Allen County, Indiana - The whole text, 1889 (part 3 of 17)

" B}- information from Brigadier-General Harmar, the commanding officer of the troops on the frontier, it appears that several murders have been lately committed on the inhabitants, by small parties of Indians, probably from the Wabash countr}-. Some of the said murders having been perpetrated on the south side of the Ohio, the inhabitants on the waters of that river are exceedingly alarmed, for the extent of six or seven hundred miles along the same. It is to be obser\ed that tlie United States have not formed an}' treaties with the Wabash Indians; on the contrary, since the conclusion of the war with Great Britain, hostilities have almost constantly existed between the people of Kentucky and the said Indians. The injuries and murders have been so reciprocal that it would be a point of critical investigation to know on which side they have been the greatest. Some of the inhabitants of Kentucky during the past year, roused b}- recent injuries, made an incursion into the Wabash countr}'-, and possessing an equal aversion to all bearing the name of Indians, they destroyed a number of peaceable Piankeshaws who prided themselves in their attachment to the United States. Things being thus circumstanced, it is greatly to be apprehended that hostihties may be so far extended as to involve the Indian tribes with whom the United States have recently made treaties. It is well known how strong the passion for war exists in the mind of a young savage, and how easily it may be inflamed, so as to disregard -every precept of the older 'and wiser part of the tribes who ma}' have a more just opinion of the force of a treaty. Hence, it results that unless some decisive measures are immediately adopted to terminate' those mutual hostilities, they will probably become general among all the Indians northwest of the Ohio.

" In examining the question how the disturbances on the frontiers are to be quieted, two modes present themselves by which the object might perhaps be effected - the first of which is by raising an army and extirpating the refractory tribes entirely; or secondly, by forming treaties of peace with them in which their rights and limits should be explicitly defined, and the treaties observed on the part of the United States with the most rigid justice, by punishing the whites who should violate the same.

" In considering the first mode, an inquiry would arise, whether, under the existing circumstances of affairs, the United States have a clear right, consistently with the principles of justice and the laws of nature, to proceed to the destruction or expulsion of the savages on the Wabash, supposing the force for that object easily attainable. It is presumable that a nation solicitous of establishing its character on the broad basis of justice, would not only hesitate at but reject every proposition to benefit itself by the injury of any neighboring community, however contemptible and weak it may be, either with respect to its manners or power. When it shall be considered that the Indians derive their subsistence chiefly by hunting, and that, according to fixed principles, their population is in proportion to the facility with which they procure their food, it would most probably be found that the expulsion or destruction of the Indian tribes have nearly the same effect; for if they are removed from their usual hunting-grounds, they must necessarily encroach on the hunting-grounds of another tribe, who will not suffer the encroachment with impunit}- - hence they destroy each otlier. The Indians, being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. . It can not be taken from them unless b)' their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them on any other principle, would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of that distributive justice which is the glor_y of a nation. But if it should be decided, on an abstract view of the question, to be just to remove by force, the Wabash Indians from the territory- they occupy, the finances of the United States would not at present admit of the operation.

" By the best and latest information, it appears that on the Wabash and its communications, there are from 1,500 to 2,000 warriors. An expedition against them, with a view of extirpating them, or destro3ing their towns, could not be undertaken with a probabilit}' of success with less than an army of 2,500 men. The regular troops of the United States on the frontiers are less than 600; of that number not more than 400 could be collected from the posts for the purpose of the expedition. To raise, pav, feed, arm, and equip 1,900 additional men, with the necessar}' officers for six months, and to provide ever}; thing in the hospital and quartermaster's line, would require the sum of $200,000, a sum far exceeding the ability of the United States to advance, consistently with a due regard to other indispensable objects."

On the 26th of August, 1789, about 200 mounted volunteers, under the command of Colonel John Hardin, marched from the Falls of the Ohio to attack some of the Indian towns on the Wabash. This expedition returned to the Falls on the 28th of September, without the loss of a man - having killed six Indians, plundered and burnt one deserted village, and destro5'ed a considerable quantity of corn.

In a letter addressed to President Washington, bearing date September 14, 17S9, Governor St. Clair pointed out with great care the embarrassments which would surround an expedition against the Indians on the Wabash, and the danger of precipitating a frontier Indian war, and considerable correspondence on the subject passed between President Washington and Governor St. Clair, and it was determined to make an effort for the government and safety of the western settlements.

About the ist of January, 1790, Governor St. Clair, with the judges of the supreme court, descended the Ohio, from Marietta to Fort Washington, and on the 8th of January, 1790, the governor and Winthrop Sargent, secretary' of the territory-, arrived at Clarksville, whence they proceeded to the Illinois country, to organize the government in that quarter. Before the governor left Clarksville, he sent to Major Hamtramck, the commanding officer of Post Vincennes, dispatches containing speeches which were addressed to the Indian tribes on the Wabash. The latter officer, on the 15th of April, dispatched Antoine Gamelin with these speeches of St. Clair, which Gamelin delivered at all the villages bordering this stream, and came as far east as Kekionga. The following is the journal of Gamelin, which will give the reader a fair notion of the spirit of the Miamis at that period :

" The first village I arrived to, is called Kikapouguoi. The name of the chief of this village is called Les Jambes Croches. Him and his tribe have a good heart, and accepted the spetich. The second village is at the river du Vermilion, called Piankeshaws. The first chief and all his warriors, were well pleased with the speeches concerning the peace: but they said they could not give presentlj- a proper answer, before they consult the Miami nation, their eldest brethren. They desired me to proceed to the Miami town (Ke-ki-ong-ga}'), and, by coming back to let them know what reception I got from them. The said head chief told me that he thought the nations of the lake had a bad heart, and were ill disposed for the Americans : that the speeches would not be received, particularlv by the Shawnees at Miamitown. * *

The nth of April, I reached a tribe of Kickapoos. The head chief and all the warriors being assembled, I gave them two branches of white wampum, with the speeches of his excellency Arthur St. Clair, and those of Major Hamtramck. It must be observed that the speeches have been in another hand before me. The messenger could not proceed further than the Vermilion, on account of some private wrangling between <he the interpreter and some chief men of the tribe. Moreover, something in the speech displeased them verv much, which is included in the third article, which sa3'S, do iiozv make you the offer of peace : accept it, or reject it as vo/t please.'' These words appeared to displease all the tribes to whom the first messenger was sent. Thev told me they were menacing; and finding that it might have a bad effect, I took upon m3-'self to exclude them; and, after making some apology, they answered that he and his tribe were pleased with my speech, and that I could go up without danger, but they could not presently give me an answer, having some warriors absent, and without consulting the Ouiatenons, being the owners of their lands. They desired me to stop at Quitepiconnoe

£Tippecanoe], that they would have the chiefs and warriors of >uiatenons and those of their nation assembled there, and would receive a proper answer. They said that they expected by me a draught of milk from the great chief, and the commanding officer of the post, for to put the old people in good humor; also some powder and ball for the j'oung men for hunting, and to get some good broth for their women and children : that I should know a bearer of speeches should never be with emptj' hands. The}' promised me to keep their young men from stealing and to send speeches to their nations in the prairies for to do the same.

"The 14th April, the Ouiatenons and the Kickapoos were assembled. After my speech, one of the head chiefs got up and told me, '\ou, Gamelin, my friend and son-in-law, we are pleased to see in our village, and to hear bv your mouth, the good w'ords of the great chief. We thought to receive a few words from the French people; but I see the contrary. None but the Big Knife is sending speeches to us. You know that we can terminate nothing \\ithout the consent of our brethren the jMiamis. I invite you to proceed to their village and to speak to them. There is one thing in your speech I do not like; I will not tell of it; even was I drunk, I would perceive it; but our elder brethren will certainly take notice of it in your speech. You invite us to stop our young men. It is impossible to do it, being constantly encouraged by the British.' Another chief got up and said - 'The Americans are ver}' flattering in their speeches; many times our nation went to their rendezvous. I was once mj^self . Some of our chiefs died on the route ; and we always came back all naked; and you, Gamelin, you come with speech, with empty hands. ' Another chief got up and said to his young men, ' If we are poor, and dressed in deer skins, it is our own fault. Our French traders are leaving us and our villages, because you plunder them ever}' da}-; and it is time for us to have another conduct.' Another chief got up and said - ' Know ye that the village of Ouiatenon is the sepulchre of all our ancestors. The chief of America invites us to go to him if we are for peace. He has not his leg broke, having been able to go as far as the Illinois. He might come here himself; we should be glad to see him at our village. We confess that we accepted the ax, but it is by the reproach we continually receive from the English, and other nations, which received the ax first, caUing us women; at the present time they invite our 3'oung men to war. As to the old people, they are wishing for peace.' They could not give me an answer before they received advice from the Miamis, their elder brethren.

"The iSth April I arrived at the river a Tx^nguille [Eel river]. The chief of the village [which was on the north side of Eel river, six miles above the confluence of that stream with the Wabash], and those of war were not present. I explained the speeches to some of the tribe. They said they were well pleased; but they could not give me an answer, their chief men being absent. They desired me to stop at their village coming back; and they sent with me one of their men for to hear the answer of their eldest brethren.

"The 23d April I arrived at the Miami town. The next day I got the Miami nation, the Shawnees and Delawares all assembled. I gave to each nation two branches of wam.pum, and began the speeches, before the French and English traders, being invited by the chiefs to be present, having told them myself I would be glad to have them present, having nothing to say against anj- body. After the speech I showed them the treaty concluded at Muskingum [Fort Harmar], between his excellency. Governor St. Clair, and sundry- nations, which displeased them. I told them that the purpose of this present time was not to' submit them to any condition, but to offer them the peace, which made disappear their displeasure. The great chief told me that he was pleased with the speech; that he would soon give me an answer. In a private discourse with the great chief, he told me not to mind what the Shawnees would tell me, haviflg a bad heart, and being the perturbators of all the nations. He said the Miamis had a bad name, on account of the mischief done on the river Ohio; but he told me, it was not occasioned by his young men, but by the Shawnees; his young men going out only for to hunt.

"The 25th of i\pril, Blue Jacket, chief warrior of the Shawnees, invited me to go to his house, and told me - 'My friend, by the name and consent of the Shawnees and Delawares, I will speak to you. We are all sensible of your speech, and pleased with it; but, after consultation, we can not give an answer without hearing from our father at Detroit; and we are determined to give you back the two branches of wampum, and to send you to Detroit to see and hear the chief, or to stay here twent}' nights for to receive his answer. From all quarters we receive speeches from the Americans, and not one is alike. We suppose that they intend to deceive us. Then take back your branches of wampum.'

" The 26th, five Pottawatomies arrived here with two negro men, which they sold to English traders. The next day I went to the great chief of the Miamis, called Le Gris. His chief warrior was present. I told him how I had been served by the Shawnees. He answered me that he had heard of it; that the said nations behaved contrary to his intentions. He desired me not to mind those strangers, and that he would soon give me a positive answer.

" The 28th of April, the great chief desired me to call at the French trader's and receive his answer. 'Don't take bad,' said he, 'of what I am to tell you. You may go back when you please. We can not give you a positive answer. We must send your speeches to all our neighbors, and to the lake nations. We can not give a definite answer without consulting the commandant at Detroit.' And he desired me to render him the two branches of wampum refused by the Shawnees; also a copy of speeches in writing. He promised me that, in thirt}^ nights, he would send an answer to Post Vincennes by a young man of each ntttion. He was well pleased with the speeches, and said to be worth}' of attention, and should be communicated to all their confederates, having resolved among them not to do anything without a unanimous consent. I agreed to his requisitions, and rendered him the two branches of wampum and a copy of the speech. Afterward he told me that the Five Nations, so called, or Iroquois, were training something; that five of them, and three Wyandots, were in this village with branches of wampum. He could not tell me presently their purpose, but he said I would know of it very soon.

"The same day Blue Jacket, chief of the Shawnees, invited me to his house for supper; and, before the other chiefs, told me that after another deliberation, the}' thought necessary that I should go myself to Detroit for to see the commandant, who would get all his children assembled to hear my speech. I told them I would not answer them in the night; that I was not ashamed to speak before the sun.

the river Wabash and the Miami: and that, for to prove the sincerity of the speech,' and the heart of Gov. St. Clair, I have willingly given a copy of the speeches to be shown to the commandant at Detroit; and according to a letter wrote by the commandant of Detroit to the Miamis, Shawnees and Delawares, mentioning to you to be peaceable with the Americans, I \\ould go to him ver}' willingh', if it was in my directions, being sensible of his sentiments. I told them I had nothing to say to the commandant; neither him to me. You must immediateh' resolve if you intend to take me to Detroit, or else I am to go back as soon as possible. Blue Jacket got up and told me, 'My friend, we are well pleased with what you say. Our intention is not to force you to go to Detroit. It is only a proposal, thinking it for the best. Our answer is the same as the Miamis. We will send in thirty nights, a full and positive answer b}' a young man of each nation by writing to Post Vincennes.' In the evening. Blue Jacket, chief of the Shawnees, having taken me to supper with him, told me in a private manner, that the Shawnee nation was in doubt of the sincerity of the Big Knives, so called, having been alread}- deceived by them. That they had lirst destroyed their lands, put out their fire, and sent awa}- their 3'oung men, being a hunting, without a mouthful of meat; also had taken awa^^ their women - wherefore many of them would, with a great deal of pam, forget these affronts. Moreover, that some other nations were apprehending that offers of peace would, may be, tend to take away by degrees, their lands, and would serve them as they did before: a certain proof that thev intend to encroach on our lands, is their new settlement on the Ohio. If they don't keep this side [of the Ohio] clear, it will never be a proper reconcilement with the nations Shawnees, Iroquois, Wj^andots and perhaps many others. Le Gris, chief of the Miamis, asked me in a private discourse, what chiefs had made a treaty with the Americans at Muskingdum'[Fort Harmar] ? I answered him that their names were mentioned in the treaty. He told me he had heard of it some time ago; but they are not chiefs, neither delegates who made that treaty - they are only young men who, without authority and instructions from their chiefs have concluded that treaty, which will not be approved. They went to the treaty clandestinely, and they intend to make mention of it in the next council to be held.

" The 2d of May I came back to the river a I'Anguille. One of the chief men of the tribe being witness of the council at Miami town, repeated the whole to them; and whereas, the tirst chief was absent, they said they could not for the present time give answer, but they were willing to join their speech to those of their eldest brethren. ' To give j-ou proof of an open heart, we let you know that one of our chiefs is gone to war on the Americans :^but it was before we heard of you, for certain they would not have been gone thither.' They also told me that a few days after I passed their village, seventy warriors, Chippewas and Ottawas, from Michillimackinac, arrix-ed there. Some of them were Pottawatomies, who meeting in their route the Chippewas and Ottawas, joined them. ' We told them what we heard b}' you; that 3'our speech is fair and true. We could not stop them from going to war. The Pottawatomies told us that, as the Chippewas and Ottawas were more numerous" than them, they were forced to follow them.'

" The 3d of May I got to the Weas. They told me that they were waiting for an answer from their eldest brethren. ' We approve very much our brethren for not to give a definite answer, without informing of it all the lake nations; that Detroit was the place where the fire was lighted; then it ought first to be put out there; that the English commandant is their father, since he threw down our French father. They could do nothing without his approbation.' The 4th of May I arrived at the village of the Kickapoos. The chief, presenting me two branches of wampum, black and white, said : ' My son, we can not stop our young men from going to war. Every da}' some set off clandestinely for that purpose. After such behaviour from our young men, we are ashamed to say to the great chief at the Illinois and of the Post Vincennes, that we are busy about some good affairs for the reconcilement; but be persuaded that we will speak to them continually concerning the peace; and that, when our eldest brethren will have sent their answer, we. will join ours to it.' The 5th of May I arrived at Vermilion. I found nobody but two chiefs; all the rest were gone a-hunting. They told me they had nothing else to say but what I was told going up."

Gov. St. Clair being at Kaskaskia, early in June of this j'ear, received from Major Hamtramck the following, bearing date Post Vincennes, May 22d, 1790: "I now inclose the proceedings of Mr. Gamelin, by which )'our excellenc_y can have no great hopes of bringing the Indians to a peace with the United States. The 8th of May, Gamelin arrived, and on the nth some merchants arrived and informed me that, as soon as Gamelin had passed their villages on his return, all the Indians had gone to war; that a large party of Indians from Michillimackinac, and some Pottawatomies, had gone to Kentucky; and that three days after Gamelin had left the Miami village, an American was brought there and burnt."

Hannar^s Campaign. - Being induced to believe from the dispatches received from Hamtramck, that there was no possibility of forming a treaty of peace with the Miamis and other tribes banded with them, St. Clair quit Kaskaskia and reached Fort Washington on the 13th of July. Having consulted with General Harmar, and concluding to send a formidable force against the Indians about the head-waters of the Wabash, b}^ authority of President Washington, on the 15th of Juh% he addressed circular letters to a number of lieutenants of the western counties of Virginia [Kentucky] and Penns3'lvania, for the purpose of raising 1,000 militia in the former, and 500 in the latter. The regular troops then in service in the west General Harmar estimated at about 400 efllcient men, with whom the militia were to operate as follows: Of the Virginia militia, 300 were to rendezvous at Fort Steuben, and, with a garrison at that post, to proceed to Vincennes, to join Major Hamtramck, who had orders to call to his aid the militia of that place, and move up the Wabash, attacking such Indian A'illages along that river as his force might seem adeq^uate to. The 1,200 militia remaining were to join the regular troops, under General Harmar, at Fort Washington. That the British commandant at Detroit might know the true cause of the movement, on the 19th of September Gov. St. Clair addressed a letter to him, assuring the said commandant that the purposes of the United States were pacific in so far as their relations to Great Britain were concerned; that the expedition was to quell the vindictive and intolerable spirit of the Indians toward the settlements against which the}' had so long, so inhumanh' and destructively carried on their savage warfare. That the English, toward Lake Erie, notwithstanding this spirit of candor and courtesy on the part of St. Clair, gave aid to the Indians in their efforts against the United States during 1790-91, the evidence is clear enough; but to what extent they did so, was not fully known. The following paragraphs from a certificate of one Thomas Rhea, taken in the early part of 1790, will give some indication of the encouragement given the Indians by the British.

" At this place, the Miami," said Rhea, in his account, " were Colonels Brant and McKee, with his son Thomas; and Captains Bunbury and Silvie, of the British troops. These officers, &c.,were all encamped on the south side of the Miami or Ottawa river, at the rapids above Lake Erie, about eighteen miles; they had clever houses, built chiefly by the Pottawatomies and other Indians; in these they had stores of goods, with arms, ammunition and provision, which they issued to the Indians in great abundance, viz.: corn, pork, peas, &c. The Indians came to this place in parties of one, two, three, four and five hundred at a time, from different quarters, and received from Mr. McKee and the Indian officers, clothing, arms, ammunition, provisions, &c., and set out immediatelj' for the upper Miami towns, where they understood the forces of the United States were bending their course, and in order to supply the Indians from other quarters collected there, pirogues loaded with the above-mentioned articles were sent up the Miami [Maumee] river, wrought by French Canadians."

About the middle of September, the Virginia militia began to gather about the mouth of Licking river, opposite Cincinnati, for the most part badly armed and equipped; they were organized by General Harmar, and formed into three battalions, under Majors Hall, McMullen and Ra}', with Trotter as lieutenant-colonel. About the 24th of September, came the militia of Pennsylvania, also badly prepared, and many of them substitutes - "old, infirm men, and young boys." These were formed into one battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel Truby and Major Paul; while four battalions of militia, subject to General Harmar's command, were commanded b}^ Col. John Hardin. Majors John Plasgrave Wj'lles and John Doughty commanded the regular troops, in two small battalions. The artiller}' corps, with but three pieces of ordnance, was under the command of Captain William Ferguson; while under James Fontaine was placed a small battalion of light troops or mounted militia. The whole army contained about 1,453 regular and raw militia troops. The militia under Col. Hardin, on the 26th of September, advanced from Fort Washington into the country, for the double purpose of opening a road for the artillery and obtaining feed for their cattle. On the 30th of September, the regular troops marched, commanded b\- General Harmar, and on the 3d day of October joined the militia. A journal of the dail}' movements of the army was regularl}' kept by Captain John Armstrong, of the regulars, up to its an-ival at the Miami village.

x\fter an uninterrupted march of sixteen da}S, on^the afternoon of the 15th of October, Colonel Hardin, with an advanced detachment, stole upon Kekionga, onl\' to find it deserted by men, women and children. A few cows, some vegetables, about 20,000 bushels of corn in the ear, and empty wigwams, were all that greeted them; and the militia, in much disorder, soon began to scatter in search of plunder. On the 17th, about one o'clock, the main body of the army came up and crossed the Maumee to the village. Major McMuUen, having discovered the tracks of women and children leading to the northwest, so reported to General Harmar, and the latter on the morning of the i8th, detailed Col. Trotter and Majors Hall, Ray and McMullen, with 300 men, among whom were thirtj' regulars, forty light-horse, and 230 active riflemen. Furnished with three da3's' provision, the}' were ordered to reconnoiter the country around the village. About one mile from the encampment, an Indian on horseback was discovered, pursued and killed b}^ a part of the detachment, under Trotter; and before returning to the main bod}' another Indian was seen, "when the four field officers left their commands and pursued him, leaving the troops for the space of about half an hour without any direction whatever." Being intercepted by the fight-horsemen, one of whom he had wounded, the Indian was at length despatched. Changing the route of his detachment, and moving in different directions, till night. Col. Trotter, contrar}- to instructions, returned to the Miami village.

In consequence of the disorderl}' course of the militia on their arrival. General Harmar ordered cannon to be fired for the purpose of calling them to ranks, and also harangued the officers on the bad results liable to follow such indifference. On the i8th he issued the following general order:

"The general is much mortified at the unsoldierlike behavior of many of the men in the army, who make it a practice to straggle from the camp in search of plunder. He, in the most positive terms, forbids this practice in future, and the guards will be answerable to prevent it. No party is allowed to go beyond the line of sentinels without a commissioned officer, who, if of the militia, will appl}- to Col. Hardin for his orders. The regular troops will apply to the general. All the plunder that may be hereafter collected, will be equally distributed among the army. The kettles, and everj^ other article already taken, are to be collected by the commanding officers of battalions, and to be delivered to-morrow morning to JMr. Belli, the quartermaster, that a fair distribution may take place. The rolls are to be called at troop and retreat beating, and every man absent is to be reported. The general expects that these orders will be pointedly attended to; they are to be read to the troops this evening. The army is to march to-morrow morning early for their new encampment at Chillicothe, about two miles from hence. "Josl\h Harmar, Brigadier-General.''''

Col. Hardin having asked for the command of the troops returned to camp under Trotter, for the remaining two da3'S, Gen. Harmar put that officer in command, and he on the next da}- led the detachment along an Indian trail to the northwest, in the direction of the Kickapoo villages. Coming to a point, near a morass, some five miles distant from the confluence of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph rivers, where on the preceding day there had been an Indian encampment, the detachment came to a halt, and was stationed in readiness for an attack should the enemy still be near. A half hour passed with no alarm. The order now being given to the front to advance, all marched forward except the company under Faulkner, which not having received the order, was left behind. Having advanced some three miles, two Indians afoot, with packs, were discovered ; but they dropped their burdens at the sight of the troops and were soon lost sight of. The absence of Faulkner at this time becoming apparent, Major Fontaine, with a portion of the cavalry, was sent in pursuit of him, on the theory that he was lost.

The report of a gun to the front soon fell upon the attentive ear of Captain Armstrong in command of the regulars - an alarm gun, perhaps, suggested he. He had discovered the "tracks of a horse that had come down the road and returned." Captain Armstrong also observed the fires of the Indians in the distance. Hardin thought the Indians would not fight, and moved forward in the direction of the fires, neither giving orders or preparing for an attack. The band of 300 was now several miles from camp and marching tlirough the forest, unaware that the enemy was in ambush, and Little Turtle was the leader. Behind the fires lay the red men with guns leveled. No sooner had the troops approached the fires than a destructive volley burst upon them from the ambush. The militia were panic stricken, and all but nine began a precipitate flight for the camp of Gen. Harmar. Hardin had retreated with them, and in vain strove to rally them. The regulars bravely faced the enem\', and returned the fire. The nine remaining militia were pierced bj- the balls of the enem}-, and twenty-two of the regulars fell, Captain Armstrong, Ensign Hartshorn, and some five or six privates, alone making their escape. This bloody engagement was near the place now known as " Heller's Corners."

Having, after the departure of Hardin in the morning, destroyed the Miami village, Harmar moved about two miles down the Maumee to the Shawnee village, known as Chillicothe. On the 20th he issued the following order:

Epoch Of Pavage Triumphs

"The part}' under command of Captain Strong is ordered to burn and destroy everj- house and wigwam in this village, together with all the corn, etc., which he can collect. A party of 100 men (militia), properly officered, under the command of Col. Hardin, is to burn and destroy effectuall}-, this afternoon, the Pickaway town, with all the corli, etc., which he can find in it and its vicinitjr.

" The cause of the detachment being worsted yesterday, was entirely owing to the shameful, cowardly conduct of the militia, who ran awa}', and threw down their arms, without firing scarcely a single gun. In returning to Fort Washington, if any officer or men presume to quit the ranks, or not to march in the form that they are ordered, the genera) will most assuredly order the artillery to fire on them. He hopes the check they received j-esterday will make them in future obedient to orders. Josiah Harmar, Brio-adier-Gencral.''''

From the scene of the smoking remains of the Indian village of Chillicothe, at ten o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the ami}' under Harmar began march toward Fort Washington, and proceeded about seven miles, when a halt was made and the troops encamped for the night.

The evening was clear and beautiful - ushering in a glorious October night. There was no sign of the enemy and the hoarse calls of the night owl, mingled with the voices of the soldiery, were all the sounds that fell upon the attentive ears of the sentinels.

Reassured by this peaceful outlook, a desire for revenge came to the mind of Colonel Hardin. His desire for the chastisement of the Indian was by no means appeased by burning villages. The Miamis had perhaps returned to the village immediately after the departure of the army, thought he, and a most propitious opportunity was presented to return and surprise them. He urged upon General Harmar "that, as he had been unfortunate the other day, he wished to have it in his power to pick the militia and try it again." He sought to explain the cause of the mihtia not meeting the Indians on the 19th; and insisted that he wished to vindicate their valor. The earnest demeanor of Hardin prevailed, and Harmar. gave his consent, as he was anxious that the Indians should be as well subdued as possible, that they might not give the arm}.- trouble on its March to Fort Washington. That night Hardin set out, intending to strike the Miami village before dayhght. Under his command a body of 340 militia, and sixty regulars under Major Wyllys, took up its line of march, in three columns, the regulars in the center and the militia to the right and left. Captain Joseph Ashton moved at the head of the regulars, while Major Wyllys and Colonel Hardin were in his front. Contrar}- to Hardin's hopes, some delay having been caused by the halting of the militia, the banks of the Maumee were not gained till after sunrise. Indians were soon discovered by the spies, and Major Wyllys called the regulars to a halt, and ordered the militia on to a point in front, and presented his plan of attack to the commanding officers of the detachment. Major Hall was directed, with his battalion, to move round the bend of the Maumee, cross the St. Mary's and take a position in the rear of the Indians, until an attack should be made by Major McMullen's battalion. Major Fontaine's cavalry, and the regular troops under Major Wyllys, who were all ordered to cross the Maumee at or near the ford. Hardin and Wyllys had aimed to surround the Indians in their encampment; but Maj. Hall, having reached his flanking position unobserved, disregarded the orders given by firing upon an Indian that appeared in sight before the general attack was made. This startled the Indians, and small squads of them being seen hurrying awa}' in many directions, the}- were rapidly pursued, contrary to orders, by the militia under McMullen and the cavalry under Fontaine, leaving Wyllys, at the head of the regulars, without support. In crossing the Maumee they were attacked by a superior bod}' of Indians, under the lead of Little Turtle, and at length, after the fall of Wyllys and the larger part of the regular troops, were forced to retreat. Major Fontaine, at the head of the mounted militia, in a charge upon a small body of Indians, was killed, and a considerable number of his men fell, and the remainder sought safety in retreat. While the regulars were being slaughtered by Little Turtle, the militia under Hall and McMullen, at the confluence of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph, were briskly engaged with small parties of Indians, but when they learned of the misfortune of the regulars they scurried away toward the camp of Harmar. A single horseman having reached the camp of the main army with the news of the defeat about ii o'clock a. m., Harmar at once ordered Major Ray, with his battalion, to advance to the aid of the retreating forces. But the effect of the panic on the militia was too great - but thirty men could be prevailed on to advance to the rescue under Major Ray, and those had gone but a short distance when they were met by Hardin and the retreating forces. Gaining the encampment. Colonel Hardin, flushed with excitement, and still entertaining a strong desire to fight the Indians, urged Harmar to set out at once with the entire force for the Miami village. But Harmar would not venture a return. Said he: "You see the situation of the army; we are now scarcely able to move our baggage; it will take up three days to go and return to this place; we have no more forage for our horses; the Indians have got a very good scourging; and I will keep the army in perfect readiness to receive them, should they think proper to follow."

The remains of Major Wyllys and Fontaine and eight other officers and men who fell in the engagement with Little Turtle, were buried in trenches near the river, some twenty rods below the site of the residence of J. J. Comparet, which was built just above the fatal ford. Before the destructive fire of the red men the soldiers fell in such numbers that the water, then of no great volume, became bloody. One of the soldiers wounded here, John Smith, managed to conceal himself on the bank, and after witnessing the triumph of the savages, escaped down the Maumee and reached Fort Washington. Returning with Gen. Wayne, he became a resident of the village about the fort

The militia had now become little better than wooden men in the eyes of Gen. Harmar. He had lost all faith in them, and on the morning of the 23d of October, after a loss of 183 killed and thirty-one 'wounded, the army again took up its march for Fort Washington, where it arrived on the 4th of November. Among the killed in this campaign were Maj. Wyllys and Lieut. Ebenezer Frothingham, of the regulars; Major Fontaine, Captains Thorpe, McMurtre}' and Scott, Lieutenants Clark and Rogers, and Ensigns Bridges, Sweet, Higgins and Thielkeld, of the militia. The loss on the part of the Indians was thought to be about equal to that of the forces under Harmar.

Major Hamtramck, who had moved from Vincennes up the Wabash, had proceeded with his command to the mouth of the Vermilion river, and after laying waste several deserted villages, returned again to Vincennes. The campaign of 1790 against the Indians of the northwest was now closed, and the chilling blasts of another long, dreary winter, with its anxieties, its hardships, and its perils, had begun to set in about the lonely settlements.

St. Cla/r''s Campaign. - The defeat of Harmar gave great encouragement to the Indians, as well it might, and brought corresponding depression to the settlements. So elated were the savages, that they renewed their attacks upon the frontier settlements with greater vigor and ferocity, if possible, than ever before, rendering it necessary for the settlers to combine and take prompt measures for their safety. Meetings were held all along the frontier. The government was freel}" criticised and in many instances severely denounced for the inefficient management of the campaigns of the past. Particularh-, they denounced as unwise, the appointment of regular army officers, unused to Indian warfare, to command the mihtia, which was composed of men accustomed to study the Indian and his cunning from bo3fhood, and the}' earnestly implored the president to employ onl}' the militia, under officers of its own choosing, for frontier defense, offering at once to raise a force sufficient not only for frontier defense, but to carry an aggressive war forthwith into the Indian country'. This was not granted, but the president readily favored the increase of the regular army on the frontier, and appointed Gen. St. Clair to the command.

On the third of March, 1791, congress passed the "act for raising and adding another regiment to the militia establishment of the United States, and for making further provision for the protection of the frontier." It was proposed to place an army of some 3,000 men under the command of St. Clair. On the 21st of March, instructions were addressed, b}^ the secretary of war, Gen. Henry Knox, to that general, which show what importance was attached to the possession of Kekionga. Said the secretar}': "While you are making use of such desultory operations as in your judgment the occasion may require, you will proceed vigoroush' in eveiy preparation in j-our power, for the purpose of the main expedition ; and having assembled your force, and all things being in readiness, if no decisive indications of peace should have been produced, either by the messengers or b}- the desultory operations, you will commence your march for the Miami village, in order to establish a strong and permanent military post at that place. In your advance 3-ou will establish such posts of communication with Fort Washington, on the Ohio, as ypu may judge proper. The post at Miami village is intended for awing and curbing the Indians in that quarter, and as the only preventive of future hostilities. It ought, therefore, to be rendered secure against all attempts and insults of the Indians. The garrison which should be stationed there ought not onh- to be sufficient for the defense of the place, but alwa3^s to afford a detachment of live or six hundred men, either to chastise any of the Wabash or other hostile Indians, or to secure any convoy of provisions. The establishment of said post is considered as an important object of the campaign, and is to take place in all events. In case of a previous treaty, the Indians are to be conciliated upon this point if possible; and it is presumed good arguments ma}' be offered to induce their acquiescence. » * * Having commenced your march upon the main expedition, and the Indians continuing hostile, you will use ever}' possible exertion to make them feel the effects of 3four superiority; and, after having arrived at the Miami village, and put your works in a defensible state, you will seek the enemy with the whole of 3'our remaining force, and endeavor by all means possible to strike them with great severitj-. * * * In order to avoid future wars, it might be proper to make the Wabash, and thence over to the Maumee, and down the same to its mouth at Lake Erie, the boundary [between the people of the United States and the Indians], excepting so far as the same should relate to the Wyandots and Delawares, on the supposition of their continuing faithful to the treaties. But if they should join in the war against the United States, and your army be victorious, the said tribes ought to be removed without the boundary mentioned."

Following this Brig.-Gen. Scott, of Kentucky, marched with about Soo mounted men toward Ouiatenon, and destroj-ed the villages and cornfields, and in a light with the Indians killed thirty and took fift3--one prisoners. On the 5th of July, Gen. James Wilkinson was sent in command of another expedition against the Wabash and Red ri\-er Indians, and destroyed a number of towns and cornfields. These campaigns were undertaken principally with the object of weakening the strength, and destroying the resources of the Indians on the Wabash, and thus giving material aid to Gen. St. Clair in the campaign he was preparing to enter upon against the Miamis at Kekionga, but the}- accomplished little in that direction and served to increase the hatred of the Miamis, who, filled with desire for revenge, instead of slackening their efforts, or ceasing to make war upon the Americans, began to call to their aid numerous warriors from the surrounding tribes of the Pottawatomies,

Kickapoos, Delawares, Ottawas, Wyandots, and other tribes of the northwest. While Gen. St. Clair was making preparations to establish a military post at the Miami village, Little Turtle, the Shawnee chief Blue Jacket, and the Delaware chief, Buck-ong-a-helas, were actively engaged in an effort to organize a confederacy of tribes sufficientl}^ powerful to drive the white settlers from the territory - receiving aid and counsel from Simon Girty, Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott (the latter two sub-agents in the British Indian department), and from a number of British, French and American traders who generally resided among the Indians, and supplied them with arms and ammunition in exchange for peltries.

This Girty was a noted character in all the frontier Indian wars. A renegade white man who allied himself with the Wyandots, and for many years was their leader in battle, as well as the planner of their campaigns, he exhibited a savageness of disposition, and a heartlessness in witnessing (if he did not direct), the torture bv his savage allies of their white prisoners, which display almost unparalleled depravity, but by means of it, he no doubt obtained and held a supremac}' of control over their minds. He was often at the Miami villages of the Maumee, and is said to have resided for some time at the town of Chillicothe, two miles east of Fort Wayne, at the bend of that river.

It was unfortunate for the success of the movements against the Indian tribes, that although in the treat}- of 1783 with Great Britain it was declared in the seventh article of that document that the king would, " with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carr\-ing away any negroes or propert}' of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his forces, garrisons and fleets from the United States, and from every post, place and harbor within the same, yet, at the time of Harmar's, St. Clair's and Wayne's campaigns, he still held and garrisoned the posts of Niagara, Detroit and MichiUimackinac. From these points, under the plea that that part of the treaty of 1783, relating to the collection and payment of all debts theretofore contracted with and due to the king's subjects, had not been faithfulU^ complied with by the Americans, the English government continued, from time to time, to give aid and comfort to the Indians and others in open warfare upon the United States forces and the settlements along the Ohio, and at other points in the west. According^, while Gen. St. Clair was preparing to march upon the Miami village, the British at Niagara, Detroit and MichiUimackinac, were using what means they could to defeat the purposes of the United States; and an insight into their movements, at that time in league with the Indians, would doubtless have discouraged St. Clair in his effort to capture the Miami village, or to establish a military post at this point. But the effort was destined to be made; and after much delay and many impeding and perplexing circumstances, in the early part of September, 1791, the main body of the armj-, under General Butler, marched from the vicinity of Fort Washington, and, moving northward some twenty-five miles, on the eastern bank of the river Miami erected a post, which they called Fort Hamilton. On the 4th of October the army continued its march, and having advanced forty-two miles from Fort Hamilton, they erectea Fort Jefferson, six miles south of Greenville, Ohio. The season was now far advanced, and the 24th of October had arrived before the army again moved for the Miami village.

Some of the militia deserted, heav}- rains fell, provisions became short, a reconnoitering party was fired upon, two were killed and one supposed to have been taken prisoner, and St. Clair was sick, during the nine days' march which followed. On the 3d of November the main army reached the site of Fort Recovery, and encamped at the headwaters of the Wabash, in view of several small creeks, about fifty miles from the Miami village. The chill of winter now begun to be felt - snow had alread}^ fallen. Some Indians were seen but the}^ fled as soon as observed.

The famous Shawnee chief Tecumseh had been placed in charge of a part}' of spies and scouts, with which he had hung upon the route of the army of St. Clair as it advanced toward Greenville, and reported the movements and strength of his forces to the head chiefs of the Indians. The advance and general movement of St. Clair thus became well known to the confederated tribes and their allies, and this information inspired them with the determination to draw the army into their power by wiles and stratagems, and, if possible, destroy it. Under the lead of the famous Little Turtle, and Buckongahelas, and Blue Jacket, the renegade Simon Girt}- and several other white men, they prepared to meet St. Clair with a force of 1,400 warriors.

This force was assembled for review on an extensive plain about five miles southwest of the village on the banks of the St. Mary's [part of the Richardville reserve]. A considerable altercation arose among the Indians on the review ground relative to a commander-in-chief. Some were in favor of Buckongahelas, while others favored Little Turtle. At length Buckongahelas settled the controversy by yielding the command to Little Turtle, saying that he was the younger and more active man andthat he preferred him to himself. This reconciled the opposing factions and Little Turtle took command.

He divided his warriors into bands or messes, to each mess twenty men. It was the duty of four of this number alternately to hunt for provisions. At noon of each day the hunters were to return to the main army with what they had killed, and by this regulation his commissariat was well supplied during the seven days they were advancing to the field of battle.

Meanwhile, at the camp of St. Clair, a site afterward known as Fort Recovery, the commander desiring a place of safety for fhe knapsacks of the soldiers, had, on the evening of the arrival of the army, concluded " to throw up a slight work," and then after the arrival of the regiment still on the way, to move on and attack the enemy. But before the sun had risen on November 4, following that hour which is accounted the darkest just before day, the Indian whoop startled the army of St. Clair, just getting under arms. A furious attack burst from the darkness, upon the militia, which soon gave way, and came rushing into the camp, through Major Butler's battalion, creating the wildest disorder on every side, and closely pursued b}' the Indians. The fire of the front line checked the red men, but almost instantly a very heav}' attack began upon that line; and in a few minutes it was extended to the second likewise. The greatest pressure was directed against the center of each, where was placed the artiller^^ from which the men were repeatedly driven with great slaughter. Perceiving but little effect from the fire of the artillery, a baj^onet charge was ordered, led by Lieut.-Col. Darke, which drove the Indians back some distance, but they soon returned to the attack and the troops of Darke were, in turn, compelled to give way; while, at the same time, the enemy had pushed their way into camp by the left flank, and the troops there also were in disorder. Repeated charges w^ere now made by Butler's and Clark's battalions, but with great loss; manj' officers fell, leaving the raw troops without direction - Major Butler himself being dangerous^ wounded. In the Second regiment every officer had fallen, except three, and one of these had been shot through the body.

The artillery being now silenced, half the army fallen and all the officers killed, except Captain Ford, who was ver}^ badly wounded, it became necessary to regain the trail from which the troops were now cut off, and to make a retreat if possible. For this purpose the remnant of the arm}^ was formed, as well as circumstances would admit, toward the right of the encampment, from which, by the way of the second line, another charge was made upon the enemy, as if with the design to turn the right flank, but in fact to gain the route. This was effected, and as soon as it was open, the militia took the lead, followed by the troops, Major Clarke with his battalion covering the rear. Everything was now in confusion. The panic had produced a complete rout. The camp and artillery were all abandoned - not a horse was left alive to remove the cannon; and the soldiers threw away their arms and accoutrements as they ran, strewing the path for miles with them. The retreat began about half-past nine o'clock and continued a distance of twenty-nine miles, to Fort Jefferson, where the survivors arrived soon after sunset, St. Clair having lost thirtj'-nine officers killed, and 593 men killed and missing; twenty-two ofUcers and 242 men wounded. The loss in stores and other valuable property was estimated at $32,810.75.

The officers who fell in this memorable occasion were: Major General Richard Butler; Lieutenant Colonel Oldham, of the Kentucky militia; Majors Ferguson, Clarke, and Hart; Captains Bradford, Phelon, Kirkwood, Price, Van Swearingen, Tipton, Smith, Purdy, Piatt, Guthrie, Cribbs, and Newman; Lieutenants Spear, Warren, Boyd, McMath, Bead, Burgess, Kelso, Little, Hopper and Lickens; Ensigns Balch, Cobb, Chase, Turner, Wilson, Brooks, Beatty, and Purdy; Quartermasters Reynolds and Ward; Adjutant Anderson, and Dr. Grasson.

Valley Of The Upper Mau.Mee

The officers wounded were: Lieutenant Colonels Gibson, Darke, and Sargent (adjutant general) ; Major Butler; Captains Doyle, Trueman, Ford, Buchanan, Darke and Hough; Lieutenants Greaton, Da\'idson, De Butts, Price, Morgan, McCroa, Lysle, and Thompson; Ensign Bine's; Adjutants Whisler and Crawford, and the Viscount Malartie, volunteer aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief.

In this engagement, Little Turtle displa3'ed feelings of humanity toward his retreating foes, of which few examples have been recorded in the history of Indian warfare, and which reflect honor on his character. On beholding the soldiers fleeing before the exasperated Indians, and falling every moment under the merciless blows of the tomahawks, his heart revolted, and ascending an eminence he gave a peculiar cry, which commanded his forces to cease from further pursuit and return to their camps. He also sent out messengers to inform them, wherever they might be, that they must be satisfied with the carnage, having killed enough. But this humane effort was of little effect.

Many women had followed the army of St. Clair in its march toward the Miami village, preferring to be with their husbands rather than remain behind. Most of them were destroyed or captured, and after the flight of the remnant of the army, the Indians began to avenge their own real and imaginar}^ wrongs by perpetrating the most horrible acts of cruelty and brutality upon the bodies of the living and dead Americans who fell into their hands. Believing the whites made war merely to acquire land, the Indians crammed cla^_and_sancl into the eyes and down the throats of the d3'jjig_and_the dead. The unfortunate women who feTl~behirfdTirTlTe" pnhic-stricken retreat, were subjected to the most indecent cruelty which the ingenuity of their lustful and merciless captors could devise, and the bodies of some of them were found with stakes as large as a man's arm driven through them.

B. Van Cleve, who was in the quartermaster-general's department, of the army of St. Clair, gave the following narrative of the affair: "On the fourth [of November] at daybreak, I began to prepare for returning [to Fort Washington], and had got about half my luggage on m}- horse, when the tiring commenced. We were encamped just within the lines, on the right. The attack was made on the Kentuck}^ militia. Almost instantaneously, the small remnant of them that escaped broke through the line near us, and this line gave away. Followed by a tremendous fire from the enemy, they passed me. I threw m}" bridle over a stump, from which a tent pole had been cut, and followed a short distance, when finding the troops had halted, I returned and brought my horse a Httle further. I was now between the fires, and finding the troops giving away again, was obliged to leave him a second time. As I (Quitted him he was shot down, and I felt rather glad of it, as I concluded that now I should be at liberty to share in the engagement. My inexperience prompted me to calculate on our forces being far superior to any that the savages could assemble, and that we should soon have the pleasure of driving them. Not more than' five minutes had yet elapsed, when a soldier near me had his arm swinging with a wound. I reijuested his arms and accoutrements, as he was unable to use them, promising to return them to him, and commenced firing. The smoke was settled down to within about three feet of the ground, but I generally put one knee to the ground and with a rest from behind a tree, waited the appearance of an Indian's head from behind his cover, or for one to run and change his position. Before I was convinced of my mistaken calculation, the battle was half over and I had become familiarized to the scene. Hearing the firing at one time unusually brisk near the rear of the left wing, I crossed the encampment. Two levy officers were just ordering a charge. I had fired away my ammunition and some of the bands of my musket had flown off. I picked up another, and a cartridge box nearly full, and pushed forward with about thirty others. The Indians ran to the right, where there was a small ravine filled with logs. I bent m^? course after them, and on looking round, found I was with only seven or eight men, the others having kept straight forward and halted about thirty yards off. We halted also, and being so near to where the savages lay concealed, the second fire from them left me standing alone. My cover was a small sugar tree or beech, scarcely large enough to hide me. I fired away all my ammunition; I am uncertain whether with any effect or not. I then looked for the party near me, and saw them retreating and half wav back to the lines. I followed them, running my best, and was soon in. B}' this time our artillery had been taken, I do not know whether the first or second time, and our troops had just retaken it, and were charging the enemy across the creek in front; and some person told me to look at an Indian running with one of our kegs of powder, but I did not see him. There were about thirty of our men and officers lying scalped around the pieces of artillery. It appeared that the Indians had not been in a hurry, for their hair was all skinned off.

"Datiiel Bonham, a young man raised by my uncle and brought up with me, and whom I regarded as a brother, had by this time received a shot through his hips and was unable to walk. I procured a horse and got him on. My uncle had received a ball near his wrist that lodged near his elbow. The ground was literally covered with dead and dying men. Happening to see my uncle, he told me a retreat was ordered, and that I must do the best I could and take care of m3rself. Bonham insisted that he had a better chance of escaping than I had, and urged me to look to my own safet}- alone. I found the troops pressing like a drove of bullocks to the right. I saw an officer whom I took to be Lieut. Morgan, an aid to Gen. Butler, with six or eight men, start on a run a little to the left of where I was. I immediately ran and fell in with them. In a short distance we were so suddenh' among the Indians, who were not apprised of our object, that they opened to us and ran to the right and left without firing. I think about 200 of our men passed through them before they fired, except a chance shot. When we had proceeded about two miles most of those mounted had passed me. A bov had been thrown or fell off a horse and begged my assistance. I ran, pulling him along about two miles further, until I had become nearly exhausted. Of the last two horses in the rear, one carried two men and the other three. I made an exertion and threw him on behind the two men. The Indians followed us but about half a mile further. The boy was thrown off some time afterwards, but escaped and got in safel}-. My friend Bonham I did not see on the retreat, but understood he was thrown off about this place, and lay on the left of the trace, where he was found in the winter and was buried. I took the cramp violently in my thighs and could scarcely walk, until I got within a hundred yards of the rear, where the Indians were tomahawking the old and wounded men; and I stopped here to tie my pocket handkerchief around a man's wounded knee. I saw the Indians close in pursuit at this time, and for a moment my spirits sunk and I felt in despair for my safety. I considered whether I should leave the road, or whether I was capable of any further exertion. If I left the road the Indians were in plain sight and could easil}- overtake me. I threw the shoes off mj^ feet and the coolness of the ground seemed to revive me. I again began a trot, and recollect that, when a bend in the road offered, and I got before half a dozen persons, I thought it would occupy- some time for the enemy to massacre them before my turn would come. B}- the time I had got to Stillwater, about eleven miles, I had gained the center of the flying troops, and, like them, came to a walk. I fell in with Lieut. Shaumburg, who, I think, was the onl}' officer of artillery that got away unhurt, with Corp. Mott, and a woman who was called red-headed Nance. The latter two were both crying. Mott was lamenting the loss of his wife, and Nance that of an infant child. Shaumburg was nearl}' exhausted, and hung on Mott's arm. I carried his fusee and accoutrements and led Nance; and in this sociable way we arrived at Fort Jefferson a little after sunset.

" The commander-in-chief had ordered Col. Darke to press forward to the convoys of provisions, and hurry them on to the army. Major Truman, Captain Sedan and mj^ uncle were setting forward with him. A number of 'soldiers, and packhorsemen on foot, and myself among them, joined them. We came on a few miles, when all, overcome with fatigue, agreed to a halt. Darius Curtus Orcutt, a packhorse master, had stolen at Jefferson, one pocket full of flour and the other full of beef. One of the men had a kettle, and one Jacob Fowler and myself groped about in the dark until we found some water where a tree had been blown out of root. We made a kettle of soup, of which I got a small portion among the many. It was then concluded, as there was a bend in the road a few miles further on, that the Indians might undertake to intercept us there, and we decamped and traveled about four or five miles further. I had got a rifle and ammunition at Jefferson from a wounded militiaman, an old acquaintance, to bring in. A sentinel was set, and we laid down and slept until the governor came up a few hours afterward. I think I never slept so profoundly. I could hardly get awake after I was on 013- feet. On the day before the defeat, the ground was covered with snow. The fiats were now filled with water frozen over, the ice as thick as a knife-blade. I was worn out with fatigue, with my feet knocked to pieces against tlie roots in the night, and splashing through the ice without shoes. In the morning we got to a camp of packhorsemen, and amongst them I got a doughbov or water-dumpling, and proceeded. We got within seven miles of Hamilton on this day, and arrived there soon on the morning of the sixth."

On the 26th of December following, notwithstanding the ill-fortune which seemed to follow all movements against the Miamis, Gen. Knox, secretar}- of war, again urged the estabhshment of a strong military post at the head of the Maumee. In 1792, Rev. Samuel Kirkland was sent on a mission to the western Indians, one point of his journey to be the Miami village, -to urge the Indians to make peace, and to learn what number was engaged against St. Clair, but he accomplished little b}' his mission. The 12th of May of the same year, Capt. Truman was sent from the Ohio river to the Maumee, on a similar errand, but was killed by an Indian on his way.

Campaign Of Anthony Wayne

George Washington, as early as 1750, had become as deeply interested in the great west as any enthusiast of the past few decades. His brothers were ofiicers of the Ohio company, organized in 1749, '^"'^ Washington, surve3'ing in the Shenandoah valle^v, and dreaming of the future, obtained such broadened views of the destiny of the colonies, that the grand idea of a vast nation which should bind together all these regions, possessed his mind. He held fast to the conception of western development, even during the darkest hours of the revolution, and when some one coming to him with a rumor that Russia had made an alliance with England to crush the colonies, asked the heroic leader if that were true, what was to be done, Washington replied: "We will retire to the valley of the Ohio, and there be free." After the war he made a trip over the Alleghanies, and returned with a stronger national inspiration than ever, so that he wrote to La Fayette: " The honor, power and true interests of this country must be measured on a continental scale." Subsequentl}' he made another western trip of seven hundred miles on horseback through the Indian countr}-, and it was after that excursion that he wrote the letter to Benjamin Harrison, governor of Virginia, and great-grandfather of the president of the United States, which has been mentioned on a previous page.

Washington wished to encourage settlements in the Ohio region and beyond, and had a strong antipathy for the land-jobbers, speculators and monopolizers, a " parcel of banditti " he called them, who might " skim the cream of the country at the expense of the suffering ofiicers and soldiers who fought and bled to obtain it." Throughout all the efforts to subdue and colonize the west, the majestic will of Washington was the ruline^ force. Strange as it may appear to a. citizen of the commonwealth of Indiana, in the closing decade of the nineteenth century, his poHcy of opening the western lands was one of the pretexts for abuse and invective which has not been surpassed in the politics of later days. A strong party which opposed him would have preferred the mihtary force of the government, if any were used, to be directed southward to open the Mississippi. The nation, in the year 1889, knows Washington better than he was ever known, even by his contemporaries. But among all that has been said and written of the father of his country, nothing causes a more inspiring realization of his profound wisdom and marvelous political insight than the words he addressed to those who advocated the polic}- of southern aggression. " The problem of the Mississippi will settle itself," he said, "if we simply let it alone and think only of multiplying communications between the west and the Atlantic." Less than a century later, the west, to which Washington threw his influence, was strong enough to again settle " the problem of the Mississippi," and establish the foundation principles of the northwest territory from the lakes to the gulf.

As has been indicated, the issue of the campaign of St. Clair had political bearings as well as military. If it failed the enemies of Washington could declaim with greater reason against the " waste " of money upon the " wild west." Furthermore, it was emphatically a campaign by Washington, in all but personal leadership. He had thrown himself heart and soul into the preparation for the campaign, and planned the movement to Kekionga with a knowledge of details made possible by his experience as an Indian fighter.

The courier reached the president's house at Philadelphia, on a December day, and Washington was called from the side of his wife at a reception to receive the news of a tragedy rivalling that of the defeat of Braddock at Fort DuQuesne. He read the dispatch, and quietly returned to the reception and calmly and courteous!}' met every guest until all at a late hour had departed. Then in grim silence he walked up and down the room, his secretary alone being with him. Suddenly he broke the silence with a thunderous outburst: "It's all over; St. Clair defeated,' routed, the officers nearly all killed, the men by wholesale; the rout complete; shocking to think of, and a surprise into the bargain. Here at the very spot I took leave of him, I wished him success and honor. You have your instructions, I said to him, from the secretary' of war. I had a strict eye to them, and will add but one word: beware of a surprise. I repeat it, beware of a surprise. You know how the Indian fights us. He went off with that as my last solemn warning thrown into his ears. And yet, to suffer that army to be cut to pieces, hacked, butchered, tomahawked, by a surprise, the very thing I guarded him against. O God! O God! he is worse than a murderer. How can he answer to his country-? The blood of the slain is upon him, the curse of widows and orphans, the curse of heaven." He walked long in silence, and then said, "This must not go beyond this room." Then

Mankind knows Washington better, and loves him more, because the revelation alike of his passionate, warmly human nature, and the supreme self-control that inspired the closing declaration, did get " beyond that room." St. Clair received just and considerate treatment, and the president at once set about the formation of an army to renew the advance toward Kekionga. The arm}- of the republic was re-organized on the basis of five thousand soldiers, and was styled the Legion of the United States. As major-general commanding this army, Washington considered Gen. Lee; but there were objections, and he selected Gen. Anthony Wayne, although there were grumblings thereat in Virginia. Wayne had won the admiration of the people by his daring and desperate valor and uniform success in the revolution. Whenever recklessness led him into danger, genius enabled him to alight on his feet where others would have been irretrievably ruined. He was selected because a rapid campaign was contemplated, but even the energy of both he and his chief could not hasten the march of events. Wayne was given two brigadiers, James Wilkinson and Thomas Posey, who had served honorably in the war of the revolution. Pittsburg was appointed as the rendezvous of the forces, and here Gen. Wayne arrived in June, 1792, to find a perplexing task before him. Many of the officers experienced in Indian warfare had fallen in the disastrous campaigns of Harmar and St. Clair, others had resigned, and nearly all the forces were without any knowledge of tactics and innocent of the meaning and importance of discipline. He began a dailj^ drill of these raw levies to prepare for the impending campaign.

But some time was destined to elapse before his movement was effectively under way against the stronghold on the Maumee. The opposition to western development compelled the government to exhaust every peaceful resource before waging another costh' war, while a strong partj^ was opposed to any efforts tending toward conciliation, especially with the British who had been for five years inspiring the northwestern Indians to bloodshed, as well as committing depredations themselves at sea. The embassies that were sent out to treat with the Indians protested against any movements on the part of Gen. Wayne, on the ground that the}' tended to enibarrass their diplomatic efforts, while Gen. Wayne no doubt felt the settlement of the trouble lay altogether in his hands. Furthermore, before he was ready to advance in force, the effect of European complications was felt, and it happened that the war which the republic of France waged against combined Europe delayed the establishment of Fort Wayne for many months. The government at Washington was embarrassed by the extraordinary conduct of Genet, minister of France, who, among other schemes, sent four agents to Kentucky to raise an army to invade Louisiana, then under Spanish dominion; and even the brave and discreet Gen. George Rogers Clark accepted a commission from the agents of Genet as

" major-general of the armies of France." The enHstment of the army for the gigantic filhbustering scheme of clearing the Mississippi of Spanish forts was actively under way in Kentuck}'. Not oiily there, but throughout the union, a large and active part}', in fact nearl}' all " popular sentiment," was in favor of an open alliance with the French, and an attack on Louisiana. This would have involved another immediate war with Great Britain on the part of a young, experimental government, with a bankrupt treasury; and all the actions of the English appeared to indicate that such a conflict was courted. Against this seemingly popular movement, though he was incensed at the British, and none more desired to chastise them, Washington stood firm as a rock, unmoved by a storm of abuse and misrepresentation and caricature. Throughout this most critical period his wonderful self-control was often nigh to exhaustion, but he finally triumphed. He maintained the national idea, that America must not allow her destinies to be associated with those of an}' other land, nor go to war as a subordinate of a foreign power, but should hold herself aloof as the equal of an}' nation, looking first of all to her own interests and self-development.

The negotiations for peace with the Indians made subsequently to St. Clair's defeat should be briefly noticed, as they throw much light upon the reason whv Wayne was compelled to adx'ance to the place which now bears his name. While Gen. Wayne was making his army ready, the government from early in 1792 until August, 1793, was constantly employing messengers with speeches, commissioners to make treaties, and spies with secret instructions. The Indians were assured that the United States made no claim to any land not already ceded by treaties. Major Hamtramck, stationed at Vincennes, concluded treaties of peace with some of the W^eas and Eel river Indians, and subsequently Gen. Rufus Putnam at the same place made a treaty with some of the Wabash and Illinois tribes, on the basis that the land they occupied was theirs, and that the United States should not attempt to take it without purchase. But these were exceptions, and the proud Miamis and their alHes still stood aloof. To them, Gen. Wilkinson sent two messengers. Freeman and Gerrard, April 7, 1792. They were' captured by a party of Indians, who, on learning that they were embassadors, started with them for the Maumee. But the messengers were too inquisitive about the country and the strength of the savages, and -their escort, concluding that the pale-faces were spies, killed them when within one day's march of the Indian camp. Undeterred by their fate, Maj. Alexander Truman, of the First regiment, and Col. John Hardin, of Kentucky, started on the same mission of peace from Fort Washington in May. They carried an eloquent letter, inviting the Indians to send a deputation to Philadelphia to talk with the president, and assuring them that they would not be despoiled of their lands. The embassadors were never seen again; but William May - who was with Freeman's party, and had deserted it according to orders, so that he might safely work his way back to the arm}' with news, was captured afterward and sold to

Campaign Of Axtiiony Wayne

The last effort for peace was made bj^ Benjamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph and Timothy Pickering, who were appointed commissioners, and given private instructions which bound them to insist that the United States would gi\'e up none of the territory between Lake Erie and the Ohio, which had been ceded at the treat}' of Fort Harmar, in 17S9, but that if it clearly appeared that the Miamis and other tribes had a right to anj- of that land, and had not taken part in the treaty, they should be reimbursed for their interest in the territory. They were met at Niagara b}' Capt. Brant and other Indians representing, they said, the Five Nations, Wyandots, Shawnees, Delawares, Muncies, Miamis, Chippewas, Ottawas, Pottawatomies, JMingoes, Cherokees and Nantokokis, assembled on the Maumee. The commissioners were cheered by the talk of these diplomates and sent back a petition to Secretary Knox, to restrain the activity of Gen. Wayne until they could have an opportunity to again meet the red embassadors with their white belts and wampum. The}' proceeded to the Detroit river, where they were met by Buckongahelas and others who, adopting the plan of letter writing, had a paper ready, in which the United States was offered this ultimatum - the Ohio must be the boundary line, and all the v»'hites must be removed beyond it. The commissioners objected that large numbers of whites had settled in this territory and the United States had given them lands which they could not^now be dispossessed of without injustice. To this, the Indians, after returning to the council, where were the British agents, ingeniously rejoined that the large amount of mone}' proposed to be paid them for their land had better be divided among these settlers, to extinguish their claims. They emphatically declared that the English had no right to convey any of the northwest to the United States, and that they refused to recognize the exclusive right of America to purchase their lands. The position of the Indians was in fact that they had a right to dispose of their lands to the English or any other nation they chose. This issue was an important one, in the then critical condition of the government, menaced by French intrigue, and with the British holding posts in the territory and thereby practically supporting the Indian policy. The commissioners could not settle it, and retired. It remained for Anthony Wayne to decide by his famous campaign against Kekionga, the question of the ownership of the northwest territory, now the seat of magnificent commonwealths which, as the most energetic members of an indissoluble Union, exert a dominant influence over the affairs of the western hemisphere.

During the period of negotiation the savages had continued to skirmish along tht; frontier, committing many atrocities, while the little forts which were established a short distance from Cincinnati, toward Kekionga, were held by a few patient soldiers, shirtless, shoeless and with several months' pay overdue. Major-General Wayne was near Fort Washington in October, 1793, and on the 7th marched for Fort

Valley Of The Upper Jiaumee

Jefferson with 2,600 regulars and about 400 auxiliaries. With unerring sagacity he wrote to Washington that the great tranquility just then prevailing proved to him that the Indians were massing for a battle, and in his plans he indicated a policy of taking advantage of the inability of the Indians to remain long massed without exhausting their provisions. Advancing to a point between Fort Jefferson and the field of St. Clair's battle, Gen. Wayne built a fort which he named Greenville for his friend Gen. Greene, and halted for the winter, sending home the militia. Two days before Christmas he sent Major Henr}' Burbeck with eight companies of infantr}' and a detachment of artillery, to take possession of the fatal field of 1791, and there on the site of St. Clair's rout, was erected Fort Recovery, aptly named. This midwinter approach appears to have startled the Indians for the time, and the}- sent a message expressing a desire to make peace, which was evidently intended to secure delaj*. But the activity of the French party gave the Indians enough time to collect their bands.

During this winter and the early spring the great intrigue reached a climax, and Wayne was required in April to send a detachment to make a fortification below the mouth of the Tennessee river, to overawe the proposed Louisiana army. It was just a little earlier that Lord Dorchester, governor general of Canada, told a number of Indian chiefs that " he would not be surprised if Great Britain and the United States would be at war in the course of a j'ear." As if in earnest of this declaration, Lieutenant-Governor Suncoe was ordered to establish a British post at the foot of the Maumee rapids, within the territory ceded b}- England to the United States. Not only the British, but the Spanish, were preparing to take advantage of a war alliance between the United States and France; the governor of Louisiana invaded the American territor}', and during this critical spring of 1794, a messenger from the Spaniards came up to the Maumee to assure the Indians of the co-operation of the occupants of the great river. It was not remarkable that under these circumstances, in the midst of these endless and mysterious intrigues which involved the fate of nations on both sides of the Atlantic, that the Indians boldly demanded that the northwest territory should be abandoned, or that the advance of Gen. Wa\ne was marked by extreme caution. Another defeat like that of St. Clair would have been -' inexpressibly ruinous," as Washington himself declared, and would have involved the welfare of the young repubHc.

Wayne still remaining quiet, on the 30th of June, 1794, the Indians took the offensive at Fort Recover}'. - In the morning of that da}', under the walls of the fort. Major McMahon, with an escort of ninety riflemen and fifty dragoons, was fiercely assailed by a body of some 1,500 Indians. Assisted by a number of British agents and a few French Canadian volunteers, the Indians, during a period of about twenty-four hours, made several sallies upon the fort, but finding their efforts unavailable, retired. The loss to the garrison, however, was by no means trifling - twentytwo men being killed and thirty wounded, and three were missing; 221 horses were killed, wounded and missing. The Indians carried away their dead during the night, by the light of torches, so that only ei^ht or ten of their warriors were found dead near the fort. Major McMahon, Capt. Hartshorne, Lieut. Craig and Cornet Torr3% fell on this occasion.

Major-Gen. Scott with some i,6oo mounted \-olunteers arrived at Fort Greenville on the 26th of July, and now it was time to move. Wayne had waited patiently. Now he struck with rapidity considering that his way lay through unbroken primeval forests. On the 28th the army began its march upon the Indian villages along the Maumee. Some twenty-four miles to the north of Fort Recovery, Wajme built and garrisoned a small post which he called Fort Adams. From this, on the 4th of August, the arm}' moved toward the confluence of the Auglaize and Maymee rivers, where it arrived on the 8th of August, Here a strong stockade fort, with four blockhouses for bastions, was erected and called Fort Defiance. On the 14th of August, Gen. Wayne wrote to the secretary of war: "I have the honor to inform 3'ou that the army under my command took possession of this very important post on the morning of the 8th inst. ; the enemy on the preceding evening having abandoned all their settlements, towns and villages, with such apparent marks of surprise and precipitation, as to amount to a positive proof that our approach was not discerned by them until the arrival of a Mr. Newman, of the quartermaster-general's department, who deserted from the armj- near the St. Mar3''s. * * * I had made such demonstrations, for a length of time previously to taking up our line of march, as to induce the savages to expect our advance by the route of the Miami villages, to the left, or toward Roche de Boeuf by the right, which feints appear to have produced the desired effect, by drawing the attention of the enemy to those points, and gave an opening for the army to approach undiscovered by a devious, i. e., in a central direction. Thus, sir, we have gained possession of the grand emporium of the hostile Indians of the west, without loss of blood. * * * Ever3'thing is now prepared for a forward move to-morrow morning toward Roche de Boeuf, or foot of the rapids. * * * Yet I have thought proper to offer the enem}' a last overture of peace; and as they have ever}-- thing that is dear and interesting now at stake, I have reason to expect that they will listen to the proposition mentioned in the enclosed copy of an address dispatched yesterday by a special flag [Christopher Miller], who I sent under circumstances that will insure his safe return, and which may eventually spare the effusion of much human blood. But should war be their choice, that blood be upon their own heads. America shall no longer be insulted with impunity. To an all-powerful and just God I therefore commit myself and gallant army."

In his address to the Indians, as dispatched b}' Miller " to the Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, and Wyandots, and to each and every of them: and to all other nations of Indians northwest of the Ohio, whom it may concern," General Wayne said : " Brothers - Be no longer deceived or led astra}- by the false promises and language of the bad white men at the foot of the rapids; they have neither the power nor inclination to protect you. No longer shut your eyes to y(jur true interest and happiness, nor your ears to this last overture of peace. But, in pitj' to your innocent women and children, come and prevent the further effusion of j'our blood. Let them experience the kindness and friendship of the United States of America, and the invaluable blessings of peace and tranquility." He urged them also - "each and every hostile tribe of Indians to appoint deputies " to assemble without delay " in order to settle the prehminaries of a lasting peace." The answer brought bj^ Miller upon his return, on the i6th, was, " that if he (Gen. Wayne) waited where he was ten days, and then sent Miller to them, they would treat with him; but that if he advanced, they would give him batde."

Many of the Indians felt no little distrust as to their ability to defeat the great chief of the Americans who was making so masterful an advance with sleepless vigilance. A man afterward known as Captain Wells, who, at the age of twelve years, had been captured in Kentuckj^ and adopted by the Miamis, and who had lived to manhood and raised a famil}' among them, began to feel a strange conflict in his mind. He had fought by the side of Little Turtle against both Harmar and St. Clair; and it was said of him, that afterward, in times of calm reflection, with dim memories still of his childhood home, of brothers and playmates, he seemed to have been harrowed by the thought that amongst the slain by his own hand, may have been his kindred. He had resolved to break his attachment to the tribe, even to his wife and children. In this state of mind, with much of the Indian characteristics, he invited Little Turtle to accompany him to the " Big Elm," about two miles east of Fort Wayne. Wells there told the chief his purpose. " I now leave your nation," said he, " for my own people. We have long been friends. We are friends 3-et until the sun reaches that height," indicating an hour. " From that time we are enemies. Then if j-ou wish to kill me, you ma}'. If I want to kill you I may." At the time indicated Wells crossed the river, and was lost to the view of his old friend and chieftain. Little Turtle. Moving in an easterly course to strike the trail of Wayne's forces, he was successful in obtaining an interview with the general, and thereafter proved the fast friend of the Americans. This movement of Wells was a severe blow to the Miamis. To Turtle's mind it seemed to be an unmistakable foreboding of speedy defeat to the confederated tribes of the northwest.

On the 15th of August, Gen. Wajme moved toward the foot of the rapids, and came to a halt a few miles above that point, on the iSth, and the next da}^ began the erection of a temporary post for the reception of stores and baggage, and began to reconnoiter the enemy's encampment, which lay "behind a thick, bushy wood and the British fort." This was Fort Miami, situated at the foot of the rapids on the northwestern bank of the Maumee, near the site of Maumee Citv-

Campaign Of Anthony Wayne. Io3

The post established bj- Wayne was named Fort Deposit. The Miamis were now undecided as to policy notwithstanding the fact that they had succeeded in defeating the former expeditions of Harmar and St. Clair. At a general council of the confederated tribes, held on the 19th of August, Little Turtle was most earnest in his endeavors to persuade the Indians to make peace with Gen. Wayne. Said he, " We have beaten the enem\- twice under different commanders. We cannot expect the same good fortune to attend us alwa3-s. The Americans are now led by a chief who never sleeps. The nights and the days are alike to him, and during all the time that he has been marching on our villages, notwithstanding the watchfulness of our young men, we have never been able to surprise him. Think well of it. There is something whispers me, it would be prudent to listen to his offers of peace." But his words were little regarded. One of the chiefs of the council even went so far as to charge him with cowardice, which he readily enough spurned, for there were none-braver or more read}' to act where victor}- was to be won or a defense required, than Little Turtle. The council broke up, and Little Turtle, at the head of his braves, took his stand to give battle to the advancing army. The best account of the engagement is that given by Wayne in his report to Secretary Knox:

" At eight o'clock on the morning of the 20th the army again advanced in columns agreeably to the standing order of marc^i: the legion on the right, its flank covered by the Maumee: one brigade of mounted volunteers on the left, under Brigadier-General Todd, and the other in the rear, under Brigadier-General Barbee. A select battalion of mounted volunteers moved in front of the legion, commanded by Major Price, who was directed to keep sufficiently advanced so as to give timely notice for the troops to form in case of action, it being yet undetermined whether the Indians would decide for peace or war.