Waterloo Township (part 2 of 5)

Early in the morning Napoleon wrote a letter to Ney, similar in character to the letter to Grouchy already referred to. In this letter the Emperor is extremely confidential ; he details his own plans and the instructions given to Grouchy, declares his intention of attacking the enemy and clearing the road as far as Gembloux. There, according to events, he will decide upon his future course. Ney is to be ready to march on Brussels the moment Napoleon's decision has been arrived at. He may even arrive at Brussels at seven o'clock the next morning. To effect this purpose Ney is to dispose his troops in front of and around Quatre Bras, extending a division to Marbais to be in touch with the battle on the right, and these dispositions are to be so made

Following immediately upon this letter came the formal orders from Soult, in which he is instructed to take position at Quatre Bras. It is clear from the tone of these orders that little resistance was looked for from the side of Brussels, and that the movements of the 16th, as far as the left wing at any rate was concerned^ were expected to be as leisurely and unopposed as these of the day before. But it was not long before news reached head-quarters of the real state of the case. Soult had heard of masses of troops on the side of Quatre Bras. He therefore writes again to Ney with supplementary instructions " Reunite the corps of Counts Reille and D'Erlon, and that of the Count of Valmy (Kellermann), who is this instant starting to join you ; with these you should beat and destroy any hostile forces which may present themselves. ,, How far Ney was from carrying out these instructions is seen in the orders of the following day. In them Soult was instructed to say, " The Emperor has seen with pain that you did not yesterday reunite the divisions. They acted in isolation, and consequently you suffered losses. If the corps of D'Erlon and Reille had acted together, not an Englishman of the force which attacked you would have escaped."

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dilatory corps, and to join it to the corps of Reille, but throughout the day the two corps remained disunited, with consequences disastrous to both wings of the French army.

Not only did Ney fail to consolidate his force, but he also neglected to occupy Quatre Bras early on the morning of the 16th. Admittedly, it would have been easy to occupy it at any time up to noon or one o'clock, for Ney's force, if combined, amounted to more than 40,000 men, while the ground was held only by a part of the Prince of Orange's divisions, no English reinforcements beginning to arrive till after two o'clock.

Various considerations may be put forward to account for this. First of all, the Marshal was assuredly unaware how small was the force in occupation of Quatre Bras, for, owing to the nature of the ground, it was difficult to gain precise intelligence, or to form accurate estimates. Moreover, he had not merely to reckon with the enemy actually upon the ground, but with those hostile forces which were hurrying to the scene of action. Wellington, he knew, was rapidly concentrating his army, and the French left wing was in danger of being confronted at any time by 80,000 men. Caution, therefore, was the first essential in face of such a possibility, for it was only by extreme caution that 40,000 men could manoeuvre to any advantage in face of double their numbers.

to appear on paper. Not only was the 1st corps far behind, but one division of the 2nd - that of Girard - had been detached from the left wing, and was operating in support of Grouchy near Fleurus. Reille's corps was thus weakened for Ney's purposes by about 5000 men, and so, instead of 40,000, he had not, in the absence of D'Erlon and Girard, 25,000 men available for an immediate advance.

Again, an immediate movement on Quatre Bras would, as the map plainly shows, throw Ney considerably to the front of the main army ; but it was an essential principle of the general scheme of operations, that the two wings should advance simultaneously, and should keep as far as possible la meme hauteur. Hence it is urged by Clausewitz and others, that Ney was right in timing his forward movement to keep pace with that of Napoleon, and that it would have been an act of inexcusable rashness to outstrip the movement of the main army. " Ordered as he was to advance tite baissee along one road, could he tell whether, when at last he raised his head and eyes, he would not find himself outflanked by hostile columns on the right, and above all on the left, and pinned to the ground he stood on ? . . . What general has ever been asked to advance with 40,000 men along a single road into the very midst of the enemy's forces ? " * not excuse Ney. The quotation from Clausewitz ends with a question which is almost in the form of a challenge. Both question and challenge are met by a reference to Ney's instructions. He was ordered to advance on and beyond Quatre Bras with the force entrusted to him, and events were soon to prove that, had he concentrated his corps, and obeyed his orders, he would not have had to face these problematical dangers. When, as has been said, he assumed the right to an independent judgment, he assumed the responsibility for its consequences, and if those consequences were disastrous, the blame must in justice fall upon him.

"Charleroi, 16th June 1815. " M. LE MAR£CHAL, - The Emperor orders you to put in movement the 2nd and 1st Corps d'Armee, as well as the 3rd Cavalry Corps, which has been put at your disposal, in order to direct them upon the intersection of the roads called Les Trois Bras (Quatre Bras), where you will cause them to take position. . . . His Majesty desires, if there is no obstacle, that you should establish one division with cavalry at Genappe, and he orders you to carry another division towards (du cdte de) Marbais. . . .

Ney's dispositions, however, were by no means such as were prescribed. Reille was still at Gosselies at 10.15 A.M., for he wrote to Ney from that place, announcing that information had arrived to the effect that the Prussians were forming at St Amand, and that as a consequence he should postpone his own movement until the receipt of further orders. It was not till nearly noon that the 2nd corps left Gosselies, and in due course it was formed up for action at Quatre Bras.

The 1st corps was still in the neighbourhood of Marchiennes and the river at 1 1 A.M. According to D'Erlon's own statement, it was not till between 11 and 12 A.M. that he received his marching orders - namely to take position at Frasnes, with three of his four divisions, and to direct the fourth on Marbais. D'Erlon was engaged in executing this movement when the battle began at Quatre Bras, and he reached Frasnes about 5 P.M.

Kellermann's dragoons were posted at Frasnes and Liberchies, where also were the divisions of the Guard commanded by Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Colbert.

Thus, at 2 P.M., at which hour the engagement at Quatre Bras began, Ney had only Reille's three divisions in position. The bulk of his force was in reserve at Frasnes, or engaged in marching on that point, and this notwithstanding his precise instructions to " reunite the corps of D'Erlon, Reille, and that of the Count de Valmy (Kellermann),"

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" I have adopted as a general principle of this campaign the division of my army into two wings and a reserve." In conformity with this announcement, made to Ney in his morning letter of the 16th, Napoleon wrote to Marshal Grouchy investing him with the command of the right wing, which was to consist of the 3rd and 4th corps, and of the cavalry corps of Pajol, Milhaud, and Excelmans.

The 6th corps and the Guard made up the reserve, which was under the immediate direction of the Emperor in person. The reserve formed the centre of the army, and was so disposed as to be able to support the operations of either wing, according to circumstances. It could also be strengthened by reinforcements detached from either wing, as occasion might require.

Such being the general principle underlying Napoleon's dispositions, it is necessary to examine the particular plan of operations which the Emperor sketched out for the day of the 16th, for it is of the first importance to recognise clearly the distinction between the general plan governing the campaign as a whole, and the particular plan governing the operations of a single day."*

Nor is this the only distinction which it is essential to have in mind. The march of events upon the morning of the 16th was destined to produce important modifications in the scheme of operations as originally laid down for the day, so that in the morning we see a set of instructions issued to meet the situation as Napoleon conceived it in theory; in the afternoon the dispositions and instructions were based on the actual facts of the case as learned from practical experience and observation.

In the letters to Ney, Napoleon informs the Marshal of his intention to attack the Prussians if he meets with them, and to explore the road as far as Gembloux. This done, he will decide upon his future movement, and the instant his decision is made, Ney is to be ready to march on Brussels. " I will support you with the Guard, which will be at Fleurus or Sombref, and should wish to reach Brussels to-morrow morning." Therefore {done) Ney was to dispose his troops partly in front of Quatre Bras at Genappe, partly around that point, and partly at Marbais, a point midway between Quatre Bras and Sombref. The object of placing a division at Marbais, as Soult makes clear to the Marshal, was that it might be ready to support either Grouchy at Sombref or Ney himself at Quatre Bras according to circumstances, and to

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The letter to Grouchy instructs him to march with the right wing to Sombref. "If the enemy is at Sombref, I wish to attack him. I even wish to attack him at Gembloux, and to seize that position, my intention being, after making myself acquainted with these two positions, to march this night and operate with my left wing against the English. Lose not a moment therefore. . . . Communicate constantly with Gerard, so that he may be able to assist you in attacking Sombref, if it be necessary. . . . All the information which I have is to the effect that the Prussians cannot oppose to us more than 40,000 men.

" As soon as you have made yourself master of Sombref, it will be necessary to send forward an advance guard to Gembloux to reconnoitre all the roads which converge on Sombref, at the same time that you will establish your communications with Marshal Ney."

The first point to which these letters draw our attention is Napoleon's uncertainty in regard to the Prussian army. He proposes to attack the Prussians " if he meets with them." He anticipates no difficulty in occupying Sombref - indeed, his objective point is rather Gembloux than Sombref. Evidently, in his opinion, the Prussians were far from being fully concentrated. If Ziethen from Charleroi were supported by Pirch from Namur, that was about the extent of the force which Bliicher would have to oppose to him, and so he persuaded himself that he had to deal only with some 40,000 men, against whom,* using Grouchy's force alone, he could place 50,000 in the field.

He is also quite at ease on the subject of the the Anglo-Dutch army. No resistance to Ney at Quatre Bras is expected. The march on Brussels would be unimpeded, for the Emperor proposes to arrive there "to-morrow morning." The results of the 16th, according to Napoleon's ideas in the morning, would be the occupation of Genappe, Quatre Bras, Gembloux, and Sombref, the overthrow of such Prussian corps as had effected a concentration, and the disappearance of all obstacles to an uninterrupted march on Brussels.

At the moment when the Emperor was transcribing these confident anticipations to his lieutenants, Bliicher was rapidly concentrating threefourths of his army at and about Sombref, and Anglo-Dutch troops to the number of 25,000 men were pressing hastily on Quatre Bras to support Prince Bernhard in the defence of that position.

Conclusions very unfavourable to Napoleon have often been drawn from a comparison of his intentions with the true facts of the situation. He is accused of exhibiting arrogant self-confidence in combination with an almost wilful self-deception. But the case is capable of quite another interpretation, for the contention is, to say the least, tenable, that on general principles of strategy his judg- ment of the situation was a correct one. That judgment was based upon knowledge which in the "main was accurate. He knew that the concentration of the Prussian army was by no means complete, and on general principles he was justified in assuming that Gembloux, or even Wavre, was the point on which that concentration would be made. Gembloux was nearer to Namur than Sombref, and was nearer for Bulow in his march from Liege. In fact, while concentration at Sombref was sure to be partial, at Gembloux it might have been complete. He also knew that Wellington was not in any proper sense of the word concentrated at all. His own arrangements excluded the possibility of any effective support being at present given by Wellington to Bllicher or by Bliicher to Wellington, and therefore, in Napoleon's opinion, it would be the height of imprudence in either of the allied commanders to risk a general engagement upon that day. To do so would be to play into his hands - for he could oppose to the Prussians on the one hand a force which, even if inferior in numbers, was yet, by superiority in military qualities, capable of inflicting upon them a severe defeat, while on his left wing Ney could certainly hold in check, if not entirely overthrow, any force which Wellington, in the backward state of his concentration, might be able to put into the field. Could he suppose, in default of actual observation, that his enemies would thus play his game for him ? But even if they did, his general plan for the day was not thereby invalidated. On the contrary, much of it would still hold good in spite of the altered state of affairs, and the result would be more decisive than he had at first ventured to anticipate. Instead of merely inflicting a check upon his adversaries, the chance would be offered him of disposing of them both in the course of a single day.

It was about 10 A.M. when Napoleon began to entertain suspicions that his movements for the day would not be so uninterrupted as he had at first supposed. At that hour he learned " that the enemy was displaying masses of troops on the side of Quatre Bras," and it was then that he imperatively ordered Ney to unite his corps, and with his forces thus consolidated, to beat and destroy all the hostile forces which might display themselves. He then proceeded in person to Fleurus, and upon his arrival he learned that the Prussians, according to all appearances, were taking position in force with a view to a general engagement. He was not inclined to credit these reports, and it was not until he had himself inspected the Prussian position that he was convinced of Blucher's intention to stand and fight. From the vantage ground of a windmill a little in front of the town he was able to observe the whole disposition of the Prussian army, and it taught him in a moment all that he needed to know. Instead of 40,000 men, he saw before him three-fourths of Blucher's force. From its extended line he could read the Prussian general's intention of reaching forward one hand to Wellington upon his right, and the other to Biilow coming up upon his left. Convinced that neither Wellington nor Bulow could render any assistance, Napoleon at once formulated his plans, so as to gain the utmost possible advantage from the imprudence of his adversary, and the plan of attack which he now developed was of a character to result in the complete overthrow of the Prussian army.

We now turn to the examination of this plan, which was to govern the operations of the French army throughout the remainder of the day. Napoleon's earlier schemes, communicated in the morning to Grouchy and to Ney, may be dismissed from our minds, except in so far as they were still partially applicable to the new situation. His movements, far from being entirely dislocated by Bliicher's unexpected demonstration in force, were only rendered the more vigorous and the more decisive, and with marvellous skill he adapted all the essential features of his original design to serve the purposes of the unlooked-for opportunity which was now before him. Bliicher, as Napoleon expressed it, was " taken en flagrant delit" and it only remained to mete out to him the punishment due to his rashness and temerity.

With the Prussians in force before him, and with masses of troops displaying themselves at Quatre Bras, there was no longer a question of occupying, practically without resistance, Quatre Bras and

Genappe on the one hand, and Sombref and Gembloux on the other. Manoeuvres were to give place to action, and the problem before Napoleon was how to make action most decisive against one, if not both, of the enemies he was about to meet.

The first essential was to prevent the allied armies from rendering each other any support. For this purpose his original plan was still efficient. The left wing would hold Wellington in check at Quatre Bras, while the right and the reserve would contain Bliicher. The division which Ney had been ordered to post at Marbais would not only intervene directly between the allies, but could be utilised with crushing effect against one or other of them, as circumstances might direct.

All anxiety on the score of a junction between the allies being removed, it remained to determine, should it prove impossible to secure a decisive triumph on both wings, against which of the opposing armies the- main effort was to be directed. Every consideration pointed to the Prussian army as the true point of attack. Any conspicuous success gained against the 90,000 men then on the ground would involve the demoralisation of the whole Prussian contingent ; it would retire in confusion upon its base, thus separating itself, with every step in retreat, further and further from its ally ; nor, even when reinforced by Billow's additional 30,000 men, would it be in a position for several days to assume an offensive attitude, and

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..Moreover, the very dispositions of the Prussians, in order of battle, exposed them to such a defeat as that upon which Napoleon calculated ; while in the case of Wellington only a small portion of his troops could possibly be on the ground at Quatre Bras, and any success gained over him then could only be of a partial and indecisive character.

The main idea, therefore, in Napoleon's mind in drawing up his plans for the afternoon of the 16th was this, that the main business of the day rested with him and with the right wing at Ligny, Sombref, and St Amand, while the duty of Ney was first to* contain Wellington, and then to second Napoleon's operations against Bliicher.

The Emperor's plan of battle against Bliicher was governed altogether by the dispositions of the old Marshal himself. These were by no means such as to secure the approval of the Duke of Wellington. He was at Bry while the Prussians were being placed in position, and expressed to Sir Henry Hardinge his opinion that "if they fight here, they will be damnably mauled." Exposed along the hill slopes to the full fire of the enemy's artillery, their superiority in numbers was likely F to be more than counter-balanced by Napoleon's superiority both in skill and position. The Prussian army had been drawn up in order of battle, with its right extending as far as Wagnelee, its centre at Ligny, and its left reaching in a south-easterly direction from Sombref to Tongrines and Balatre. The inferences from this formation clearly were that the Prussian right were endeavouring to keep open the communications with Wellington, and that the Prussian left was similarly employed in relation to Blilow and the town of Namur. If this were so, the left could take no very vigorous part in the coming engagement, for its operations must necessarily be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the main chaussee to Namur. It would therefore be sufficient to occupy the Prussian left by false demonstrations, while the main effort was directed against the right or the centre, or both simultaneously.

Having inferred that the Prussian left might be comparatively neglected, Napoleon had yet to decide whether he should direct his full force upon the right, or confine himself to an endeavour to break the Prussian centre. Either alternative offered some special advantages. By attacking the right, he would be drawing nearer to his own left wing, and, moreover, would, if successful, be forcing the Prussians away from their allies. By breaking their centre he would be in a position to roll up the Prussian army upon its wings, and to effect its total ruin. The fertile genius of the

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Emperor was equal to devising a combination which, if properly carried out, would secure the advantages of both these courses. His plan was to demonstrate in strength against both points, but more especially against the right. As a result, Bliicher would detach his reserve in increasing numbers to the support of his menaced wing. At the favourable moment the French reserves would be launched against the centre, thus denuded of its full complement of defenders, and the Prussian line would be utterly broken. Simultaneously with this movement, a detachment of 10,000, or even possibly .20,000 men, would arrive from Ney, and would take the Prussian left in flank and rear; penetrated in the centre and outflanked upon the right, general confusion would overtake the whole army, and it would be, if not annihilated, at least crippled by a blow from which it would take long to recover.

The first step towards its execution was to secure the co-operation of Ney. To this end a despatch was sent to the Marshal, dated Fleurus, 2 P.M.

"The intention of his Majesty is that you should attack what troops are before you, and that, after having vigorously driven them in, you should fall back on us, in order to assist in surrounding the (Prussian) corps, of which I have just spoken."

" At this moment the engagement is very pronounced. His Majesty desires me to tell you that you should manoeuvre at once, so as to envelope the enemy's right, and fall a bras raccourcis^ upon his rear. This army is lost if you act with vigour. The fate of France is in your hands.

"So hesitate not a moment to execute the movement which the Emperor orders, and direct yourself upon the heights of Bry, and St Amand to assist in a victory perhaps decisive. The enemy is taken en flagrant delit at the moment when he is seeking to form a junction with the English."

In the meantime the French army was formed up for the attack. In front of St Amand were posted the three divisions of Vandamme's 3rd corps. Girard's division was in reserve, with the cavalry of the 3rd corps (Domon) upon the left.

The Imperial Guard, with Milhaud's cuirassiers, were in rear of Gerard and Vandamme, in reserve, while Lobau's 6th corps was at Charleroi, from whence it was ordered to move on Fleurus.

The first attack was by Vandamme upon the village of St Amand. It was followed within half an hour by Gerard's attack upon the village of Ligny. Throughout the afternoon the contest for these positions was carried on with desperate fury on both sides. The houses both in Ligny and St Amand were for the most part built of stone, and stood each in its own little plot of ground, which contained a garden, perhaps an orchard, and some out-buildings. The Prussians had taken full advantage of every means of defence. From crenellated walls, from every window, from the shelter of each bush and tree, a furious fire was poured in upon the advancing French, and bloody handto-hand contests went on in the streets. As often as the French secured possession of one or other of the villages, so often did Bliicher send in reinforcements to drive them out again, and in this way, as Napoleon had foreseen, his reserves were being rapidly exhausted.

The Emperor on his side as resolutely refrained from putting in fresh troops. Gerard, Vandamme, and Girard fully understood that they were to expect no support until Napoleon judged the decisive moment to have arrived, and thus it is estimated that, after three hours' fighting, 10,000 fewer troops had been employed on the French than on the Prussian side. In this fact lay the real secret of Napoleon's ultimate success, and the knowledge that Lobau was advancing with 10,000 additional troops gave Napoleon ample confidence that the issue would be favourable to himself.

In the meantime Grouchy, upon the French right, was engaging Thielemann's corps. Here the struggle was less intense, for it was Grouchy's business to demonstrate rather than to attack in earnest. It was sufficient if he continually menaced Bliicher's communications with Namur, for as long as they were threatened it would be impossible to draw upon the Prussian left wing for support to the right and centre.

By five o'clock all Bliicher's troops were engaged. Amand-la-Haye was in the hands of Girard, but the division of Pirch and the cavalry of Jiirgas were now joined to Ziethen's division in an endeavour to recover it. Vandamme held St Amand, though hotly pressed by superior forces : Gerard was in possession of Ligny, though his corps had suffered fearfully in the struggle, and he was desperately in need of succour.

Napoleon judged the crisis to have arrived. It was now 5.30 P.M. Moving forward the guard from their station in front of Fleurus, he put himself at their head and directed them against the Prussian centre. Scarcely had this movement of his reserve begun than it was arrested. A report from Vandamme informed the Emperor that a strange corps had appeared upon his left, and seemed as if about to take him en revers. In view of this demonstration it was essential to take instant measures to ascertain its meaning, and in the meantime the advance of the guard in force was suspended.

In due course it was discovered that the strange troops upon the left were the 1st corps of the French army under Count D'Erlon advancing to the support of Napoleon.

Apparently, therefore, Ney had fulfilled his instructions. The plan of battle which the Emperor had devised was answering his anticipations point by point. The violence of Girard's and Vandammne's attack had deceived Bllicher into the supposition that his right was the vital point : his centre had been weakened to strengthen his forces at Wagnelee and St Amand - all his reserves were now employed in action, and this was the moment when his centre was to be attacked by the full

For it was not until 7.30 P.M. that he learned definitely that the strange corps was D'Erlon's, and not a reinforcement coming to the assistance of Bliicher. Consequently the suspended movement of the Imperial Guard was not resumed until after a lapse of two hours. It was during this interval that the 3rd and 4th corps suffered most severely at Ligny and St Amand, and the delay cost Napoleon several thousand men.

At 7.30 the day would soon be over, and instead of four hours in which to complete the defeat of the Prussians, scarcely two remained before darkness set in : the delay therefore rendered the victory less complete, and the pursuit of the defeated enemy less vigorous. But more important still, it was not in accordance with Ney's instructions that D'Erlon's corps was advancing to the field. On the contrary, his movement was in direct opposition to them. Before the 1st corps had time to render any assistance in the battle in progress before its eyes, a peremptory order from Ney at Quatre Bras recalled it to his side, and as a result neither at Ligny nor at Quatre Bras did it fire a shot. The fourth section of this chapter will be devoted to an investigation of this deplorable blunder and its consequences. Here it can only be noted in re-

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At the moment when Vandamme perceived the unknown corps upon his flank, he was at the end of his resources. Blucher in person was rallying the scattered division of Pirch, which had been sent to the support of Ziethen, but had retired before the furious onslaught of the French infantry. One of Vandamme's divisions was forced to give way, and St Amand-le-Hameau and St Amandla-Haye once more fell into the hands of the Prussians. Napoleon therefore, while suspending the general advance of the Imperial Guard, none the less moved forward Duhesme with the Young Guard to the support of his shattered left This timely reinforcement re-established the battle on that wing. Gerard in the centre in the meanwhile was performing prodigies of valour. Alone with his two divisions, for one had been withdrawn from him to the support of Grouchy, he held his own against twice his numbers, and still clung to Ligny with indomitable tenacity. At last the time arrived when Napoleon could with safety advance his reserves, and Friant's and Morand's battalions of the Imperial Guard marched straight on the Prussian centre. Weakened as it was by the withdrawal of so many brigades to the right, the centre first wavered and then gave way. An attempt to turn the French column upon its flanks was frustrated by Milhaud's cuirassiers. Blucher, at last recognising his deception, strained every nerve to re-establish his line, but without effect. He was himself thrown from his horse, and a charge of cavalry passed over him, only, however, with the effect of inflicting severe bruises upon the tough old veteran. The French Grenadiers and Chasseurs soon crowned the heights of Bry and Bussy upon which the Prussians had stood : Vandanime debouched from St Amand, driving the Prussian right before him : Grouchy met with equal success against Thielemann. To maintain the contest further was impossible, for the Prussians were in retreat throughout the length of their line. All that remained was to withdraw in as good order as the circumstances permitted, and favoured by the darkness which had now set in, and by the blunder which had robbed Napoleon of his reinforcements from Ney, Blucher was enabled to retire from the field with an army defeated indeed and exhausted, but none the less capable, when joined by the absent corps of Biilow, of rendering a good account of itself in the subsequent operations of the campaign.

It will be remembered that Ney had failed to carry out his repeated instructions to reunite the force under his command. D'Erlon was not yet at

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Frasnes, and it was Ney's intention, when he arrived there, to keep him in reserve at that point. Kellermann's dragoons were at Frasnes and Liberchies, while of Reille's four divisions of infantry, one, that of Girard, had been withdrawn for service at Ligny.

Thus, when the engagement began, Reille's three divisions - Bachelu, Foy, and Jerome, with Pire's cavalry, alone were in position facing the enemy, and even of these Jerome was not actually in readiness until three o'clock.

The part which had been assigned to Ney was to keep Wellington in check, so as to prevent any assistance from the Anglo-Dutch army moving to the support of Blucher.

But in view of the backward state of Wellington's organisation, a force of over 40,000 men was more than sufficient to effect this purpose. Ney, therefore, with a part of his force, was to manoeuvre towards his right, in order to come up upon the Prussian right at Ligny, and crown the victory which Napoleon there hoped to gain. To accomplish this he was to sacrifice all ideas of a brilliant success on his own wing. This would come later, when Napoleon, having overthrown the Prussians, had joined his forces to those of Ney, as he purposed doing at the first opportunity. To contain Wellington with one part of his force, and to assist the Emperor with the other, would be productive of results which might prove decisive of the campaign - results more far-reaching than an absolute victory over the Anglo-Dutch army could entail. " It may be," said Napoleon to Gerard, as the battle of Ligny was beginning, " that the fate of the war will be decided to-day. If Ney efficiently executes my instructions, not a cannon of the Prussian army will escape. It is taken en flagrant delit?

Ignorant of the number of troops the Duke of Wellington would be able to bring against him, and fully aware that every moment the number was increasing, Ney determined to proceed with the utmost caution. He kept a strong reserve behind him in case of need, and throughout the engagement he was more intent upon his own position than upon the position of the Emperor at Ligny. For this there is much excuse, but still the results of the 16th were far less decisive than they might otherwise have been. / Quatre Bras is situated at the junction of the main road from Brussels to Charleroi with the main road from Namur to Nivelles. A little to the south of the latter, and to the west of the former, was the Bois de Bossu, a wood which, as well as the village of Quatre Bras, was held by Perponcher's division of Dutch - Belgians, under Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar. No other troops - of the whole of Wellington's army - were present at two o'clock, when the engagement began. Ney drew up two of Reille's divisions - those of Bachelu and Foy - on each side of the Brussels-Charleroi road in such a manner that that road bisected his centre. They were supported by Pire's cavalry, while the division of Jerome, upon its arrival, took position on the right. No orders were sent to Kellermann to bring up his cavalry from Frasnes and Liberchies till the afternoon was well advanced.

The battle of Quatre Bras was a series of charges, on the right and left, for the possession of the Bois de Bossu and the village at the cross roads. Great credit is due to the Dutch-Belgians, who, though only 9000 strong, had yet held these positions undismayed by the proximity of such vastly superior forces. The first French attack was directed against the Dutch-Belgians alone, but at about 2.30, Sir Thomas Pictcn's division began to come up, and throughout the afternoon reinforcements of English and Hanoverian troops were arriving. This arrival in isolated detachments was, however, especially at first, a source of great danger to Wellington, and the cause to a large extent of the very severe losses which his troops suffered, for it was possible for the French to charge the English regiments while they were forming, and before they were prepared for the attack - notably this was so in the case of the 42nd Highlanders, two companies of which were pierced by the French lancers and overwhelmed while in the act of falling-in. Picton's division was largely made up of Highland regiments, the

3rd battalion of the Royal Scots, the 28th Highland regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 95th regiment, composing Kempt's brigade, forming the English left, while Pack's brigade, composed of the 44th, 79th, and 92nd Highland regiments, constituted the right. The Duke of Wellington was present in person almost from the beginning of the action, and exposed himself fearlessly. He was for a considerable period with his staff just in front of the 92nd regiment, which lined the ditch immediately in front of the Namur road and from that spot he directed the movements of his force and watched the fierce charges of the French Cuirassiers. One such charge swept the ground on which he had been standing only five minutes before. Picton's division was in turn supported by the Brunswickers, who arrived about three o'clock and were posted on the left. The Duke of Brunswick, their commander, displayed conspicuous personal gallantry, but fell, pierced by a musket ball, about seven o'clock in the evening. In the meantime repeated charges and counter-charges were being made upon the Bois de Bossu, and whenever the English were successful in expelling the French and debouching on to the open ground beyond, they were met by the fierce onset of the French cavalry before they could form, and were in turn driven back. Detachments of the French cavalry also manoeuvred round the wood to their left, and thus were in position to charge the English the moment they emerged from the wood upon the open ground. Affairs were in a critical situation as the evening wore on, for the French had gained the Bois de Bossu, and had passed beyond it to the main road. It was now that the English Guards arrived, having marched from Enghien since 3 A.M. that morning. They immediately formed and forced the French to retire. It was a tremendous struggle - the French attempting to again outflank the English, but being met in their attempt by the 3rd battalion of the Guards, which had skirted the wood and was drawn up in hollow square upon its extreme western edge. When evening closed the cross roads and the wood were still in the occupation of our troops. Upon the French right and English left the fight was no less deadly. Ney soon discovered that his dispositions were insufficient to effect his purpose - so by five o'clock he had ordered up one brigade of Kellermann's dragoons from Frasnes. These plunged desperately and at once into the thick of the fight for Quatre Bras : but fresh reinforcements were now arriving to the Duke in quick succession. Halkett's brigade and Kielmansegge's first Hanoverians came up about six o'clock, followed by Cooke's division about seven, and it was clear that the French were outnumbered, and could only gain the contested positions by the arrival of fresh troops. Such support was momentarily expected, for Ney had already despatched orders to D'Erlon to bring up the 1st corps to take part in the battle. To his dismay he learned that the 1st corps had been turned off the road at Frasnes to attach itself to Napoleon's main army by a march on Bry. No chance, therefore, remained of re-establishing Kellermann's dragoons, which, notwithstanding the impetuosity of their onset, were repulsed between six and seven P.M. But even in this repulse we can trace the determined obstinacy of Ney only to employ a part, not the whole, of the troops entrusted to him. For but one brigade of Kellermann's heavy cavalry had been ordered up to the front. The other brigades were still maintained at Frasnes and Liberchies. Had Kellermann been in force, with his four brigades together, it is more than probable that the French operations on their right would have been crowned with success, even without the support of D'Erlon's divisions. As it was, not only did the Bois de Bossu and the cross roads remain in the hands of the Anglo-Dutch army, but it was able to occupy an advanced position beyond Quatre Bras - the French, when darkness set in, retiring to Frasnes.

Such was the action at Quatre Bras, when rather more than 53,000 men on both sides were engaged. Nearly 9000 in all fell in the battle, or about one in six. Wellington had collected altogether upon the field about 31,000 men - not one-third of his total available force ; and the bulk of these had arrived in detachments as the engagement proceeded, peculiarly exposed to disaster while in process of formation. These facts and figures are an eloquent commentary upon the Duke's note to Bliicher, written in the morning, and to which full reference has already been made. How completely misinformed he was of the real whereabouts of his troops, the progress of the battle was to make abundantly clear. However much the Duke is to be praised - and very justly praised - for his cool and spirited conduct of the fight, for the most part against superior numbers and troops of very superior calibre to his own - nothing but censure can be extended to arrangements which left him exposed to such chances at so critical a moment. For it is sufficiently evident that the Duke's success depended upon chances which he had no right to count upon, and which, in fact, he did not count upon. Every account of the battle of Quatre Bras, contemporary or critical, goes to emphasise the desperate character of the struggle, the doubt of victory, the half-expectation of defeat. If this was so when Ney had only 22,000 men engaged, can it be denied that the Duke would have experienced a severe defeat if 43,000 men had been brought against him ? And this was the force at Ney's disposal had he cared to avail himself of it.

The fatal procrastination which allowed D'Erlon's corps to remain so far behind Reille, the vagaries of D'Erlon, who, when called upon, was not to be found, the over-caution which maintained three out of Kellermann's four brigades in reserve throughout the action, all these were chances on

It has been seen that the engagement at Ligny did not begin until 2.30 P.M., and that at Quatre Bras until about two o'clock. Thus, for purposes of active fighting, the morning hours were entirely thrown away. It was broad daylight at 3.30 A.M. The troops were not in position before Quatre Bras or Ligny until - rputting it at the very earliest - 1.30 P.M.

This delay has excited much criticism and controversy, and every writer on the campaign has made it the subject of his attention. Some see in it a large part of the cause of Napoleon's subsequent failure, and censure him severely for his inactivity ; others regard it as inevitable, - the result of his situation and the nature of things ; others, again, throw the responsibility for it upon Ney, or upon Gerard, or upon some other of Napoleon's lieutenants. Amid so many conflicting opinions it is difficult to feel assured that any conclusion is thoroughly sound and final : any explanation must necessarily be based to a large extent upon conjecture.

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Napoleon began the day under an entire misapprehension as to the intentions of his opponents. His plan of action was communicated to the commanders of his wings about 9 A.M., and we have seen that it was based upon the supposition that no serious resistance would be offered that day by the allies to his operations on either side. Neither Wellington nor Blucher could be concentrated in force, and until their concentration was completed, or in a fair way to completion, Napoleon judged that they would not be rash enough to risk an engagement which might prove decisive of the campaign. Therefore, as far as the 16th was concerned, he would have to deal, on the right wing, with perhaps 40,000 Prussians at the most, while Ney, on the left, would have before him only such troops as Wellington could hastily muster from Brussels.

With these views, which on all general principles of strategy he was justified in entertaining, he limited his own operations for the day to the occupation of Genappe and Quatre Bras by Ney, and of Gembloux and Sombref by Grouchy.

To accomplish these objects, in view of the fact that little resistance was expected, there was no need of haste. The afternoon would amply suffice for their complete fulfilment. The morning would give to his soldiers the opportunity for that repose which they imperatively needed, and thus refreshed,

It was not until Napoleon actually saw the Prussians forming at St Amand, Bry, and Sombref that he could believe in the extent of his own good fortune ; but having realised it, he lost no time in getting his army into position for immediate action.

It is claimed for the explanation here suggested that it possesses at least the merit of simplicity. It answers both to the facts of the situation and to the documentary evidence of the Emperor's ideas and intentions. It is not, however, the explanation usually put forward, and hence it may be well to glance for a moment at the opinions on the subject expressed by such experts as Clausewitz, Ropes, and Chesney.

Clausewitz considers that, in the nature of things, it was impossible to begin the attack upon the Prussians at Ligny until the afternoon. " The troops," he says, " had attacked the Prussian outposts as early as 4 A.M. on the 15th, had probably been marching, therefore, the greater part of the night, and had spent the whole of the 15th right into the night in fighting, or, at any rate, under arms or on the march, consequently it was impossible that an attack on Blucher at Sombref . . . should ensue in the early hours of the 16th.

" Could the real tactical encounter of the two main forces have taken place on the forenoon of the 16th, it would have been a monstrous mistake to delay it, for Blucher was still concentrating, as

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Bonaparte knew; and seeing that the total Prussian force was so very superior to the 75,ooo men whom he could employ against it, it was of the utmost importance to give battle before they were all united. . . . But the French troops needed time to rest, to get their provisions, to cook, and, finally, to concentrate. All this could not be accomplished in a short summer's night."*

Clausewitz thus attributes the delay to the fact that a soldier's powers of endurance are limited, and the Duke of Wellington endorses this opinion.

" The backwardness of D'Erlon's corps not only deferred the forward movement of the left wing, it seems to have delayed the advance of the main body. Until Napoleon could be sure that Ney, with the large force that had been assigned to him, was in march on his left ... he seems to have been unwilling to move upon Bliicher. . . . He postponed his own forward movement upon Fleurus and Sombref until Ney could move simultaneously upon Quatre Bras," f

Chesney considers that Napoleon was alone to blame for Ney's want of concentration and failure to occupy Quatre Bras, and he judges that the cause of delay on the morning of the 16th is to be found in the fact that " Napoleon had no idea that three-fourths of the Prussian army was collected in his front. As he was aware beforehand how their army was cantoned, and judged Bliicher still to be near Namur, it follows that he believed himself in contact with their extreme right, which, unsupported, must needs give way and open his path to Brussels.

Chesney therefore agrees with the view expressed in the text as far as Napoleon and the Prussians are concerned, but he differs in regard to the responsibilities of Ney upon the left.

It is much easier to estimate the effects of D'Erlon's wanderings upon the issue of the two battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, and upon the campaign as a whole, than to penetrate the mystery which attaches to his movements.

The facts, however, up to a certain point are clear. D'Erlon, in obedience to Ney's instructions, was marching his corps from Marchiennes and Gosselies to Frasnes. Before reaching Frasnes, Durutte, who commanded the leading division, received further orders to direct his march on Quatre Bras. On arrival at Frasnes, however, an aide-de-camp met Durutte at the head of the column, and gave him instructions to march immediately to the support of Napoleon at Ligny. The 1st corps accordingly turned off the main chausse'e to its right, and in due course appeared upon the flank of the armies engaged around St Amand between 5 and 5.30 P.M. Scarcelyhad it arrived when peremptory orders from Ney recalled it to Quatre Bras. The 1st corps, therefore, spent the day in marches and countermarches, but rendered no assistance in either battle, for it did not reach Quatre Bras until the battle was over.

The mystery attaching to these proceedings begins when we endeavour to discover by whose order the 1st corps was turned aside to march on St Amand. If by Napoleon's order, why were his movements disconcerted by its approach, why did he not keep D'Erlon with him to operate upon the Prussian flank, instead of allowing him to march back again to join Ney ?

The fact being established that D'Erlon's movement was directed in obedience to the order of somebody, the question as to who gave the order is narrowed down within three alternatives. It was either Ney, or Napoleon, or some one else.

It certainly was not Ney, for that Marshal was firmly convinced from the first that the order was given by Napoleon. In his letter to the Duke of Otranto, dated Paris, June 26th, 181 5, Ney writes - " The battle (of Quatre Bras) became general, and victory was no longer doubtful, when, at the moment that I intended to order up the first corps of infantry, left by me in reserve at Frasnes, I learned that the Emperor had disposed of it without advising me of the circumstance. The shock

There is a tone of genuine astonishment about this letter which is an evidence that it expresses Ney's honest convictions, and his attitude of personal indignation against Napoleon, which was strongly marked on the morning following the battle of Quatre Bras, is another indication that his letter to the Duke of Otranto was not the outcome of an afterthought.

But Ney's convictions, however sincere, are not conclusive upon matters of fact. There is further evidence, in support of his opinions, which is entitled to be carefully weighed.

In his "Etudes sur Napoleon" (Paris, 1841), Lieut-Colonel Baudus, attached to Soult's staff during the Waterloo campaign, says, that when the battle of Ligny was at its height, " Napoleon called me and said, * I have sent an order to Count D'Erlon to direct his whole corps on the rear of the right of the Prussian army. Go and carry the duplicate of this order to Marshal Ney.'"

Baudus then goes on to say that both the Emperor and Soult urged upon him to insist with Ney that nothing was to prevent the execution of this order. " Tell him," said Napoleon, " that the important affair is here."

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statement of Baudus ? 1841 is twenty-six years after the battle of Waterloo, and in twenty-six years a man's memory may well become untrustworthy about great events, much more about matters of minute detail.

Moreover, the narrative bears a sufficient resemblance to the facts as we know them from official documents to justify the suspicion that Baudus was confused between the truth and his recollections of the truth. No form of error is more common or more misleading.

The order which Baudus carried was, he tells us, a duplicate. The original order, then, had been previously despatched. Now, at 3.15 P.M., when the engagement at Ligny was en ce moment tres prononce, an order was sent to Ney which has already been quoted. In it the Marshal was told that the fate of France was in his hands - that he was to lose not a moment in executing the movement which the Emperor ordered. There is a suspicious similarity between the terms of the order and the terms in which Baudus was entrusted with his mission. It is, at any rate, by no means improbable that Baudus was not the bearer of a further order in duplicate, but was carrying the duplicate of the 3.15 P.M. order.

In the 3.15 order there is not a word about D'Erlon's corps. Ney was instructed to direct a detachment on the heights of Bry and St Amand, but what particular troops he was to detach is not specified. The order was general in its tenor.

If, therefore, we accept the supposition that Baudus, twenty-six years after the campaign, was confused in his recollections, his testimony to the effect that Napoleon was directly responsible for D'Erlon's movement falls to the ground.

In addition to this it is significant that no such order as that which Baudus asserts that he carried is in existence. Even if the duplicate has been lost, we might expect to find some traces of the original. Copies, moreover, would have been made before the order was despatched, but not a vestige of the order, its duplicate, or the copies of it has ever been discovered, nor was any allusion to these alleged orders made in the official despatches of the following day. Ney strenuously denied that any order of the kind ever reached him, and his denial carries as much weight as Baudus' assertion. In fact, the evidence in favour of the latter's narrative is not such as to carry conviction with it. It is certainly more credible that Baudus mixed up in his own mind an acknowledged order to Ney with an alleged order to D'Erlon, particularly as this supposition does not for a moment impugn his good faith, than that orders in duplicate, of which, probably, there were copies, should entirely disappear without having been received, and that both commanders - he who wrote them and he to whom they were written - should be confounded at an incident which, on the

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According to D'Erlon's own statement, written in 1829, it was General Labedoyere, Napoleon's aide-de-camp^ who showed him a pencil note which he was carrying to Marshal Ney, enjoining the 1st corps to march on Ligny. Labedoyere also informed D'Erlon that he had taken upon himself to communicate this intelligence to Durutte at Frasnes, and that the change of direction had already been made.

Colonel Heym6s, however, chief of Ney's staff, says that it was not General Labedoyere but Lieutenant-Colonel Laurent who instructed the 1st corps to bend their march on St Amand, and once more we are met by a conflict of personal testimony. If the chief aide-de-camp of the Emperor was carrying a pencil note to Ney, it is legitimate to infer that the Emperor had sent him with the note. No such inference can be drawn from the presence of Laurent, for he was, comparatively speaking, an obscure member of the staff.

There are two facts, however, which, apart from all other considerations, seem to prove conclusively that Napoleon did not order D'Erlon's change of movement. The first is the surprise which the Emperor exhibited when the 1st corps appeared. At the most critical moment of the battle of Ligny he suspended an operation which was designed to be decisive, lest he might be taken on his flank by a hostile force. If he was expecting D'Erlon, could he have mistaken him for a moment for a hostile force ?

The second fact is Napoleon's neglect to employ D'Erlon when on the field. When, in obedience to Ney's imperative order, the 1st corps marched back again to whence it had come, Napoleon made no effort to retain it. From this we may infer that he considered it as a part of Ney's wing, not of his; as subject to Ney's orders, not to his, and, therefore, as altogether outside his own sphere of operations.

Whether, when the corps had arrived, Napoleon would not have done better to use it himself, is another question not bearing on Napoleon's responsibility for the incident. The point, however, for the sake of convenience, may be referred to here.

La Tour d'Auvergne, whose treatise on the campaign is for the most part luminous and careful, states that the Emperor " reiterated his orders to D'Erlon " (to take the Prussian army a revers) indicating to him again the direction, so as to " avoid all indecision." He does not, however, produce any evidence for this statement, which is directly contrary to the account of the matter given by D'Erlon and Durutte, who, of all people, were likely to know the truth as to this particular.

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The Emperor then did not employ D'Erlon at Ligny, either because of the lateness of the hour, or through uncertainty as to the state of Ney's operations on the left, or because he supposed that D'Erlon already had his definite instructions from Ney. At the moment also his attention was wholly directed to the movement of his guard. This question is almost as difficult a one as the mystery of D'Erlon's appearance, but, as it is impossible to do more than guess at the motives which actuated Napoleon, the problem is not capable of a thoroughly satisfactory solution.

It was, however, undoubtedly an error, considering that the corps was on the field, and could scarcely be back with Ney in time to render any assistance upon the left, not to employ it at Ligny, where it might have proved very useful.

The arguments which have been applied to the incident as a whole point to a definite conclusion - the conclusion that neither Napoleon nor Ney ordered the oblique movement of D'Erlon's corps. It must then have been somebody else who did it. It was probably an officer from the headquarters' staff, either Labedoyere or more probably Laurent, who, knowing the tenor of the orders he bore, took it upon himself to change the direction of the march of the columns. From D'Erlon's subsequent statement in 1829, we may judge that he shared this opinion.

having seen the marshal ? I do not think so ; but, in any event, this circumstance alone was the cause of all the marches and counter-marches which paralysed my Corps cPArmte during the day of the 1 6th."

With one more quotation from the official despatches, the matter may be dismissed. In a letter addressed to Ney from Fleurus next morning, Napoleon says -

If the corps of Counts D'Erlon and Reille had been together, " not an Englishman of the corps which attacked you would have escaped. If Comte D'Erlon had executed the movement on St" x Amand,* which the Emperor ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed, and we should have made perhaps 30,000 prisoners."

In this passage Napoleon hits the true mark. Though Ney was assuredly not responsible directly for the D'Erlon blunder, yet had he in the morning consolidated his command in accordance with repeated instructions the blunder could not have occurred.

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would otherwise have been. The Imperial Guard broke the Prussian centre at Ligny about eight o'clock P.M. But for the uncertainty caused by D'Erlon's appearance this would have been done about 6.30. The daylight would have sufficed to push the Prussian retreat severely, and to ascertain its direction beyond possibility of error. As it was. the retreat was conducted in good order, and ifes direction was not thoroughly known to Napoleon thoughout the remainder of the campaign. That steady, solid movement to the northward which reconnected Bliicher's communications with Wellington would have been frustrated, and it was this movement which won the battle of Waterloo. Much more disastrous would the Prussian defeat have been had D'Erlon been called upon to participate in the final struggle at Ligny.

At Quatre Bras the co-operation of the 1st corps would have ensured a victory over Wellington. It is impossible to doubt this in view of what Ney actually accomplished with only 20,000 men engaged. It is a simple problem in proportion. If Ney, with 20,000 men, could hold Wellington in check for seven hours, what could he have done with 40,000 ?

And had Wellington suffered at Quatre Bras a severe reverse, he could scarcely have adopted, on the following day, that policy of reculer pour mieux sauter which, at Waterloo, was crowned with such decisive success. Time would have been necessary for the reorganisation of his army, and an engagement such as Waterloo would have been postponed, perhaps indefinitely. For the Prussian retreat northward was conducted on the supposition that Wellington would stand and fight the French at Mont St Jean. The Prussians would assuredly have retired on their base but for the prospect of an immediate engagement, in which they might co-operate.

Thus, with D'Erlon either at Quatre Bras or at Ligny, the whole future of the campaign would have been other than it was. This is not to say that Napoleon would have succeeded ultimately, but undoubtedly a heavy reverse on either point would have rendered the prospects of the allies far more gloomy than on the evening of the 16th they actually were.

In attempting, as we have done, to estimate the effects of the absence or presence of 20,000 men, who might have been employed on either wing, we run some risk of falling victims to an unconscious confusion. We may end by imagining them employed on both wings at once, and drawing conclusions from premisses which are obviously absurd. This danger, it is hoped, has been avoided. And yet, perhaps, some such employment of D'Erlon's corps was not so impossible as at first sight appears. Let us split the corps in halves, allowing 10,000 men to Ney to support his battle at Quatre Bras. This brings Ney's effective force to over 30,000 men. It is by no means impossible that with this number Ney might have gained a real success.

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Coming up with a full knowledge of their mission, and at the crisis of the battle, this manoeuvre might have effected all that Napoleon anticipated from it. This, of course, is speculation, but it was not impossible to materialise this speculation into a fact. It was this that Napoleon ordered and expected, and such a disposition of D'Erlon's corps was most in conformity with the actual situation which confronted each wing of the French army.

The 1 6th of June was perhaps the most eventful day in the history of the campaign, and also the most important in the effects which it exercised upon the ultimate issue. The hour of five o'clock in the afternoon marks the turning-point when the fortunes of Napoleon began to decline, and the prospects of the allies to grow bright ; and yet the honours of the day rested, on the whole, with the Emperor.

Instead of a day of mere manoeuvres, he had been enabled to strike a heavy blow against three-fourths of the Prussian army. He had, in his own opinion, rendered it incapable, at any rate for some days, of taking any further part in the campaign ; he had kept the allies asunder while maintaining his own position in strength between them.

Wellington, out of his whole army, had only succeeded in bringing to the field about one-third of its effective force, and, far from overthrowing whatever was in front of him, and directing himself on Gosselies, his utmost endeavours had only succeeded in gaining him a few yards more ground than his troops had occupied the evening before.

But, on the other hand, no decisive success had been gained by the French at Quatre Bras, and the Anglo-Dutch still interposed between them and Brussels. At Ligny the Prussians had been suffered to retreat in good order, and by withdrawing northward on Wavre, towards Wellington and their own reinforcements, they were more formidable after defeat than they had been before, for they had succeeded in veiling from Napoleon both their direction and their intentions.

Thus, by the very fact of his success, the Emperor was filled with a confidence that was at once misplaced and delusive, and from it all his subsequent false moves in the campaign took their origin.

The I7Th Of June

I. The Line of Blucher's Retreat - II. Wellington's determination to Retreat - III. Position of the French Army on the morning of the 17th ; delay at Quatre Bras and on the Right - IV. The Retreat on Waterloo - V. The position at Waterloo ; Wellington's dispositions - VI. Views and expectations of Wellington in standing at Waterloo - VII. Anticipations of Napoleon in taking position - VIII. Summary.

After the battle of Ligny the Emperor rested upon his victory. " The Prussian army has been put to rout," he writes to Ney on the 17th. "General Pajol is pursuing it on the roads to Namur and Liege." This letter was written about 8 A.M., twelve hours after the fight was over. Yet during these hours Napoleon had made no attempt to pursue the Prussians, except, early in the morning, to send out Pajol with a division of his cavalry. Pajol's reports, no doubt, suggested the tone of confidence in which the Emperor wrote. The facts, however, were widely different from these confident suppositions. The Prussian army had not been put to the rout. After the battle,

Ziethen's corps retired in good order on Tilly, a village about two miles due north of Bry. Pirch's corps continued to occupy Bry until after midnight, when it followed Ziethen. Thielemann's corps remained in occupation of Sombref until ordered to retire on Gembloux, while Biilow, after marching all day, arrived at Sauvenieres in the early hours of the morning. Within six hours after the battle the Prussians were better concentrated than before. Nor was it the Prussian army which Pajol was pursuing on the roads to Namur and Li£ge. More than 10,000 men who had taken part in the battle deserted when the battle was over, and made their way along the Namur road. In addition to these there were plenty of stragglers and wounded men, as is always the case after a hot engagement, who had drifted away from the main body, and would naturally be making their way towards the Prussian base. The prisoners captured by PajoPs cavalry were from these straggling detachments. As for the main body, it entirely escaped observation, and was every moment interposing a greater space between itself and the French army. The very measures, therefore, which Napoleon took added to his deception, and he whose success had so often depended upon neglect of the strict rules of war, could hardly be brought to believe that his enemies had imitated his example, and for the purposes of greater ultimate advantage, had determined to risk the loss of their base. The risk, indeed, was very great. The Prussian soldiers carried with them but very scanty rations, and by a retreat northwards it became doubtful how soon fresh supplies could be brought up. The ammunition, too, was a source of anxiety, for all that Bliicher had with him had been exhausted at Ligny, and he was in ignorance as to whence or when fresh supplies would be forthcoming. Nothing can exceed the pluck and daring of a determination arrived at in the moment of disaster, to court privations, hunger, and fatigue, if only the communications with the Anglo-Dutch army might be maintained.

The chief credit for this determination must be given to Gneisenau, Bliicher's chief-of-staff. The Marshal himself had been severely bruised and shaken in the course of the battle of Ligny. His horse fell dead upon him, and two successive cavalry charges passed over his prostrate body. No sooner was he rescued than he was on horseback again, though now over seventy years of age, but he was in no condition to conduct the further operations of his force, and this duty therefore fell to Gneisenau.

It may be doubted what that General really meant by directing the line of Ziethen and Pirch's corps on Tilly. It is a fundamental rule in war that a defeated army retreats upon its reinforcements, and Billow's columns, as yet wholly unemployed, were heading fast towards Gembloux. It may therefore have been that Gneisenau conn8 sidered a northerly line of retreat was, in any event, a good direction to take, as tending to concentrate the army, and that this decision by no means committed him to following this line further when once his immediate purpose was accomplished. Be this as it may, in the course of the night each corps of the Prussian army was under orders to march on Wavre, - Ziethen and Pirch by way of Gentinnes and Mont St Guibert, Bulow and Thielemann by way of Walhain.

The Duke of Wellington received no news of his allies until about nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th. The Prussian commanders have been blamed for neglect in this respect, but it appears that, immediately after Ligny, information had been sent to Wellington informing him of the result of the battle, but that the officer who carried the despatch had been wounded, and so was unable to deliver it. Certainly the receipt of communications of such importance should not have been made contingent upon the chance disasters which might occur to an individual aide-de-camp. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss here the serious consequences which this want of information might have involved ; for the present it is sufficient to note the fact that, at 10 A.M., the Duke's army, now powerfully reinforced, though not even yet completely concentrated at Quatre Bras, was still in position at and beyond that point, completelyisolated, and exposed, without prospect of support, to the conjoint attack of both wings of the French army. There was no alternative but retreat. It was an unpleasant necessity, and liable to expose the Duke to much ill-natured criticism. He was mindful of the persistent misrepresentation which had followed him throughout the Peninsula campaigns, and he evidently expected the same kind of thing now. His composure, however, was quite undisturbed, and his decision was arrived at with singular promptitude. " Old Blucher," he said to Captain Bowles, " has had a damned good licking, and gone back to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go too. I suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can't help it ; as they are gone back, we must go too." " He made all the arrangements for retiring," says Captain Bowles, "without moving from the spot on which he was standing, and it certainly did not occupy him five minutes."

We may now return to Napoleon and consider, his movements in relation to these operations. His general plan of action had been sketched in his letter to Grouchy of the previous day. " My intention is, after having defeated the Prussians, tg set off this night, and to operate with my left wing, which Marshal Ney commands, upon the English." This was written when he expected but little resistance from the Prussians, but the fact that resistance had been in force, and had been protracted, did not necessarily affect his general design. It was not now possible " to set off this night " but there was nothing to prevent his setting off quite early in the morning. Eventually he did proceed on exactly the lines he had himself laid down the day before. We have therefore - as no new plans had to be devised, nor any important changes introduced into those already existing - merely to consider the reasons which induced Napoleon to delay his movement on the morning of the 17th. The question must be examined from two sides - his delay in ascertaining the facts about the Prussian retreat, his delay in attaching himself to Ney for offensive operations against the English.

In regard to the first point, two hours of the battle of Ligny having been lost by the unexpected appearance of D'Erlon, darkness intervened to prevent any efficient and vigorous pursuit of the Prussians.* Nor at a later time was a pursuit in force practicable. Napoleon had not to deal with the Prussians alone. He must, in fulfilment of his plan, operate promptly against the English. For this purpose he required to keep his troops well in hand, and also, not to exhaust those who were comparatively fresh, and on whom he relied to defeat Wellington. Hence any pursuit of the Prussians must be entrusted to those who had borne the brunt of the fight at Ligny - that is, to the troops of Vandamme and Gerard, composing the 3rd and 4th corps. These men were thoroughly exhausted. Not only had their ranks been thinned by severe losses - it is estimated that 12,000 French fell at Ligny - not only had they fought with great persistency and fury for eight hours, but they had sustained the fatigues of a long march begun in the early morning of the 15th, and only ended by the order to form in line of battle on the 16th. There are limits to the soldier's powers of endurance, and those limits may well have been reached by the time Ligny was over. We do not, therefore, blame Napoleon for failure to pursue energetically and in force. We blame him for not observing the line of the enemy's retreat. A small cavalry detachment was despatched in the wrong direction, - why was no reconnaissance made on the roads to Tilly and Gembloux? The fatigues of the soldiers can be no excuse here, for Napoleon had plenty of cavalry upon his right wing which had only been slightly engaged. Instead of detaching Pajol and Excelmans on the Namur road, why should not Excelmans have explored towards Wavre ? It is perfectly clear that both Napoleon and Soult were so certain, on abstract grounds of reasoning, that the Prussians had gone in the direction which ought in theory to have been taken, that they did not think it worth while to explore the roads in any other direction. Two hours more daylight on the 1 6th would have rendered such a misapprehension impossible.

Here again the fatigues of the soldiers cannot be alleged as an excuse. The Emperor at no time proposed to utilise for his attack upon Wellington the troops of Vandamme and Gerard. Apart from these he had the Guard. The Guard had certainly been employed at Ligny. They had fought with conspicuous valour from seven o'clock until perhaps 9.30, but throughout the afternoon they had been spectators of the scene, and a few hours' rest were sufficient to recruit their energies. He also now had the 6th corps of Lobau, which had not been employed at all, and on his left wing there was D'Erlon, none of whose 20,000 men had fired a shot. He had, therefore, 50,000 troops, exclusive of those who had fought at Quatre Bras, to which may be added three divisions of Kellermann's dragoons, and Lefebvre-Desnouette's division of the cavalry of the Guard, which Ney had not employed, with which to attack the Anglo-Dutch army on the 17th. Wellington, at Waterloo on the 1 8th, could only oppose about 68,000 men to the French army. Before Quatre Bras, on the 17th, the rivals would have been fairly equally matched in point of numbers, and Wellington

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Napoleon's delay, therefore, must be accounted for on other suppositions than that his troops were fatigued and his forces inadequate. Napoleon's personal fatigue, however, was one factor in the situation, his want of information was another. It is to these causes that his delay may be attributed. The amount of work which the Emperor had got through since the opening of the campaign was enormous. He had personally superintended everything. He had to lay down the movements for Ney upon the left, for Grouchy on the right, and himself to lead the reserves. We see him supping with Ney at midnight on the 15th, and again astir a few hours later. On the 16th he must have been twenty hours in the saddle. His capacity for dispensing with sleep is proverbial, but none the less, when Ligny was over, he was terribly exhausted. Critics are sometimes apt to regard military affairs as if they were conducted by pieces on a chessboard. Armies are composed of men, and it is a man, subject to human weakness, who leads them. It may be true that to issue a few orders would not have taken much time, nor have added materially to Napoleon's fatigue, but this leaves out of consideration not only the physical but the mental lassitude which ensues upon the completion of some great piece of work - the disinclination to face even the smallest tasks which refer to the execution of another. It was but human nature that Napoleon should be content to leave matters as they were till next morning, when he could undertake the new work before him with energies renewed and mind and body refreshed by some hours of undisturbed repose.

But it cannot be denied that had he been more than man - had he been able to dispense with that much-needed rest - a great opportunity was before him, never to present itself again. But he was unaware of the fact, - his intelligence was at fault * Ney had sent no information upon the conclusion of the action of Quatre Bras of how things had gone with him that day. Early in the morning we find Soult writing to Ney under the supposition that his force was only now concentrated, and demanding exact information as to the position of his divisions, " and of all which is passing in front of you." As late as twelve o'clock this information had apparently not arrived. " His Majesty awaits your reports with impatience," Soult writes at that hour. The fact was that Ney was bitterly exasperated by the Emperor's supposed withdrawal of D'Erlon's corps from the operations at Quatre Bras, and it would seem that he expressed it by reserving information of what had passed and was passing upon his front. But all this time the opportunity was slipping away - the enemy were retreating. Had Napoleon known that the allied army was still before Quatre Bras, isolated from Prussian support, exposed to an immediate attack, it is impossible to imagine that he would have hesitated to march at early morning for the purpose of overwhelming it. Had this been done, say at 6 or even 7 A.M., it does not appear that anything could have saved Wellington from destruction. But in the absence of information from Ney, Napoleon was justified in assuming that the English had withdrawn in the night, for he could not know that the news of Blucher's defeat would not reach Wellington till nine o'clock in the morning. The blame for his inaction does not rest wholly upon the Emperor's shoulders. Ney must share the burden, in that he failed to display either initiative or activity at a time when, from a leader of his reputation, both might well have been expected.

Napoleon then contented himself on the morning of the 17th with recruiting the energies of himself and his troops, and by writing a letter to Ney, the contents of which have already been alluded to. He blames the Marshal's want of concentration on the day before. To avoid the possibility of any such misfortune in the future, very precise instructions are given. " The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven divisions of infantry and the cavalry shall be well together, and that together they should not occupy one league of ground, so as to have them well in hand and employ them at need." In the same letter the Emperor declares his intention of moving to his left by the Namur-Nivelles route. This would avert the possibility of an attack upon Ney by Wellington's troops, for they would immediately be exposed to destruction from such a flank movement by Napoleon ; whether Ney should himself attack was left to his own judgment. "The intention of his majesty is that you should take position at Quatre Bras, as you have been ordered to do " (the day before), " but if that is impossible, report at once and in detail, and the Emperor will move, as has been described ; if, on the contrary, there is only a rear-guard, attack it and take position."

Considering the temper and disposition of Ney on the morning in question, no very vigorous action was to be looked for from him, but it may be doubted if any was required beyond the prompt despatch of news to the Emperor's headquarters. As he read over his instructions, he may well have felt that they conveyed to him orders to remain as he was until Napoleon could join him.

It is true he was to take Quatre Bras, but it was recognised that he might be outnumbered there. He was to act according to circumstances, and he was to be the judge of the circumstances. Some hostile criticism has been levelled against Ney for not having attacked the Anglo-Dutch army himself on the morning of the 17th. Such a proceeding would certainly have been rash, though it might well have been successful. It scarcely follows, as some of Ney's defenders have asserted, that the order -

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"If there is only a rear-guard, attack it" - constitutes proof positive that if there was more than a rear-guard he was not to attack it. In the one case there could be no doubt about the matter ; in the other, Ney was to do what he thought best. If Napoleon had marched promptly by his left to the support of Ney, there could have been no time for hesitation or delay, but as it was, to attack with weakened forces troops which had just been strongly reinforced, might seem a mad and senseless proceeding. At the same time, it must be remembered that Ney had been reinforced too. He had now D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 men, in addition to the 15,000 who remained of Reille's corps after the engagement of the day before. He had at his disposition three untouched brigades of Kellermann's dragoons, and Lefebvre-Desnouette's cavalry. He could put into the field in the early hours of the 17th at least 1 5,000 more men than were mustered when the action of the 16th was ended. Should he not have risked his now consolidated force against Wellington, even though the latter was now consolidated also, and outnumbered him by perhaps 10,000 men ? Moreover, he had upon his right the main French army. A true comprehension of the situation must have made clear to him that he had only to apply for assistance to get it. Had he informed Napoleon at night or even early in the morning of the facts, a strong detachment could have arrived upon his right in three hours, and by eight o'clock Wellington might have been

We have evidence that Napoleon's co-operation in such an attack would have been immediate. When at length he heard what the actual situation on Ney's front was, he immediately despatched a corps of infantry and the Imperial Guard to Marbais, at the same time writing to the Marshal instructions " to attack the enemy at Quatre Bras in order to drive them from their position, while the corps at Marbais would second his operations." Can there be a doubt that the same action would have been adopted many hours earlier if the facts had been known earlier ? We may admit that Ney was right in not risking an engagement against a superior force, but this admission does not excuse him for not taking vigorous and immediate steps to secure adequate reinforcements in order to effect so vital an object as the overthrow of the only enemy now remaining in the field.

But whatever might have been, the fact remains that the morning of the 17th was wasted, and the grand opportunity lost. Hearing nothing from his left, and being satisfied with the completeness of his own success upon the right, Napoleon determined to devote the day to the recuperation of his army. "La journee d'aujourd'hui" he says, "est necessaire pour terminer cette operation" - which operation is not distinctly specified, whether his own movements or Ney's, though, from the context it may be judged that he refers to Ney's seizure of the position at Quatre Bras - "pour completer les munitions, rallier les militaires isoles et faire rentrer les detachements"

Thus it is that we see the Emperor, on the morning of the 17th, chatting with his generals on indifferent subjects, recalling incidents of the early days of the Revolution, and, with the exception of the one letter to Ney, taking no step to hasten or direct the movements of his wings.

At noon, however, he was active once more. He then set about preparing to move upon Marbais, with a view to forming a junction with Ney and prosecuting a vigorous attack upon the English by his left, and about the same hour he entrusted to Marshal Grouchy the task of following up the retreat of the Prussians with 33,000 men, a commission which has been the subject of eighty years of controversy and recrimination, and which marks a crisis in the history of .the campaign.

He took with him the Imperial Guard and the 6th corps of Lobau, all of them comparatively fresh troops, for they had taken no very prolonged part in the engagement at Ligny - indeed, Lobau had not been employed at all.

At Marbais he picked up the infantry and cavalry which had been despatched to that point earlier in the day, and appeared upon the flank of his left wing with over 30,000 men. Upon his approach Ney put his men in movement, the forces thus united pursuing the enemy who had been in process of withdrawal from Quatre Bras for now at least four hours. Napoleon must have perceived at last, with feelings of bitter chagrin, the opportunity which had presented itself to him in the early morning, and which he had omitted to grasp. If his general movement had begun earlier, the united French army, over 71,000 strong, would have appeared against the English army in a position of isolation, and only 45,000 strong.

There is small wonder that he should have felt indignant with Marshal Ney, not because he had not himself attacked the English, but because he had refrained from sending information which would have enabled Napoleon to seize the chance offered him. " They have ruined France," he said to D'Erlon, whom he found in advance of Quatre Bras. Perhaps he was thinking of his order to Ney the previous afternoon - " The fate of France is in your hands." Perhaps already he had a premonition of coming disaster. At two o'clock he was a different man to the Napoleon who at eleven o'clock was talking politics to his generals, pleased with the operations of the past and confident about the future. Instead of a holiday march he now had serious work before him, and

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The pursuit, however, was now urged with as much vigour as the fact that Wellington had already been four hours in movement would permit. It was impossible to approach the English main army ; its march was entirely unimpeded, except " by fatigue, dust, heat, and thirst " - but the rear guard, which was made up of the cavalry led by Lord Uxbridge, supported by one division of infantry, had some smart skirmishes with the French vanguard. In one of these, at Genappe, the 7th Hussars were ordered to charge the head of the French column. Opposed to them were Lancers, strongly backed by Cuirassiers, and strengthened on each flank by strong bodies of cavalry. The ground was heavy, and the horses of the Hussars were leg -weary and jaded. Under such conditions the order was injudicious. Several English officers and over forty men were killed, and reflections were subsequently cast upon the regiment which were thoroughly undeserved. It was at the moment of this reverse that the 1st Life Guards were brought up and ordered to charge. Their weight and impetuosity carried everything before them, and the temporary check was speedily repaired. No second effort on the part of the English Guards was necessary, for "though we were to have given them another charge of the same sort," writes an officer of the 2nd Life Guards, " they thought it prudent not to expose themselves to our weight a second time." On the other side, the French Guards, marching at the head of the pursuing column, with six pieces of horse artillery, kept up a murderous cannonade against the English cavalry whenever the opportunity permitted. Throughout the afternoon the rain fell in torrents from a murky and thunderous sky - the air was heavy, hot and sultry - the fatigues and exhaustion of the soldiers were excessive, but on each side there was the same strict obedience to orders, the same discipline, the same high courage exhibited under most depressing circumstances.

In the meantime, at Brussels, all was confusion and alarm. The news soon spread that the Duke of Wellington was in retreat before Napoleon in person, that the Prussians had been decisively defeated, and that the French would be in the city in a few hours. The Belgians were in no condition to distinguish between retreat conducted for the purposes of better resistance and complete and hopeless rout. The dead and wounded were now arriving from the rear, and among these there was carried through the city, in the course of the day, the body of the ill-fated Duke of Brunswick,* whose chivalrous oath never to sheathe his sword until he had expiated the outraged manes of his father was to be fulfilled only by his own death.. Each straggler brought news more alarming than the last, and the only hope of safety seemed to lie in prompt flight. Heartrending scenes were witnessed in the streets, as wounded soldiers staggered to their homes in the hope - often a vain one - of dying surrounded by the care and affection of their own families. A greater contrast could scarcely be exhibited between the Brussels of the 16th, full of unreasoning hopes and boasting confidence, and the Brussels of the 17th, stricken by a panic as unreasoning as its previous elation.

As the evening closed the Anglo-Dutch- army took up its position with a view to a battle on the following morning. The field of Waterloo had already recommended itself to the skilled eye of the Duke of Marlborough, during the campaigns of the War of Succession, as eminently suitable for the purposes of a general engagement ; and before the campaign of 1815 opened, it had been surveyed by order of the Duke of Wellington, as being the spot where, if put to it, he would take position for the defence of Brussels. The little village of Mont St Jean, where Wellington placed his head-quarters, is situated at the junction of the high roads which lead from Nivelles and Charleroi to Brussels. In front of it was rolling ground, affording excellent cover to troops drawn up for purposes of defence, while behind it was the village of Waterloo, about two miles distant upon the Brussels road, just where it emerges from the Forest of Soignies. The village of Braine-la- Leude lay to the west, affording cover for the right of an army posted at right angles to the main road, while the hamlets of Merbe Braine on the right, of Papelotte, Frischermont, and Smohain on the left, were available to afford still further protection. In front of the right were the chateau and grounds of Hougomont, lying a little off the Nivelles road and towards the Brussels turnpike. The estate of Hougomont consisted of a house, chapel, farm buildings, a wood, a garden, laid out in the Dutch fashion with parallel walks and high thick hedges, and was surrounded by an orchard.

A mile to the southward of Mont St Jean, lying upon the west side of the main Brussels road, was the farm of La Haie Sainte, situated in the hollow just where the road begins to ascend towards La Belle Alliance. On the other side of the road, against La Haie Sainte, was a quarry, and the turnpike just about this point had been cut through the ground, leaving high banks upon either side. For purposes of defence the whole position could be turned to account most effectively, and as he retreated the Duke threw troops both into Hougomont and La Haie Sainte in order with the one to guard his right, with the other his centre. The villages to his left were also occupied.

Such dispositions on the night of the 17th clearly indicated Wellington's intention of standing to meet the enemy, and it must now be considered what justification he had for thus accepting a battle

It has been seen that the Duke did not receive information from Blucher as to the results of the battle of Ligny and his subsequent movements until about nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th. He had already been made aware by a patrol party which he had sent out that the Prussians were in retreat, but he could have no accurate knowledge of their intentions until he heard from Blucher. Upon receipt of news, his decision was prompt to fall back for the express purpose of maintaining communications with his allies, at the same time despatching a letter to Blucher, informing him of his resolution to stand at Waterloo if he could be assured of Prussian support to the extent " of one or more corps, as might be necessary," * but that otherwise he would fall back upon Brussels. We may assume that this letter was despatched at the earliest possible moment, but, none the less, a reply to it could rtot by any possibility have been received before 3 P.M. As a fact, Blucher at that hour was in no position to give positive assurances. He was deficient in ammunition, though the train was, as it happened, upon the road, nor was he yet aware of the precise positions of his 3rd and 4th corps; marching, as they were, upon the extreme right by way of Gembloux and Sarta-Walhain. The ammunition reached Wavre at * Despatch to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 181 5.