Waterloo Township (part 3 of 5)

5 p.m. News of Thielemann and Bulow arrived just before midnight It thus becomes a question as to the hour when Bliicher sent an answer to Wellington assuring him of the support which had been requested. It may have reached the Duke on the evening of the 17th. It may have reached him only on the morning of the 1 8th. In any event, it is clear that the Duke's retreat was based upon his confidence in Bliicher, not upon any exact assurances, and that upon the strength of that confidence he took up position at Waterloo. Chesney tells us that " Wellington, before deciding to fight on his chosen ground next day, had had the full assurance of hearty support from Bliicher," and in confirmation of this statement, he quotes an extract from Blucher's letter, that " he would march with his whole army to join him, but on condition that if the French delayed to attack, the allies would give them battle on the 19th," but Chesney makes no reference to the hour when this letter was received, and, as a consequence, his contribution towards a proper estimate of the Duke's conduct is of small value. The point is this - Was there sufficient likelihood of Prussian support being forthcoming to justify the Duke in risking a battle without positive assurance of such support ? A reference to the battle of Ligny may be of use in considering this question. There, entirely unsupported by his ally, Bliicher had suffered a reverse. He had taken position in the hope of assistance from

Wellington, but without the certainty of it. That assistance it was [.impossible to afford, and in default of it Blticher had been defeated. Just as the Duke was unaware of the nature of the resistance he was himself to meet with at Quatre Bras, so he, and Blticher too, were unaware of the strength of the force which had been despatched to occupy the Prussians and separate them from the English. Grouchy's troops were estimated by Blticher at 10,000 or 11,000 men; as a fact they were three times that number ; exactly the same circumstances, therefore, might intervene to keep the allies apart at Waterloo as had actually kept them apart during the engagements of the 16th. It must be remembered, too, that though the Prussians did arrive, it was not until between four and five in the afternoon of Waterloo, when the battle was four hours old. Had Napoleon begun the battle of the 18th at 6 or 7 A.M., it would have been in progress at least nine hours before the Prussians arrived, and it is, to say the least, improbable that Wellington's miscellaneous force could have held their own, unsupported, for anything like that time. The conclusion must be that the Duke's decision was marked by a boldness which closely resembles rashness ; and supposing, as some critics maintain, that he received no assurances from Bliicher whatever until the morning of the 1 8th, it will be difficult to deny that his conduct can only be justified by its success.

Duke himself was fully sensible of the risks he was incurring, for, after his troops had taken position, the pickets posted, and all arrangements made, Wellington rode over to Wavre in order to interview Blucher, "that I might learn from his own lips at what hour it was probable he would be able to join forces with us the next day." The story of this night ride has been most circumstantially told by so trustworthy a witness as the Duke of Wellington himself, who related it to Mr Pierrepont in 1833, and to Mr Justice Coltman in 1838. It also appears in Lockhart's " Life of Napoleon." *

Those who assert that the Duke had no personal interview with Blucher from the time he met him at Bry, on the morning of the 16th, until they greeted each other at Genappe, at the close of the battle of Waterloo, have to contend with this story of the Duke himself, attested by independent witnesses at different times. Such a ride was certainly not unnatural in the very critical circumstances in which Wellington found himself. We may, therefore, believe the Duke when he says - " However, I saw him (Blucher), got the information I wanted from him, and made the best of my way homewards." Very possibly it is to this interview that he refers when he says, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst, that "the Marshal had promised

* In addition to the interesting pages devoted by Mr Ropes to this matter, the reader is referred to an article by Mr Archibald Forbes in the Pall Mall Magazine for August 1894 - " Copenhagen, and other Famous Battle-horses."

me ... he would support me with one or more corps." Some time, therefore, in the course of the night the Duke - by letter, or by personal interview, or by both - received from Blticher a definite assurance with regard to his co-operation on the morrow. Confidence was converted into certainty, and whatever may have been the Duke's misgivings throughout the 17th, as he conducted the retreat and took up his situation for the night, they must have been dispelled before morning dawned. It was then in full and clear reliance upon Bliicher and Prussian assistance that the Duke stood his ground on the 18th June.

Napoleon took up his position for the night partly in front of the Anglo-Dutch army upon the high ground about La Belle Alliance and partly at Genappe. His one fear was that the enemy might escape him and continue its retreat through the forest of Soignies upon Brussels. With Blticher retreating upon Brussels from Wavre, the two armies would be concentrated in force in front of the city, and Napoleon's situation thereby rendered most critical. This was the course the Emperor afterwards insisted would have been the right one for the allied commanders to take under the circumstances, and though he had no apprehensions from the Prussians, he was much afraid that the Anglo-Dutch for their part were adopting it. In the ''Relation fidele et dtiailtee" published in the year after the battle, it is stated that the French were astonished that the English had not onlymaintained their evening position, " but were prepared to defend it," while Napoleon exclaimed- - " Enfin je les tiens - ces Anglais / " He had pushed forward his cavalry detachments in-order to assure himself that the enemy was really standing, and his pickets were stationed as close to the British lines as possible in order to inform him if any attempt to withdraw should be made in the night. The Emperor himself at nightfall retired to quarters at Caillou, about three miles from Mont St Jean, and it was not until the following morning that his troops occupied the positions in which they were to fight during the day.

The events of the 17th of June were of the utmost importance in relation to the issue of the campaign. It was a day of manoeuvres, whereas the 1 6th was a day of action, but the final victory of the allies was more dependent upon the manoeuvres than on the actions. Want of complete and accurate intelligence is perhaps the most noticeable feature of the^ day, whether we regard the movements of Ney, of Napoleon, of Wellington, or of Bliicher. Ney knew not or neglected the opportunity which Wellington's isolated position at Quatre Bras afforded him. Wellington was thus isolated because he knew not the results of Ligny and the line of the Prussian retreat. Napoleon, owing to the remissness of Ney, knew not that byjoining his centre to the left wing early in the morning he could overwhelm the Anglo-Dutch, cut off as they were from all chance of support from their allies ; and equally was he unaware of the true line of march adopted by the Prussians, owing, in the first place, to an over-sanguine estimate of his victory of the day before, and in the second to his own neglect in omitting to send reconnoitring parties in any other directions than the one he wrongly assumed the Prussians to have taken. Bliicher marched on Wavre, unaware of the exact situation of two of his four corps, ignorant of the situation of his ammunition trains, and trusting that Wellington would adopt a line of retreat parallel to his own, rather than knowing with any certainty that such a line was actually being taken. Wellington withdrew from Quatre Bras towards Brussels, and took position at Mont St Jean, trusting, from the nature of the case, that the Prussians would support him, if he stood his ground, not with any sure intelligence that he would be so supported. He was also misinformed as to the force the French were bringing against him, for he supposed that Napoleon had mustered his whole army, with the exception of some 10,000 or 11,000 men, whereas 33,000 men had been detached to follow the Prussians, and Girard's division of 3000 men had been left at Ligny. The movements of Grouchy were equally characterised by uncertainty, as will be seen, but this was in the nature of things, for he had been specially sent forth to obtain information, and his mission would have been useless had certainty already existed.

Uncertainty implies hesitation and delay, and hence the 17th was a day of delays. Ney delayed his attack upon Quatre Bras until Napoleon could join him. Napoleon delayed joining him until he received information from Ney. Wellington delayed his retreat until he received information from Blticher, while Grouchy's march was delayed through over-confidence that the Prussians were disposed of, and was ultimately despatched through a growing feeling of uncertainty as to whether it was really so. The responsibility for this state of things has been apportioned first to Ney, who, smarting with a sense of indignation against the Emperor for withdrawing, as he wrongly supposed, the 1st corps from his command, attributed his ill-success at Quatre Bras to Napoleon, and, ' as if in revenge, deliberately sacrificed his chances of converting repulse into victory. Responsibility also directly attaches to Napoleon himself, and to Soult, his chief-ofstafF, for neglecting simple and feasible precautions, and wasting precious moments until it was too late to redeem them. On the Prussian side alone do we see, on the 17th, time being placed to the best account, and the time thus gained was to prove the ultimate cause of the brilliant success at Waterloo.

The 17Th Of June 143

When at last the French and Anglo-Dutch troops were put in motion, we see on the one hand a retreat most skilfully conducted and a pursuit as vigorously pressed as the nature of the ground, the weather, and Wellington's dispositions would permit. At the close of the day we find one army in position, ready to fight at Mont St Jean - another at Wavre ready to support it in a decisive engagement - Grouchy, far from the main French Army, far from the Prussians, and further still from the English ; while the Emperor is congratulating himself that he has but one enemy to deal with, and that it is now before him, certain to be destroyed on the morrow by his superior force, his more skilful manoeuvres, and loftier military capacity.

Of Waterloo

I. Grouchy despatched in pursuit of the Prussians - II. Arrangements and instructions which governed his march - III. Grouchy at Gembloux ; the two versions of the 10 p.m. despatch - IV. Grouchy's determination to advance on Wavre - V. The sound of the Cannonade at Waterloo - VI. General criticisms and observations on Grouchy's movements.

At the beginning of the campaign Grouchy had been invested with the command of the cavalry upon the right wing, but upon the morning of the 1 6th, a letter from the Emperor, dated Charleroi, reached the Marshal, informing him of his appointment as commander of the right wing in its entirety. " My intention is that, as commander of the right wing, you should take the command of the 3rd corps commanded by General Vandamme, of the 4th corps commanded by General Gerard, and of the cavalry corps of Pajol, Milhaud, and Excelmans, which ought not to be far short of 50,000 men. My intention is that all the Generals should take directly their orders from

Grouchy'S March 145

The confidence which Napoleon thus exhibited in Grouchy was not misplaced upon the 16th. His operations at Ligny were marked by vigour and resolution, and he continued to personally superintend the charges of his cavalry against the Prussians until a late hour at night. The Emperor himself withdrew from the field a little after eight o'clock in the evening, and gave orders that Grouchy should join him at Fleurus. It was not until after 11 P.M. that the Marshal's duties permitted him to obey these orders. On reaching the Emperor's headquarters Grouchy was informed that the Emperor was in bed ill, and had given strict instructions that he was not to be disturbed. Soult would not take upon himself the responsibility of issuing any orders during Napoleon's retirement, and as a consequence the Marshal withdrew in a state of cruel uncertainty as to the action he ought to pursue. He, in common with Vandamme and all Napoleon's lieutenants, expected that the retreating Prussians would be instantly pursued. It was ever Napoleon's habit to follow up success to its furthest limits - but without instructions it was impossible to take the necessary measures. Still Grouchy, on his own initiative, despatched cavalry reconnaissances under Excelmans and Pajol in the direction of Gembloux and Namur, while to Pajol was added Teste's division of infantry.

At daybreak Grouchy again betook himself to Fleurus, but was unable to see the Emperor or to get any instructions at so early an hour. At last he was informed that the Emperor would visit the battlefield of yesterday as soon as he was up, and that he would see Grouchy and give him his orders there.

It was not until twelve o'clock at the earliest, and more probably towards 1 P.M., that Napoleon's plan in regard to the Prussians formulated itself. He then called Grouchy to him and put him in command of the two corps of Vandamme and Gerard, of Teste's division of infantry detached from its own corps, the 6th, and of a part of Pajol's and Excelman's cavalry. . The whole amounted, as nearly as possible, to 33,000 men with 96 guns. With them Grouchy received verbal orders, which were, he assures us,* to this effect - " Put yourself in pursuit of the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon as you shall have joined them, .and never lose sight of them. I am going to reunite the troops which I lead to the corps of Marshal Ney, march against the English and fight them if they stand on this side of the Forest of Soignies. You will correspond with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras."

* "Fragments Historiques," par le General Grouchy. Paris, 1829. " Le Marechal de Grouchy," par le General de division Senateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris, 1864.

Grouchy 'S March 147

conclusion of the battle of Ligny, no doubt could have entered his mind as to what he was intended to do. He would have had the enemy just in front of him, and there would have been no possibility of the Prussians deceiving him as to their line of retreat. But now they had fourteen hours' start. They had been lost sight of, and the time when he would come up with them was a matter of mere conjecture. No one knew exactly which way they had gone. No wonder, therefore, that Grouchy received his command with misgivings and remonstrances. He pointed out that the troops entrusted to him were not expecting to march that day - they were the corps on whom the brunt of the battle of Ligny had fallen, - that some time must elapse before they were ready to start, that the Prussians had already gained many hours upon any pursuit that might be made, and that consequently he would not be in a position to harass their retreat or hinder the dispositions which they had already determined upon. He even ventured to point out the strategical disadvantages which might follow from detaching so large a contingent from the operations of the main army. "In a word, I conjured him to authorise me to follow him." Napoleon's reply was to reiterate his commands, and Grouchy proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for his march.

have adopted their natural line of retreat towards Namur. Thus they would be separating themselves from Wellington, and were no longer to be feared so far as the next day's battle was concerned. It was possible that they still contemplated further intervention in the campaign, and to effect this purpose they had two courses open to them, - to direct their march parallel to the main Brussels-Charleroi road, and so maintain communications with Wellington, or else they might attempt to return upon the French as they moved towards Brussels and take them in flank or rear. The first contingency had obviously, from all the evidence which we have, not even crossed Napoleon's mind at mid-day on the 17th, and his measures were in no way directed to meet it. The second contingency was probably to some slight degree present to his thoughts when he despatched Grouchy in pursuit, but he was dominated by the idea that the Prussians were retreating on Namur. In this event their fourteen hours' start was a matter of slight importance. It was only of importance if they had adopted the first course - viz., to effect a concentration with the allied army further north, and of this Napoleon had no suspicion. He therefore despatched Grouchy in full confidence that he would come up with the enemy somewhere on the Namur road, that he would complete their overthrow, and effectually check any attempts they might be inclined to make to return upon the march of the main French army.

Grouchy'S March 149

The Emperor's delusion was still further strengthened by the arrival at Fleurus of a battery of eight pieces which Pajol had captured from the enemy upon the Namur road. This piece of evidence seemed convincing as to the line the Prussians were taking, and contributed more perhaps than anything else to throw dust in Napoleon's eyes.

Grouchy accordingly left the Emperor's presence to make arrangements for his march. Though still far from reassured as to the prospect before him, he none the less proceeded to his task with promptness and energy. Vandamme was ordered to get ready to advance without delay, and to proceed with his corps to Point-du-Jour, a spot where the road from Gembloux joins the main chaussee from Namur to Quatre Bras. Gerard's corps was ordered to follow up Vandamme. It was not, however, till about 3 P.M. - according to documents published by Gerard himself - that the 4th corps began to move, and this despite Grouchy 's personal exertions to expedite its march. At about 3.30 P.M. he received reports from Pajol and Excelmans - the one informing him that the Prussian retreat was by St Denis and Leuse, so as to gain the high road from Namur to Liege - the other that the enemy was massed at Gembloux. These despatches were almost immediately followed by a letter from Napoleon himself. It was

" Betake yourself to Gembloux with the cavalrycorps of Pajol, the light cavalry of the 4th corps, the cavalry corps of Excelmans, the division of General Teste, of which you will have special care, as it is detached from its army corps, and the 4th corps of infantry.

" You will explore in the directions of Namur and Maestricht, and you will pursue the enemy ; explore his march and instruct me as to its movement, so that I may penetrate what it is intending to do.

" I am carrying my headquarters to Quatre Bras, where the English still were this morning. Our communication then will be direct by the paved road of Namur. (Here follow instructions as to the occupation of Namur, should Grouchy find it evacuated by the enemy.)

" It is important to penetrate what Blucher and Wellington intend to do, and if they propose to reunite their armies to cover Brussels and Lieget in trying the fate of another battle. In any case keep your two corps of infantry constantly united in a league of ground ; occupy every evening a good military position, having several avenues of retreat. Place intermediate detachments of cavalry to communicate with headquarters. " Dictated by the Emperor ; in the absence of the Major- General \ to the Grand-Marshal Bertrand." *

* The text of this Document has been translated literally from Pascallet, in whose biography of Grouchy it first appeared in 1842. f There is no warrant for Mr Rope's reading "or LUge"

Grouchy'S March 151

Several reasons make it necessary to produce this order practically in full, chiefly perhaps because it was the only despatch received by Grouchy from the Emperor until the afternoon of the next day.

Here are the instructions which governed his whole march. He had no others of any kind whatever until he reached Wavre on the afternoon of the 1 8th.

The document assumes additional importance from the fact that for many years it was suppressed by Marshal Grouchy. Until it appeared in 1842 he always asserted that he acted under Napoleon's verbal orders only, and that no written instructions whatever were sent to him except those despatched from the field of Waterloo.

It also gives us the first indication of doubt in Napoleon's mind as to the real direction of the Prussian retreat. His suppositions on the subject have already been stated, and he did not for a moment contemplate any movement on Blticher's part towards a concentration with Wellington. In Bertrand's order, sent off about three o'clock, we see the first glimmerings of such a suspicion in Napoleon's mind. The fact was that after Grouchy's departure the Emperor had received information that a strong body of Prussians had been seen at Gembloux. This might mean anything. It did not necessarily destroy the theory that they were retreating on Namur, though to Namur from Ligny via Gembloux was certainly a circuitous route. They might, as Pajol reported, be seeking the high road from Namur to Louvain by way of Gembloux. They might be halting there in order to concentrate, and, if unmolested, effect a movement on the flank and rear of Napoleon's army ; or they might be at Gembloux with a view to marching northward on Wavre, in order to keep open their communication with Wellington. It was then of the first importance that Napoleon " should be able to penetrate what the enemy was intending to do," and this was Grouchy's mission. In any event Gembloux was a good place to make for, and hence he is specifically instructed to betake himself there.

In accordance with these instructions, Grouchy made all haste to reach his destination. But his progress was necessarily slow. Heavy rain began to fall about 2 P.M., and soon the rough and narrow country roads were converted into quagmires by the march of his troops through the dripping weather. Vandamme, it is true, reached Gembloux towards 7 P.M., and pushed forward some considerable distance beyond the town, but Gerard's corps did not enter into its bivouacs till 10 P.M., and to advance further at that hour, after such fatigues and in such weather, was out of the question. In and around Gembloux, therefore, the Marshal encamped for the night. He could not advance Vandamme while leaving Gerard at Gembloux, for his orders to keep all his troops well together within a league of ground were precise. Certainly he had not got far, for from Ligny to

Grouchy'S March 153

From Gembloux that evening Grouchy despatched a number of letters which betray an activity which can only be described as feverish. There are two to Gerard, one to Vandamme, one to Excelmans, one to Pajol, - an important despatch to the Emperor dated 10 P.M., and an equally important one (which cannot be found) at 2 A.M. on the 1 8th. These letters indicate a due sense of the importance of his mission, and in them he repeatedly urges upon his corps commanders the necessity of expedition. Vandamme is to put himself in motion before 5 A.M. Gerard's cavalry is to set out " a la petite pointe du jour" and his infantry is to follow up Vandamme at 8 A.M. Pajol is to start " a la pointe du jour" But it is with his letter to Napoleon that we are chiefly concerned, for it is clearly an answer to the Bertrand despatch, and shows us how Grouchy interpreted the obligations which that document laid upon him. Unfortunately there are more versions than one of this letter, the generally received text differing in many important particulars from that given in the Grouchy memoirs, and in the apology for Grouchy written by his son in 1864.

first informed the Emperor of his own position, then of what he had learned about the Prussians. " It appears, from all the reports," he says, " that the Prussians, having arrived at Sauvenieres ' - a village three miles north-east of Gembloux - " divided into two columns. One must have taken the road to Wavre, passing by Sart-a-Walhain ; the other column appears to be directed on Perwez. One may perhaps infer that one portion is going to join Wellington, and that the centre, which is the army of Blticher, is retiring on Li6ge." He is sending forward Excelmans with six squadrons on Sart-a-Walhain and three on Perwez, and will act according to the reports which he may receive, " but if the mass of the Prussians are retiring on Wavre, I shall follow them in that direction, so that they may not be able to gain Brussels, and so as to separate them from Wellington." *

The salient difference in the two versions is to be found in this last clause. In the received text Grouchy announces that if he marches on Wavre, it will be for the purpose of preventing the Prussians from gaining Brussels, and of separating them from Wellington. Now he did march on Wavre, but did not accomplish either of these purposes, nor did he take the best means to secure their accomplishment. In the Grouchy version, he says his march on Wavre, if made at all, will be for the purpose of attacking the Prussians there as soon as he shall have joined them. This is precisely what he did do on the following day.

If Napoleon received the Grouchy version, he certainly sanctioned, as we shall see later on, the precise action which Grouchy took upon the 18th. If he received the other version, his sanction was given to Grouchy's intentions as expressed in that version - he sanctioned his design of following the Prussians, with a view to separating them from Brussels and from Wellington.

Which version, then, are we to accept ? On this question must depend, to some extent, the judgment which we shall form as to Grouchy's conduct as a whole, and the matter is therefore deserving of close attention. But as in this chapter we are concerned chiefly with the narrative of Grouchy's march, it will be better not to interrupt that narrative more than is absolutely necessary in order to discuss debatable points. The main arguments on both sides are therefore appended in the form of a note,* and it must be for the reader to decide which version he will receive as the true one.

* The weight of critical authority is all on the side of what we have called "the received version." Gerard, after citing it in his " Dernieres Observations," published in 1830, adds the following words : - " Certifie conforme a l'original, qui nous a ete remis par l'Empereur Napoleon et qui est entre nos mains. " - Signe :

From Grouchy's despatch to the Emperor at 10 P.M., from Gembloux, we gather that at that hour he was still uncertain as to the line which the Prussians had taken, and as to the intentions with which they were marching. But during the next few hours he received further information, which he immediately communicated to the Emperor in a letter, dated

Le General Gourgaud." Gourgaud, therefore, is the ultimate surety for the veracity of the received version. Almost all critics accept it as the true one.

On the other hand, the security of Gourgaud is not good. He wrote in the' interests of Napoleon, and notoriously falsified facts. He tells a story about two despatches, sent by Napoleon to Grouchy the night before Waterloo, containing precise instructions for his operations next day. Almost all critics agree that this story is purely mythical. Critics, therefore, are inconsistent. They cannot be allowed to treat one unsupported statement of Gourgaud as absolute truth and to discard another as absolute falsehood.

Napoleon notoriously falsified letters and bulletins to suit his interests. His interest was as great in maintaining the received version as Grouchy's in maintaining his version. Neither Grouchy nor Napoleon is entitled to absolute confidence, but the balance of confidence rests rather with Grouchy.

The author of the Grouchy Le Memoirs " says he copies the letter from the original, which is under his eyes. [But Grouchy suppressed the Bertrand orders for twenty-seven years, and may have been capable of altering a document.] Gourgaud says the same thing of the received version : which of the two are we to believe ?

Grouchy's son quotes the version of the " Memoirs," and says all the documents which he quotes are either in his own hands or in the archives. Some which he quotes as being in the archives are certainly not there.

On the whole, I am inclined to think that Grouchy's version is quite as likely to be the true one as Gourgaud's version, and, if anything, to give the preference to Grouchy's.

Grouchy'S March 157

Gembloux, 2 A.M., June 18th. This letter is not in existence, but Soult's reply to it, dated from the field of Waterloo at 10 A.M., sufficiently discloses its contents. Grouchy had discovered that two Prussian columns had marched by Sauvenieres and Sart-a-Walhain, and he was now convinced that the Prussian retreat generally was upon Brussels. "The movement of Bliicher's army," he writes to Pajol at day-break, " appears to me pronounced upon Brussels ; " and it was with this idea firmly fixed in his mind that he issued his final orders for the operations of the day. These orders were to march on Wavre.

A natural process of reasoning brought the Marshal to adopt Wavre as his first point of destination. The road from Sart-a-Walhain to Brussels is almost direct, and passes through Wavre. The Prussians, therefore, must, in their movement on Brussels, go to Wavre. There, or beyond that town, Grouchy's force would come up with them. If Bliicher stopped at Wavre, the French would engage him there ; if he pursued his march on Brussels, the French would either follow him up or would march by their left from Wavre to St Lambert, so as to join operations with the main army of Napoleon. The idea that Bliicher, arrived at Wavre, would leave there a portion of his force to detain Grouchy, while detaching the major part of it to join operations with

Wellington in the coming battle, never seems to have occurred to the Marshal. He was wedded to a fixed idea - that the junction between Wellington and Blucher would take place in front of Brussels, on the other side of the forest of Soignies, and to prevent this, or at least to hinder it materially, an immediate march on Wavre was the best course to pursue.

Grouchy 's operations, therefore, on the 18th June, were from the first conducted under a serious but rooted misapprehension, and it was this fact which caused him to be useless throughout the day - useless to Napoleon, and useless against the Prussians.

Notwithstanding his letters of the evening before, addressed to his corps commanders, urging the necessity of speed, and prescribing very early hours for their start, his force was not in movement from Gembloux until many hours after sunrise. Much recrimination has passed between the generals upon this point, and the mists of controversy have obscured the question as to who was responsible for the delay. Excelmans, with his dragoons, started at 7.30, Vandamme at 8, and Gerard at the same hour. The columns moved on Wavre by way of Sart-a- Walhain. Grouchy preceded his troops, and was at Walhain * before his advance-guard arrived. There he gathered all the information he could, and at eleven o'clock wrote a letter to the Emperor, detailing his impressions as to the intentions of the Prussians. The ist, 2nd, and 3rd corps of Blucher, he says, are marching in the direction of Brussels. Two of these corps have passed Sart-a-Walhain on the right, and amounted to 30,000 men at least. A corps coming from Liege (Biilow's) had effected its junction with those who fought at Ligny. The Prussians were designing to make a stand against the troops which were pursuing them, or else to unite themselves with Wellington, "a project announced by their officers, who, with their usual assurance, pretend only to have quitted the field on the 1 6th, so as to operate their junction with the English army on Brussels.

"This evening I shall be massed at Wavre, and shall thus find myself between Wellington - whom I presume to be in retreat before your Majesty - and the Prussian army."

This despatch had scarcely been sent off at 11 o'clock on the morning of the eventful 18th when Colonel Loriere, Gerard's chief of the staff, announced to Grouchy and to Gerard, who had reached W^lhain in advance of his corps, that he heard in the west the roar of artillery fire. The generals, surrounded by their staffs, proceeded at once to ascertain the character of the engagei6o ment which was apparently in progress on the left. At first, through the drizzling rain and heavyatmosphere, they were inclined to interpret what they heard as a skirmish of advanced guards, but very soon they were unmistakably convinced that a general action was in progress. There was little difficulty in fixing the situation of the battlefield. The plateau of Mont St Jean was marked out as being the scene of the combat. What, then, under these fresh conditions, was the right wing of the French army to do ?

Gerard impetuously urged the imperative duty of marching to the sound of the cannon. The Prussian march had now definitely narrowed itself down to one of two alternatives, - either they were marching on Brussels or else were moving to join forces with Wellington at Mont St Jean. In either event, prudence and policy alike suggested the advisability of joining the Emperor as quickly as possible, for if the Prussians were moving on Brussels, they might be regarded as a negligable quantity in the battle at Waterloo. If, on the other hand, they were advancing to join Wellington, Grouchy, by marching on the cannon sound, would be most advantageously disposed to stop them, to hinder them, or to diminish the effects of their junction in the event of its having been accomplished.

Grouchy, however, thought otherwise. Undoubtedly the tone of authority adopted by Gerard predisposed the Marshal to disregard his counsels, but he had solid objections to urge to the course proposed. He had, first of all, his instructions. Napoleon's verbal instructions were precise and definite in their terms. He was to pursue the Prussians, never lose sight of them, and attack them as soon as he had come up with them. He was now close upon their heels, and proposed to attack them at once. The sounds of battle at Mont St Jean created no new situation. It was exactly what Napoleon himself had anticipated at the time when he despatched Grouchy in pursuit of the enemy. " I am going," he said on the field of Ligny, " to attack the English if they stand on this side of the Forest of Soignies." They were standing there and the Emperor was attacking them. If the Emperor had intended to modify his instructions in any way he would have done so ; he had not done so, therefore his original instructions still held good. It was not for a subordinate to carry out operations of inspiration, but to carry out the operations prescribed by his superior.

Moreover, there were serious practical difficulties in the way of Gerard's plan. Balthus, who commanded Gerard's artillery, considered it almost impossible to carry the guns over the muddy lanes and marshy ground, by which alone the Emperor was to be approached, in time to render any service in a battle to be fought at Mont St Jean that day. It was indeed doubtful if the troops themselves could accomplish so long and difficult a march before the day would be practically over. They certainly could not arrive before six o'clock, assuming that their progress, at the rate of three miles an hour, would be quite unimpeded by the enemy.* But was it at all likely that it would be unimpeded ? The Prussians were 90,000 strong. The French right wing only numbered 33,000. If it were to commit itself to a flank march while 90,000 of the enemy were massed within a few miles of it, was it to be supposed that the Prussians would fail to avail themselves of their opportunity ? Half Bliicher's force would be sufficient to detain them indefinitely, while with the other half he might march unimpeded on Mont St Jean.

Such, and much more, were the arguments that passed in this momentous colloquy. Gerard endeavoured to break the resolution of his chief by proposing that he should march with his corps to the sound of the cannonade, while Grouchy with the rest proceeded on Wavre. Such a suggestion the Marshal was bound by his orders to reject. His instructions were formal to keep his corps together within a league of ground. His determination, whether for good or evil, must apply to the whole force under his command, and his determination was to march, according to his original purpose, on Wavre, and to engage the Prussians there. An hour before the discussion arose, Napoleon was replying to Grouchy 's 2 A.M. despatch. His letter is dated from the field of

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Waterloo at 10 o'clock A.M. In it there occur the following phrases : - " The Emperor charges me to acquaint you that his Majesty is about to attack the English army, which has taken position at Waterloo, near the Forest of Soignies. Accordingly (ainsi) his Majesty desires that you should direct your movements on Wavre, so as to approach us, to put yourself in touch with our operations, and to bind our communications, pushing before you those corps of the Prussian army which have taken this direction, and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible."

No wonder that Grouchy congratulated himself when he received this letter at four in the afternoon, that he had decided to follow his own counsels, and had refused to be guided by the advice of Gerard.

The intention, so far, has been to put before the reader the more important facts connected with the first twenty-four hours of Grouchy's march. It has, however, been impossible, without encroaching unduly upon the narrative, to state the whole of the facts, or to examine them with the minuteness and care which they deserve. The present section, therefore, will be devoted to a

It must be admitted that Grouchy was tardily despatched, and for this Napoleon alone is to blame. Mr Ropes contends that, as commander of the right wing at Ligny, it was the duty of Grouchy to send out reconnaissances during the night which followed the battle in order to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat, whether he received instructions to do so or not. He did send out such reconnaissances upon his own responsibility. Pajol explored the Namur road ; Excelmans proceeded as far as Gembloux. No detachment, it is true, was sent along the road leading due north by Gentinnes, G6ry, and Mont St Guibert to Wavre, and had this been done great results might have followed, for this was the line that Blticher and Gneisenau had actually taken. But strategical reasons seemed to render investigation in this direction unnecessary, and if Grouchy was in error here, the Emperor, when he could be prevailed on to exert himself, made no sort of effort to rectify that error.

The question that first presents itself is, Ought Napoleon to have detached Grouchy at all ? If he was to be detached, would not 10,000 men have been as effective, as a corps of observation, as a force of over 30,000? How could Grouchy seriously attack and hold in check a force which was nearly three times as great as his own ? If the enemy was in a state of demoralisation after defeat, to observe them and to prevent them from rallying was all that was required. Some 10,000 men would have been adequate for this purpose. If, on the other hand, the enemy was retreating in good order, and was falling back upon a fresh corps which had taken no part in the battle - and Napoleon knew that Billow's corps was close at hand - how could some 30,000 men be an adequate protection to the French main army from all further interference on the part of the Prussians ? All that Napoleon really required was that the Prussians should not intervene in the coming battle against Wellington. If, therefore, he had concentrated his force instead of dividing it, and marched along the main road to Brussels against the allied army, he might easily have detached Grouchy at Genappe, or even at a point still further north, to manoeuvre towards the right with better hopes of accomplishing his object, than by despatching him on a vague mission, under every circumstance of disadvantage, which must of necessity break off effective communications between himself and a third part of his total strength.

The next point which meets us is Napoleon's total failure to make Grouchy acquainted with his own intentions, and of the information which he had gained as to the movements of the enemy.

Except a vague intimation that he intends to fight the English should they venture to stand and meet him, it is not until an hour or so before the battle of Waterloo begins that Napoleon tells his lieutenant that a battle is imminent. There can be no clearer proof than this that he began the battle without a thought of being assisted in it by Grouchy's contingent. Certainly he had no thought that the Prussians would assist Wellington, and yet he had information on this point which, had it been communicated to Grouchy, would have been most useful in guiding that Marshal's movements and dispositions. In his first letter of the 1 8th Napoleon says - " You only speak of two Prussian corps. . . . Yet reports say that a third column, which was pretty strong, has passed by Gery and^Gentinnes, directing its march on Wavre." Here is a piece of information of priceless value in indicating the ultimate intentions of Blucher, and yet it is withheld from Grouchy until the eleventh hour, until the opportunity of profiting by it has long since passed away, and the natural inferences to be drawn from it are entirely ignored by Napoleon himself. Grouchy's only mission, in fact, is to find out what the enemy is intending to do ; Napoleon has knowledge on the point which, by itself, could enable him to form conclusions more correct than any which, without that knowledge, Grouchy could form, yet not only does he refuse to act upon the intelligence which he possesses, but by withholding it from Grouchy prevents that Marshal from acting upon it either.

Again, with the exception of the Bertrand order, which can be characterised as nothing else than a roving commission, no instructions whatever were sent to the right wing throughout the remainder of the 17th, or until 10 o'clock on the morning of the 1 8th. No attempt was made to keep communications with Grouchy open, no reconnaissances were sent in his direction on taking position for the battle which was imminent. Vague expectations, indefinite hopes held Napoleon's mind to the exclusion of vigorous measures and active precautions, and instead of two wings of a single armyacting in concert and mutually supporting one another, we have two separate armies acting independently of each other's operations, and one of which drifts aimlessly for want of the knowledge, instructions, and assistance which the other could in large part supply.

The Grouchy mission, indeed, exhibits in Napoleon a strange and unwonted mixture of confidence and apprehension. Either the Prussians were still formidable or they were not. If they were, no measure of precaution, even the slightest, ought to have been omitted to render them harmless. Every route should have been promptly explored, if by any possibility the Prussians might have taken it. Every indication of their intentions should have been duly weighed and transmitted without delay from one wing to the other. And when circumstances pointed, in however small a degree, to the possibility of their junction with Wellington for the purposes of the coming battle, Grouchy should not have been left to follow his vague ideas of what was required of him, but should have been

Grouchy moved on Gembloux in obedience to his orders, and as a consequence of the general belief that the enemy was retreating by way of the Meuse. The Prussian columns therefore, which were marching on Wavre by way of Mont St Guibert, were left unmolested, for their very existence upon that route was entirely unsuspected. But thus a considerable detachment of the enemy was allowed to interpose itself between the two French wings. Clausewitz thinks that Grouchy might have been expected to explore this line of march with a portion of his troops, while yet proceeding with his main force by Gembloux; but this criticism ignores Napoleon's orders, that the whole of Grouchy's force was to be kept well together within a league of ground. By the terms of his instructions, the Marshal may defy criticism until the time when he learned at Gembloux that Bliicher's march was on Wavre and towards the Dyle river. He had made up his mind on this point by 3 A.M. on the 1 8th, and his orders for the day were therefore the result of the certainty he had acquired. Was his determination to march on Wavre by Sart-a-Walhain in correspondence with Bliicher's movement towards the Dyle ?

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the meaning to be attached to 'Bliicher's movement. A mistake very commonly made is to suppose that the Prussian general could have no other object in view, when he concentrated his army at Wavre, than that of co-operating with Wellington at Waterloo ; but his action admits of another interpretation, for he might merely be marching by way of Wavre on Brussels. Grouchy had no information that Wellington had taken position at Waterloo - he supposed him to be in retreat before Napoleon. Having no knowledge that a battle was about to take place, he could have no knowledge that the Prussians were marching to take part in it. "He thought the Prussians," says General Hamley, in his treatise on the operations of war, " if they were really moving on Wavre, intended to join Wellington at Brussels. And were they so moving, he, by marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their communications with their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the execution of their project or render it disastrous." In fact, the fatal error of Napoleon again confronts us. A line to Grouchy that the English were in position intending to fight would have poured a flood of light upon the nature of Blucher's dispositions, but Grouchy was deliberately left to make a choice between conjectures, and for want of the information at Napoleon's disposal, he conjectured wrongly.

The alternative to reaching Wavre by Sart-a- Walhain was to reach it by the Dyle; and, as matters turned out, Grouchy ought in any event to have taken this direction. If by chance the English were standing to fight, then Bllicher's movements were certainly suggestive of an intention to join them. By marching towards his left, Grouchy would at any rate be putting himself in a position to thwart these designs ; by marching towards his right he was tending, if anything, to facilitate them. Either road would bring him to Wavre, but the one would bring him nearer to the Emperor, the other would take him further away. This seems so obvious to us now that we are apt to overlook the strong reasons which influenced Grouchy's decision. He was still in bondage to the original error. He imagined that the real danger from the Prussians lay upon his right, not on his left ; he was full of his own mission, not of Napoleon's necessities, and regarded himself as altogether outside the scope of the main operations of the army ; he thought himself at liberty to execute his mission in the way that seemed best to him, without reference of any kind to the movements of the Emperor.

But the matter assumes quite another aspect when once Grouchy became convinced that a general action was in progress on his left. If up to this point Bliicher's retreat seemed pronounced upon

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Brussels, now the idea that it was not so ought to have forcibly borne itself in upon him, and in face of the bare possibility of some Prussian help being rendered to Wellington it was Grouchy's obvious duty to concentrate all his energies on the single purpose of preventing such assistance from being given. How this could best be done was now the only question.

The only object in doing so was to join the Emperor, and to come up to him as a reinforcement while the battle was in progress. The question therefore hinges almost entirely on distances.

The variety of estimates given as to the simple matter of the distance from Sart-a-Walhain to the field of Waterloo, and of the time which it would take Grouchy to cover that distance, is one of the most surprising things in the history of the campaign. Authorities range between two hours, which is the least estimate, and nine hours, which is the largest. The matter of distance, however, can be authoritatively decided. To march from Sart-a- Walhain to Planchenoit necessitates crossing the river Dyle. It could only be crossed at Moustier and by bridges further north of that point. Now the distance from Sart-^-Walhain to Planchenoit vid Moustier was, by the only available roads, as nearly as possible eighteen miles.

foot. It took them five and a half hours. Thus they walked at a rate of a little more than three miles an hour. An army corps could not advance at anything like that rate, more particularly when the state of the roads is taken into account. Two miles an hour is a fair rough estimate for the march of an army corps under such circumstances as then prevailed. Grouchy's leading columns would therefore have debouched on Planchenoit at 9 P.M., assuming that he started from Sart-&- Walhain at twelve.*

This calculation is based entirely upon the assumption that his march would have been unimpeded by the Prussians. Such might have been the case, but at the same time it is most improbable that it would have been so. If the Prussians disputed the passage of the river, it is clear that Grouchy could not arrive on the field of Waterloo that night. If they did not do so, he could not arrive until the battle was over.

But it is urged with great force and much weight of authority that if he could not arrive himself, he might have prevented the Prussians from arriving. To accomplish this would have been to accomplish

* Mr Ropes has been at great pains to show that Grouchy was not at Sart-a- Walhain but at Walhain or Walhain St Paul when the sound of the cannonade at Waterloo was heard. He has certainly established this point conclusively. This brings Grouchy a mile nearer to Planchenoit. But the point is not where Grouchy was, but where his troops were, and his troops at 11.30 a.m. had not yet reached Sart-a- Walhain, much less Walhain St Paul.

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all that was necessary, for without the intervention of the Prussians, Napoleon was assured of victory over the English. Here we enter the realm of pure conjecture. It is, of course, possible that if Grouchy had displayed himself in force, the march of BUlow would have been stopped, and, as a consequence, that of Pirch, who was following up Billow. The mere appearance of an unexpected corps (D'Erlon's) had done much to influence the battle of Ligny on the 16th. The mere appearance of Bulow at St Lambert did much, as will be seen, to influence the issue at Waterloo. But is it probable that the whole Prussian force marching on Napoleon's flank would allow itself to be stopped by so comparatively slight an obstacle as Grouchy's contingent ? * It is at least equally probable that a detachment of Prussians would have been employed to detain Grouchy, while the main body continued its movement towards the battle. In this case, Grouchy's march on Planchenoit would have been altogether ineffectual, except perhaps to involve himself in the common ruin.

But in addition to the practical issues depending upon Grouchy's decision, there is an abstract strategical question involved - whether it is not, on general principles, the duty of a corps, detached from the main body, to march in the direction where heavy firing indicates a critical engagement? The authority of Clausewitz must carry great weight as to this point. After referring to this contention as a dictum "hastily fabricated," he says - "This principle can only hold good in those cases when the commander of a separate column has been placed by circumstances in a position of doubt, when the originally clear and definite character of his task has been clouded by uncertainties and contradictions, which are so frequent in actual war. I admit that a commander so placed, instead of standing still doing nothing or wandering vaguely about, would do better to hasten to his neighbour's assistance if heavy firing suggests that he needs it. But to expect of Grouchy that he should trouble himself no further about Bliicher, but march off to where another portion of the army was engaged with another enemy, would be contrary to all theory and practice. That General Gerard really gave such advice at noon on the 18th at Sart-a-Walhain only proves that, where there is no responsibility, consideration is apt to be hasty." *

The matter might be allowed to rest here were it not that Grouchy's alternative policy was productive of nothing. To continue his march on Wavre, and to engage the 16,000 men or so whom Bliicher had left there, was the equivalent to that "standing still doing nothing or wandering vaguely about " which Clausewitz condemns. The arguments which applied against the march on Plan- chenoit applied in an equal degree against the march on Wavre. It was most improbable that the whole Prussian force would allow itself to be detained from its fixed purpose in order to oppose Grouchy at Wavre. And all the force which was not detained there would be available to march on Waterloo. Was it not better to run some risk in order to be of some possible use, than to run practically the same risk without the chance of being of any use at all ? It cannot be shown with any degree of conclusiveness that Grouchy, by marching to the sound of the cannonade, could have exercised any appreciable influence on the battle of Waterloo. It is clear that he exercised no influence upon events by the course which he actually adopted. We are thus brought back to the point from which we started - that Grouchy's mission was from the first a mistake - that Napoleon despatched him on a vague and ill-calculated errand - and that, although perhaps a general of great intuitive genius might possibly have so dealt with the difficulties and chances of the position as to make them his instruments in achieving success for his chief, yet from no general could such results be looked for with any degree of confidence, from few could any results be looked for at all.

Chapter Ix The Morning Of The Battle

I. Napoleon's Formation in Order of Battle on the 18th - II. Wellington's Formation - III. Analysis of the Duke's Force and Position - IV. Delay in beginning the Battle - V. Napoleon's Despatch to Grouchy before the Battle - VI. Prussian Movements on the Morning of the 1 8th.

It has been seen that Napoleon's one fear was that Wellington might escape him, and that the stand at Mont St Jean was not really intended as an offer of battle. The astonishment of the French when they found that the English had not only taken position, but were prepared to defend it, has been noted. Should not this very fact, that the English were standing, have suggested considerations to Napoleon's mind as to the causes which had induced Wellington's determination ? Instead of that overweening confidence which is expressed in the exclamation, " Enfin je les tiens, ces Anglais /" should he not rather have gathered from what he saw before him that the English had taken position in reliance upon some support not yet apparent? Wellington's caution was well known to Soult from experience, and to Napoleon from report, and it was inconsistent with this caution that the Duke should deliberately, and with alternatives to choose from, risk his all upon an unequal contest. The very fact that battle was accepted should of itself have sufficed to forcibly suggest the truth about the Prussian movements, even if this were the first indication that his previous surmises were incorrect. But, as we have seen, when the Emperor dictated to Bertrand his orders for Grouchy, doubts had already risen in his mind as to the intentions of the Prussians. Unable to discard the strong and convincing impression that they were hors de combat, yet the Bertrand order clearly shows that a suspicion of the truth was struggling with his preconceived impression. This being so, he might well be convinced by Wellington's attitude that the Prussians were near, especially when we consider Grouchy's despatches addressed from Gembloux, which explicitly warned him that one Prussian column, at any rate, was on its way to Wavre, only ten miles distant from Mont St Jean.

But nothing is more clear than that the idea of the intervention of the Prussians in the coming battle did not enter Napoleon's mind. Notwithstanding Wellington's attitude of defiance, notwithstanding the doubts which he himself evidently entertained on the day before, in spite of Grouchy's information on the morning of the 18th, Napoleon made ready for the contest with a light heart, seeing before him the prospect of a victory as decided and undisturbed as any which he had ever won. As early as one o'clock on the morning of the 1 8th Napoleon was in the saddle, closely examining the enemy's position, and satisfying himself that Wellington was standing for battle. There was a moment when he suspected that the Anglo-Dutch army was making ready to withdraw, but a closer examination showed him that the suspicious movement was one of preparation, not of retreat, and being satisfied upon the point, he said to D'Erlon, " Order the men to make their soup, to get their pieces in order, and we will determine what is to be done towards noon." He then proceeded to take up his own position, his whole available force being upon the ground at 8 A.M.

The Emperor established his headquarters at La Belle Alliance, a little inn upon the side of the main Brussels road, about a mile and a half from Wellington's quarters at Mont St Jean, and about half a mile from La Haie Sainte. The rising ground to the right hand and to the left gave him a commanding position, and would enable his cavalry and infantry charges to be made down-hill. On each side of the road he drew up his army in two lines, the reserve forming a third, making La Belle Alliance the centre. On the right the first line consisted of D'Erlon's 1st corps, 20,000 strong, and burning to redeem, by gallant deeds, its previous inactivity. Donzelot's division formed its left, resting on the Charleroi road, the division of Quiot rested upon Donzelot, Marcognet on Quiot, and Durutte's formed the extreme right opposite to the hamlets of Smohain, Papelotte, and La Haye. The cavalry of the 1st corps observed these hamlets, being posted to the right of Durutte's infantry. The 3rd corps of Milhaud's heavy cavalry and Jacquinot's light cavalry acted as a support to the whole line. Eighty pieces of artillery were posted partly in front of the line, and partly between and on the flank of the supporting cavalry.

The left wing consisted of the 2nd corps, with the exception of Girard's division, which had been left behind at Ligny. The three remaining divisions numbered about 1 3,000 men, and were posted upon the left of the Brussels road, Bachelu's division forming the right, Foy resting upon it, and Jerome Bonaparte resting upon Foy. It extended from La Belle Alliance to beyond Hougomont. Pire's cavalry continued the line upon its extreme left, and it was supported, as a whole, by Kellermann's 4th corps of heavy dragoons.

The reserve consisted of Lobau's 6th corps (with the exception of Teste's division, which was with Grouchy), together with the cavalry corps of Domont and Subervie, detached the one from Vandamme's division, and the other from Pajol. Lobau, therefore, with allowance for additions and subtractions, had about 10,000 men under his command. He formed behind the centre, the infantry

In rear of Lobau came the Imperial Guard, 19,000 strong, their infantry posted near the farm of Rossomme, with their artillery upon their flanks. The main road divided them into two equal parts. They were drawn up in six lines, four battalions in each line, and thus they presented a formation in column, two columns on each side of the road, each column containing six battalions, the reserve artillery of the Guard, consisting of 12-pounders, being in the rear. The horse Grenadiers and dragoons of the Guard, with their artillery in the centre, were drawn up in rear of Kellermann's cavalry supporting the left wing, while in rear of Milhaud's cavalry supporting the right wing were drawn up the light horsemen of the Imperial Guard, consisting of Colbert's Lancers and Lefebvre-Desnouette's Light Dragoons. The total force amounted to close upon 72,000 men, the infantry numbering nearly 49,000, the cavalry about 15,700, and the artillery about 7300, with from 240 to 246 guns.

The position taken up by the Duke was looser than, but in many respects similar to Napoleon's. About a thousand yards from Mont St Jean the road from Ohain crosses at a right angle the main Brussels road. The Ohain road defined the

English position. Its point of junction with the main chaussee marked the English centre, with La Haie Sainte immediately in front of it, not 300 yards away. The course of the Ohain road for rather more than a mile on each side of the Brussels road is along the top of a gentle ridge. Along this ridge the army was posted. Its slopes afforded protection, while from its crest an uninterrupted view was obtained of all the enemy's movements. The front was also well covered, as has been already seen, by the hamlets of Smohain, Papelotte, and others on the east, and on the west by Hougomont. The English left consisted of the 5th British division, under command of Sir Thomas Picton, the 6th British division commanded, in the absence of Sir Lowry Cole, by Sir J. Lambert, and the 2nd division of Dutch-Belgians under Perponcher. The 6th division formed the right of the left wing, and rested upon the main Brussels road. It was composed of the 4th Regiment of Foot, or the King's Own - veteran soldiers who had just returned from the war in America, and who had scarcely reached the field in time - and of the 27th, 40th, and 81st regiments. They had fought under the Duke in Spain, and constituted that " Spanish Infantry " of which he used to talk sometimes as having been present at Waterloo. Resting upon the 6th division came Kempt's 8th British Brigade and Pack's 9th or Scotch Brigade. With Pack were the 1st Royal Scots, a part of the 42nd Highlanders, the 44th and the

92nd Highlanders; with Kempt were the 79th Highlanders, the 95th Royal Rifles, and the 28th and 32nd Regiment. Best's 4th Hanoverian and Vincke's 5th Hanoverian brigades supported Pack, and continued the line, the centre of which was covered by Bylandt's Dutch-Belgians, who were drawn up in a very exposed position in front of the Ohain road, and in front of, not behind, the slope. " They were/' says Sir J. Shaw Kennedy, "directly exposed to the fire of the greatest battery that was on the field, and singly exposed to the first onset of the French attacking columns." Such a formation affords a reasonable amount of excuse for the conduct of some of the Dutch-Belgian troops at the outset of the battle. Perponcher's troops continued the line to the left, while Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's brigade occupied the hamlets of Smohain, Papelotte, and La Haye. Vivian's cavalry were posted on the extreme left, with the cavalry of Vandeleur upon their right.

In rear of the first line stood the Union Brigade or 2nd cavalry brigade of Sir W. Ponsonby. It consisted of the 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and the 6th Inniskillen Dragoons. Its formation particularly attracted the attention of Napoleon, as he observed his enemy's movements in the morning. " Regardez ces chevaux gris" he said, as he watched the Scots Greys, " Qui sont ces beaux cavaliers? Ce sont de braves troupes mais dans un demi-heure je les couperai en pieces" between the two high roads from Charleroi and Nivelles, running for about 500 yards at right angles to the Charleroi road, and then inclining as it follows the bend of the Ohain road, to the southwest. Opposite the south-western extremity, where the Ohain road meets the road from Planchenoit, lies the Chateau of Hougomont. Wellington's right front, therefore, lay in a semi-circular situation from Hougomont to the main road. It consisted of Alten's 3rd British division and Cooke's 1st division, with Byng's brigade occupying Hougomont. Alten's left rested upon the main Brussels road, and his division consisted of Sir Colin Halkett's brigade, the 2nd brigade of the King's German Legion under Ompte^da, and Kielmansegge's 1st Hanoverian brigade, partly in the first, partly in the second line. Maitland's 1st brigade of Cooke's division, which had been severely handled two days before at Quatre Bras, was formed next to Halkett. It consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 1st Guards, or Grenadier Guards, as they were subsequently called. Notwithstanding the hot work it had been called upon to perform at Quatre Bras, Maitland's brigade was to be put to even further proof in the coming battle, for upon it the charge of the French Imperial Guard was in a great measure to fall. Mitchell's brigade, detached from Colville's division, which was at Hal, rested its left on the Nivelles road, with Chasse's Dutch-Belgians beyond it, extending as far as Braine-la-Leude. The line was supported in the rear by Lord Edward Somerset's heavy cavalry resting close upon the main Brussels road, while the Dutch-Belgian cavalry were still further to the right.

The reserves were placed en potence, to the rear of the extreme right of the English army. They occupied a plateau formed by a second ridge behind that on which the first line of the army was drawn up, and owing to the undulating character of the ground at that point, it was possible to completely conceal from view the troops there stationed. These consisted of the 2nd division under Sir Henry Clinton - comprising the Light Brigade, Colbourne's 52nd, the 71st, and the Rifle Brigade (59th Rifles). With them was the 1st King's German Legion and the 3rd Hanoverian brigade. Their situation en potence enabled them to be used either as reserves or for a flank movement, hence their value in such a position, having regard to the defensive character of the Duke's operations, can scarcely be over-estimated. They also tended to consolidate the English right into a compact but very manageable mass. With Clinton behind, and with Hougomont in front, the right wing was certainly prepared to resist, with every chance of success, the hottest attacks which could be made upon it.

The troops of the Duke of Brunswick, now commanded by Colonel Olfermann, were posted close to the little hamlet of Merbe-Braine, but two battalions in the course of the day were moved up to strengthen the right above Hougomont, where they distinguished themselves by their desperate bravery. The Duke of Wellington originally posted in Hougomont the 2nd brigade of Cooke's division, commanded by Sir J. Byng, comprising three, afterwards increased to seven, companies of the Coldstream regiment, four companies of the Guards, and a battalion of the Nassau regiment. These were reinforced as occasion required, for the importance of the possession of Hougomont was very clearly recognised on both sides. Immediately the troops had taken their posts, the work of crenellating the walls of the chateau, chapel, and garden was begun, and before morning they bristled with muskets to be fired by unseen defenders upon the advancing French. The Nassauers acted as sharp-shooters in the outlying wood, the light troops of the Guards held the orchard, while the Coldstream companies and the 3rd Guards held the house, out-buildings, garden, and chapel.

The farm of La Haie Sainte was by no means so extensive as the estate of Hougomont, but relatively its occupation and retention was of equal importance. It was held by a portion of Ompt<§da's King's Germans - the 2nd light battalion under Major Baring - but these troops needed to be constantly reinforced throughout the day, for the position fronted the very centre of the English line, and was subjected to the first and fiercest attack of the enemy. Sir J. Lambert's 10th British brigade was specially employed as the day wore on for the defence, and afterwards for the reoccupation of La Haie Sainte, when it had been taken by the French, and the regiments composing this brigade - the 4th, 27th, and 40th - won eternal glory at the cost of 830 men out of a total effective force of 2000.

The total force under arms engaged at the battle of Waterloo under the command of the Duke of Wellington was 67,661, of whom 49,608 were infantry, 12,408 were cavalry, 5645 were artillery, with 156 guns. This force was made up as follows : -

Examining this table, it may be remarked that the number of British soldiers engaged was little more than one - third of the whole ; and that even including the King's Germans, who were as reliable as the British, the strength on which the Duke of Wellington could implicitly depend did not amount to a half of the whole army. The Dutch-Belgians, who, next to the British and King's Germans, numbered the largest division of the whole, were suspected of being lukewarm in the cause on which they were engaged, and though by no means, as a whole, open to those charges of cowardice and inefficiency which have been so freely brought against them, it must yet be admitted that, as soldiers, they did not rank very high, and that their doubtful loyalty made them, to some extent, an unknown factor in the situation at the time when the battle began. The same remarks apply in general to the Hanoverians, Brunswickers, and Nassauers, for the conspicuous valour which they actually displayed, and which, perhaps, has scarcely been sufficiently realised by chroniclers of the battle, was not to be confidently looked for from troops whose political temper was uncertain, and whose military calibre was of doubtful quality.

The Duke's slight superiority in infantry - a superiority of about 650 men - was more than compensated for by his inferiority in cavalry - an inferiority of no less than 3300 men. Considering the important part which this arm was to play in the battle, the deficiency in cavalry was likely to have very -serious results, especially when coupled with a similar deficiency in artillery and guns, Napoleon bringing to the field 1600 more artillery and about 90 more guns. Numerically, however, the forces were fairly evenly matched, and the Duke made up in position for any disadvantage he was under as to numbers. The strength of his position lay in its suitability for purposes of defence. The right wing was by far the stronger of the two, for not only did Hougomont protect its centre, but a larger proportion of troops was concentrated in line and in reserve upon that side. In this disposition the Duke was actuated by two motives - first, that under no circumstances should Napoleon be able to turn his right wing by any open or veiled movement upon the flank ; and, secondly, because he was expecting the Prussians to come up upon his left, and could thus afford to leave it comparatively weak until that support should arrive. The function of the right wing was to hold its own without expectation of assistance, beyond that to be afforded by its own reserve, throughout the entire day ; that of the left wing to hold its own, temporarily, till assistance arrived, and this it would probably be able to do, owing to the strength afforded it by the little hamlets which lay immediately in its front. In a similar manner the centre was protected by La Haie Sainte, and thus, before Napoleon could reach the line of battle at all, it was necessary for him to make himself master of strongly occupied positions on the left, the centre, and the right.

There were, however, 18,000 men belonging to Lord Hill's 2nd corps, whom the Duke might have employed at Waterloo, but of whose aid he deliberately deprived himself. Colville's division, consisting of the 4th and 6th British Brigades and the 6th Hanoverian brigade, Anthing's division and the first Dutch-Belgians, under Prince Frederick of Orange, had, in the general orders issued by the Duke before the retreat from Quatre Bras, been directed on Hal. " The brigades of the 4th division at Braine-le-Comte are to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal. . . . Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible." On the 18th these troops remained in their positions between Hal and Tubize - at a distance of about ten miles from the battlefield - nor were they called upon at any time during the day to take part in the battle, though they could have been brought up in less than four hours.

On such a critical occasion, outnumbered by his antagonist, and,* as he erroneously calculated, outnumbered by three to two, the Duke has laid himself open to severe criticism at the hands of both English and foreign military experts for these dispositions. The matter, as it lies outside the narrative of the battle, will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. It is enough to say here that the Duke would not have thus denuded himself of so material a portion of his force unless he had

* Under the impression that Grouchy had only about 10,000 men with him, and ignorant that Girard (3000) had been left at Ligriy, the Duke should have calculated Napoleon's army as nearly 99,000 strong. He himself had rather more than 66,000, or a proportion of two to three.

The armies were in position early in the morning, but several hours were yet to elapse before the battle actually began. We have now to consider the manner in which the Emperor employed these hours, and the motives which led him to delay, for as the attacking party he had the option of beginning the fight at any time that seemed good to him.

It has been seen that when Napoleon was examining the English position about eight o'clock in the morning, in company with Count D'Erlon, he gave instructions to that General to order the men to make their soup, and to get their pieces in order, and " we will determine what is to be done about noon." It is evident, therefore, that he was in no hurry, and that he had no idea that the issue of Waterloo depended very largely upon moments. He saw before him the opportunity for which throughout the campaign he had been working. His opening moves had all been directed to secure the chance of meeting Wellington, unsupported by his Prussian ally, and the chance, as he supposed, was now before him. It offered him the practical certainty of success, for his force was superior in numbers to that of his opponent ; the quality of his soldiers was superior to that of the Anglo-

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Dutch soldiers ; retreat was for them, he presumed, if not impossible, at any rate difficult and hazardous, because of the forest through which they must withdraw. The Prussians were occupied by his army under Grouchy, and, therefore, were not to be reckoned with. Everything pointed to the certainty of a great victory, which seven or eight hours would amply suffice to secure. There were therefore no reasons for hurry, and several reasons for delay. The rain had fallen heavily all night, but the weather cleared in the morning. A few hours' bright, hot sunshine would do something towards drying the sodden ground and making it fit for the operations of artillery. Considering the superiority of the French in this arm, and the great use to which Napoleon always put it in his battles, this in itself was a sufficient ground for delay, supposing there were no very urgent necessity for haste. Accordingly he determined to modify his original intention of attacking the enemy at nine o'clock, and to use the interval in reviewing his army, and in exhibiting a great spectacle of military pageantry before the eyes of his opponents. The sight would be likely to produce a disspiriting effect upon such of the Anglo-Dutch divisions as had at some time themselves served under the Emperor's banner - who were still in awe of his military genius and his reputation for invincibility, and who, perhaps now hesitating between their fears and their loyalty, might under the influence of a splendid military display be led to desert their ranks and join his own. The review was over about half-past ten, and when it was ended Napoleon dictated a despatch to Grouchy, and then proceeded to formulate his plan of attack for the battle, which was to begin as soon as it had been communicated to the divisional commanders.

After acknowledging Grouchy s last report from Gembloux, and calling attention to a third Prussian column advancing on Wavre by Gery and Gentinnes, it proceeds -

" The Emperor charges me to inform you that at this moment his Majesty is about to attack the English army which has taken position at Waterloo, near the forest of Soignies ; thus {ainsi) his Majesty desires that you should direct your movements on Wavre, so as to approach us, put yourself in touch with our operations, and connect communications, pushing before you the corps of the Prussian army which have taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you are to arrive as soon as possible.

Morning Of The Battle 193

" You will cause the enemy's columns which are upon your right to be followed by some light corps, so as to observe their movements and pick up their stragglers. Instruct me immediately as to your dispositions and your march, as well as of the news which you have of the enemy, and do not neglect to connect your communications with us. The Emperor desires to have news of you very often.

This despatch was the first that Grouchy received from Napoleon since the Bertrand order of the day before. In Gourgaud's narrative of the campaign, written at St Helena, and in Napoleon's " Memoir es pour Servir? &c. there is, it is true, a story of an order sent in duplicate to Grouchy in the course of the night, informing him that an engagement was imminent, and instructing him as to the part he was to play in it.

But the story may be summarily dismissed as a fabrication. " The two officers sent by Napoleon," says Quinet, "were never seen by Grouchy. No one has ever been able to give their names. The orders they are asserted to have carried are not to be found registered on the staff-records. What is still more to the purpose, in the despatches which followed, Napoleon made no mention whatever of these orders of the night. He does not even refer to them, contrary to his invariable custom." This criticism admits of no answer.

it, an answer to Grouchy 's 2 A.M. letter from Gembloux, and although we may read in it some uncertainty as to the Prussian movements and a strong desire for information, it is quite impossible to read into it any real apprehension as to the issues of the coming battle being affected by Prussian intervention. Though the facts which it contains were known to Napoleon ten if not twelve hours before, he only thought it worth while to inform Grouchy of them as the engagement was about to begin. The despatch was written at leisure, was sent off at leisure, and was conveyed leisurely to Grouchy, for he did not receive it till after four in the afternoon, when he was definitely committed to his action at Wavre.

Taking this letter in conjunction with the other circumstances which have been related, it is clear that the Emperor contemplated the coming battle, and formulated his plan for the conduct of it, with a mind at ease both as to Grouchy and as to the Prussians.

While Napoleon was consuming the morning in delay and suffering a golden opportunity to slip from him, Bliicher was profiting by the inactivity of his rival.

The four corps which constituted his army were concentrated at and around Wavre before midnight on the 17th, and were in readiness to move to the support of Wellington at any early hour on the 18th. Blilow was to head the advance, for he had not yet been employed in action, and consequently might be expected to display more energy and promptitude than troops which, in addition to the fatigues of severe marches, had undergone the strain of a general engagement. Biilow was to be followed up by Pirch with the 2nd corps, and the duty of these commanders was to take Napoleon on the flank, their ultimate destination being Planchenoit, by way of St Lambert.

The 1st and 3rd corps, under Ziethen and Thielemann respectively, were to march first on St Lambert, and striking off from there in a northerly direction, to come up upon the rear of the English left by the Ohain road. If, however, Grouchy's force should display any activity before Wavre, Thielemann's corps was to remain behind in order to detain the French and to secure for the rest of the Prussian army an unmolested march.

In conformity with these arrangements, Biilow was in motion at break of day from Dion-le-Mont, where his corps had bivouacked the night before. Dion-le-Mont is some two miles east of the town of Wavre, and it was certainly a faulty arrangement that the column which was to lead the advance in the morning should have been stationed for the night on the extreme left instead of on the extreme right of the army. It took many hours for the 4th corps to reach the town of Wavre and

There a halt was made for three hours in order to allow the rear divisions to come up, and it also happened that Ziethen's columns had to cross the road on which the 2nd and 4th corps were advancing. It was not, therefore, until 4.30 P.M. that Biilow debouched upon the field of Waterloo.

Pirch and Ziethen did not leave Wavre till noon, reaching their positions upon the field a little after 7 P.M. Thielemann's 16,000 were left behind to engage throughout the afternoon the very superior force of Marshal Grouchy.

I. Napoleon's general plan and the attack on Hougomont - II. D'Erlon's infantry attack - -III. First appearance of the Prussians at St Lambert - IV. Observations on Napoleon's conduct of the battle and on the difficulties of ascertaining the facts - V. The attack on La Haie Sainte - VI. Cavalry charges on the British right and centre - VII. The battle with the Prussians around Planchenoit - VIII. The charge of the Imperial Guard - IX. Wellington's advance and rout of the French - X. Lobau at Planchenoit protects the line of retreat for the main army - XI. Pursuit of the French by the Prussians.

SUCH were the dangers which were gathering on Napoleon while he, all 'unconscious of them, was reckoning only with the army in front of him.

- To cope with Wellington he formulated a plan at once simple and comprehensive, a plan which, if efficiently executed, must be productive of decisive results.

To prevent Wellington from concentrating all his attention upon the point which was specially menaced, the attack was to be general all along the line, and was to be so evenly sustained that the Duke would have difficulty in deciding where his danger particularly lay.

With these views Napoleon drew up his Order of Battle, which contained his general plan, as well as the measures which were to be taken to execute it.

" When once the whole army shall be drawn up in order of battle, at one o'clock P.M. as nearly as possible, at the moment when the Emperor shall give the signal to Marshal Ney, the attack will begin for the purpose of gaining possession of Mont St Jean."

The road to Mont St Jean was, however, blocked for the French by the two positions of Hougomont and La Haie Sainte. It was necessary to occupy them both, and as the former lay quite close to the French lines it was to be attacked first.

The prompt occupation of Hougomont would, moreover, assist the Emperor's projects in several ways. From it, when once in possession, his troops could operate directly on Mont St Jean, and also a demonstration in force upon the position would be likely to divert the attention of the English commander from his centre, and so facilitate the French operations upon that point.

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Accordingly, about 11.30 A.M., as a preliminary to the main battle, Jerome's division of Reille's corps was sent forward against Hougomont to the sound of a general cannonade by the artillery, which was posted in advantageous positions all along the line. As the columns moved down into the hollow ground below them two brigades of artillery attached to Cooked division opened fire, and so accurate was the range of the English ninepounders that many of Jerome's men were killed and wounded before they reached the outskirts of the position against which their attack was directed.

But soon a battery was brought to bear upon Cooke's guns, and under its cover the French succeedeS in gaining possession of the wood. But every step of the way was most desperately contested. The defence of the wood had been entrusted to some Hanoverian troops of the line and a battalion of Nassauers, and it was not until Jerome put in Soye to assist the brigade already engaged that the Hanoverians and Nassauers gave way.

The buildings of Hougomont, the walls surrounding the garden, the chateau itself and the chapel, were held by Lord Saltoun with four light companies of the Coldstream Guards and two companies of the 3rd Guards. To these Wellington quickly added three more companies of the Guards and a Brunswick battalion. By the nature of the place it was capable of being stubbornly defended, for the thick hedges and high walls gave cover to the defenders, from which, themselves unseen, they could pour destruction on their assailants. Against the main position, therefore, the attack of the French was unavailing. They displayed heroic courage and resolution, but even more necessary than these was artillery to beat down the defences of the place. It is strange that Jerome should have attempted, at such cost of life and time, to take by assault a position which could easily have been demolished by either artillery or siege appliances.

Yet there was a moment when the impetuous valour of the French seemed as if it would carry everything before it. A few companies of the 1st light infantry succeeded in reaching the northern entrance of the castle, and a sub-lieutenant, Legros, penetrated within the courtyard. As, with his handful of men, he advanced against the open door of the building, Sir James Macdonald, with a sergeant and corporal of the Guards, hurled himself against it. The door was shut in the face of the French ; Legros and his companions were all of them killed.

In view of the desperate resistance offered by the English, Reille ordered Foy's division to support Jerome. But the character of the engagement was not materially altered, the advantage continuing to rest now with one side now with the other. Throughout the buildings remained in the hands of the Guards.

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At last eight howitzers were brought to bear upon the chateau and its out-buildings, which were soon in flames ; but still the high walls of the garden served as a protection, and when the flames drove them to seek shelter in the garden the Guards maintained themselves there.

And thus Hougomont was attacked and defended throughout the entire day. Originally designed to be a preliminary attack, subsidiary to the main Operations, it became in itself a main operation to which other movements were subsidiary. The stanza of Thackeray's " Ballad of the Drum " applies with telling force to the defence of Hougomont -

" At noon we began the dread onset, We charged up the enemy's hill ; And madly we charged it at sunset - His banners were floating there still."

Though foiled in his attack upon Hougomont, and disappointed of his expectations there, Napoleon determined that the grand attack which he had fixed for one o'clock should none the less proceed. w

It was to be made under the general orders of Marshal Ney, who was instructed to make the first movement upon the enemy's left and centre with the 1st corps under Count D'Erlon.

of having been so far useless in the campaign, and were burning to redeem their reputation. In their hands, the attack was likely to be conducted with extraordinary vigour and impetuosity. At one o'clock, or a little later, the order reached D'Erlon to advance.

* Already, since 11.30, a battery of eighty pieces of artillery, posted in front of the French line, had been playing upon the English left front, dealing havoc among the Dutch-Belgians, who, as has been seen, were stationed in a very exposed position in front of the road behind which the English line extended. So heavy a fire would, it was expected, have the effect of demoralising the British left and centre, and of weakening its power of resistance when the French infantry attack should be made in force.

Each of the four divisions of D'Erlon's corps, with the exception of one brigade, specially detached against La Haie Sainte, were formed in columns. Each column consisted of the various battalions composing the division. Each battalion was drawn up in three ranks. There were thus three times as many ranks as there were battalions in the division. The battalions were separated from one another by a distance of five paces.

It will be observed that this formation was very unwieldy for purposes of attack. The overthrow of the leading battalions would involve in confusion those behind. No room was afforded for deploying in line, and similarly there was no room for formation in squares in the event of the enemy's cavalry charges rendering such an operation advisable. There were no advantages, except perhaps that of weight, to counterbalance these disadvantages, and moreover, the formation was one not usually employed. The charge, however, of such a body of men, 20,000 in number, was likely to prove, from mere weight and impetuosity, exceedingly formidable. To resist it there were drawn up, as has been seen, Bylandt's Dutch-Belgians in front, with the $th British Division behind under Picton. The attaick would chiefly fall upon the brigades of Kernpt and Pack, that is to say, upon the 1st Royal Scots, the 42nd, 44th, and 92nd Highlanders, the 79th Highlanders, with the 95th Royal Rifles and the 28th and 32nd English Regiments. Behind them were the cavalry of the ,;< Union Brigade," the Royals, the Scots Greys,, and the Inniskilling Dragoons, and thus it was largely upon the infantry and cavalry of Scotland that there fell the burden and the glory of repelling the first great and general attack made by I Napoleon upon the day of Waterloo.