Waterloo Township (part 5 of 5)

When we turn to Napoleon's lieutenants, we no longer find in them the same elan, the same enthusiasm, as in their early days. They had won honours and wealth, and they wished to enjoy them. " Gorged with all the favours that human vanity can dream of, the marshals and generals of first rank had become grumblers. One exclusive desire animated them all, to live peaceably on the benefits which the bounty of Napoleon had conferred on them." * " These men," says Mellernich, " wished to enjoy their fortune, and had no idea of risking their possessions and their lives every day in the midst of the vicissitudes of war." " The men whom I have overwhelmed with favours wish to enjoy them," said Napoleon to the Duke of Vicenza. " They no longer wish to fight. They do not understand, poor reasoners that they are, that to fight is still necessary, if the repose for which they thirst is to be conquered. And have not I, too, a palace, a wife, a child ? " In addition to this, they lacked also something of that confidence in the fortune of their chief which bad animated them in the old days. The campaigns of Russia and the Peninsula, the days of Leipsic, and the frontier struggle of 1 814, had shaken their faith in the Emperor's star, and had engendered some distrust, perhaps, of his genius. " My generals were discouraged," Napoleon said at St Helena, " and imagined that they saw everywhere armies of a hundred thousand men, and I had not myself sufficient leisure to occupy myself with the secondary details of the organisation of my troops." " Many of the generals," says Gourgaud, " were no longer the same men. They had lost that energy and that enterprising genius which formerly distinguished them ; they had become timid and circumspect in all their operations. Their personal bravery remained, but for them the grand object was to compromise themselves as little as possible." Thus, while some among the marshals were bent upon conducting the campaign so as to compromise themselves as little as possible, however the issue might turn out, others, as in the case of Ney and D'Erlon, were committed beyond possibility of redemption, should Napoleon be defeated. A mixture of calculated temporising with headstrong impetuosity is thus a notable characteristic of the campaign - a characteristic which it would be difficult adequately to understand and appreciate, were it not for our knowledge of the circumstances and inner feelings of the chief actors in the scene.

No estimate of Waterloo can therefore be satisfactory if the personal element is ignored. The state of Napoleon's health was as vital to the issue as the state of his army, for the dispositions of his army were largely dependent upon the state of his health. The motives and emotions which animated his lieutenants must no more be left out of account than the technical questions of strategy and tactics on which campaigns are too readily supposed exclusively to depend. It is this which gives its enduring fascination to the study of Waterloo, and removes the campaign from the exclusive domain of the military specialist. It is a drama of real life, teeming with human interest, with dramatic contrast, and the ingredients of tragedy. The serene confidence with which the battle was begun, the proud display of military force and pageantry which heralded the combat, stand out in glaring opposition to the utter ruin and despair in which it closed. The hopes and fears which alternated so rapidly ; the Nemesis which was so surely, because unseen and unsuspected, overtaking the greatest genius of his own or perhaps of any age, but who had degraded that genius to the uses of a transcendent egotism ; the fate of Europe, which \hung trembling in the balance ; the constancy and matchless fortitude which decided the issue, - these are the magnetic forces which have focussed upon Waterloo the attention of all succeeding years, and which render it as much the theme of moralist and poet as of the military expert, critic, and historian.

IN the last chapter criticism has been confined to the French movements in- the battle. In the present chapter criticism will be directed to the allied armies under Wellington and Bliicher.

No very extended remarks are necessary to this part of the subject, for the function of Wellington was merely to defend himself, while that of Bliicher was first to arrive and then to make his co-operation as effective as possible. We have simply to ask (a) Could the resistance of Wellington have been made more vigorous and less expensive than it was? (b) Could the assistance of Bliicher have been rendered more speedily, or when rendered, could it have been made more effective ?

(a) At whatever point on the battlefield or at whatever period in the battle we look, there is seen the same spectacle of dogged, obstinate resistance opposed to impetuous attacks. At Hougomont practically the whole French left was employed to secure that position, but it remained in the hands of its defenders when the day closed. At La Haie Sainte Wellington was not so fortunate. A failure in the supply of ammunition, and the impossibility of remedying this failure in time, compelled Major Baring to evacuate the position, but the dauntless tenacity with which it was held as long as it was possible to hold it has never been called in question. So, too, with the attacks, both by cavalry and infantry, upon the front. No defence could have been finer, more resolute, and more effective than was that of the allies all along the line. Some of the foreign regiments, it is true, broke and fled, carrying consternation and panic in their flight, but the causes of this need not be considered here. It is proposed to treat separately the question of the conduct of the foreign troops at Waterloo. For the moment it is sufficient to notice that the resistance of Wellington's army as a whole was only the more obstinate in proportion as panic seized upon some isolated parts of it. The very circumstances in fact that would half excuse vacillation and despondency were actually productive of exactly contrary effects.

The only serious fault which can be urged against Wellington's defence is that he failed to employ all the forces which were available for use.

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In reviewing in a previous chapter the dispositions of the Duke of Wellington on the eve of the battle of Waterloo, it was pointed out that some 18,000 men, constituting Colville's division, had been stationed at Hal - a point within four hours' march of the field - a distance from Mont St Jean of about ten miles. The present section will discuss the reasons which induced Wellington to deprive himself of the assistance of Colville's division in the action of the 18th June.

Hitherto critics have for the most part referred to this matter merely in order to express their condemnation of the Duke's determination. Few have thought it worth while to treat in any detail a point which is certainly of the first importance. For the absence or presence of Colville might at a crisis have turned the scale one way or the other.

And yet it is impossible to conceive that it was through wantonness, lack of care, or insufficient reflection that the Duke acted as he did. He must have been actuated by strong motives when, in the face of all the risks of his situation, he voluntarily increased those risks by detaching 18,000 men from his side. He must have supposed that advantages would accrue from this course which would more than counterbalance the additional dangers which their absence implied.

Wellington's general orders to his troops at the close of the 17th give the first clue to the problem. His instructions to Colville's division were as follows: - "The brigades of the 4th division at Braine-le-Comte are to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal. . . . Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible'' Now the sentence which has been placed in italics demonstrates beyond the possibility of doubt that the Duke expected an attack to be made upon the position which he had ordered the Prince to occupy. The Duke clearly was anticipating the possibility of an attempt on the part of Napoleon to outflank him upon his right, and the presence of Colville between Hal and Enghien would effectually prevent this. No such attempt was made by Napoleon, and so Colville was wasted for the purposes of Waterloo ; but none the less it was the duty of Wellington to guard against all chances, especially seeing that if such a movement had been successfully made it would have brought confusion and disaster upon the allied right wing, on which, for purposes of resistance, Wellington chiefly depended.

There is an interesting passage bearing upon this point in Napoleon's " Me'moires pour Servir" &c, compiled at St Helena, in which the Emperor asserts that on the evening of the 17th he detached a column of 5000 cavalry to make a detour in order to gain the high roads, or one of them, leading from Enghien and Braine-le-Comte to Brussels. The force thus detached was, when it had gained its object, to make a march upon the

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English rear, taking them unawares at the very crisis of the next day's engagement. Nothing was ever heard of this detachment of cavalry ; no account is to be found of how it was composed, who commanded it, or what its operations were, and the whole story is generally regarded as a figment of Napoleon's brain - an afterthought conceived in his retirement, and suggestive rather of what he might advantageously have done than what he actually did. The Duke of Wellington, however, in his Memorandum relating to the battle, published in 1842, accepts this story and defends the employment of 18,000 troops at Hal on this ground, that they were there to repel Napoleon's project of falling upon the English rear. If we accept these statements of the " M/moires" and of the Memorandum, it speaks volumes for the foresight of the Duke that he should have so accurately divined the precise action which Napoleon asserts that he adopted, but the testimony of both documents is generally rejected as untrustworthy. It is pointed out that the Memorandum of 1842 is full of inaccuracies as to details and matters of fact, and that it was composed from the Duke's recollections of the engagement, twenty-seven years after the event, when his memory was clouded by the great mass of misstatement and invention about the battle which so long a period had naturally produced, and when the true circumstances of the case had to some extent faded from his mind. As to this particular statement of the Memorandum it is asserted "that in his old age he unhesitatingly accepted the story told in the i Memoiresl " * and that it was from that source that he first heard of it.

It is, however, to be noted that this precise storyis related as a fact in the " Additional Particulars to the Battle of Waterloo/' published by Booth in 1 8 1 7. Napoleon's " M^moires " were not published till 1820, three years later. The story was, therefore, Current two years after the battle, and three years before the " Memoires " appeared. It was regarded at the time as an explanation of the Duke^ dispositions, and, at any rate, it throws doubt upon the assertion that it was from the Emperor's book that the Duke first learned of the projected manoeuvre. There is no evidence whatever to show that Napoleon did detach, or ever thought of detaching, a corps to act upon the enemy's rear, and the story is, without doubt, a creation of his fancy; but it is by no means improbable that the Duke contemplated the possibility of some such movement being made, and thought it well to be prepared against any event. It is, in fact, more probable that a due consideration of the Duke's dispositions suggested to Napoleon at St Helena the advantage which such a movement might have gained for him (and that consequently he wished it to be thought that he had executed it), than that the Duke should have first heard in 1820 a story which was current in 1 8 17, and should have utilised it in 1842 to explain certain of his dispositions in 181 5.

It is, therefore, very possible that the troops were posted at Hal to prevent any veiled movement on the part of Napoleon upon the right flank and rear of the Anglo-Dutch army. But there were other reasons to account for the Duke's dispositions, and of these the one most currently received is this - that the Duke placed so considerable a force out of his reach upon the right in order to ensure support for his retreat in the event of defeat. In this connexion we have to consider what the Duke's line of. retreat would have been. It is generally assumed that it would have been direct on Brussels by the roads leading through the Forest of Soignies, but retreat through a forest is always hazardous. The nature of the situation must afford great opportunities to the enemy of harassing an army in retiring through thick woods, and Napoleon always maintained that to post an army in front of a forest, through which alone retreat was possible, was contrary to the principles of military science. Indeed, he goes so far as to assert that it was only the circumstance that retreat was practically impossible that prevented Wellington twice upon the day of Waterloo from giving the order to his army to fall back. To these criticisms of Napoleon the Duke subsequently retorted that had he been compelled to retire he would not have withdrawn through the forest, but upon his right by Hal, and in support of this statement he instanced the troops which he had posted there. Just as after Ligny the Prussian corps of Thielemann retired upon its reinforcements in the shape of Bulow's corps, stationed near Gembloux, so after Waterloo the Duke would, he asserted, have retired upon his reinforcements stationed, to the number of 18,000 men, in the neighbourhood of Hal, or, at any rate, his right would have so retreated in the event of the centre being pierced during the battle.

There is still one further point to be noticed in regard to this matter. It has been seen that Wellington, from the very first, was doubtful as to the true line of Napoleon's advance. He delayed the concentration of his army upon the main Brussels-Charleroi road until the last moment, because he thought Napoleon's advance by Charleroi might only be a feint, and that the real object was to cut his communications with the sea, or to advance on Brussels by way of Mons. Even as late as midnight on June 15th, Nivelles rather than Quatre Bras was the point on which the army was directed, Nivelles lying six miles further to the west than the latter place. Moreover, the Duke always maintained that to attack him first (and not Blucher), and by his right would have been the best policy for Napoleon to adopt. It is therefore clear that the Duke's judgment throughout the opening days of the campaign was biassed by a preconceived opinion, and feeling strongly that an advance by way of Mons was a contingency always to be guarded against, he posted an effective number of reserve troops to meet such an event, should it occur, content to run the risk of the loss of their services in return for the sense of security which their presence at Hal afforded him.

These reasons, taken together, seem to form a strong justification Tor Wellington's action. They are not, however, admitted by critics to be an excuse. Chesney speaks of the Duke's " strategical error," and considers that " this blot is the single one of several once charged against Wellington for this day's conduct, which "time has not long since cleared away." Sir J. Shaw Kennedy says, "The Duke ought certainly to have had Colville ... on the field." Sir E. Hamley is equally emphatic, while foreign critics are practically unanimous in the same sense.

was much force, it is contended, in the Duke's apprehensions, and much caution and good sense displayed in the measures which he took to allay them.

But, while admitting this, there still remains another question, - whether every purpose would not have been equally served by posting Colville nearer to the main army than Hal, or, at any rate, by gradually drawing him nearer as the fight wore on. Had » he been stationed, say at Braine-le- Chateau, six miles nearer to the field, he might have served a double purpose. He would have been equally useful to guard the right wing from the chance of a surprise attack upon its flank, and would also have been available to take his part in the battle, should it become evident that no danger upon the flank was threatened.

A student of the campaign has forcibly stated this aspect of the question in a letter to the author of this study. " I never doubted the wisdom of this precaution of Wellington, nor questioned his excuse for it. My only trouble is in his apparent oversight in placing the 18,000 Dutch and Hanoverians at a fixed point, some twelve miles away on his right rear, instead of gradually, as the fight wore on y drawing them nearer and nearer, so that, at a critical moment, while having them in hand to cover his retreat, he might have turned them into an attacking force on Napoleon's left, if opportunity occurred - as it did. When Btilow was active upon Napoleon's right the latter had no chance of operating on Wellington's right. If at that time the Hal force could have been brought up, Napoleon, at the time of Bliicher's arrival, would have been caught between three fires, and the French would have been annihilated. As it was, the Hal force was stuck fast all day, and never fired a shot nor sought a chance of firing one. In short, the Hal force might have had alternative offices instead of one."

This, however, is judgment after the event. Wellington had to judge while events were in progress, and with only a very limited knowledge of all the elements in the situation. With the full information which we possess of the whole history of the campaign, we can see that his precautions were unnecessary. But he could not know this at the time, and, moreover, it was always his habit to carry caution to its extreme limits.

Again, if the disposition of the force at Hal was intended to prevent a French advance upon Brussels by way of Mons, it is clear that he must have troops stationed close to the line of communication between those cities. For this purpose they would not have been effective, or so effective if posted at Braine-le-Chateau as at Hal and Tubize.

Their presence nearer to the field also would have offered strong if not irresistible temptation to use them. Could the Duke have known for certain that to use them would ensure him the victory, he would have disregarded all ulterior consequences in order to gain his ultimate end, but with no such certainty before him, and with a possibility of being compelled to retire, there was prudence in removing beyond the reach of any temptation to employ them the troops on whom he relied to support his retreat. While the troops were at Hal he was certain, should he have to withdraw, that he would be able to withdraw in good order. With the troops nearer the field there was the chance of their being involved in the general ruin.

If, after examining the question as a whole, we are desirous of forming some definite conclusions, it must be borne in mind that controversial topics seldom admit of any dogmatic conclusions. The object of this section is to point out the strong grounds which exist for reserving judgment upon Wellington's arrangements, not to insist that he was right and wiser than his critics. The justification, in fact, for devoting a separate section to a matter which, after all, is only of secondary importance, is that most treatises on Waterloo dismiss this subject in a few sentences of unqualified censure, whereas the case warrants a careful examination. Attention has also been called here, possibly for the first time, to the fact that, whereas Wellington's own explanations in 1842 are generally regarded as an afterthought, suggested by the commentaries of his antagonist, those explanations in truth exactly coincide with the view of the matter put before the public shortly after the

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It has been clearly seen that the Prussians were the determining factor in the situation at Waterloo. They were so at the beginning as much as at the end of the day, for it was in the full assurance of their intervention that Wellington determined to stand and meet Napoleon in battle. Without such assurance it is certain that no battle would have been fought at all - at any rate, at Waterloo. What precise arrangements were arrived at between the two commanders - what transpired at that mysterious midnight interview which Wellington assures us took place between himself and Blucher, it is impossible to say, but it is certain that while the Duke was prepared to risk an engagement upon the security of the co-operation of two Prussian corps, Bliicher's impetuous eagerness would only be satisfied if he brought up his whole army to share in the overthrow of the traditional enemy of his country.

The corps, of Billow was naturally marked out to lead the van of the Prussian advance. This corps had taken no part in the battle of Ligny y and was therefore quite unaffected by the exhaustion of a great contest or by the depression caused by defeat. Bulow had effected his junction with the rest of the Prussian army in the course of the 17th, and could have bivouacked for the night at or beyond Wavre, ready at break of day on the 1 8th to begin an uninterrupted march. As a fact, however, Blilow bivouacked" at Dion-le-Mont, three miles to the east of Wavre, while the other three corps were stationed in and about the town. The troops which were to lead in the morning were stationed in the extreme rear the evening before, and thus, instead of starting in the morning clear of the town, they had first to march to it and then through it. Wavre was already encumbered by the troops and military equipage of the other corps composing the Prussian army, and Billow's march was consequently much impeded. It was still further impeded by a fire which broke out in the streets of Wavre, and as a consequence of these delays the two leading divisions of the corps only reached St Lambert at noon - three hours before its two remaining divisions. Btilow, in fact, ought not to have been stationed at Dion-le-Mont, but considerably further westward, or, at least, he should have skirted Wavre in his march instead of passing through it.

The 2nd Prussian corps, under Pirch, was under orders to follow the march of Btilow. It did not actually start from Wavre till mid-day. This was perhaps in conformity with the arrangements, for the rear divisions of Btilow could scarcely have been clear of the town much before noon, but in the case of Ziethen's corps - the 1st - there was a delay which is highly significant. Its march was not to be in any way dependent upon that of the 2nd or 4th corps ; it was not to traverse the same road, being directed on Ohain by Bierge, and it might well have started at daybreak. It did not start till close upon noon.

These facts clearly show that it was not until mid-day on the 18th that Bliicher began seriously and vigorously to prosecute his march. It was not until nearly mid-day that the sound of the cannonade at Mont St Jean was heard at Wavre. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is some connexion between these two circumstances. It would seem as if Bllicher scarcely cared to commit his army finally to the hazard of a march to Waterloo until he was thoroughly assured that Wellington meant to stand and await his arrival. That he should have some doubts about Wellington's good faith was not unnatural, and it is well known that Gneisenau, his chief of the staff - on whom the direction of affairs very largely rested - entertained grave, though quite unfounded, suspicions as to the Duke's trustworthiness and intentions. The wholly inaccurate account of the position of his troops which Wellington had given to Bllicher on the morning of Ligny, his failure to support the Prussians at Ligny, even to the extent of a single division, his known prudence and caution, coupled with the very hazardous position in which he stood at Mont St Jean, were all facts calculated to arouse some amount of suspicion and distrust. What, again, would be the situation of the Prussian army if Wellington were not standing to fight a battle, but retreating on Brussels ? Engaged in a dangerous oblique march with the main French army in front and Grouchy behind, it would be advancing to inevitable disaster, perhaps to utter and irretrievable ruin. Every dictate of prudence counselled delay, until all doubt and hesitation gave Way to certainty. At noon the sound of the cannonade gave the necessary assurance, and at noon the march began in earnest.

This view of the case will also go far to account for the somewhat tardy and ill-arranged march of Billow with the 4th corps, and for the long halt of his two leading divisions at St Lambert until the other divisions came up. Though he left his position at Dion-le-Mont so early, yet, as has been seen, he gained no advantage from this early start, nor was he actually on the field of battle till 4.30 P.M., little less than twelve hours after he had broken camp in the morning. It is only reasonable to conclude, with Mr Ropes, " that Biilow had been ordered to be very cautious and to proceed with all deliberation."

But if misgiving and hesitation mark the attitude of the Prussian commanders, Bliicher and Gneisenau, up to noon on Waterloo day, nothing but vigour, energy, and resolution is to be found from that hour. Through miry roads and over marshy ground, three of the four Prussian corps - - the third, under Thielemann, was left behind to engage Grouchy at Wavre - laboured and struggled upon their way. No effort of human endurance was left untaxed if only the old Field-Marshal might be true to his plighted word. The strenuous vigour which he exhibited now stands out in inverse proportion to the suspicion which filled him before. The spirit which animated the Prussians was that of enthusiasts, confident in their powers, marching fresh to gain their laurels in a first campaign, rather than that of wearied soldiers who, for the past four days, had been continuously in movement, had experienced nothing but defeat and discouragement, who were saturated with rain and caked with mud, and who with every step were abandoning their natural base of supplies in order to commit themselves to the perilous chances of a possible success, to which complete ruin was the only alternative.

The spirit of desperate resolve which characterised their march equally characterised their action upon the field of battle. There every corps surpassed itself. In the headlong impetuosity of their pursuit of the routed French the sentimentalist may see vengeance let loose rather than discipline acting under restraint, but the peace of the world and the cause of humanity is served in proportion as success is absolute and defeat irretrievable. The armies of Wellington and Bliicher must be indissolubly and without reservations associated together in the glories of Waterloo. The parts of each were separate and distinct, but it is to the fact that each played its part so well that the ultimate triumph must be ascribed.

It is not only with Prussia that England is called upon to share the laurels of Waterloo. More than half of Wellington's army was made up of foreign troops, and for good or evil, these foreign regiments played a considerable part in the battle of Waterloo. Here at home the opinion seems still to prevail that it was rather in spite of his allies than by their assistance that Wellington secured the victory. It may be useful to examine ' this view a little in detail, and to endeavour to estimate exactly the extent of the burden of de-* fence which lay upon the various foreign contingents.

The total Anglo-Dutch force present at Waterloo numbered rather less than 68,000 men. Of these only 24,000 were British. Forty-four thousand men, therefore, belonged to other nationalities.

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First in military qualities comes the small contingent of the King's German Legion. It consisted at Waterloo of two brigades of infantry under Duplat and Ompteda, two regiments of cavalry under Dornberg and Arentsschildt, and numbered, with its artillery equipment, rather more than 5800 men.

Duplat, with four brigades of infantry, was attached to Clinton's division. He was stationed above Hougomont upon the right, where he was opposed to Bachelu. It would be impossible to distinguish between the capacity and bravery displayed by these troops and by their British comrades.

Ompteda was attached to Alten's division, and was stationed in the front to the right of the Charleroi road. The cavalry of Dornberg and Arentsschildt were posted immediately in rear. These troops, therefore, formed part of Wellington's centre. They were exposed to the full shock of the cavalry charges as well as to the fire of the French artillery which preluded the cavalry attacks. - " The enemy's artillery," says Alten, in his report to the Duke of Cambridge, " played upon our squares at the distance of 150 paces. Not one of them gave way; the dead were pushed aside and the ranks filled up again. Several went to meet the enemy's cavalry, and by their heavy fire, compelled it to retreat. At length some of them, which were almost entirely cut in pieces, fell back. They retreated, however, in good order, and immediately advanced again when they were ordered. . . . The greatest part of our most distinguished officers have fallen. Among these I reckon particularly Colonels Von Ompteda and Duplat. . . . We have, to be sure, this consolation, that these men have covered their graves with glory."

In addition to these services rendered by the King's German Legion must be reckoned the defence of La Haie Sainte. The position, it is true, was taken by the French, but not until late in the afternoon - towards six o'clock, probably - and throughout the day its chief defenders were the men of Baring's battalion (2nd light infantry of the King's German Legion), reinforced by the Llineburg battalion of the same force. The post was held until ammunition failed ; as it was impossible to introduce fresh supplies, nothing was to be done but withdraw. The struggle for La Haie Sainte cost Baring's battalion half its effective force.

The Hanoverian troops at Waterloo, exclusive of the King's German Legion, numbered rather more than 11,000 men. Of these one brigade, under Count Kielmansegge, was attached to Alten's division, and fought side by side with Ompteda's brigades. Alten reports that " Major - General Count Von Kielmansegge gave the most brilliant example of courage and intrepidity to his brigade, and constantly supported me with all his might."

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great gallantry upon the right. The brigade, indeed, was to Duplat what Kielmansegge was to Ompteda. As the action drew near its close Halkett moved down the slope, together with the 71st regiment, in rear of the movement of the 52nd. His men shared in the pursuit of the French Imperial Guard when its rear column had been broken by Colborne's flank fire, and thus they were associated with one of the most critical and glorious exploits of the day. Their performances, however, are somewhat magnified in the Hanoverian official report, for there it is said that "the Osnabrlick Landwehr fought against Napoleon's Guards, and overthrew them."

The two brigades of Hanoverians, under Vincke and Best, formed a part of Wellington's left, and were attached respectively to the 5 th and 6th divisions, which seem to have been under the general command of Sir Thomas Picton.* Upon this part of the line the attack of Marcognet and Durutte with their divisions of D'Erlon's corps was very severe. The Hanoverians were roughly handled, and Vincke's brigade was subsequently withdrawn from the line into reserve in front of Mont St Jean ; but the whole of Picton's division displayed conspicuous courage and sound soldierly qualities throughout the day, and no distinctions need be made between the Hanoverians and the other brigades of which it was composed.

A detachment of Hanoverian Jagers served in Hougomont throughout the engagement, and a Hanoverian regiment despatched by Kielmansegge as a reinforcement to Baring in La Haie Sainte was almost cut to pieces by a charge of the French Cuirassiers.

Such, then, were the services rendered by the Hanoverian contingent at Waterloo. It is astonishing that they should have done so much rather than they did not do more, for they consisted for the most part of raw untrained troops, of whom but very little was expected by Wellington. It is to be noticed that he intermingled them as much as possible with his British regiments or with the men of the King's German Legion. Thus disposed, they would have before their eyes an example of steadiness and determination, and it was, moreover, a measure of precaution, for the Duke had as little confidence in their loyalty as in their fighting powers. His suspicions, however, though not unnatural, were entirely misplaced, and we may certainly consider that the Hanoverian infantry performed their duty in a thoroughly efficient manner on all parts of the field.

The Hanoverian cavalry under EstorfT was with Colville's division at Hal, with the exception of one regiment known- as the Cumberland Hussars. These were placed, together with the rest of the cavalry, under the general command of Lord Uxbridge, but he did not find it necessary to use them until the close of the afternoon, when the heavy cavalry of Guyot and Kellermann had been driven back. At this point the Cumberland Hussars were ordered to assist in the pursuit of the beaten enemy. But scarcely had they responded to the call when they turned rein and fled from the field, deaf to all remonstrances, and carrying panic and confusion with them in their abject flight to Brussels.

There were nearly 6000 Brunswick troops at Waterloo. They were stationed in reserve! when the action began, between the village of Merbe Braine and the Nivelles-Brussels chaussee. They were moved forward in order to restore the Duke's right when it had been weakened by the repeated charges of the French cavalry. There, in company with the British and Hanoverians, the Brunswickers formed squares and were exposed to the full fury of the renewed cavalry attacks. Leeke, who was ensign in the 52nd, tells us that, as his regiment advanced, it " passed over the spot on which one of the Brunswick squares had stood, and found lying there many of their killed and badly wounded men. They had suffered most severely from round shot and shells. It was one of the most shocking sights we saw, even on that most bloodstained battlefield. Close to this was a Brunswick square, prepared to receive cavalry, the front rank kneeling, as steady as a rock." Other eye-witnesses speak of the Brunswickers as seeming to revel in the fire " like Salamanders." Later in the day, as the infantry of the Imperial Guard were beginning their advance, the Brunswick contingent was exposed to the charge of Donzelot's and Quiot's divisions, and was very severely handled, being indeed broken and forced back by the fury of the onset ; but according to General Alava's report to the Spanish Government, "the Duke, who felt that the moment was most critical, spoke to the Brunswick troops with that ascendancy which every great man possesses, made them return to the charge, and putting himself at their head, again restored the combat, exposing himself to every kind of personal danger." "The gallant and noble conduct of the Brunswickers was the admiration of everyone," wrote an English officer of the Guards, three days after the battle.

Not alone at Waterloo, but at Quatre Bras, the Brunswick contingent earned just titles to fame. It was there that " Brunswick's fated chieftain " fell. In the roll of brave men who fought through this campaign, the Brunswickers stand high, nor should the noble service which they rendered ever be forgotten.

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contingents at Waterloo, numbering over 20,600 men, but it was also by far the most unreliable. In military qualities and in loyalty to the cause for which they were fighting they left much to be desired, and the possibility that they would desert to the enemy was constantly present to the mind of the Allied Commanders. Every care was taken by the Duke to prevent such a mischance, by breaking them up into comparatively small detachments and intermingling them with the stable elements which composed his force. One brigade - Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar's - was posted on the extremity of the allied left, and occupied the villages of La Haye, Papelotte, and Smohain. Chasse's division, including the brigades of Ditmers and D'Aubreme, were posted on the extreme right at Braine-la-Leud, and extending as far as the farm of Vieux For£t. Thus the line on each side was flanked by Dutch-Belgians - that is to say, the greatest possible distance was put between Chassis and Saxe-Weimar's men.

Two other brigades were stationed towards the centre. Bylandt's was attached to Picton's division, and was associated with such- splendid British regiments as the 28th, 79th, 95th, and 42nd, while Kruse's Nassauers, nearly 3000 strong, leaned their left upon the Charleroi-Brussels chaussee, and their right upon Kielmansegge's Hanoverians and Ompteda's King's Germans.

Special ignominy has always in England attached to the Dutch-Belgians, for almost every Englishman believes that they turned and fled at the first charge. It is well to understand the truth of the matter, and for this purpose it is necessary to study the part played by the various Dutch-Belgian brigades in detail.

The first to be attacked was Bylandt's brigade. These troops were posted in a very anomalous manner. The ground rises sharply from the Wavre-Ohain road, which may be taken as indicating roughly the direction of the British line. Behind the road and beyond the slope the allied troops were posted, and their position was therefore covered by the rising ground, with the exception of Bylandt's brigade, which was stationed in front of the road, entirely without cover, and exposed to the full fire of the greatest French battery. This disposition, says Sir James Shaw Kennedy, was most unaccountable, and was followed by its natural results. Having endured the fire of the battery for an hour and a half, Bylandt's men were also to endure, unsupported and " singly exposed," the first shock of D'Erlon's charge. " Utterly unable," says Mr Ropes, " to resist alone the impact of such an enormous force, they broke in confusion and fled to the rear amid the undeserved curses of their English allies," and they were of little further use throughout the day. We may fairly conclude that if Bylandt's brigade had received fair treatment - if only such a measure of constancy and endurance had been demanded of them as was demanded from the other troops of the line upon the left - they would have rendered as good an account of themselves as their comrades on other parts of the field.

Prince Bernhardt brigade held the villages entrusted to it with great courage and tenacity, and were only expelled from their positions by Durutte's final onset between 6 and 7 P.M. Scarcely were the villages lost than they were regained, for shortly after 7 Ziethen's leading division (Steinmetz) came upon the field.

At first the Nassauers were mistaken by the Prussians for enemies, for, as Prince Bernhard tells us, the uniforms of his men were still " very French." The mistake was serious, for the Prussians " made dreadful fire " upon them, drove them from their post, nor could they be rallied until they had fled "a quarter of a league from the field." They did rally, however, and performed good service till the day was over.

On the other extremity of the line, Chasse's division was ordered up from Braine-la-Leud in order to restore Wellington's right, shattered by the French cavalry. They were thus not called upon till late in the afternoon. Massed in deep columns to the left of Maitland's brigade, they awaited with steadiness the onset of the French dragoons. They were still in position when the

Imperial Guard advanced, directing its charge, it will be remembered, full on Maitland's brigade. Thrown into confusion by the charge of the Imperial troops, they were rallied by Vandeleur's cavalry closing up behind them, and a Belgian battery, that of Van der Smissen, was most opportunely brought forward by Chasse to the support of Napier's battery of nine-pounders, and helped to render even more decisive the rout of the French Grenadiers.

The services rendered by the Dutch cavalry were so unequal as to be of scarcely any value. An occasional "charge seems to have been made with vigour and resolution, but the troopers were liable to be seized with panic at the moment when their co-operation would have been most useful.

On the whole, the Dutch-Belgians on the right can scarcely be said to have covered themselves with glory, but some solid work was done by them ; the intervention of Van der Smissen's battery was most timely, and their conduct generally entirely belied the suspicions formed of them before the battle began.

When we turn from the Dutch-Belgians, whose operations have already been reviewed, to Kruse's brigade, we can feel nothing but unreserved admiration for the devoted gallantry which it displayed. Stationed just to the left of that part of the line which was most fiercely beset by the French cavalry, it was upon the Nassauers in part that the duty fell to re-establish the broken front of the allied army. Just as the crisis of the French attack arrived, the Prince of Orange put himself at the head of Kruse's battalions. For the moment their courage failed them when they saw their hereditary Prince severely wounded and obliged to quit the field, and before the point-blank fire of the French musketry they turned and fled. The Brunswick battalions also failed before so furious an attack, but it was only for a moment. Encouraged by the advance of Kielmansegge's Hanoverians and some battalions of the King's Germans, supported by the ioth British Hussars, both Nassauers and Brunswickers resumed their formation, and threw themselves into the thick of the fight. In the contest they amply redeemed their momentary failure, and showed the grit and stuff of veteran soldiers in a melee engaged with some of the finest troops in Europe.

Of the Nassauers in Hougomont it is unnecessary to speak, except to say that the splendid defence of that position in no way depended upon their exertions or assistance.

It may then be conceded that the Dutch- Belgian and Nassau troops exceeded expectations in the battle of Waterloo, and occasionally gave glimpses of conspicuous gallantry. No one pretends - outside official reports and laudatory accounts of the battle emanating from Belgium - that they contributed in any special way to Wellington's victory. Any troops might have done as well, and many, doubtless, would have done better. But by troops from whom little was expected, effective work was done, and not only did they not desert, but contributed a fair share towards the success of the day. If they ran upon occasions, it was, it must be conceded, when skilled and tried troops could scarcely be expected to stand, and when they ran they could generally be rallied to render good service to the allied cause.

In the case of the King's German Legion, the Hanoverians, and the Brunswick corps, it has been seen what they were called upon to do, and how they did it It is with no wish to detract from the splendid services of the British troops, but simply in a spirit of justice to those to whom the British owe so much that this chapter has been written.

Chapter Xiv

Grouchy follows the Prussians to Wavre - Receipt of Napoleon's 10 A.M. despatch - Grouchy confirmed in his design of attacking the Prussians - Prussian dispositions at Wavre - The battle at Wavre on the 1 8th - Receipt of Napoleon's I p.m. despatch - Its effect on Grouchy's dispositions - Early morning of the 19th - Thielemann's determination to attack - Success of the French on the 19th - Grouchy receives the news of Waterloo - Determination to retreat on Namur - Grouchy's conduct of the retreat - Conclusion.

The operations of Grouchy at Wavre upon the 1 8th are, in a technical sense, a part of the campaign of 181 5, though for all practical purposes that campaign ended with the rout of Napoleon's army at Waterloo.

Nothing which Grouchy could do against the Prussians left behind at Wavre could have any effect upon the main issue which was decided between the French and the allies at Mont St Jean.

With a view to completeness, however, it may be well to devote a few pages to the fortunes of Grouchy from the moment when he came to his fateful decision to neglect the main battle upon his left in order to follow up the Prussians to were in the neighbourhood of Sart-a-Walhain at the time when the cannonade of Waterloo was first heard, about 11.30 A.M. From Sart-a-Walhain to Wavre the distance is at least nine miles. It was not, therefore, till between 4 and 5 P.M. that Vandamme with the 3rd corps appeared upon the high ground which overlooks the town of Wavre upon the left bank of the river Dyle.

It was while the 3rd corps was taking position that Grouchy received the Emperor's despatch, dated from the field of Waterloo at 10 A.M. He was there informed of Napoleon's immediate intention to attack Wellington. "Accordingly {ainsi) his Majesty desires you to direct your movements on Wavre, so as to approach us, put yourself in touch with our operations, and connect communications ; pushing before you the corps of the Prussian army which have taken this direction, and who may have stopped at' Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible."

Whatever Napoleon's real meaning may have been - and critics have laboured with much ingenuity to prove that this despatch does not instruct Grouchy to proceed to Wavre, but to march on Waterloo - Grouchy read in it an unmistakable sanction for the course which he had pursued. He at once gave orders for a vigorous attack on Wavre, exclaiming to his lieutenants, " Vous voyez bien que j'avais raison." *

Grouchy At Wavre 305

The task of holding the town had been entrusted by Bliicher to Thielemann, commanding the 3rd corps of the Prussian army. The three remaining corps - of Biilow, Pirch, and Ziethen - were already well on their way to Waterloo, Biilow, in fact, taking position on the Emperor's flank almost at the very moment when Vandamme was preparing to attack Thielemann.

The position of the latter was hazardous in the extreme. His troops numbered scarcely a half of those which Grouchy could oppose to him, nor was any reinforcement to be looked for from Bliicher. Originally estimating Grouchy's force at less than 12,000 men, the Prussian commanderin-chief confidently reckoned that one of his corps would be sufficient to occupy it. Nor when undeceived as to its strength, did he see cause to modify his existing arrangements. Bliicher, in fact, determined to abandon to the chances of total destruction a whole corps d'armee if only thereby he might be enabled to punctually fulfil his engagements to Wellington. The immediate advantage of supporting Thielemann against Grouchy was sacrificed to the greater advantage of inflicting a crushing defeat upon Napoleon. Few commanders would have been capable of such a decision, involving, as it did, the abandonment of his fellow-countrymen in order to march with his army to the assistance of a stranger-ally.

so fully to engage the attention of Grouchy that it would be impossible for him to send assistance to Napoleon or to impede in any way the movements of the main Prussian army. This object was successfully accomplished. Vandamme opened a sharp fire from his batteries upon the town, and under cover of it his infantry columns descended on to the low ground bordering the river, and made a desperate effort to seize the bridges and to occupy the town. The Prussians offered a furious resistance, the contest raging for two hours hand to hand without any conspicuous success being gained by the French. Indeed, upon the left, the attack of Lefol's division of Vandamme's corps upon Bierges was a signal failure ; so much so that Grouchy ordered up Gerard's 4th corps to relieve Lefol, and himself headed the charge. While the fight was thus in progress along the whole line from Wavre to Bierges, the marshal received Napoleon's second letter, dated from the field of Waterloo at one o'clock. From it he learned that Billow's corps had been sighted at St Lambert, and that the Emperor expected his lieutenant not to lose an instant in approaching the main battle in order to catch Billow redhanded (en flagrant delit). It was now six o'clock, and Blilow had been actively engaged for an hour and a half against the French before Grouchy even received the despatch which summoned him from Wavre to Waterloo pour ecraser Billow, It was now too late for anything to be done which could serve Napoleon. None the less, Grouchy promptly set himself to obey instructions. Leaving to the unassisted efforts of Vandamme's corps the task of taking Wavre and Bierges - a task which had proved too severe for Vandamme and Gerard together - the marshal moved the 4th corps to Limal, a hamlet some distance to the west of Wavre, where a bridge crossed the river. A Prussian detachment stationed there was quickly driven in, the bridge was seized, and Gerard's corps, supported by Pajol's cavalry and Teste's infantry division, crossed the river and formed up in order of battle upon the ground beyond it. There the attempts of the Prussians to regain the lost position were successfully resisted, the French became masters of the ground from Limal to the wood of Rixensart, two miles and a half due west of Wavre, and Thielemann's position in the town was in danger of being turned. Such was the situation upon the left when darkness put an end to further hostilities. In the meantime Vandamme was maintaining a vigorous attack along the right bank of the Dyle from Wavre to Bierges, but all his efforts to make himself master of those positions were unavailing. At nightfall the Prussians still held Wavre, .Bierges, .and the bridges across the Dyle, which gave access to the town.

At an early hour upon the 19th the Prussians renewed the combat. No authentic information from the field of Waterloo had yet reached Thiele- mann, and Grouchy was altogether without news. It is, however, probable that some rumours of Napoleon's defeat were current in Wavre, for otherwise Thielemann, outmatched as he was, would scarcely have ventured upon an offensive movement. But if Napoleon was in retreat Grouchy must retreat too ; and it would be exceedingly difficult for him to withdraw in good order in face of an attack in force by which he found himself committed to a general engagement. Moreover, the longer Grouchy was detained fighting at Wavre the more likelihood there was that one of the Prussian corps from Waterloo would come up to aid Thielemann. Or perhaps Blucher would despatch a force from Genappe or Quatre Bras to circumvent Grouchy and intercept him as he retreated on Namur. In any event, therefore, the French force before Wavre was likely to be annihilated if only its retrograde movement could be delayed for a few hours. At 8 o'clock A.M. vague rumour gave place to certainty, for it was at that hour that official information arrived at the Prussian headquarters of the result of Waterloo. Grouchy, however, remained ignorant of the issue of the battle for three hours longer, and cherishing the hope that the allies had been defeated, and that he would soon be supported by a detachment from the main army, he had no hesitation in accepting Thielemann's offer of battle.

Grouchy At Wavre 309

of the wood of Rixensart, notwithstanding determined efforts to dislodge them. Bierges was taken by Teste's infantry at the point of the bayonet. Thielemann, finding himself menaced upon the right flank, evacuated Wavre, which was promptly occupied by Vandamme. The pursuit of the Prussians was vigorously pressed, and thus it was when in the full tide of success that Grouchy, at 1 1 A.M., received the news of the Emperor's total overthrow. His situation was now desperate in the extreme, and his successes against Thielemann only made it the more so. He was beyond Wavre, in complete isolation from the main army, the shattered remnants of which were by this time across the Sambre, surrounded by enemies elated by a splendid victory, and outnumbering him by at least four to one, utterly unable, with his 30,000 men, to do anything to retrieve Napoleon's disaster, and with very little prospect of being able to effect his own retreat. It was, however, precisely when things were at their worst that Grouchy was at his best. Compelled to rely upon himself alone, and with a full sense of his position, he exhibited at this crisis powers of initiative, resource, activity, coolness, and skill such as have compelled the warm admiration of his bitterest detractors.

Masking his designs from Thielemann by maintaining an appearance of force at Wavre and at Limal throughout the day, with his main force he retired in good order, but with great rapidity, upon Namur. He succeeded in eluding the vigilance of

Pirch, who, with the 2nd corps, had been despatched from Waterloo to cut off his retreat. On the 20th he was at Namur, the Prussians now in hot pursuit. A little to the north of the town an engagement took place between the Prussians of Pirch and Thielemann and Vandamme's corps assisted by Teste's division. The Prussians were severely handled, and under cover of this action Grouchy, with the 4th corps, passed safely through Namur. Vandamme followed, leaving Teste to hold the town. Teste delayed the Prussians till nightfall, when he in turn retired, having succeeded with a mere handful of men in covering the retreat of Grouchy's whole force. At 4 A.M. on the 21st the 30,000 men under Grouchy's command were united at Dinant, soon to be distributed in cantonments at Soissons, Rocroi, and other neighbouring towns. Grouchy received from the provisional government the office of commander-in-chief, for in the days which immediately followed the campaign of Waterloo, he was not its scapegoat/ but its hero. Was it not he who, in the midst of appalling defeat, had redeemed the honour of France by victory, who, in the hour of headlong flight and utter consternation, had, by a coolness and intrepidity which recalled the best traditions of the Grand Army, secured the safety of his whole command in the face of tremendous odds, and so provided France with the nucleus of another army with which the disasters of Waterloo might even yet be repaired ?

Appendix Note To Chapter V.

In a recent article in the Preussische Jahrbuch, Herr Delbriick has emphatically condemned Wellington's conduct as a breach of faith to Blucher. He asserts that English writers on the campaign, and notably Lord Wolseley, are accustomed deliberately to ignore the evidence which goes to prove that the Prussian commander was deluded into taking position at Ligny on the strength of false assurances. He declares that such assurances were given, not only on the morning of the 16th, but also to Muffling on the evening before, and roundly asserts that it was the Duke's intention to induce Blucher to fight in order that the concentration of the Anglo-Dutch army might be effected quietly while the Prussians were occupying the French. Blucher, in fact, was to be the scapegoat of the Duke's blunders. These are serious charges, and certainly should not be ignored ; nor, under the circumstances, can we affect much surprise that such charges should be made. The situation of the Prussians at Ligny on the 16th was not at all unlike that of the Anglo- Dutch army on the 18th, and when we remember the splendid and strenuous determination which brought the Prussians to our aid at Waterloo, we can scarcely wonder that their vigour should be favourably contrasted with Wellington's apathy as regards the contest at Ligny.

about them is the assertion that the Duke gave definite assurances of his support, that Blucher took position on the strength of them, and that there is documentary evidence to prove this. Where are the documents? If Herr Delbriick can produce anything over and above Wellington's letter to Blucher, which has been already quoted, English writers will unquestionably be prepared to examine it with attention, but if, as we shrewdly suspect, the Duke's letter is the only and ultimate piece de conviction^ few will be inclined, on the strength of that letter alone, to endorse the sweeping charges of the Preussische Jahrbuch,

Misleading as that letter is, at least it was written in good faith, or, if this be disputed, it still remains certain that Blucher had already taken his position at Ligny before the Duke's letter was received. For a letter despatched at 10.30 from Quatre Bras cannot have influenced the orders of Blucher, which were issued at an earlier hour. Now Ziethen and Pirch were both in position before 10 a.m., and Thielemann completed the line before noon. It was not, therefore, Wellington's letter which caused the Prussians to be formed up in order of battle at Ligny, though the receipt of it must have done much to establish Bliicher in the conviction that he had acted wisely.

February 1899

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