unavailing.

Message Of The President

"Congress witnessed at their late session the extraordinary agitation produced in the public mind by the suspension of our right of deposit at the port of New^ Orleans, no assignment of another place having been made according to treaty. They were sensible that the continuance of that privation would be more injurious to our nation than any consequences which could flow from any mode of redress, but reposing just confidence in the good faith of the government whose officer had committed the wrong, friendly and reasonable representations were resorted to, and the right of deposit was restored.

"Previous, however, to this period we had not been unaware of the danger to which our peace would be perpetually exposed whilst so important a key to the commerce of the western country remained under foreign power. Difficulties, too, were presenting themselves as to the navigation of other streams which, arising within our territories, pass through those adjacent. Propositions had therefore been authorized for obtaining on fair conditions the sovereignty of New Orleans and of other possessions in that quarter interesting to our cjuiet to such extent as was deemed practicable, and the provisional appropriation of two million dollars to be applied and ac- counted for by the President of the United States, intended as part of the price, was considered as conveying the sanction of Congress to the acquisition ]M-oposed. The enlightened government of France saw with just discernment the importance to both nations of such Hheral arrangements as might best and permanently promote the peace, friendship and interests of both, and the property and sovereignty of all Louisiana which had been restored to them ha\e on certain conditions been transferred to the United States by instruments bearing date the 30th of April last. When these shall have received the constitutional sanction of the Senate, they will without delay be communicated to the representatives also for the exercise of their functions as to those conditions which are within the powers vested l)y the Constitution in Congress.

"Whilst the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters secure an independent outlet for the produce of the western states and an uncontrolled navigation through their whole course, free from collision with other powers and the dangers to our peace from that source, the fertility of the country, its climate and extent, promise in due season important aids to our treasurx', an ample provision for our posterity, and a wide spread for the blessings of freedom and equal laws.

"With the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those ulterior measures which may be necessary for the immediate occupation and temporary government of the countr}' ; for its incorporation into our Union ; for rendering the change of government a blessing to our newly adopted brethren ; for securing to them the rights of conscience and of property ; for confirming to the Indian inhabitants their occupancy and self-government, establishing friendly and commercial relations with them, and for ascertaining the geography of the country acquired. Such materials, for your information, relative to its affairs in general as the short space of time has permitted me to collect will be laid before you when the subject shall be in a state for your consideration."

Onlv three davs' consideration served for the ratification of the treaties, and the action of the Senate was approved by the President on the day following. The papers being transferred to the representatives, a bill was brought in and passed, after a short debate, authorizing the creation of the government's obligations to pay France the eleven million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The act having ])assed the Senate, and on receiving the approbation of the President, the purchase of Louisiana was thereby concluded so far as the executive and tlie Congress were ctMicerned.

The stock issued in settlement for Louisiana, under the authority of the act of Congress passed on the loth of November (certificates of indebtedness

It is stated by M. Thiers in his "Consulate and Empire of Napoleon," that Napoleon had previously arranged for its conversion into money, with the banking house of Hope & Company, of Amsterdam; but although he had stipulated that the stock should not be sold so as to impair the credit of the United States, it is not known, nor developed by any historical writer, the price at which the stock was negotiated. The redemption of this stock began in 1812, before maturity. Our fund commissioner purchased this stock at different times in 1812, 1813, 18 17 and 18 18, at from ninety-six and threefourths to ninety-nine and three-fourths, in the latter year, 18 18. The records of the government do not show by whom it was held at the time of its reimbursement, but it may be reasonably presumed that the purchase of it before maturity was designed to get it out of the way of other indebtedness it was found necessary to incur in the prosecution of the war of 18 12-14, i^^ which an indebtedness of about one hundred million dollars was contracted. But the war was well worth what it cost the United States and was very properly characterized as "the second war for independence."

The closing battle of the conflict of 18 12-14, 01^ the 8th of January, 18 1 5, at New Orleans, tenninated our trouble with Great Britain for all time, it would seem. We have never since asked anything of the mother country that was not granted, even the payment of the "Alabama claims," resulting from our Civil war.

It is, however, very fashionable of late years with our federalistic historians to indulge in unfriendly criticism, not only of the government at Washington, but to exaggerate the failures and misfortunes of our troops during the first year of the war of 1812. In my view of the conflict, the greatest misfortune and ill luck growing out of it was the ill-timed efforts to make peace, the administration being driven to these efforts by the hostile attitude of the New England Eederalists.

Had attempts to make peace been postponed until the spring of 18 15, after the battle of New Orleans, and after the escape of Napoleon from Elba and his return to France, Castlereagh - yes, "carotid artery-cutting Castlereagh," who governed England - would have merely asked our commissioners to state their terms. If we had wanted Canada, or the entire British possessions in America, the country would have been thrown at our feet, tossed to us, as emphasized by a late writer, as Napoleon tossed Louisiana to us, "like the Sultan would toss a purse of gold to one of his favorites."

Louisiana In Possession

M. Laussat, who was commissioned as prefect, had been sent over frum France before the cession of Louisiana to the United States, with special authority to take possession of Louisiana early in the spring of 1803, and to act as civil and military commandant. Reaching New Orleans in March or April, 1803, and of course having no knowledge or intimation of the transfer to the United States, he set about arranging for the government of the country. He announced his regret that the Spanish government had countermanded the act of Morales suspending the American right of deposit at New Orleans, and made preparations to enforce his views on the arrival of the troops, which he supposed were about to be sent to Louisiana by France.

But M. Laussat had made little progress, except to arouse considerable ill feeling towards the United States, when he was informed of the cession of Louisiana and instructed to turn the country over to the United States. He carried out his instructions faithfully in the face of opposition from the Spanish officials and inhabitants. Obtaining full possession on the ist of December, on the 20th he delivered to the American authorities possession of Louisiana. Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson had been commissioned by the President and sent to New Orleans for that purpose.

Governor Claiborne went down in company with General Wilkinson and the troops from Fort Adams, a military post in Mississippi Territory, on the east bank of the Mississippi river a short distance above the southern line of the United States. General Wilkinson was the major-general of the army, subject only to the orders of the secretary of war and the President.

Laussat made the transfer of possession with appropriate ceremonies on the 20th of December; but the Spanish troops and their commander did not show any great haste to surrender possession of the barracks ; on the contrary, they remained in possession until March, 1804. when they moved over to Pensacola.

Captain Amos Stoddard (afterwards, in 1807, promoted to major) was constituted by Laussat. the agent of the French government, to receive possession of Upper Louisiana from the authorities of Spain, and was also appointed temporary governor by the President of the United States. He reached St. Louis in March, 1804. Delassus, the lieutenant-governor, residing at St. Louis, had been apprised of his coming and of the fact that the low^er country had been transferred to France and by France to the United States. There was no hitch in the transfer of the upper country at St. Louis. On the 9th of March the United States troops were brought over from Kahokia, under command of Lieutenant Worrall and accompanied by Captain Lewis, of the Lewis and Clark exploring expedition (then camped above St. Louis, near the mouth of the Missouri river, on the Illinois side), and marched to the government house, where they were finally received by Delassus, who addressed them, saying, "By the King's command" he surrendered the post and the dependencies to them. A written statement of the alTair was then made out. signed by the representatives of the three governments, and witnessed by Captain Lewis, Antoine Soulard and Charles Gratiot. Then Delassus, turning to Captain Stoddard, said that he placed him in possession of the territory.

The S[)anish troops having withdrawn from the fort or barracks, the Americans, under Stoddard, entered. The French flag floated for one day, until JMarch loth, when it was hauled down to give place to the stars and stripes of the United States.

Captain Stoddard, of the regular army, who had been commissioned by Governor Claiborne, under the direction of President Jefferson, as first civil commander of upper Louisiana, issued to the people an address, in which he displayed political sagacity of a high order, saying that he was directed to cultivate friendship and harmony among the inhabitants of the territory and to make known the determination of the United States to preserve all their rights, both civil and religious. He told them that thev had been divested of the character of subjects and clothed with that of citizens of the LTnited States.

The whole substance and tone of the address is so admirable and excellent that one, at this day, might conclude that it em'anated from Mr. Jefferson himself. Captain Stoddard w^as one of the best educated of the officers of the army. He lost his life in the siege of Fort Meigs in 1813, his worth as a soldier being recognized afterwards by the Legislature of Missouri, calling a county in his honor and for the perpetuation of his name.

At that time (1804) the population of all upper Louisiana, exclusive of Indiana, was about ten thousand, of which about three and one-half thousand were French and Spanish (only a few of the latter race), five thousand Anglo-Americans, and twelve hundred negro slaves.

The government of upper Louisiana, under Spanish authority, had greatly encouraged immigration of people from the United States by grants of lands and exemption from taxation, until one-half the population was made up of Anglo-Americans.

was passed by Congress, changing the name from the "District of Louisiana" to the "Territory of Louisiana,"' and thereby vesting the legislative power in a governor, secretary and two judges to be appointed by the President.

Under this act of 1805, President Jefferson appointed Gen. James Wilkinson, governor; Frederick Bates, secretary; Reuben J. Meghs and John B. Lucas, judges. Following this, in the latter part of the next year, 1806, Meriwether Lewis, having returned to St. Louis from his exploring expedition to the Pacific ocean, was appointed governor of the territory, holding the office until his death, in 1809.