Contra Costa County, California - The whole text, 1882 (part 9 of 22)
From History of Contra Costa County, California, Including Its Geography, Geology, Topography, Climatography and Description; Together with a Record of the Mexican Grants ... Also, Incidents of Pioneer Life; and Biographical Sketches of Early and Prominent Settlers and Representative Men .., published 1882. 15,993 words, reproduced complete and unedited. Source changes inside the text are labelled in place.
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15,993 wordsMachine-read from scans of History of Contra Costa County, California, Including Its Geography, Geology, Topography, Climatography and Description; Together with a Record of the Mexican Grants ... Also, Incidents of Pioneer Life; and Biographical Sketches of Early and Prominent Settlers and Representative Men .., published 1882. Nothing has been corrected: fixing what looks like a misspelled name is how an invented one gets published. Source changes are marked where they occur.
The United States, Appellants, vs. Kosa Pacheco et al., claiming the Rancho Arroyo de las Nueces y Bolbones. - Claim for two leagues of land, more or less, in Contra Costa county, confirmed by the Board of two leagues, and appealed by the United States and by claimants. In this case appeals have been taken botlfby the United States and by the claimants. The Board confirmed the title to the land to the extent of two leagues, and the claimants assert that they are entitled to a confirmation of the tract granted by metes and bounds, and irrespective of quantity. With regard to the validity of the grant no question seems to be raised. In the brief filed on the part of the United States it is observed that, " on the general question of the validity of the whole grant, it is not designed to repeat objections and arguments which this Court has so often decided to be untenable." The validity of the title being thus admitted, under the principles laid down in former adjudications of this Court, the only question is as to the extent to which it should be confirmed. The petition was presented to Governor Figueroa on the fifteenth of May, 1834, and the usual order of reference for information was made. After receiving the report of the Ayuntamiento of San Jose" Guadalupe, a further reference was made to the Alcalde of Monterey, directing him to examine witnesses, to be produced by the petitioner, as to her qualifications, as to whether the land was vacant, as to its extent and nature, and as to whether she had the means of stocking it with cattle. The Alcalde accordingly took the depositions of the witnesses, by which it appeared that, as stated by two of them, the land was two and one-half leagues, " a little more or less," long, and about two leagues broad ; and as deposed by the third, that it was two leagues long, more or less, and about two leagues broad. Upon receiving these reports, the Governor made the usual order of concession, declaring this petitioner " owner of the land between the Arroyo de las Nueces and the Sierra de los Golgones, bounded by the said places and by the Ranchos of San Ramon, Las Juntas and Monte del Diablo," and directing the expediente to be sent to the Most Excellent Deputations for their due approval. The grant or final title, in what would seem to be strict compliance with the colonization laws, was withheld until the approval of the Assembly had made the grant definitely valid. On the eleventh of July, 1834, the Assembly passed a resolution approving " the grant made to Dona Juana Sanches de Pacheco of the place included between the Arroyo de las Nueces and the Bolbones." On the thirty-first of July, the Governor, after referring to the resolution of approval, ordered the title to issue. It accordingly issued on the same day. The grant, after reciting that Dona J. S. de Pacheco had petitioned for the land included between the Arroyo de las Nueces and the Sierra de los Golgones, bounded by the said places and the Ranchos de las Juntas, San Ramon and Monte del Diablo, and after referring to the resolution approving the grant of the land between the Arroyo de las Nueces and the the Sierra de los Golgones, grants to her " the aforesaid land, declaring to her the ownership of it by these presents, and subject to the following conditions." The fourth condition is as follows : " The land of which mention is made is two square leagues, a little more or less, as shown by the map which goes with the expediente. The magistrate who may give the possession will cause it to be measured in conformity with the ordinance, for the purpose of making out the boundaries, leaving the surplus which may result to the nation for its convenient uses." It is contended on the part of the United States that by this condition the quantity of land is limited to two leagues, a little more or less. It is urged on the part of the claimants, that the original order of concession, the resolution of approval, and the description of the land in the grant itself, clearly show the intention to have been to grant the land as delineated on the diseno and described in the grant ; and that if the fourth condition be construed to limit the quantity, it is repugnant to the rest of the grant, inconsistent with the previous concession and resolution of approval, and probably introduced by mistake. If such was the intention of the Governor when he made the concession, and of the Assembly when they approved of it, the final title, issued with an express reference to, and avowed conformity with the resolution of approval, should, if possible, be so construed as to give effect to it. The inquiry therefore is, did the Governor intend by the fourth condition to limit the quantity of land granted, or is the mention of quantity to be treated as merely a mis-description of the extent of the land, which should, as at common law, yield to boundaries, when the latter are distinctly mentioned, and when such construction is necessary to give effect to the intention of the parties ? In the case of the United States vs. Wright, it was held by the Court that where land had been granted by specific boundaries, which included in fact about eight leagues, and the condition specified the extent as four leagues, a little more or less, the grant could not be construed to embrace the larger quantity. But in that case it appeared that the petitioner himself, as well as the witnesses produced by him, had represented the land as only " three or four leagues in extent." The Governor, therefore, in limiting the grant to the quantity represented to be included within the boundaries, either merely carried into effect the understanding and intentions of all parties, or else the representations were fraudulent, and the parties to the deception could not in a Court of Equity be allowed the fruits of their fraud. It seemed to the Court in that case that justice would be satisfied and every substantial right protected by limiting the extent of the land to the quantity which the Governor intended to grant and the petition asked for. But the case at bar is different. The Governor was fully apprised of the extent of the land, not only by the testimony of the witnesses produced before the Alcalde, but the diseno which was submitted both to the Governor and the Assembly, and which is referred to in the condition, shows the land included within the boundaries to be of about the extent mentioned by the witnesses. The boundaries mentioned in the concession, the resolution of approval, and the grant, are the same as those indicated on the map, and the Governor, in all probability, derived his description of the land from that source. It is clear from this fact, as well as the express language of the condition, that the Governor intended to grant the land " as shown by the map ;" and that map contains a scale which must, independently of other information, have apprised the Governor that the quantity was greater than two leagues. In this, as in all analogous cases, the only object of the Court should be to carry out the instructions of the granting power. When, therefore, we find the land granted by specific boundaries, and those boundaries represented to the grantor to contain a certain quantity ; when the grantor's attention has been directed to the point ; and on ascertaining that the quantity is the same as that represented, he nevertheless proceeds to grant all the land within those boundaries, and refers to the map which clearly indicates the quantity - under all these circumstances, we must consider that the intention was to grant all the land included within the boundaries, notwithstanding that in a subsequent condition the quantity may be erroneously stated. That conditions applicable only to one species of grants were often asserted by mistake in grants of a different species is notorious. In this case the mention of two leagues as the extent of the granted land is, perhaps, owing to the fact that the clerk who drafted the document forgot that a tract two leagues broad by two wide contained four and not two square leagues. However this may be, we think it clear that in this case all the land within the boundaries was intended to be granted ; and as there is no proof or suggestion that the land so included exceeds in extent the quantity testified to by the witnesses before the alcalde, that the claim should be confined to the tract as described in the grant and delineated on the map. (June Term, 1856.)
The United States, Appellants, vs. Jonathan D. Stevenson, et al., claiming the Rancho Medanos. - Claim for two leagues of land in Contra Costa county, confirmed by the Board, and appealed by the United States. The claim in this case is for a piece of land called " Medanos," embracing two square leagues, " a little more or less." It was confirmed by the Board, and the cause has been submitted to this Court on appeal without argument, or the statement of any objection to its validity. The title paper is produced by the claimants, and its genuineness duly certified. The expediente from the archives not only shows that the preliminary proceedings were in due form, but that the grant was confirmed by the Departmental Assembly about six months after its date. It is also shown that the conditions were fully complied with. The delineation on thediseno appears to be rude and inexact, but the title itself describes the boundaries of the tract with some precision. In that document the land is mentioned as that known by the name of " Medanos," and bounded on the south by the land of citizen Noriega, on the north by that of citizen Salvio Pacheco, on the east by the river San Joaquin, and on the west by the " lomarias," or small hills. The third condition states the extent of the granted land to be two square leagues, a " little more or less." Some of the witnesses appear to have supposed that the land embraced within these boundaries would include a tract of far greater extent than that mentioned in the condition. But it is clear that they have confounded the "lomarias" mentioned in the grant with the range of mountains known as the Contra Costa hills, which lie at a considerable distance, and which would, if taken as the western boundary, not only include a tract of country of great extent, but also one or more intervening Ranchos. It would seem, however, that the " lomarias " spoken of are a range of low hills, and that the land included within these and the other boundaries of the grant has about the extent mentioned in the grant. Such appears to have been the view taken of the case by the Board, and we see no reason for a different conclusion. The mesne conveyances appear to be regular. Under the proofs offered, the claimant, Stevenson, is entitled to a confirmation of the part conveyed to him by the deed as reformed according to the intentions of the parties under the decree of the District Court of this State. A decree affirming the decision of the Board must be entered. (June Term, 1856.)
Inocencio Romero et al., claiming El Sobrante, Appellants, vs. The United States. - Claim for five leagues of land in Contra Costa county, rejected by the Board, and appealed by the United States. It appears from the expediente on file in the archives, that on the eighteenth day of January, 1844, the brothers Romero petitioned the Governor in the usual form for a grant of land, being a sobrante lying between the ranchos of Moraga, Pacheco and Welch. This petition Avas by a marginal order referred to the Honorable Secretary for his report. The Secretary referred the papers to the First Alcalde of San Jose, with directions to summon Moraga, Pacheco and Welch, hear their allegations, and return the papers to the office. On the first of February, 1844, the First Alcalde reports that the owners of the lands bounded by the tract have been confronted with the petitioners, and that the former are willing and desirous that the land be granted. He adds that it had come to his knowledge that one Francisco Soto claimed the tract some six or seven years ago, but as he had never used nor cultivated it, the petitioners appeared to him to be entitled to the favor they ask. On the fourth of February, 1844, Manuel Jimeno, the Secretary, reports to the Governor that, in view of the report of the First Alcalde, there would seem to be no obstacle to making the grant. On this report of the Secretary, the Governor makes the following order : " Let the Judge of the proper district take measurement of the unoccupied land that is claimed, in presence of the neighbors, and certify the result, so that it may be granted to the petitioners. - Micheltorena." On the twenty-first of March, 1844, the claimants addressed a petition to the Governor, representing that, owing to the absence of the owners of the neighboring lands, the Judge of the Pueblo of San Jose had been unable to execute the superior order, (above recited), and soliciting that his Excellency would grant the tract to them, " either provisionally, or in such way as he would deem fit," while there was yet time for planting, etc. On this petition Jimeno reports (March 23, 1844,) that the original order should be carried into effect as to the measurement of the land, and that " as soon as that was accomplished, Senor Romero can present himself with Senor Soto, who says he has a right to the same tract." The Governor thereupon made the following report : " Let everything be done agreeably to the foregoing report. - Micheltorena." The above documents constitute the whole expediente on file in the archives. From the documents produced by the claimant from the files of the Alcalde's office, it appears that on the same day, March 23, 1844, Jimeno communicated to the Alcalde the order of the Governor that the Sobrante solicited by the Romeros should be measured, and that if it should be necessary a measurement of the adjoining ranchos should also be made - with the understanding that those parties who should become " agraciados " should bear the expense. It is evident that up to the date of the last order of Micheltorena no grant of the land had issued. That pursuant to the recommendation of Jimeno, the Governor declined to make even a provisional grant as solicited, and that final action in the matter was deferred until a measurement should be made, and until Romero and Soto should present themselves. Jimeno does not seem to have finally adopted the opinion of the Alcalde that Soto had forfeited his rights to the land, for he recommends to the Governor, as we have seen, that the land should be measured without delay, and that then " Romero should present himself, joined with Senor Soto, who says he has a right to the same land." In this recommendation the Governor concurs. There is certainly nothing in these proceedings which indicate that the Governor had finally determined to grant the land, though it is evident that he regarded the application with favor ; still less can any of the orders made by him be construed to import a present grant. On the contraiy, it is clear that the Governor refuses to make even a provisional grant, but insists that a measurement shall first be made, and then tnat Romero and Soto shall appear before him, evidently with the view of determining the rights of the latter.
The subsequent proceedings, as shown by documents exhibited by the claimants, confirm this view. On the fifteenth of January, 1847, Romero and Garcia, the present claimants, appeared before John Burton, the Alcalde of San Jose, and executed a paper in the presence of the Alcalde and two witnesses, reciting a sale by Romero to Garcia of one-half of the land, and stipulating that both parties should remain subject to the final result, "if the Governor grant it in ownership." And if the contrary should be " the case, then Garcia should lose equally with Romero, without any right to reclaim the consideration paid." This paper is signed by the parties, the Alcalde and the witnesses. On the twenty-eighth of May, 1847, Josd Romero addressed a petition to John Burton, Alcalde of San Jose, representing that as early as 1844, an order from the former Governor had been sent to the Alcalde's Court requiring a measurement of the land called " Juntas ;" that such measurement had not yet been made. He therefore solicits the Alcalde to give him a testimonial of the reports which in the year 1844 were sent to the Government, so " that we can be granted said land." The Alcalde in a marginal order directs that the lands should be measured according to the original order of the Supreme Government.
In the margin of the order transmitted by Jimeno, under date of March 23, 1844, the Alcalde writes : " Be it done accordingly, on the ninth of April, 1847. The interested parties will proceed to take possession of the mentioned land according to the order of the Governor. I further order, that in case any bordering land-owner demand it, a measurement of his land be ordered. John Burton, J. P." It appears, moreover, that about two months before the date of their last petition, viz : on the thirty -first of March, 1847, Jose- Romero had addressed a petition to the same Alcalde, representing that some years before he had solicited a piece of land in the Canada de San Ramon, and bordering upon lands of Don M. Castro, and that his Excellency had ordered the lands of Castro to be measured, which had never been done. The petitioners further stated that they were two brothers, with a numerous family, and were without any piece of land whatever to raise cattle ; they therefore begged the Alcalde to provide for them as soon as possible, that they might retain and locate their stock. The Alcalde on the fifth of April orders that the fulfillment of the superior order should be at once proceeded to. The entry in the marginal order transmitted by Jimeno was made on the Romeros' petition of the twenty-third of March, and not on that of the twenty-eighth of May, above referred to; for it directs the measurement to be proceeded to on the ninth of April. And, finally, on the twenty-seventh of December, 1847, K. H. Dimmick, then Alcalde, makes an order in which, after reciting that disputes as to the boundaries existed between the Romeros and Domingo Peralta, he directs that the boundaries be established and adjusted in the manner specified in the order of the Governor, dated twenty-third of March, 1844. I have stated the contents of these various documents with some particularity, because an attempt has been made since the rejection of the claim by the Board, to show by parol evidence that a final grant issued to the Romeros, which has been lost. We have seen that the last document in the expediente is the order of the Governor of the twenty-third of March, 1844, adopting Jimeno's recommendation that a measurement should be made before issuing the final grant, or even a provisional one, as solicited by Romero ; and even then it does not seem that the grant was certainly to be made, for Romero and Soto were to " present themselves," evidently for the purpose of enabling the Governor to ascertain their respective rights. Nothing further seems to have been done, either by the government or the petitioners, until 1847. On the thirty-first of March of that year we find the Romeros representing to the Alcalde that the Governor had some years before ordered the land to be measured, which had not been done ; and that they were without any piece of land whatever, and they beg the Alcalde to provide for them. The Alcalde thereupon directs that the superior order of March 23, 1844, be proceeded to. On the 28th of May, 1847, the Romeros again petition the Alcalde, representing that as early as 1844, the Governor had sent to the Alcalde's Court an order requiring a measurement of the land ; they therefore ask a testimonial of the reports and orders in his office, "so that we may be granted the land" The Alcalde again directs the superior order of March 23, 1844, to be complied with, and on the following day a declaration is made before the Alcalde by Antonio M. Pico, that Don J. Moraga and Don L. Pacheco, the colindantes, had declared that for their parts the surplus of land which does not belong to them " could be granted to the Romeros." And, finally, the deed from Romero to Garcia of January 15, 1847, expressly stipulates that both the parties to it should remain subject to the final result, " if the Governor grant it in ownership, and if the contrary should be the case, then Garcia should lose equally with Romero without reclamation." These documents appear to me to establish beyond doubt that all action of the Government on the application of the Romeros terminated with the order of March 23, 1844, directing the measurement as an indispensable preliminary to a grant, either final or provisional. That during the year 1847, the petitioners made several attempts to have that measurement effected, but apparently without success ; and that up to December, 1847, neither they nor any one else pretended that the order of March 23, 1844, was not the last act of the Government in the premises. The parol testimony offered to prove that a grant issued will be briefly adverted to. C. Brown swears that the Romeros have lived on the Rancho since 1840, and that he always understood they had a grant. He does not pretend to have seen it. James M. Tice swears that he has searched for the title papers, but has been unable to find them. J. J. P. Mesa saw a bundle of papers in Romero's hands on his return from Monterey, in 1844. The bundle was not opened, but Romero said they were his title papers. He subsequently saw Micheltorena's order for the measurement of the land. He does not pretend to have seen any grant. It is to be observed that Mesa was examined before the Board, and did not mention this circumstance ; and that he can neither read nor write. Inocencio Romero, who disclaims any present interest in the land, swears that he had a grant ; that he gave it to Mr. Tingley to be presented to the Board, and that since then he has not seen it. He also states that the grant was made by Micheltorena a short time after he arrived in the country, and that Arce, who was then his secretary, delivered it to him. The expediente, however, shows that Jimeno was the secretary, at least until March 23, 1844. And as it is clear that at that date the grant was suspended until a measurement should be made, the title papers seen by Mesa in the hands of Romero on his return from Monterey in 1844, must have been the papers now produced.
The testimony of Mr. G. B. Tingley is the only evidence in the cause which approaches proof that a grant issued. This witness swears that on the trial of a suit between Domingo Peralta and the Romeros, a grant from Micheltorena to the latter was produced in evidence ; that the petition was for a sobrante ; that the signatures were genuine ; and that one Sanford took the papers, and he has never seen them since. On his cross-examination he states that the papers produced were the original petition, and the marginal order of reference an information signed by A. M. Pico, then a decree of concession, and final a title in form, with a condition that the grant should not interfere with the adjoining grants. If these papers were produced, they must all, with the exception of the grant, have been procured from the archives, for the petition, the informes, and the decree of concession form part of the expediente which remains on file. That expediente is in evidence in this cause, and contains no decree of concession whatever, nor any draft or " borrador " of the formal title delivered to the party, as is almost invariably the case where such a document issued ; on the contrary, the last order of the Governor, in effect, refuses, as we have seen, to grant the petition for even a provisional title until a measurement was made, which clearly was not done until after December, 1847, if at all. Besides, if all these papers were produced from the archives and were delivered to Sanford, how does it happen that only a part of them were restored to the archives, and are now produced ? Jose" Ramon Mesa, a witness produced on the part of the United States, testifies that he was present at the trial of the suit referred to by Mr. Tingley ; that no formal title was produced by the Romeros, but only a provisional license to occupy, subject to the boundaries of the neighboring proprietors, during the pendency of the proceedings to obtain a title. The witness further swore that he heard Inocencio Romero state to Domingo Peralta, in reply to an inquiry as to what title he had, that he had no title ; and that he had intended to take steps to get one, but that all he had was a " provisional license." This provisional license is in all probability the order made by John Burton, Justice of the Peace, in April, 1847, on the margin of the Governor's order of March 23, 1844, for the measurement of the land, and was in compliance with Romero's petition to him of the thirty-first of March, 1847. The Justice of the Peace directs that " the interested party will proceed to take possession of the land, according to the order of the Government," etc. As a copy of Jimeno's order, with this marginal entry of Burton's, appears to have been furnished to Romero, and by him sent to Garcia, it is in all probability the " license " referred to. It Avill not be pretended that any rights could be conferred by such an order of an American Justice of the Peace in April, 1847. The record of the suit between Peralta and the Romeros has been produced. It contains no evidence whatever even tending to show that a grant was produced at the trial. Antonio M. Pico, a witness produced by the claimants, swears that he received an order from the Governor to put the coterminous neighbors, Pacheco and Moraga, into possession of their land, and to measure the same for the purpose of separating them from those of the Romeros ; that he was directed by the same order to put the Romeros in possession of the sui-plus ; that he summoned the colindantes, but they did not appear : that he did not then execute the order, but repeated the summons to them ; that the Romeros made a complaint to the Governor, and he, the witness, received from the latter a new order to carry the former into effect, upon which he told the Romeros to go there - which they did in 1844. This witness explicitly states that no title to the land in favor of the Romeros was ever exhibited to him. The orders referred to by Pico are obviously those contained in the expediente. The first order did not, as he supposes, direct him to put the Romeros in possession, but only to measure the land and certify the result, "so that it might be granted." Romero's complaint or petition to the Governor, stating the failure of the alcalde to measure the land, and asking for a provisional grant, we also find in the expediente, and also the second order of the Governor, which, like the former, only directs the measurement of the land - the Governor having, as we have seen, adopted Jimeno's recommendation that the land should be measured, and Soto and Romero should present themselves before any grant should issue. On the parol proofs alone I should come to the conclusion that Mr. Tingley is mistaken in supposing that a grant for the land was ever produced. But the evidence afforded not only by the expediente, but by the repeated declarations of the Romeros themselves in their various petitions and in the conveyance to Garcia, remove every possible doubt on the question. The facts of the case are unmistakable. The Romeros solicited land, which the Governor was disposed to grant. He directed a measurement preparatory to making the grant, and this measurement never was effected. I cannot perceive how this Court can recognize these proceedings as giving any title to the lands. It may be admitted that in 1844 they went upon the land, as stated by Pico - though, if so, it is singular that John Burton, Alcalde, should, in April, 1847, have ordered " the interested parties to proceed to take possession of the mentioned lands, according to the order of the Government." But this occupation, not authorized, so far as it appears, by the Government, and only made in pursuance of a verbal permission of Pico, and without the measurement of the land, as required by both orders of Micheltorena, can hardly be deemed to have conferred any title, either legal or equitable, upon the claimants. The case is, perhaps, a hard one, for there seems no reason to suppose that the grant would have been refused if the measurement had been made and Soto's rights had been found to have been forfeited. But no grant, either perfect or inchoate, was made, nor any promise given that one should be made. The petitions were favorably received, a provisional grant refused, and a measurement directed. There the action of the Goverment ended, and certainly such proceedings did not confer such a right of property in the land as this Court can recognize. The claim must be rejected. (June Term, 1857.)
Alice Marsh, claiming the Rancho Los Megamos, Appellant, vs. The United States. - Claims for twelve leagues of land in Contra Costa county, rejected by the Board, and appealed by the claimant. The claim in this case is for a tract of land called " Los Meganos " granted to Jose" Noriega, October 13, 1835, and approved by the Territorial Deputation, October 15, 1835. The final documents and titulo issued December 2d of the same year. The original grant was not produced to the Board, nor was any satisfactory evidence of its contents given. The expediente, however, containing the petition, informes and decree of concession, was found duty archived, and on these documents, together with parol proof that the titulo had in fact issued, the claimant relied for confirmation. In his petition, Noriega set out the boundaries of the land solicited with some particularity, and states its extent to be four leagues from south to north, and three from east to west. Inasmuch as the decree of concession and the approval of the Deputation showed that the lands of "Los Meganos" had been granted, it was contended that the lost titulo must have embraced the land solicited in the petition. It was not, however, urged that all the land embraced within the boundaries had been granted, and the claim was confined to a tract of twelve square leagues, which had been, at the instance of the claimant, surveyed by the Surveyor-General. By this survey, the last line which enclosed the Rancho had been so run as to include the precise quantity of twelve leagues. Had the Surveyor's lines been extended so as to embrace the entire tract according to the principles on which the survey was founded, the land would have been found to be about fifteen square leagues in extent. A survey, according to the description contained in the petition, would, it is observed by Mr. Commissioner Felch, embrace some twenty or twenty-five square leagues of land. Since the cause has "been pending on appeal, the original record of the titulo has been produced from the archives, where it is set out at length. The fourth condition states the extent of the granted land is to be a little more than three square leagues, and it contains the usual direction for a judicial measurement and a reservation of the sobrante. It is urged that this limitation should be disregarded as being repugnant to the obvious intention of the grantor, and probably introduced by mistake. It is not, perhaps, very clear what the claimant supposes herself entitled to ; whether she contends that the grant should be treated as a grant by metes and bounds, and the whole tract embraced within the boundaries mentioned in the petition should be confirmed to her, to the extent of twenty or twentyfive leagues, or whether, as it appears to have been admitted before the Board, she should be restricted to the quantity of twelve leagues, according to the survey procured to be made. It is presumed, however, that independently of the limitation contained in the fourth condition, it would not be contended that the Governor could have intended to grant a tract of twenty or twenty -five leagues in extent, when the petitioner himself stated it to contain only twelve leagues, and two of the witnesses a much smaller quantity ; and such seems to have been the view taken of the grant by the counsel for the claimant.
The grant cannot, therefore, be treated as a grant by metes and bounds, and the only question is, which of the specifications of quantity shall govern - that contained in the petition or that contained in the grant ? It is urged that the Governor by his decree of concession, and the Deputation by confirming the title to " Los Meganos," clearly indicated their intention to grant the tract as described in the petition, and of the extent therein mentioned. Had the boundaries of this tract been found to embrace only the quantity stated in the petition ; had the attention of the Governor been particularly directed to the question of its extent ; had he been apprised of its extent by the testimony of witnesses, and with these facts before him, repeated in his concession, and in the title, the boundaries as set forth in the petition ; and had the deputation confirmed with express reference to those boundaries, we might have supposed, as in the case of Rosa Pacheco, that the limitation in the condition was the result of a clerical error - provided that in attributing to the Governor the intention to grant by metes and bounds, we did not suppose him to have exceeded the quantity of eleven leagues to which his granting power was limited. But in this case the proceedings show, that in all probability the limitation in the condition accurately expressed the intention of the Governor and of the Assembly. The petition was referred to the Alcalde of the Capital to take information, by the oaths of three competent witnesses, as to the qualifications, etc., of the petitioner, and the extent and character of the land. One of them states that the tract petitioned for may be three leagues long, and in width from two leagues to less than one-half a league. The second witness states its extent to be about two and one-half or three leagues in length, and from one-half to two leagues in width. The third witness states it to be four or five leagues in length, and three in breadth. It thus appears that by the evidence of two out of three witnesses, the Governor and the Deputation were apprised that the extent of the land of " Los Meganos " was about three leagues. When, therefore, they granted the land by that name, it was at least as probable that they intended a tract of the extent sworn to by the two witnesses, as of the larger extent sworn to by the third, or as represented by the petition. The limitation in the condition of the grant removes all doubt upon the subject, and unequivocally expresses the intention which, without it, we might well have attributed to the grantor. The claim to twelve leagues rests entirely upon the supposition that the Governor intended, by the term " Los Meganos," a tract of the extent represented by the petitioner. But when we find him informed by the depositions of two witnesses that the land of that name only included about three leagues, there is surely as much reason to suppose that he meant a tract of the smaller extent as of the larger. There is, therefore, nothinorepugnant to the apparent intention of the Governor or the Deputation in the introduction of the limitation of quantity in the fourth condition. Nor can I perceive on what grounds the Court would be authorized to strike from the grant so important a part of it. As the grant can in no case be deemed a grant by metes and bounds, the words " a little more than," which precede the words " three leagues," are not susceptible of any definite construction. They were probably inserted as an authority to the judicial officer, slightly to increase the quantity for convenience of boundary, or similar reasons. As no such discretion can be confided to the Surveyor- General, those words must be rejected for uncertainty, and the claimant confirmed to the precise quantity of three square leagues, to be located within the boundaries described in the petition, in the form and divisions prescribed by law for surveys in California, and embracing the entire grant in one tract. (December Term, 1857).
Washington, February 23, 1882. To the Commissioner of the General Land Office - Sir : I have considered, on appeal from the decision of your office of February 26, 1881, the matter of the survey of the California private land claim known as El Sobrante Rancho, situate in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda, and confirmed to Juan Jose" and Victor Castro by the Board of Land Commissioners and the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, under the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1851 (9 Stats., 631). Such facts, appearing of record in your office, as are necessary to a proper understanding of the main questions presented for consideration, will be stated as briefly as practicable.
On the 26th of May, 1852, the said Juan Jose- and Victor Castro, by their attorneys, H. W. Carpentier and John Wilson, filed in the office of the said Board of Land Commissioners a petition in which they set forth, among other things, that on the 22d of April, 1841, they j>resented their joint petition to Juan B. Alvarado, then Governor of Upper California, " for a grant of all the vacant (sobrante) land lying between the Ranchos San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Valencia, and Moraga, being the surplus or overplus left between the said Ranchos after the boundaries to the Ranchos " should " be ascertained and settled ;" that "on the 23d of April, 1841, the said Alvarado, so being Governor, and having full power and authority to do so, granted the land as prayed for in the said petition," and directed the petitioners "to anew before the proper authority with a map of the land so asked * as soon as the boundaries of the Ranchos named in said petition
* * * should be ascertained, regulated and settled ;" that they had always been ready to comply with the direction of the Governor to present themselves anew to the proper authority, with a map of the land thus conceded to them, but that the boundaries of the Ranchos named had not been . ascertained and settled ; that " the said Victor, several years before the date of the grant, had settled upon the land so granted them, had built and resided in a house, and cultivated fields thereon ;" that both the petitioners " pastured their cattle, horses, etc., upon it," the land granted, " before the grant was made," and had continued to do so ever since ; that the said Victor had " constantly since resided thereon," and had cultivated three different Ranchos thereon, and had, forthe last fourteen years (prior to presentation of the petition to the Board), "had and held (and which was known to the owners of the neighboring Ranchos mentioned in the grant * * *) exclusive and continued possession thereof ;" and the petitioners prayed that they might " be allowed to intervene in the cases arising out of the said Ranchos when the boundaries thereof " were to be investigated, so that justice might be done them and they obtain " all the vacant (sobrante) land lying between the said Ranchos after their boundaries are properly adjudged and regulated," and that their grant might be confirmed and made valid to them " according to the full intent of the grant at the time the same was made." (Record of Petitions, vol. 1, p. 460, et seq., Land Commission of California.)
On the same day, to wit, May 26, 1852, the Castros filed another petition, in which they represented, as before, that they had petitioned for a grant April 22, 1841, of "all the vacant (sobrante) land lying in between the Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, the ranch of Valencia and the ranch of Moraga, being the overplus lying between these several Ranchos, which lie in the county of Contra Costa;" that on the 23d of April, 1841, the Governor granted the same to them, " as they petitioned," and directed them to "present themselves anew before the proper authority, accompanied by a map of the land so granted, so soon as the boundaries of the Ranchos named should be ascertained and settled ; * * * but that the boundaries of the said Ranchos" had never been ascertained and settled. They therefore prayed the Board to ascertain and settle said boundaries, and then they would comply with all their duty in the premises. They also stated that they would prove that they had been " in the actual possession of said sobrante or vacant land so granted them ever since the date of the said grant," and that they had " had on it a large stock of cattle, horses, sheep, etc."
They further alleged that the grant had not been approved by the Departmental Assembly, " because the boundaries of the adjoining Ranchos had not been ascertained," and set forth other matters not necessary to be here.
Whether this petition was to amend the one first herein referred to, or vice versa, does not appear ; but the two may be taken together as the petition of the Castros to the Board of Land Commissioners.
It may be well here to state that about the year 1853, after said petition to the Board was filed, and before the claim was confirmed, the county of Contra Costa, in which the petitioners alleged their land to be situated, was divided, and part of it included in the county of Alameda. There is, consequently, no variance between the general location called for in the petition as in Contra Costa county, and that in the Board's decree as in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda.
In support of their claim the petitioners introduced in evidence the original petition and concession, or grant, and a translation thereof, which translation was certified as correct by George Fisher, secretary to the Board. This official translation of said petition and grant reads as follows :
Petition
To his Excellency, the Governor : The citizens, Juan Jose" and Victor Castro, natives of this Department, and residents within the jurisdiction of San Jose de Alvarado, present ourselves before your Excellency in the most proper and respectful manner, and represent that, being desirous of being finally settled upon land of our own, for the purpose of devoting ourselves to the labors of agriculture and the raising of cattle, in order by these means to obtain the very necessary means of subsistence for our numerous increased families, which is of such vital importance, we beseech your Excellency that you will deign to grant unto us a piece of vacant land which is situate on the immediate limits (inmediaciones) of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, the farm (rancho) of Valencia, and the farm of Moraga, which land is the overplus (sobrante) of the ranches aforesaid.
Alvarado. (Record of evidence, vol. 19, p. 107, Land Commission, California.) Testimony was introduced to prove the genuineness of the grant, its character, the settlement of Victor Castro thereon, the possession of the Castros as alleged in the petition, and also some testimony concerning the boundaries of the Peraltas' grant of San Antonio, and the case was submitted for decision, whereupon, on the 3d day of July, 1855, the following opinion and decree were rendered by the Board of Land Commissioners :
Opinion
The evidence in this case establishes the following facts : That the petitioners presented their expediente for a sobrante of land lying between Ranchos named in said expediente, and in pursuance of said expediente, Juan B. Alvarado, Governor of California, on the 23d day of April, 1841, issued a grant to the petitioners, and requiring them to report a plat of the same as soon as the adjoining Ranchos could be surveyed and the extent of the sobrante ascertained, which survey has not been had of said Ranchos so as to enable the petitioners herein to define with certainty the boundaries of their said sobrante, and a large amount of testimony has been taken for the purpose of settling the boundai'ies, which is rendered inapplicable to the merits of this claim by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Fremont.
The grant offered in evidence is proven to be genuine, and the proofs in the case go to show that it was issued to the grantees in consideration of services rendered to the nation and for supplies furnished for the use of the Mexican Government.
Decree
In this case, on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by the commission that the claim of the said petitioners is valid, and it is therefore decreed that the same be and hereby is confirmed.
The land of which confirmation is hereby made is situated in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda, and is the surplus (sobrante) which on the 23d day of April, A. D. 1841, the date of the decree of concession to the present claimants, existed, lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia, reference being had to the original expediente on file in this case. (Record of Decisions, vol. 3, pp. 106 and 107, Land Commission, California.)
The case was taken to the proper United States District Court, as provided in section 9 of the Act of 1851, above referred to, and such pi'oceedings
The contest now here on appeal arose over a survey of the claim thus confirmed, which was executed by Deputy Surveyor William Minto, in 1878, under contract with the Surveyor-General of California, approved by your office. The field notes of the survey were returned to the Surveyor- General's office August 26, 1878, and from them a plat was made, after which, in September and October, 1878, notice of the execution of the survey and plat was duly published under Section 1 of the Act of July 1, 1864, (13 Stats., 332), and the survey and plat were retained in the office of the Surveyor-General for inspection, as required by law.
Many objections to the survey, protests against the surveying of the claim as demanded by the owners thereof, and interventions in the case were filed, some before and others after the period of ninety days from the first publication of notice had expired ; and thereunder a vast amount of testimony was introduced before the Surveyor-General, which was forwarded with the appeal. It is unnecessary to pass upon the status of the various objectors, protestants, iritervenors, or to specify those who appeared in time and showed such interest as entitled them to be heard, and to dismiss the proceedings of all others, under the rule laid down by the Department May 28, 1879, in the matter of the survey of the Bancho El Corte de Madera del Presidio (Copp's L. 0., vol. 6, p. 52), for the reason that the case is appealed by parties having a proper standing therein, who have raised every point, it seems to me, that the circumstances of the case admit, or that arises in the case.
I need not further recite connectedly the history or facts of the case, enough having already been stated to develop the principal questions involved ; but such other matters of record in your office as shall seem proper to be considered will be referred to and discussed as occasion may require.
It is proper here to state my reasons for not using and discussing the testimony of witnesses taken before the Surveyor-General. I have not done so for the reason as to one branch of the case no such testimony is admissible, and as to the other, from my view of the case, none of it is needed. The explanation is this : The decree is said to be ambiguous. Now, if there is a patent ambiguity, it cannot be explained by testimony unless the terms used are wholly indefinite and equivocal, and convey on their face no certain or explicit meaning, and the decree itself furnishes no materials by which the ambiguity thus arising can be removed. In such a case, rather than the claim which has been adjudicated upon the principles of equity (Sec. 11, Act. of 1851, 9 Stats., 633), should entirely fail, the light of intrinsic evidence may be brought in to ascertain the intention of the Board. But, in my opinion, the decree is not in such a condition. I think that any patent ambiguity in the expressed decree can be explained by reference to such matters, as, under the rules of interpretation applicable to this case, may properly be examined for that purpose as a part of the decree. It follows, therefore, that any ambiguity appearing upon the face of the decree itself must be removed by construction and not by averment, and hence upon this branch of the case the testimony aforesaid is inad-
The latent ambiguity of the decree can, in my opinion, be sufficiently explained by the records of your office or those of the Surveyor-General's office, and therefore the testimony of witnesses was not, and is not, needed in this case. In other words, that which was confirmed by the decree of the Board can be so surveyed as to do substantial justice from light afforded by the records of the land department, and no testimony dehors the records would make the matter more certain.
The decree of confirmation in this case is final and conclusive as between the United States and the Castros, or those claiming under them. If there were error or mistake in it the only remedy was by appeal. The appeal from the decree of the Board having been dismissed by the District Court, the decree must forever stand as the court thus made and left it. There is no authority or jurisdiction in any tribunal to correct, alter, amend, or annul it. Nothing remains to be done except to execute it according to its true intent as the law provides. If it is ambiguous and requires construction, then this must be done under the rules of the common law. The decree must serve as the guide to the Surveyor-General in making a survey in execution of the same. It is the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to see to it that the survey conforms as nearly as practicable to the decree, and finally, the Secretary of the Interior, by virtue of his supervisory powers and appellate jurisdiction, has authority to review the action of the Commissioner in the premises and direct how the survey shall be made. Each of these several propositions of law will be found fully sustained by some one or more of the following authorities : Higueras vs. The United States (5 Wall., 827, 828, 830, 832, 834) ; United States vs. Halleck (1 Wall., 439) ; United States vs. Billings (2 Wall., 444) ; the Fossatt case (ibid., 649) ; United States vs. Fossatt (21 How., 447) ; United States vs. Sepulveda (1 Wall, 107) ; 12 Opins. Attorneys-General, 250 ; Snyder vs. Sickels (8 Otto., 203) ; sections 13 and 15, act of 1851, 9 Stats., 633, 634; sections 1, 6, 7, act of 1S64, 13 Stats., 333, 334 ; section 1, act of 1812, 2 Stats., 716; section 1, act of 1836, 5 Stats., 107 ; section 3, act of 1849, 9 Stats., 395 ; section 453 Revised Statutes ; and decisions of this Department of March 3, 1881, in the matter of the survey of the pueblo lands of San Francisco, and of May 21, 1881, in the matter of the survey of the Rancho San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero.
It has been contended in argument by some of the able counsel that the claim of the Castros was not such as, according to the decision of the
Supreme Court in numerous cases, should have been confirmed; because the paper constituting the petition and concession was in the hands of the Castros until the organization of the Board of Land Commissioners, and until it was filed in the office of the Board ; because there was no map accompanying the petition, no reference by the Governor of the petition for information, no report upon the petition by any government officer, and the grant was not made matter of record in the archives of the Mexican Government ; and hence, that the only title to consideration which the claim has is the decree of confirmation. For these reasons it is contended that, as to the claim, the construction of the decree should be strictissvmi juris. Others contend that the doctrine applicable to public or legislative grants should be applied in construing this decree ; that it should be strictly construed as against the confirmees. On the other hand, counsel for claimants contend that the doctrine above mentioned does not apply to decrees, especially not to a decree under the Act of 1851, founded upon the principles of equity, and that as to such a decree the doctrine of liberal or equitable construction should be applied.
As to the first point, it is only necessary to say that the tribunal created by law to execute the decree cannot go behind it. The presumption is that the Board and the United States District Court did their duty in the premises, and adjudicated the case upon the laws and principles by which they were required to be governed as provided by section 11 of the said Act of 1851, and hence, that the decree is valid and binding upon all parties thereto. Therefore, if construction is necessary, the decree must be considered as entitled to the same respect and consideration as any other final decree of confirmation under said act.
As to all the foregoing propositions it may be said that the decree must be executed according to its true intent and meaning, and that construction should not be employed to any other end.
Sedgwick, in his work upon Construction of Statutes, etc., after having examined many decisions of courts bearing upon the subject of strict and liberal construction, concludes a long chapter by giving the judiciary and the legal profession, in the form of rules, the benefit of his extended researches, from which I make the following quotations : -
" The intent of the legislature should control absolutely the action of the judiciary ; where the intention is clearly ascertained, the courts have no other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without any regard to their own views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment.
" The idea that an act may be strictly or liberally construed without regard to the legislative intent, according as it is viewed either as a penal or remedial statute, either as in derogation of the common law or beneficial innovation, is,. in its very nature, delusive and fallacious.
" In cases where the intent of the legislation is ambiguous, and the effort to arrive at it is hopeless, and in these cases only, does the power of construing a statute strictly or liberally exist." (Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 325 and 326.)
The Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the doctrine of strict construction as applicable to legislative grants, held that the grant being considered by them could not extend beyond the intent it expressed ; that -
" It should be neither enlarged by ingenious reasoning, nor diminished by strained construction. The interpretation must be reasonable, and such as will give effect to the intention of Congress. This is to be ascertained from the terms employed, the situation of the parties, and the nature of the grant. If these terms are plain and unambiguous, there can be no difficulty in interpreting them ; but if they admit of different meanings - one of extension, and the other of limitation - they must be accepted in a sense favorable to the grantor." (Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co. vs. TJ. S., 2 Otto, 740.)
The harmony between the doctrine expressed by the Court and that referred to above is at once apparent. Both agree that the intention must prevail, but when the terms employed are so ambiguous as to render it impossible to ascertain the intention of the framers of the act, then the doctrine of strict or liberal construction may be applied according to the nature of the case. The Supreme Court, in the particular case, held that when the terms admitted of different meanings, one of extension and the other of limitation, they must be accepted in the sense favorable to the grantor. The Court supposed a case wherein it was hopeless, from the ambiguity of the terms employed, to arrive at the intent of the legislature, in which case it was authorized to employ the doctrine of strict construction as to the grantee, or to take that meaning which was favorable to the grantor. A meaning of extension and another of limitation are certainly diametrically opposed to each other, in which case one could be taken to the exclusion of the other. But where no such condition of affairs exists - where the intent can be reasonably ascertained from the whole act or instrument being interpreted - then there is no choice left, and the intent must govern.
In this connection it may be well to advert to the fact that the decree refers to " the original expediente and grant on file in this case." That instrument, therefore, may be read with the decree as a part of it (Sedgwick on Construction, &c, 2d edit., 229 and 230 ; and Broom's Legal Maxims, 7th edit., 673 et seq., and the numerous cases cited therein) ; not, however, for the purpose of opening anew any question adjudicated by the Board and District Court, nor for giving to the instrument referred to any other construction or force than that given by the Board and Court, as, expressed in their decree ; hence, not for the purpose of changing the meaning of terms that are clear and unambiguous in the expi-essed decree, but only to explain any ambiguity in the decree itself, (XJ. S. vs. Halleck, 1 Wall., 455; decision of this Department of May 21, 1881, in matter of survey of Rancho San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero). Wherein the decree, on its face, is clear so far as it relates to the subject matter or the original petition and grant.it must be held to be the construction of the Board and Court upon those instruments, which cannot be questioned here. Furthermore, in referring to the petition and grant in this decree, we can only look to the official translation thereof ; we cannot take any other translation, and by it undertake to explain any dubious expression of the decree. The Board had the services of a Secretary " skilled in the Spanish and English languages," a part of whose duty it was to act as interpreter to the Board, as the law provided. (Sec. 1, Act of 1851, 9 Stats., 631). The Secretary certified the translation of the petition and grant above given to be correct. The Board and the District Court gave consideration to the petition and grant, and adjudicated the case in view of that official translation. It follows, upon reasons too apparent to require explanation, that the expert testimony of witnesses before the Surveyor-General, giving a different translation to some of the words in the original petition and concession than that certified by Secretary Fisher, is wholly inadmissible, and that all efforts to inject into the case now any other translation than that which the Board and Court adopted, must fail.
The points raised by the objectors, protestants, etc., are very numerous, and need not be recited here. They are all, in some way, embraced in the three following general questions or propositions :
First. It is contended by the owners of the grant that the decree confirmed to them all the land within the exterior boundaries of the five Ranchos named as colindantes, which should be left or result as surplus upon the final survey of said Ranchos ; that their grant is not limited, except as by the exterior boundaries of said Ranchos and their finally surveyed limits, and therefore that the locative call in the decree for land " lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia " should be disregarded in making a survey under the decree.
Second. Some of the contestants insist that the claim confirmed was a piece of vacant land, never within the exterior boundaries of the five Ranchos referred to, nor any of them, but outside thereof and bounded by them.
Third. Other contestants admit that the land confirmed was surplus of said five Ranchos, or some of them, but insist that it must, from the terms of the decree, lie between those Ranchos as finally surveyed, in the sense of being surrounded or partly surrounded and bounded by them.
The San Antonio Rancho has the Bay of San Francisco for its western boundary, the ridge of the Coast Range mainly for its eastern boundary, and extends from a small stream called the Cerrito creek, on the north, to the San Leandro creek, on the south, a distance of about twelve miles. This was a grant by specific boundaries, and was surveyed and patented as such.
To the north and northeast of San Antonio, at a distance of about five miles, is the Rancho El Pinole. This, as confirmed, surveyed and patented, was a grant of quantity within larger exterior boundaries. The calls for the exterior boundaries of this grant were natural fixed objects, leaving no uncertainty as to the lines thereof.
San Pablo was a grant of quantity to be located within the boundaries mentioned in the grant, which were the Ranchos of San Antonio, El Pinole, and the Bay of San Francisco ; the southeastern boundary being thus necessarily uncertain.
To the east of San Antonio, southeast of San Pablo, and south of El Pinole, was the Rancho of Valencia, called Acalanes. It was a grant of quantity, to be measured within the general boundaries mentioned in the grant as San Pablo, San Antonio, and El Pinole.
South of the Acalanes and east of San Antonio was the Moraga Rancho, called Laguna de los Palos Colorados. It was a grant of quantity, to be measured within the exterior boundaries described in the Governor's formal grant, which virtually, though not expressly, called for San Antonio and Acalanes as colindantes.
The foregoing brief explanation, and the connected map prepared by the Surveyor-General in compliance with telegraphic order from your predecessor of October 24, 1878, from data on file in his office, which map was certified by the Surveyor-General November 22, 1S78, or the map subsequently substituted therefor by the Surveyor-General, will give a tolerably correct idea of the country occupied by said Ranchos, and their relative situation both as regards their exterior and their finally surveyed boundaries ; but as to a part of the exterior boundaries there is some question as to their being accurately delineated on said maps, which will be discussed hereafter.
It will be seen that a large tract of land is left nearly surrounded and bounded by said Ranchos as finally surveyed and patented, in addition to which there were numerous other smaller tracts excluded by final surveys, not surrounded by nor lying between said Ranchos, but within the exterior limits of some of them, most of said tracts being entirely disconnected with the large tract and with each other, and scattered about in various parts, mainly on the outskirts of the general tract embraced by the exterior boundaries of the five Ranchos mentioned in the decree.
Castros all the surplus land of the Ranchos aforesaid - that is, all the land within their exterior boundaries excluded by final survey - and that the said Ranchos were coterminous as to their exterior boundaries in the central portion in the general tract embraced by them all, set aside the Minto survey, and directed a new survey to be made, which should include not only the large tract nearly surrounded by the Ranchos as finally surveyed, but all the other tracts excluded from the final surveys, limiting his award only by the quantity of twenty-two square leagues.
In this, it seems to me, your office did not follow the decree of confirmation, assumjng that the tract confirmed was surplus of some of the said Ranchos resulting upon final survey thereof.
The error in the decision proceeds from premises, which, to my mind, are not supported by the relevant facts and the law of the case, to wit, first, that the word " sobrante," as used in the grant and decree of confirmation necessarily meant all of the sobrante of said Ranchos, and could not be limited by the words designating the particular location of the sobrante, nor by the words designating it as a piece - one piece - of land; and, secondly, that it was a grant by name of the sobrante, and hence included all of the sobrante.
It cannot be maintained upon general principles that power was wanting in the Governor to grant, or in the Board and Court to confirm, as sobrante any portion of the surplus of grants of quantity, and define its location and boundaries. As a matter of fact the records of your office will show that more than one such grant has been made of the sobrante of a single grant, and the grants thus made have been confirmed and patented accordingly. Now, that the tract confirmed in this case, admitting it to be sobrante of some of the Ranchos mentioned in the decree, was limited, seems clear to me, and that the surveyor has no authority to locate or survey any land in any other locality than that mentioned in the decree cannot be successfully questioned. In view of the authorities hereinbefore mentioned no one will deny that the decree of confirmation must be the guide in making the survey, or that the surveyor must follow it. In the United States vs. Fossatt (21 How. 449), the Supreme Court, in speaking of the powers and duties of the Board and Courts under the Act of 1821, said :
"But, in addition to these questions upon the validity of the title, there may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of a claim."
"It is true, for the determination of the validity of claims presented, some consideration must have been had of their extent, location, and boundaries. The petition of the claimants must necessarily have designated, with more or less precision, such extent and location."
In the light of these decisions no one can consistently say that the Surveyor-General, your office, or this Department can disregard the words of the decree that point out the locus of the land confirmed, in making or directing a survey thereof. The decree recites that the land of which confirmation is thereby made " is the surplus (sobrante) which, on the 23d day of April, A. D. 1841. * * * existed lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia."
Is it possible that any land that does not lie between those Ranchos can be surveyed under this decree ? By what authority can the Surveyor-General look for land under this decree, except in that locality?
But the Commissioner suggests that the words " lying between," etc., constitute a false description of the land, and that it grew out of the mistaken meaning of the words " en las inmediaciones," in the petition for the grant, which he says were carelessly taken to be translatable by the word "between ;" and he further says that the Board did well to refer for greater certainty to the original grant.
The answer to this has already been anticipated. The Board having thus translated and interpreted the grant, there is no tribunal that has the power to change it. Certainly it does not lie with the claimants to object to the translation, for the record shows it to be their own, notwithstanding it was adopted as the official translation. The regulations of the Commissioners, found in journal, vol. 1, p. 2-i, required every claimant to accompany his petition " by a copy of the original grant and a translation," and the petition of the Castros shows that this regulation was complied with, and the records do not show that said copy and translation were rejected or objected to. Unless the Board was to adopt the translation, if found correct, there was no object in requiring it to be filed.
But the idea that there is repugnance in the language of the grant and that of the decree on this point is not well founded. Referring to the official translation of the petition and grant, it will be found that the Castros petitioned for "apiece of vacant land which is situated on" (not "in" as the Commissioner has it) " the immediate limits (inmediaciones) of San Antonio," etc., "which land is the overplus (sobrante) of the ranchos aforesaid."
Here we find that this tract must be "on the immediate limits of" the said Ranchos. Now, from the very meaning of these words, taking the actual situations of the grants named, the land must lie between them all in the sense of being surrounded, or partly surrounded, and bounded by them. The word "immediate," as here used, means "not separated in respect to place by anything intervening." (See any standard dictionary.) It was one tract that was granted and the same tract was confirmed ; and it was not a tract of land, vacant or otherwise, that surrounded all these Ranchos and bounded their outer limits. The bays of San Francisco and San Pablo and the strait of Carquinez put an end to such an idea, even if the absurdity of the proposition in itself does not. Where else, then, than in the midst of these Ranchos can a tract of land be found that can lie on the immediate limits of each and all of the Ranchos named in actual contact with all of them. There is not the slightest repugnancy between the description in the grant and that of the decree, so far as the words " lying between " are concerned.
But it is urged the word "between" can refer to but two objects, and hence was not the proper expression to use to convey the idea above expressed. Perhaps in a literal, narrow sense this may be true ; but a definition is given it in dictionaries like this, " in the immediate space of ; " " having mutual relation to two or more of;" in fact, the word is quite commonly used with respect to more than two persons or things, as " between us, to go no further, I will tell you something," the pronoun " us " embracing, perhaps, twenty individuals. But, "qui ha-rrct in litera hceret in cortice." Such verbal criticisms as are indulged in upon the words " lying between," as used in the decree, are of little value in the interpretation of written instruments. The well-known general and comprehensive rule for the interpretation of written instruments is that where the intention is clear, too great a stress should not be laid on the strict and precise signification of words. One who will consider for a moment what other word can be found to describe the locality of a tract of land surrounded, or nearly so, by a number of Ranchos, will soon discover that no form of expression in the English language is better adapted briefly but clearly to define its location than that it lies between them. But if their could be atiy doubt as to what the Board meant by the use of the words " lying between," in the connection in which they were employed, it would be at once resolved by reference to the petition and grant, as has already been demonstrated.
Suppose, however, that the petition and grant did not make clear the terms in the written decree, and that the Department were required to look beyond them, then I should turn to the Board's finding of facts in the opinion preceding the decree. The Board there says that the evidence establishes the fact that the petitioners presented their expediente for a " sobrante " of land " lying between Ranchos named in said expediente." If this were not satisfactory, then I should read the petitions of the Castros to the Board. In the first one they describe the land as " lying between " the said Ranchos, and, as if to leave no room for doubt as to what they really meant, in their other petition to the Board they describe it as " lying in between " said Ranchos. No one knew better than the Castros where the land was for which they petitioned. Now, with this expression, so oft-repeated, it seems to me that no other locality than the intervening space inclosed (or partially inclosed) by all these Ranchos, could be sought for the location of the piece of land confirmed, even if the original grant did not so effectually settle the question.
But there is no confusion in the decree about this matter. The meaning of the Board and Court as to the locality of the land is plain, especially when the papers referred to in the decree are read.
It is hardly necessary to say more on this point. The mere mention of the rule, which is applicable to this decree as well as to other written instruments, that the whole instrument must be construed together, so that, if possible, every part shall stand, that no words are to be rejected as meaningless and none interpolated or added, would perhaps have been sufficient to answer all that has been said in favor of the rights of the owners of El Sobrante to have other land surveyed than that found to lie between the five Ranchos in the sense in which the Board clearly employed the word " between," that is, within the surroundings of the five Ranchos ; not between any two, or three, or four of them, but between all of them.
Whatever the land may be, whether an independent, vacant tract (vacant in the sense of never having been included within the exterior limits of any of the Ranchos named) or vacant surplus land (sobrante, in the sense of having been included in some of the exterior boundaries named in the grants, and vacant in the sense of being subject to grant), it must be found in the locality designated in the decree as above defined.
I am supported in this view by the Supreme Court of California. In the case of Tewksbury vs. Derosier, decided November 11, 1881, (The Pacific Coast Law Journal, vol. 8, No. 17, p. 683,) the Court, speaking of this very decree, said : -
" The confirmation of El Sobrante was of lands ' lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia.' The lands in controversy are not between the Ranchos above named, or any of them. On the contrary, they are on the shore of the Bay of San Francisco, and between it and the Rancho San Pablo. They are not even in the vicinity of any of said Ranchos, unless it be the Ranchos San Pablo and San Antonio."
The land in question before the Court, and of which the Court was speaking, is one of the tracts which your office directed to be included in the new survey.
After so much has been said, it is hardly necessary to discuss the proposition that this is a grant by name. Surplus is undoubtedly a name, because it is a noun, but it was not a proper noun as used by the Castros in their petition. There is nothing in the case to show that it was ever the name of this Rancho at or before the date of this grant. Sobrante means in English surplus or overplus. The three words mean the same. There is probably no foreign word that can be translated into our English with more exactness of definition than the Spanish word " sobrante " by the English word " surplus." If the Board in its decree had put in parenthesis the word " overplus," instead of " sobrante," after the word " surplus," the decree would have meant exactly what it does now, each word being the exact equivalent of the other. The use of the word " sobrante " in parenthesis simply shows that the Board translated it by the word " surplus." The Castros asked for vacant, surplus land.
Whether surplus of vacant public land left in the general tract occupied by the five Ranchos outside of and defined by their exterior boundaries, or of that which should remain within the exterior boundaries, after the quantities of said grants should be surveyed, will be determined next in order. They did not ask for a place known by the name of Surplus, or Lo Sobrante, or El Sobrante ; but for a -piece of vacant, surplus land. That is all the name the Rancho had. That does not fill the well-known definition of a Mexican grant, by name of the place granted, nor the old common law case or illustration of " Black Acre."
The expressed, recorded decree describes the land confirmed as the surplus "which, on the 23d day of April, 1841, the date of the decree of the concession to the present claimants, existed, lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga and Valencia."
The Supreme Court of the United States has, in several instances, described the different kinds of grants which could be made under Mexican law and regulations by governors of the Department of California, thus : - 1st, grants by specific boundaries where the donee was entitled to the entire tract described ; 2d, grants by quantity, as of one or more leagues situated at some designated place, or within a larger tract described by out-boundaries, where the donee was entitled out of the general tract only to the quantity specified ; and, 3d, grants, or places by name, where the donee was entitled to the tract named according to the limits, as shown by its settlement and possession, or other competent evidence. (Higueras vs. U. S., 5 Wall., 828; Alvisovs. U. S., 8 Id., 339 ; and Hornsby vs. U. S., 10 Id., 224.)
The claim of the Castros, having been decreed to be valid, should belong to one of the kinds of grants thus defined. It is clear upon the face of the decree that it was not a grant of quantity nor one of place by name. It therefore necessarily falls into the category of grants by boundaries ; and as no calls are given for boundaries, except the five Ranchos named, it must be limited by their boundaries and lie between them all. If this be not so, then, although confirmed as valid, the claim is void for uncertainty.
In United States vs. Fossatt (21 How., 449), the Supreme Court said that " in affirming a claim to land under a Spanish or Mexican grant to be valid within the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the usages of those governments, we imply something more than that certain papers are genuine, legal and translative of property. We affirm that ownership and possession of land of definite boundaries right- fully attach to the grantee." See also Fossatt's case (2 Wall, 707), and United States vs. Sepulveda (1 Wall., 107 and 108). In United States vs. Grimes (2 Black, G13), the Court, speaking of the duty of the Land Commissioners under the Act of 1851, said : " It is their duty to establish the boundaries as well as the validity of the Mexican grant as between him (the grantee) and the Government." The Board and Court, then, had power to fix the boundaries as they did.
Now, the presumption in favor of the validity of the decree, and that the Board and Court performed their duties under the law, forces the conclusion that the decree in some manner indicates the boundaries of the claim with more or less certainty, which in executing it must be ascertained with reasonable exactitude ; for not to ascertain them would render that void which the Board and Court have affirmed to be valid ; hence the decree must be construed, if possible, so as not to make void that which has thus been affirmed as valid, whether the construction be as to patent or latent ambiguity. In doing this, so far as ascertaining the boundaries is concerned, that which is certain should be preferred to that which is uncertain.
Now, as regards these boundaries, the expressed decree seems to be ambiguous, but the ambiguity is mainly latent, and, wherein it is so, it may be explained by matters dehors the decree or the documents referred to therein.
While there may be no uncertainty as to the ordinary meaning of the word "surplus" or "sobrante," yet, when applied to land, it seems to me that it may embrace lands differing in condition or status, although it is strongly maintained that it cannot. The ordinary definition of " surplus " is that which remains when use is satisfied ; excess beyond what is prescribed or wanted - overplus. Now, was the land confirmed surplus of vacant public land which was left of the general tract out of which the said five Ranchos were to be satisfied, and which was never within the exterior boundaries mentioned in the Governor's grants of the said surrounding Ranchos, and bounded by their exterior boundaries ; or was it surplus of those Ranchos, or of any of them - that which should remain of the larger tracts when the quantity to which the donees were severally entitled should be satisfied - bounded by said Ranchos after they should be measured off and segregated ?
The decree does not clearly state of what the land confirmed was surplus. But it is insisted that what here may appear to be ambigttitas latens and subject to explanation by extrinsic evidence is explained by subsequent terms in the decree, and no other evidence is admissible ; that wherein the decree describes the surplus as that " which on the 23d clay of April, A. D. 1841, * * * existed, lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio," etc., the Board and Court necessarily meant a tract of vacant public land, in the sense of lying without the exterior boundaries by the Governor in the grants of said tracts, and hence surplus of the general tract of public land out of which the several Kanchos mentioned were taken, and bounded by their exterior boundaries ; that in describing the land as surplus, which existed in 1841, lying between tracts known by the names mentioned, those tracts must have had known boundaries, and that a grant of quantity which might be located anywhere within the exterior limits mentioned would not have been referred to as a known tract.
But it will be seen that these subsequent terms necessarily lead for explanation and certainty to matters outside the decree itself. To ascertain what surplus existed in 1841, we certainly must look to matters not set forth in the decree. Were the Ranchos mentioned grants from the Mexican Government ? Were they completed grants ? Were they grants by names of places, or by specific boundaries, or of quantity within larger exterior limits ? If of quantity, had they been set off and segregated ? If not, what were their exterior boundaries ? These and divers other necessary questions are not answered by the decree, and the decree itself necessarily refers us to extrinsic matters. This is latent ambiguity, and the decree is by no means peculiar in this respect.
It is well settled that even the instruments referred to in the decree cannot be read to vary the natural import of the language used, if there be no uncertainty therein, nor to control the description of boundaries that are certain and free from ambiguity, but only to explain an ambiguity (U. S. vs. Halleck, 1 Wall., 455 ; decision in San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero, above cited), and the same may be said of all extrinsic evidence resorted to.
Now, looking at the petition and grant referred to in the decree we find that the Castros petitioned for " a piece of vacant land which is situated on the immediate limits (inmediaciones) of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, the farm (Rancho) of Valencia, and the farm of Moraga, which land is the overplus (sobrante) of the Ranchos aforesaid." Here we find the land described as both " vacant " and " sobrante ;" but in terms as sobrante of the Ranchos mentioned in the petition. What is meant by the word " vacant " as used in the petition ? Does it mean land that was vacant in the sense of not being or having been within the exterior limits of any of the Ranchos mentioned, or vacant in the sense that it was not occupied by any of the grantees of the said Ranchos, nor claimed as being included in the quantit) to which they were respectively entitled and hence subject to grant ? It would appear from the further description thereof, " which land is the overplus (sobrante) of the Ranchos aforesaid," that the latter was meant.
The Governor granted to the Castros the land of which they made mention in the petition, and by no other description than that which they had employed, holding them " under obligation to present themselves anew, accompanied by a map of the land, so soon as the boundaries of the neighboring Ranchos should be regulated."
It would appear from this that the boundaries by which the tract was to be defined were not then fixed and certain, and that the lines of the neighboring Ranchos had not then been regulated.
As has been explained, San Antonio was a grant by boundaries, which were as certain then as now ; but San Pablo, Pinole, Acalanes, and Laguna de los Palos Colorados were grants of quantity, which quantity had not been segregated in 1841. Enough appears in the records of the Land Commissioners to show that as San Pablo and Acalanes were claimed and occupied in 1841, there was land in the locality named by the Castros, which would not be taken to satisfy the quantity to which these grants were respectively limited.
The establishment of the Castros, owners of San Pablo, was on the part of the Rancho adjoining the bays of San Francisco and San Pablo, and that of Valencia was considerably east of the western exterior boundary of the large tract. It was well known that there was more land lying between these Ranchos as thus possessed than would be required in satisfying the quantity to which the respective donees were entitled. The northern limit of Moraga's Rancho would not interfere with this sobrante. The boundaries of San Antonio and the exterior boundaries of Pinole, as defined in the grant in 1842, were natural objects ; and if surplus was thrown off of neither of them there would still be a large tract between them, surplus of San Pablo and Acalanes. Now, if all the exterior boundaries of San Pablo, Acalanes, and Moraga's Rancho were clear, then there would have been no difficulty in presenting a map of the sobrante asked for, if it was composed of a tract bounded by the exterior boundaries of the five Ranchos mentioned. But it does not appear that it was customary to regulate exterior boundaries of grants of quantity in the sense of establishing them permanently Consideration was, of course, to be given them, so far as to locate the quan. tity granted within them ; but I think it cannot be questioned that the boundaries 'to be regulated were such as denned the quantity of the land actually granted, and remained as the boundaries of the land to which the donee was legally entitled under the grant.
This seems to be the view taken by the Board and the Court ; for in the finding of facts the Commissioners say that Alvarado issued a grant to the petitioners " requiring them to report a plat of the same as soon as the adjoining Ranchos could be surveyed and the extent of the sobrante ascertained, which survey has not been had of said Ranchos so as to enable the petitioners herein to define with certainty the boundaries of their said sobrante." If the exterior boundaries of the adjoining Ranchos were the ones to be regulated, then that could have been done much better in 1841, when witnesses were living who would be more likely to know of them than those that can be produced at this late day. Moreover, if the Board had supposed that such boundaries were to be regulated, then as it was their duty to fix the boundaries with as much certainty as the case would admit, and having the Governor's grants of the said Ranchos before them, and living witnesses to point out their boundaries, they would have found them and set them forth in the decree. But they found that the boundaries to be regulated were to be ascertained by surveys. No survey, to this day, has been made of those exterior boundaries of the grants of quantity. When will the surve3rs that were to make these boundaries clear and develop the extent of the sobrante be made, if the exterior boundaries of the grants were the ones intended ? There will have to be further legislation by the Goverment to accomplish this, for their is no provision for surveying other than the land confirmed by the decrees of the Board of Land Commissioners and the Courts, and the five Ranchos have been surveyed and patented. Undoubtedly the Governor referred to the regulation of boundaries that took place under the Mexican land system upon juridical measurement, for that was the " regulation" of boundaries required by law and ordinance, and which usually was expressly provided for in grants. In all cases in which the juridical measurement had not been had under the Mexican Government, this duty of measuring and segregating the lands granted was transferred to and devolved upon our Government ; and it is fully performed by our final surveys and patents. Our official surveys take (or rather till) the place of the juridical measurement required under Mexican law. This has been settled beyond question by the decisions of the Supreme Court. It would therefore appear that the boundaries to be regulated or the surveys to be made, which were to develop the sobrante granted and show its boundaries and extent, are those carried into the patents of the said Ranchos.
But suppose this view should be incorrect ; then, looking into the condition of the surrounding Ranchos in 1841, no independent, vacant tract, -with certain boundaries can be found. The San Pablo grant was to be located within the following limits, taking the description in the Governor's concessions of 1834 and 1835 : "Bounded by the Ranchos of San Antonio and El Pinole, and by a portion of the port of San Francisco." The southeastern boundary, according to these calls, was clearly not definite and certain. It is suggested that the diseSo accompanying the petition will make the southeastern boundary more certain, but examination thereof throws very little light on this matter. It will not indicate from what points on the boundaries of El Pinole and San Antonio a line should be drawn to form this boundary. The map or deseno here referred to is found in Volume 2 of maps, Land Commission Records, page 421, on which the southeastern portion of the tract, within which the quantity was to be surveyed, is limited only by the border of the map.
The southeastern exterior line of Pablo, drawn on the Boardman map attached to the objections of Edson Adams, does not agree with that drawn by the Surveyor-General upon the connected map hereinbefore referred to.
So it seems that, with all the light afforded by the Surveyor-General's office, and by actual examination in the field (see Surveyor-General's certificate on connected map), skilled surveyors cannot to-day agree as to the southeastern exterior of San Pablo.
In the third and fourth conditions, both in the decree of 1834 and that of 1835, the donees were to solicit juridical possession of the proper judge, who should measure the tract according to law, for the purpose of having the boundaries of the grant marked out, the surplus to remain to the nation for proper uses.
Provenance
Text from History of Contra Costa County, California, Including Its Geography, Geology, Topography, Climatography and Description; Together with a Record of the Mexican Grants ... Also, Incidents of Pioneer Life; and Biographical Sketches of Early and Prominent Settlers and Representative Men .., published 1882, in the public domain in the United States and digitised by the Internet Archive.