Yakima County, Washington - Chapter 9: The Yakima War, 1904 (part 2 of 2)

The second day the Indians returned to the siege. The men in the blockhouse were thus prevented from getting water, of which the wounded especially were in dire need. Their necessities were relieved by the gallantry of Sergeant Williams and William Houser, who made their way to a saloon near by and succeeded in procuring some potables, but no water, also a small box of crackers. Next morning, the third day after the attack, relief came.

The movements by which the horrible siege at the Cascades was raised must now receive brief treatment. The beleaguered people managed to send an express to Colonel Wright, who had proceeded a few miles on his way to the Walla Walla country, apprising him of what was transpiring in the rear. He forthwith turned back. Word also reached Vancouver, conveyed by fugitives from the Lower Cascades, and soon Lieutenant Philip Sheridan, who later immortalized his name in the Civil war, was sent to the rescue with forty men. He descended the river in the steamer Belle, reached the Lower Cascades early in the morning of the 27th, disembarked the men at a convenient place and sent the steamer back for volunteer assistance. It is worthy of mention that two volunteer companies were equipped in Portland and Vancouver and came to the scene, but were unable to engage actively in any conflict. Sheridan's position, after landing, was such that he could not advance upon the Indians in his front without crossing over a narrow neck of ground. He soon learned that the foe was on this narrow strip also.

"After getting well in hand everything connected with my little command," says Sheridan, "1 advanced with five or six men to the edge of a growth of underbrush to make a reconnoissance. We stole along under cover of this underbrush until we reached the open ground leading over the causeway or narrow neck before mentioned, when the enemy opened fire and killed a soldier near my side by a shot which just grazed the bridge of my nose, struck him in the neck, opening an artery and breaking the spinal cord. He died instantly. The Indians at once made a rush for the body, but my men in the rear, coming quickly to the rescue, drove them back; and Captain Dall's gun (a cannon borrowed from an ocean steamer) being now brought into play, many solid shot were thrown into the jungle where they lay concealed, with the effect of considerably moderating their impetuosity. Further skirmishing at long range took place at intervals during the day, but with little gain or loss, however, to either side, for both parties held positions which could not be assailed in flank, and only the extreme of rashness in either could prompt a front attack. My left was protected by the backwater driven into the slough by the high stage of the river, and my right rested securely on the main stream. Between us was the narrow neck

Both belligerents remained in their respective positions all day and all night, but Sheridan had in the meantime conceived the plan of crossing the command in a bateau, which he had brought with him, to the south side of the Columbia, make his way up the mountain's base to a point opposite the middle blockhouse, cross there to the north bank and endeavor to get to the rear of the Indian position. How this hazardous plan was executed is best told in Sheridan's own language:

"On the morning of the 28th the savages were still in my front, and, after giving them some solid shot from Captain Dall's gun, we slipped down to the river bank and the detachment crossed by means of the Hudson's Bay boat, making a landing on the opposite shore at a point where the south channel of the river, after flowing around Bradford's island, joins the main stream. It was then about nine o'clock and everything thus far proceeded favorably. But an examination of the channel showed that it would be impossible to get the boat up the rapids along the mainland, and that success could only be assured by crossing the south channel just below the rapids to the island, along the shore of which there was every probability we could pull the boat through the rocks and swift water until the head of the rapids was reached, from which point to the blockhouse there was swift water.

"Telling the men of the embarrassment in which I found myself, and that, if I could get enough of them to man the boat and pull it up the stream by a rope to the shore, we would cross to the island and make the attempt, all volunteered to go, but as ten men seemed sufficient, I selected that number to accompany me. Before starting, however, I deemed it prudent to find out if possible what was engaging the attention of the Indians, who had not yet discovered that we had left their front. I therefore climbed up the abrupt mountain side which skirted the water's edge, until I could see across the island. From this point I observed the Indians running horse-races and otherwise enjoying themselves behind the line they had held against me the day before. The squaws decked out in gay colors, and the men gaudily dressed in war bonnets, made the scene very attractive, but, as everything looked propitious for the dangerous enterprise in hand, 1 spent but little time in watching them and quickly returning to the boat, I crossed to the island with my ten men, threw ashore the rope attached to the bow and commenced the difficult task of pulling her up the rapids. We got along slowly at first, but soon striking a camp of old squaws, who had been left on the island for safety and had not gone over to the mainland to see the races, we utilized them to our advantage. With unmistakable threats and signs, we made them not only keep quiet, but also give us much needed assistance in pulling vigorously on the tow-rope of our boat.

"I was laboring under a dreadful strain of mental anxiety during all this time, for had the Indians discovered what we were about, they could easily have come over to the island in their canoes, and, by forcing us to take up our arms to repel their attack, doubtless would have obliged the abandonment of the boat, and that essential adjunct to the final success of my plan would have gone down the rapids. Indeed, under such circumstances, it would have been impossible for ten men to hold out against the two or three hundred Indians; but the island forming an excellent screen to our movements, we were not discovered, and when we reached the smooth water at the upper end of the rapids, we quickly crossed over and joined the rest of the men who in the meantime had worked their way along the south bank of the river parallel with us. I felt very grateful to our old squaws for the assistance they rendered. They worked well under compulsion and manifested no disposition to strike for higher wages. Indeed, I was so much relieved when we had crossed over from the island and joined the rest of the party, that I mentally thanked the squaws, one and all. I had much difficulty in keeping the men on the main shore from cheering at our success, but hurriedly taking into the bateau all of them it would carry, I sent the balance along the south bank, where the railroad is now built, until both detachments arrived at a point opposite the blockhouse, when, crossing to the north bank, I landed below the blockhouse some little distance and returned the boat for the balance of the men, who joined me in a few minutes."

Hardly had Sheridan landed and effected communication with the beleaguered blockhouse, when the advance of Wright's returning command under Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. Steptoe arrived. A conference between Sheridan and Steptoe resulted in the former's being sent with a reinforcement to the island he had just left to capture the Cascade Indians, who, it was thought, would flee to the island, while the Yakimas would retreat into the interior of their own country. As expected, the Yakimas and Klickitats fled precipitately on the approach of Steptoe's command, and the Cascades, deserted by their quondam allies, fell into the power of Sheridan. Some of them were tried by military commission. Being under treaty, they were adjudged guilty of treason in fighting and nine were summarily hanged. The remainder of the Cascades were kept on the island under military surveillance.

camping on the Naches river on the 18th of May, he remained there about a month. He was visited at intervals by chiefs professing a desire for peace, but the Indian plan was to affect to have two parties, one wishing hostilities to cease, the other advocating the continuance of the war. Their strategy consisted in the use of dilatory tactics, playing one party in their own ranks against another and making representations, true or false, which would stay the hand of their opponent until they could collect supplies. In this they succeeded admirably.

"The history of Wright's operations, as given in his reports," writes Mrs. Victor, "shows a summer spent in trailing Indians from place to place, from fishery to fishery, and over mountains before thought impassable for troops, dragging after them their season's supplies and accomplishing nothing but to collect the noncombatants of the disaffected tribes upon a reservation in Oregon, where they were secure from the turmoil of war and at liberty to spy on either side."

As before stated, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw, of the Washington volunteers, started for the Walla Walla country early in June. Arriving at the Yakima country while Wright was there, he offered to co-operate with the regulars, which offer was declined. He therefore continued his march to the Columbia at a point opposite the mouth of the Umatilla river. Seventy-five men of his command, under Captain Goff, had been sent to co-operate with Major Layton, of the Oregon volunteers, in raiding the John Day country. By capturing horses and supplies, these forces compelled many Indians, some of whom were supposed to be hostile and some who might at any time be induced to become so, to seek the protection of the Warm Springs reservation.

Acting upon Governor Stevens' instructions to "spare no exertion to reduce to unconditional submission any hostiles within reach," Colonel Shaw determined to attack a force of the enemy whom he ascertained to be encamped in the Grand Ronde valley. Pushing rapidly over the mountains, he encountered the hostiles July 17th, and in a decisive battle drove them as fugitives in every direction. The story of this fight is vividly told by the Colonel himself in the following language:

We arrived in the Grande Ronde valley on the evening of the 16th and camped on a branch of the Grande Ronde river in the timber, sending spies in advance, who returned and reported no fresh signs. On the morning of the 17th, leaving Major Blankenship. of the central, and Captain Miller, of the southern battalion, assisted by Captain DeLacy, to take up the line of march for the main valley, I proceeded ahead to reconnoiter, accompanied by Major Maxon, Michael Marchmean, Captain John and Doctor Burns. After proceeding about five miles we ascended a knoll in the valley, from which we discovered dust rising along the timber of the river. I immediately sent Major Maxon and Captain John forward to recon- noiter and returned to hurry up the command, which was not far distant. The command was instantly formed in order; Captain Miller's company in advance, supported by Maxon's, Henness' and Powell's companies, leaving the pack train in charge of the guard under Lieutenant Goodman, with a detachment ot Goff's company, under Lieutenant Wait, and Lieutenant Williams' company in reserve with orders to follow on after the command.

The whole command moved on quietly in this order until within one-half mile of the Indian village, when we discovered that the pack train had moved to the left, down the Grande Ronde river. At this moment a large body of warriors came forward singing and whooping, and one of them waving a white man's scalp on a pole. One of them signified a desire to speak, whereupon I sent Captain John to meet him, and formed the command in line of battle. When Captain John came up to the Indians they cried out to one another to shoot him, whereupon he retreated to the command and I ordered the four companies to charge.

The design of the enemy evidently was to draw us into the brush along the river, where from our exposed position they would have the advantage, they no doubt having placed an ambush there. To avoid this I charged down the river toward the pack train. The warriors then split, part going across the river and part down toward the pack train. These were soon overtaken and engaged. The charge was vigorous and so well sustained that they were broken, dispersed and slain before us. After a short time I sent Captain Miller to the left and Major Maxon to the right; the latter to cross the stream and to cut them off from a point near which a large body of warriors had collected, apparently to fight, while I moved forward with the commands of Captain Henness and Lieutenant Powell to attack them in front. The major could not cross the river, and on our moving forward the enemy fled after firing a few guns, part taking to the left and part continuing forward.

Those who took to the left fell in with Captain Miller's company, who killed five on the spot, and the rest were not less successful in the pursuit, which was continued to the crossing of the river, where the enemy had taken a stand to defend the ford. Being here rejoined by Captain Miller and bj' Lieutenant Curtis, with part of Maxon's company, we fired a volley and I ordered a charge across the river, which was gallantly executed. In doing this Private Shirley, ensign of Henness' company, who was in front, was wounded in the face. Several of the enemy were killed at this point. We continued the pursuit until the enemy had reached the rocky canyons leading toward the Powder river, and commenced scattering in every direction, when, finding that I had but five men with me and the rest of the command scattered in the rear, most of the horses being completely exhausted, I called a halt and fell back, calculating to remount the men on the captured horses and continue the pursuit after night.

I found the pack train, guard and reserve encamped on a small creek not far from the crossing, as I had previously ordered, and learned that a body of the enemy had followed them up all day and annoyed them but had inflicted no damage beyond capturing many of the animals which we had taken in charge and left behind.

I learned also that Major Maxon had crossed the river with a small party and was engaged with the enemy and wanted assistance. I immediately despatched a detachment under Lieutenants Williams and Wait, sending the man who brought the information back with them as a guide. They returned after dark without finding the major, but brought in one of his men whom they found in the brush and who stated that one of the major's men was killed and that the last he saw of them thev were fighting with the Indians. At daylight I sent out Captain 'Miller with seventy men, who scouted around the whole valley without finding him, but who unfortunately had one man killed and another wounded whilst pursuing some Indians. I resolved to remove camp the next dav to the head of the valley, where the emigrant trail crosses it, and continue the search until we became certain of their fate. The same evening I took sixty men, under Captain Henness, and struck upon the mountains and crossed the heads of the canyons to see if I could not strike his trail. Finding no sign, 1 returned to the place where the major had last been seen, and there made search in different directions and finally found the body of one of his men (Tooley) and where the major had encamped in the brush. From other signs it became evident to me that the major had returned to this post by the same trail by which we first entered the valley.

Being nearly out of provisions, and unable to follow the Indians from this delay, I concluded to return to camp, recruit for another expedition in conjunction with Captain Goff. who had, I presumed, returned from his expedition to the John Day's river.

I should have mentioned previously that in the charge the command captured and afterward destroyed about one hundred and fifty horse loads of lacamas, dried beef, tents, some flour, coffee, sugar and about one hundred pounds of ammunition and a great quantity of tools and kitchen furniture. We took also about two hundred horses, most of which were shot, there being about one hundred serviceable animals.

There was present on the ground from what I saw, and from information received from two squaws taken prisoner, about three hundred warriors of the Cayuse, Walla Walla, Umatilla, Tyh, John Day and Des Chutes tribes, commanded by the following chiefs: Stock Whitley and Simmistastas, Des Chutes and Tyh; Chickiah, Plyon, Wicecai, Watahstuartih, Winmiswot. Cayuses; Tahkin, Cayuse, the son of Peopeomoxmox ; Walla Walla and other chiefs of less note.

The whole command, officers and men, behaved well. The enemy was run on the gallop fifteen miles, and most of those who fell were shot with a revolver. It is impossible to state how many of the enemy were killed. Twentyseven bodies were counted by one individual, and many others were known to have fallen and been left, but were so scattered about that it was impossible to get count of them. When to these we add those killed by Major Maxon's command on the other side of the river we may safely conclude that at least forty of the enemy were slain and many went off wounded. When we left the valley there was not an Indian in it and all signs went to show that they had gone a great distance from it.

On the 21st instant we left the valley by the emigrant road and commenced our return to camp. During the night Lieutenant Hunter, of the Washington territorv volunteers, car"e into camp with an express from Captain Goff. I learned to my surprise that the captain and Major Layton had seen Indians on John Day's river, had followed them over to Burnt river and had a fight with them, in which Lieutenant Eustus and one private were killed, and some seven Indians. They were shaping their course for the Grande Ronde valley, and had sent for provisions and fresh horses. I immediately sent Lieutenant Williams back with all my spare provisions and horses and continued my march. On Wild Horse creek I came across Mr. Fites, a pack master who had been left in camp, who informed me, to my extreme satisfaction, that Major Maxon and his command had arrived safe in camp and were then near us with provisions and ammunition. These 1 sent on immediately to Captain Goff. I learned that Major Maxon had been attacked in the valley by a large force of Indians on the day of the fight; had gained the brush and killed many of them; that at night he tried to find our camp, and hearing a noise like a child crying, probably one of the captured squaws, had concluded that my command had gone on to Powder river and that the Indians had returned to the valley by another canyon. He moved his position that night and the next day saw the scout looking for him, but in the distance thought that it was a band of Indians hunting his trail. Conceiving himself cut off from the command, he thought it best to return to this camp, thinking that we would be on our way back to Grande Ronde with provisions and ammunition.

Meanwhile Governor Stevens was making every effort to sustain the friendly faction of the Nez Perces under Lawyer, and in this he was receiving- the hearty co-operation of William Craig, a white man who had been adopted into the tribe. In Governor Stevens' opinion an important incident in preserving the friendship of the Nez Perces was the holding of the Walla Walla valley. He seems to have determined to follow up the moral advantage gained by Shaw's victory by holding a council with all the Indians, friendly, neutral and hostile, whom he could induce to meet him in the Walla Walla country. Wishing to present a solid front against the Indians he endeavored strenuously to secure the hearty co-operation of the regulars. He accordingly held a conference with Wright at Vancouver, at which he learned that the colonel could not be present in person at the council but would send Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe with four companies to reach the scene in time. Everything seemed propitious for a friendly co-operation. The regular officers were, however, acting with duplicity, for they had received orders from General Wool such as would prevent any real co-operation with Stevens.

At the close of his pow-wow campaign in the Yakima country, Wright, having failed to find any enemy to oppose, had reported to General Wool that the war was at an end. The latter had, on the 2d of August, issued an order to Wright in which he said:

"The general congratulates you on 3'our successful termination of the war with the Yakimas and Klickitats. * * * With the least possible delay you will conduct an expedition into the Walla Walla country. No emigrants or other whites, except the Hudson's Bay Company, or persons having ceded rights from the Indians, will be permitted to settle or remain in the Indian country, or on land not ceded by treaty, confirmed by the senate and approved by the president of the United States, excepting the miners at the Colville mines. Those will be notified, however, that, if they interfere with the Indians, or their squaws, they will be punished and Sent out of the country. It appears that Colonel Shaw, from Puget sound, with his volunteers, has gone to the Walla Walla country. Colonel Wright will order them out of the country by way of Fort Dalles. If they do not go immediately, they will be arrested, disarmed and sent out."

Had Stevens known of this order, he would not have relied on the regulars for assistance. But being ignorant of it, he proceeded into the heart of the Indian country without hesitation. Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe left The Dalles with four companies August 20th, and on the 5th of the following month he established a camp five miles below the council ground. Stevens had made arrangements for "sending home the volunteers, to be mustered out of the service on the arrival in the valley of the regular troops," and thus unconsciously saved Steptoe one task enjoined upon him by Wool's order.

On the evening of September 10th, Governor Stevens, now ready for the council, requested two of Steptoe's companies of troops and some mountain howitzers. Steptoe refused on the ground that he could not do so in consistency with the directions of his superior, and Stevens retained Captain Goff's company of volunteers as guards. The council opened on the nth. It was decidedly stormy from the beginning, and by the 13th conditions became so alarming that Governor Stevens again addressed Steptoe, advising him that half the Nez Perces were hostile, as were practically all the other tribes, and stating that he deemed a company of regulars essential to his safety. Steptoe again refused and advised the governor to adjourn council to his (Steptoe's) camp. This under the circumstances Stevens could not help but do. While en route he met Kamiakin, who, he thought, would surely have attacked him had he known in time of his intended march. "Kamiakin," wrote he to the secretary of war, "had unquestionably an understanding, as subsequent events showed, with all the Indians except the friendly Nez Perces (about one-half the nation) and a small number of friendly Indians of other tribes, to make an attack that day or evening upon my camp. He found me on the road, to his great surprise, and had no time to perfect his arrangements. I had learned in the night that Kamiakin had camped on the Touchet the night before, and that he would be in this day. The council opened on the 10th. All the Indians were camped near. Kamiakin and his band were only separated from the council grounds by a narrow skirt of woods in the bottom of Mill creek."

For several days more Governor Stevens labored in vain to get the Indians to accept his terms of peace, namely, that they must throw aside their guns and submit to the justice and mercy of the government, surrendering all murderers for trial. The Indians would conclude no peace on other terms than that they should be left in possession of their territory as before the treaties. On the 19th Governor Stevens directed his march westward. His battle with the Indians on that date and the incidents of his return were thus summarized in his official report:

"So satisfied was I that the Indians would carry into effect their determination, avowed in the councils in their own camps for several nights previously, to attack me, that, in starting, I formed my whole party and moved in order of battle. I moved on under fire one mile to water, when, forming a corral of the wagons and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on - the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the Indians. Our position in a low open basin five or six hundred yards across [he was attacked on what is known as Charles Russell's ranch] was good, and with the aid of our corral, we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of the enemy.

The fight continued till late in the night. Two charges were made to disperse the Indians the last led by Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw in person, with twenty-four men; but, whilst driving before him some hundred and fifty Indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled to cut his way through them towards the camp, when, drawing up his men, and aided by the teamsters and pickets who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the Indians back in full charge upon the corral. Just before the charge the friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had been assigned to hold the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the enemy they came not to fight the Nez Perces but the whites. 'Go to your camp,' said they, 'or we will wipe it out. ' Their camp, with the women and children, was on a stream about a mile distant, and I directed them to retire, as I did not require their assistance and was fearful that my men might not be able to distinguish them from hostiles, and thus friendly Indians be killed.

"Towards night I notified Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe that I was fighting the Indians, that I should move the next morning and expressed the opinion that a company of his troops would be of service. In his reply he stated that the Indians had burned up his grass and suggested that I should return to his camp and place at his disposal my wagons in order that he might move his whole command and his supplies to the Umatilla or some other point, where sustenance could be found for his animals. To this arrangement I assented and Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe sent to my camp Lieutenant Davidson, with detachments from the companies of dragoons and artillery with a mounted howitzer. They reached my camp about two o'clock in the morning, everything in good order and most of the men at the corral asleep. A picket had been driven in by the enemy an hour and a half before, that on the hill south of the corral, but the enemy was immediately dislodged, and ground pits being dug, all points were held. The howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was believed nothing would be gained by waiting until morning and the whole force immediately returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe's camp.

"Soon after sunrise the enemy attacked the camp but was soon dislodged by the howitzer and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe's command. On my arrival at the camp, I urged Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe to build a blockhotise immediately, to leave one company to defend it with all his supplies, then to march below and return with an additional force and additional supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the Indians into submission. I placed at his disposal for the building, my teams and Indian employes. The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than ten days. My Indian storeroom was rebuilt at one corner of the stockade.

"In the action of the 19th my whole force consisted of Goff's company of sixty-nine, rank and file, the teamsters, herders, and Indian employes numbering about fifty men. Our train consisted of about five hundred animals, not one of which was captured by the enemy. We fought four hundred and fifty Indians and had one man mortally, one dangerously and two slightly wounded. We killed and wounded thirteen Indians. One-half of the Nez Perces, one hundred and twenty warriors; all of the Yakimas and Palouses, two hundred warriors; the great bulk of the Cayuses and Umatillas, and an unknown number of the Walla Wallas and Indians from other bands were in the fight. The principal war chiefs were the son of Owhi, Isle de Pere and Chief Quoltonee; the latter of whom had two horses shot under him, and showed me a letter from Colonel Wright acknowledging his valuable services in bringing about the peace of the Yakimas.

"I have failed, therefore, in making the desired arrangements with the Indians in the Walla Walla, and the failure, to be attributed in part to the want of co-operation with me, as superintendent of Indian affairs, on the part of the regular troops, has its causes also in the whole plan of operations of the troops since Colonel Wright assumed command.

"The Nez Perces, entirely friendly last December and January, became first disaffected in consequence of the then chief of the Cayuses, Ume-howlish, and the friendly Cayuses going into the Nez Perce country contrary to my positive orders. I refused to allow them to go there in December last, saying to them, T have ordered the Nez Perces to keep hostiles out of the country. If you go there your friends in the war party will come; they can not be kept out. Through them disaffection will spread among a portion of the Nez Perces.' Ume-howlish, my prisoner, was sent into the Nez Perce country by Colonel Wright, and from the time of his arrival there all the efforts made by Agent Craig to prevent the spread of disaffection were aborted. What I apprehended and predicted had already come to pass. Looking Glass, the prominent man of the lower Nez Perces, endeavored to betray me on the Spokane as 1 was coming in from the Blackfoot council, and I was satisfied from that time that he was only awaiting a favorable moment to join bands with Kamiakin in a war upon the whites, and Colonel Wright's management of affairs in the Yakima furnished the opportunity.

"The war was commenced in the Yakima on our part in consequence of the attempt, first, to seize the murderers of the agent, Bolon, and miners who had passed through their country; and, second, to punish the tribe for making common cause with Ihem and driving Major Haller out of the country. It is greatly to be deplored that Colonel Wright had not first severely chastised the Indians, and insisted not only upon the rendition of the murderers, but upon the absolute and unconditional submission of the whole tribe- to the justice and mercy of the government. The long delays which occurred in the Yakima, the talking and not fighting, this attempt to pacify the Indians and not reducing them to submission, thus giving safe conduct to murderers and assassins, and not seizing them for summary and exemplary punishment, gave to Kamiakin the whole field of the interior, and by threats, lies and promises he has brought into the combination one-half of the Nez Perce nation and the least thing may cause the Spokanes, Coeur d'Alenes, Colvilles and Okanogans to join them.

"I state boldly that the cause of the Nez Perces becoming disaffected and finally going into war, is the operations of Colonel Wright east of the Cascades - operations so feeble, so procrastinating, so entirely unequal to the emergency, that not only has a severe blow been struck at the credit of the government and the prosperity and character of this remote section of the country, but the impression has been made upon the Indians that the people and the soldiers were a different people. I repeat to you officially that when the Indians attacked me they expected Colonel Steptoe would not assist me, and when they awoke from their delusion Kamiakin said, 'I will now let these people know who Kamiakin is. ' One of the good effects of the fight is that the Indians have learned that we are one people, a fact which had not been previously made apparent to them by the operations of the regular troops.

"Is, sir, the army sent here to protect our people and punish Indian tribes who, without cause and in cold blood and in spite of solemn treaties, murder our people, burn our houses and wipe out entire settlements? Is it the duty of General Wool and his officers to refuse to cooperate with me in my appropriate duties as superintendent of Indian affairs, and thus practically assume those duties themselves? Is it the duty of General Wool, in his schemes of pacifying the Indians, to trample down the laws of congress; to issue edicts prohibiting settlers returning to their claims and thus for at least one county, the Walla Walla, make himself dictator over the country?"

From the refusal of the Indians to treat with Stevens, and their attack upon the party returning from the council, it would naturally seem that the end of the war was still far in the future. Not so, however. Colonel Wright proved more successful, and yet not more successful, in the efforts he soon after inaugurated to pacify the Indians than had Stevens. The man who pursues the policy of conceding to the adverse party all he can ask can hardly fail to be successful in negotiations.

October 19th Wright was instructed by General Wool to proceed in person at the earliest possible date to the Walla Walla country and to attend to the establishing of a post there. In the order Wool used the following significant language:

"It is also of the highest importance that you, the senior officer (the chief man), should see and talk with all the tribes in that region in order to ascertain their wants, feelings and disposition towards the whites. Warned by what has occurred, the general trusts you will be on your guard against the whites and adopt the most prompt and vigorous measures to crush the enemy before they have time to combine for resistance, also check the war and prevent further trouble by keeping the whites out of the Indian country."

As to the post above referred to, the site selected for it was a point on the bank of Mill creek, six miles above its junction with the Walla Walla river. The rest of the order was duly complied with. A council was called and forty Indians condescended to attend, practically all of whom denounced the treaty of 1855 and Chief Lawyer, of the Nez Perces, as the one by whom, mainly, the Indians were induced to sign it. Wright seemed more than willing to condone the perfidious wretches who signed the treaty as a deliberate act of treachery, and then when they had lulled the whites into a feeling of security, began assiduously the work of disseminating hostile feeling and of organizing a general war, for the purpose of exterminating or expelling the white race. His assurance to the Indians was: "The bloody cloth should be washed, and not a spot should be left upon it. The Great Spirit, who created both the whites and the red men, commanded us to love one another. All past differences must be thrown behind us. The hatchet must be buried and for the future perpetual friendship must exist between us. The good talk we have this day listened to should be planted and grow up in our hearts and drive away all bad feelings and preserve peace and friendship between us forever. Put what I say in your hearts and when you return to your homes, repeat it to all your friends." In his letter to General Wool reporting the proceedings of his council, Wright laid all the blame of the war upon the Waila Walla treaties. "Give them back

Such maudlin sentimentality, such shameful truckling with the enemies of those it was Wright's duty to defend, seemed akin to treason. Indignant and hurt, Governor Stevens wrote to the secretary of war: "It seems to me that we have in this territory fallen upon evil times. 1 hope and trust that some energetic action may be taken to stop this trifling with great public interests, and to make our flag respected by the Indians of the interior. They scorn our people and our flag. They feel that they can kill and plunder with impunity. They denominate us a nation of old women. They did not do this when the volunteers were in the field. I now make the direct issue with Colonel Wright, that he has made a concession to the Indians which he had no authority to make; that by so doing he has done nothing but get a semblance of peace; and that by his acts, he has in a measure weakened the influence of the service having the authority to make treaties and having charge of the friendly Indians He has, in my judgment, abandoned his own duty, which was to reduce the Indians to submission, and has trenched upon and usurped a portion of mine."

The citizens of the two territories, Oregon and Washington, were thrown into a furor of indignation by the conclusion of his shameful peace. The sacrifice of money and effort in equipping the volunteers, the sacrifices of the volunteers themselves, the traversing of dusty plains, the scaling of lofty and forbidding mountains, the sufferings of that dread winter campaign in the Walla Walla valley, the loss of life and limb, the brilliant and well-deserved victories of the volunteer arms - all these were for nothing. The regular officers step in and rob the country of all the fruits of victory, concede to the Indians everything they couJd ask, and then, to add insult to injury, General Wool says he hopes that Wright "warned by what has occurred, will be on his guard against the whites and prevent trouble by keeping the whites out of the Indian country," and that under the existing arrangements he doesn't "believe that the war can be renewed by the whites."

Elwood Evans, who was himself a citizen of Washington territory at the time and a participant in some of its public events, may be assumed to have correctly summarized the general opinion of the people in the following paragraphs from his history of the Northwest:

"That quasi peace was but the proclaimed continuance of the assurance by the United States army officers to the hostile Indians, 'we came not into your country to fight, but merely to establish posts.' It now officially announced the close of a war by General Wool, which he had never commenced to prosecute as war. It was but the unblushing publication of a policy inspired alone by him, and executed under his orders by officers whom he had handicapped in the enemy's country by instructions, the observance of which was but the triumph of Kamiakin. It was the official, humiliating concession to the hostiles of everything that they had demanded, or had inaugurated a war to accomplish, viz., the keeping of white settlers out of their country - save alone the isolated fact, that the Indians had made no resistance to or protest against the establishment of military posts within their territory. That failure to protest against the erection of posts was the only evidence of passive submission by the hostiles; yet with what avidity was the fact seized by General Wool to assure him that he was occupying the Indian territory by his troops, and that those troops were remaining there in peaceable possession! What a naked and barren victory, which proved too much; for it meant nothing except that armed troops within fortified posts were the only white men who could occupy such country. It too palpably demonstrated a suspension of hostilities patched up by appealing to the Indian: 'Let my troops stay here ; and I will protect you and keep out the white settler.'

"General Wool, in the execution of this plan of campaign by his army of occupation, not for making war, had effectually accomplished the aim of Kamiakin in the instigation of the outbreak. The commanding general had avowed upon several occasions his policy of protecting the hostile Indians against the whites, and of expelling them from and keeping them out of the country. In fact, there appears to have been a common object actuating both Kamiakin and General Wool : Both were equally determined that the whites should not settle in nor occupy the country of Kamiakin or Peo-peo-moxmox; both were equally hostile to the volunteers of the two territories, who sought to save the country for white settlement; both were averse to any hostile demonstrations against the Indians; both were willing that Governor Stevens should be cut off and his party sacrificed, when official duty compelled his presence in the Indian territory; both alike cordially hated the people of the two territories. Could Kamiakin have asked more than the performance of Wool's orders? - 'Leave a company and a howitzer to protect the Cayuse Indians against the volunteers.' * * * 'Warn Colonel Shaw and his volunteers to leave the country; and should they fail to comply, arrest, disarm and send them out.' How it must have delighted old Kamiakin when he had interpreted to him that interdict against white settlement: 'No emigrant or other white person will be permitted to settle or remain in the Indian country.' Glorious duty for American troops to protect the blood-stained murderers of our people, to stand guard that the spirit of treaties shall be violated, that Ameri-

The regulars soon discovered that they had been crying "peace, peace, when there was no peace, "for it was not long until there began to be apprehensions of a renewed outbreak. These conditions obtained throughout the entire year 1857 and during the winter of that year the Catholic fathers reported that they feared an uprising in the spring. The Spokanes and Coeurd'Alenes, among whom the emissaries of Kamiakin had been spreading disaffection ever since the peace had been patched up in 1856, announced that the soldiers must not show themselves in their country. It was the scheme of the wily Kamiakin to first unite the tribes in opposition to the whites, then draw a detachment of soldiers into the country and treat them as he treated Haller in the Yakima valley.

The plan worked admirably. He cultivated the friendship of Tilcoax, a skilled Palouse horse-thief, and induced him to organize a pillaging expedition against the stock belonging to Fort Walla Walla, well knowing that sooner or later a counter expedition must be made by the soldiers to recover the lost animals. He also caused the murder of Colville miners, hoping that the whites there would ask for troops They did call for troops. Their petition could not be disregarded, and in May, 185S, Colonel E. J. Steptoe set out to the' Colville country, disregarding the warnings of the Indians that no whites would be allowed to travel through their lands. Steptoe, or more strictly speaking, his subordinates, committed a most egregious and incomprehensible blunder in starting from Walla Walla. On account of the great weight of provisions and baggage, a brilliant quartermaster conceived the idea of leaving behind the greater part of the ammunition, by way of lightening the load. As Joseph McEvoy expresses it, the force was beaten before it left Walla Walla.

The expedition was made in May. The wild torrent of Snake river was running bank full from the floods of summer as the command crossed. Timothy, a chief of the Nez Perces, with a few followers, was living then at the mouth of the Alpowa, and by his efficient aid the soldiers crossed the stream in good order and good time, and continued on their way, the brave old chief accompanying them.

On May 16th the force reached a place which George F. Canis, on the authority of Thomas B. Beall, chief government packer of the expedition, describes as low and marshy, with big swales and thickets of quaking asp abounding, and surrounded by hills without timber. Mr. Beall locates the place as near the present town of Spangle. There is, however, much difference of opinion among the survivors as to where all this happened. But wherever it was, there the Indians gathered with hostile intention.

The next day, as the soldiers were descending a canyon to Pine creek, not far from where Rosalia is now located, Salteese, sub-chief of the Coeur d'Alenes, came up with an interpreter for a conference with Steptoe. The chief was making great professions of friendship, when one of the friendly Nez Perces struck him over the head with a whip, nearly knocking him from his horse. "What do you mean by speaking with a forked tongue to the white chief?" demanded the Nez Perce brave. Salteese, very angry, rode away in defiant mood. No sooner were the retreating forces well in the canyon than the attack was made. Second-Lieutenant William Gaston's forces were the first to draw the fire of the enemy. Steptoe ordered Gaston to hold fire. When again asked for orders he gave the same command, but Gaston disobeyed and soon the firing became general. Gaston and Captain O. H. P. Taylor" were in command of the rear guard, and, with amazing courage and devotion, kept the line intact, foiling all efforts of the Indians to rush through. They sent word to Steptoe to halt and give them a chance to secure more ammunition. But Steptoe deemed it safer to make no pause, and soon after those gallant heroes fell. A fierce fight raged for possession of their bodies. The Indians secured that of Gaston, but a small band of heroes, fighting like demons, got the body of the noble Taylor. One notable figure in this death grapple was De May, a Frenchman, who had been trained in the Crimea and in Algeria, and who made havoc among the Indians with his gun-barrel used as a saber, but at last he, too, went down before numbers, crying, "Oh, my God, for a saber!"

At nightfall they had reached a point as to the eKact location of which there is much difference of opinion. Here the disorganized and suffering force made camp, threw out a picket line for defense, and buried such dead as they had not been forced to leave. In order to divert the Indians they determined, having buried their -howitzers, to leave the balance of their stores. They hoped that if the Indians made an attack in the night they might succeed in stealing away. The Indians, however, feeling sure that they had the soldiers at their mercy, made no effort at a night attack. But it is stated that Kamiakin, head chief of the Yakimas, urged them to do so. Had he carried his point, the night of May 17, 1858, would have been one of melancholy memory. Another massacre would have been added to the series of frontier outrages which have darkened our earlier annals.

There was but one chance of salvation, and this was by means of a difficult trail which the Indians had left unguarded, as the Nez Perce chief, Timothy, discovered by reconnoitering, the savages rightly supposing it to be entirely unknown to the whites. But by the good favor of fortune or Providence, Timothy knew this pass. But for him the next day would doubtless have witnessed a grim and ghastly massacre. During the dark and cloudy night, the soldiers, mounted and in silence, followed Timothy over the wretched trail. Michael Kinney, a wellknown resident of Walla Walla, was in charge of the rear guard, and is our chief authority for some portions of this narrative.

The horrors of that night retreat were probably never surpassed in the history of Indian warfare in the Northwest. Several of the wounded were lashed to pack animals, and were thus led away on that dreadful ride. Their sufferings were intense, and two of them, McCrossen and Williams, suffered so unendurably that they writhed themselves loose from their lashings and fell to the ground, begging their comrades to leave some weapons with which the}' might kill themselves. But the poor wretches were left lying there in the darkness. During the night the troops followed, generally at a gallop, the faithful Timothy, on whose keen eyes and mind their lives depended. The wounded and a few whose horses gave out were scattered at intervals along the trail. Some of these finally reappeared, but most were lost. After twenty-four hours the troops found that they had reached Snake river. Here the unwearied Timothy threw out his own people as guards against the pursuing enemy and set the women of his tribe to ferry the force across the turbulent river. This was safely accomplished, and thus the greater portion of the command reached Walla Walla in safety from that ill-starred expedition.

A dramatic incident which occurred on the evening of May 20th merits a brief narration. While the horses were being picketed and preparations were in progress for the night, the guards noticed a cloud of dust in the distance. In a short time a band of mounted Indians, approaching at full gallop, came into view, and the clattering of the hoofs of their horses and the thick dust enveloping them gave the impression that the little band of soldiers, which had had such trying experiences and now seemed within reach of safety, was to be literally wiped from the face of the earth. Excitement ran high. The soldiers became greatly agitated, and orders to prepare for battle were about to be issued when the standard bearer of the oncoming horde, noting the confusion and mistrusting its cause, flung the stars and stripes to the breeze in token of friendly intentions. When the Indians swarmed into camp it was found that the banner was borne by none other than the everfaithful Chief Lawyer. In the party were some of the sub-chiefs from Kamiah and noted members of the Nez Perce tribe. Steptoe declined to return to the contest with the hostiles, much to the disappointment of Lawyer, who clearly pointed out how Indian allies could be secured and an easy victory won over the confident and exulting Indians of the Palouse country. The Nez Perces had, no doubt, learned of the defeat of Steptoe by means of the wonderful system of signaling in vogue among the aborigines.

The sequel of Steptoe's defeat furnished a more creditable chapter in the history of our Indian warfare. General Clarke at once ordered Colonel Wright to equip a force of six hundred men, proceed to the Spokane country and castigate the Indians with sufficient severity to settle the question of sovereignty forever. On August 15th Colonel Wright left Walla Walla on his northern campaign. In the battle of Four Lakes, fought on September 1st, and in the battle of Spokane Plains, September 5th, he broke forever the spirit and power of the northern Indians. Lieutenant Kip's description of the former fight is so picturesque that we cannot resist the temptation to reproduce it. He says:

"On the plain below us we saw the enemy. Every spot seemed alive with the wild warriors we had come so far to meet. They were in the pines at the edge of the lakes, in the ravines and gullies, on the opposite hillsides and swarming over the plains. They seemed to cover the country for two miles. Mounted on their fleet, hardy horses, the crowd swept back and forth, brandishing their weapons, shouting their war cries and keeping up a song of defiance. Most of them were armed with Hudson's Bay muskets, while others had bows and arrows and long lances. They were in all the bravery of their war array, gaudily painted and decorated with their wild trappings. Their plumes fluttered above them, while beneath skins and trinkets and all kinds of fantastic embellishments flaunted in the sunshine. Their horses, too, were arrayed in the most gorgeous finery. Some of them were even painted with colors to form the greatest contrast, the white being smeared with crimson in fantastic figures, and the dark-colored streaked with white clay. Beads and fringes of gaudy colors were hanging from their bridles, while the plumes of eagles' feathers, interwoven with the mane and tail, fluttered as the breeze floated over them, and completed their wild and fantastic appearance.

"As ordered, the troops moved down the hill toward the plain. As the line of advance came within range of the Minie rifles, now for the first time used in Indian warfare, the firing began. The firing grew heavier as the line advanced, and, astonished at the range and effectiveness of the fire, the entire array of dusky warriors broke and fled toward the plain. The dragoons were now ordered to charge, and rode through the company at intervals to the front, and then dashed down upon the foe with headlong speed. Taylor's and Gaston's companies were there and soon they reaped a red revenge for their slain heroes. The flying warriors streamed out of the glens and ravines and over the open plains until they could find a refuge from the flashing sabers of the dragoons. When they had found the refuge of the wooded hills, the line of foot once more passed the dragoons and renewed the fire, driving the Indians over the hills for about two miles, where a halt was called, as the troops were nearly exhausted. The Indians had almost all disappeared, only a small group remaining, apparently to watch the whites. A shell sent from the howitzer, bursting over their heads, sent them also to the shelter of the ravines. Thus the battle ended."

In the battle four days later on Spokane Plains quite a number of the Indians were killed, and Kamiakin, the war chief of the Yakimas, was wounded. After resting a day the forces moved on up the river and encamped above the falls. While there they were visited by Chief Gearry, a fairly well educated, rather bright Indian, who professed to be against the war. There is reason to doubt the sincerity of these representations, however. Colonel Wright talked plainly to him, saying that if he and the other Indians wanted peace they could have it by complete and unconditional surrender. On the 8th the march was resumed. About ten miles east of Spokane, Indians were seen in the act of driving their horses to the mountains. The horses were captured and shot, with the exception of one hundred and thirty picked ones, which were kept for the use of the troops. Defeat in battle, the loss of their horses and the execution of a few Indians who had participated in murders completely humiliated the hostile tribes. Councils were held by Colonel Wright at the Coeur d'Alene mission and with the Spokanes, at which it was found that the Indians were prepared to enter a treaty of entire submission to the whites.

"The war is closed. Peace is restored with the Spokanes, Coeur d'Alenes and Palouses. After a vigorous campaign, the Indians have been entirely subdued, and were most happy to accept such terms of peace as I might dictate. Results: (i) Two battles were fought by the troops under my command, against the combined forces of the Spokanes, Coeur d'Alenes and Palouses, in both of which the Indians were signally defeated, with a severe loss of chiefs and warriors, either killed or wounded. (2) One thousand horses and a large number of cattle were captured from the hostile Indians, all of which were either killed or appropriated to the service of the United States. (3) Many barns filled with wheat or oats, also several fields of grain, with numerous caches of vegetables, dried berries and camas, were destroyed, or used by the troops. (4) The Yakima chief, Owhi, is in irons, and the notorious war chief, Qalchen, was hanged. The murderers of the miners, the cattle stealers, etc. (in all, eleven Indians), were hanged. (5) The Spokanes, Coeur d'Alenes and Palouses have been entirely subdued, and have sued most abjectly for peace on any terms. (6) Treaties have been made with the above-named nations. They have restored all property which was in their possession, belonging either to the United States or to individuals. They have promised that all white people can travel through their country unmolested, and that no hostile Indians shall be allowed to pass through or remain among them. (7) The Indians who commenced the battle with Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe contrary to the orders of their chief have been delivered to the officer in command of the United States troops. (8) One chief and four men, with their families, from each of the above named tribes, have been delivered to the officer in command of the United States troops, to be taken to Fort Walla Walla and held as hostages for the future good conduct of their respective nations. (9) The two mounted howitzers, abandoned by the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe, have been recovered."

Thus ended the Indian wars of the fifties in Oregon and Washington. The era of robberies, depredations, murders and warfare was by this campaign effectually brought to a close in the Yakima and Walla Walla countries, making the opening of both to settlement possible. General Newman S. Clarke, who had succeeded General Wool in the command of the Department of the Pacific, and who, in the earlier days of his administration, had shown a disposition to inaugurate a similar policy, had completely changed front, even going so far as to recommend the confirmation of Governor Stevens' Walla Walla treaties. These treaties were confirmed.