Waterloo Township (part 1 of 5)

Preface

I MADE an attempt a year or two ago to put before an audience at the Royal Institution a narrative of the Campaign of 1815, together with an abstract of the volume of evidence which eighty years has accumulated around the events of the four days over which it extended. It was then suggested to me that the expansion of my lectures with a view to publication might serve a useful purpose, notwithstanding the fact that the literature upon the subject which already exists would fill a goodsized library; The works of Charras, Clausewitz, Siborne, Chesney, Ropes, and many others, are well known to all students of military history, but owing either to their length or to their severe and technical style, they are but little read by the general public. The present volume, based upon a close study extending over many years of all the available authorities, claims, within a reasonable compass, to present the conclusions of experts upon controversial points, to suggest solutions to problems about which experts are in conflict, and to give a concise and faithful narrative of evenst.

afforded me of examining several interesting papers and pamphlets from the pen of Marshal Grouchy, many of which were presented to Captain de Gruchy's father by the Marshal himself. Among these documents, however, there was none not already known to critics of the campaign.

Amid the mass of conflicting evidence and diversity of view which surrounds and obscures the subject I have endeavoured to pick an independent path, and have, it is hoped, supported every statement of an opinion by abundant evidence drawn from the official records and from the best English and foreign treatises.

Two years ago, when the substance of these pages was delivered in the form of lectures, none of the three brilliant soldiers - Lord Wolseley, Lord Roberts, and Sir Evelyn Wood - had yet begun to publish those remarks upon the campaign which have recently appeared in the Pall Mall Magazine, I should have hesitated before presuming to undertake a subject which had already engaged the attention of such authorities upon the art of war, but when once undertaken, there was no option but to proceed with it. Moreover, the appearance of the Pall Mall Magazine articles has not perhaps rendered such a little book as this entirely superfluous.

It was the dictum of one of Oxford's most brilliant scholars and critics - the late Thomas Clayton, dear to The Spectator, and still living in the affectionate memory of his friends - that " every gentleman should know at least one campaign by heart." This was his epigrammatic way of commending the study of military history to his friends. It is a study which presents to the student all the charm which an abstruse problem offers to^ the mathematician, a new force to the scientist, a disputed text to the scholar. There is undoubtedly a disposition among English people to-day to know all that is to be known about the final overthrow of England's greatest antagonist, and it is with the view of at once gratifying and stimulating the very legitimate curiosity which exists about Waterloo that the following pages have been written.

Chapter Ii

I, Character and strength of the French, Prussian, and Anglo- Dutch armies. - II. Remarks on their commanders and their subordinates . . . . .11-24

Chapter Iv

I. Napoleon's order of movement and the passage of the Sambre. - II. The Prussian dispositions. Zieten's corps retrogrades on Fleurus. - III. Wellington's dispositions in view of the French advance. - IV. Further progress of the French left and centre. - V. Ney and the occupation of Quatre Bras. - VI. Concentration of the Anglo-Dutch Army. - VII. Summary . .31-49

Chapter

I. Wellington and his army on the morning of the 16th ; his statements to Blucher ; their value. - II. Bliicher's stand at Ligny. - III. Advance of the French right on Ligny. - IV. Attitude and conduct of Ney on the morning of the 1 6th. - V. Ney's dispositions before Quatre Bras. -

Contents

VI. Napoleon on the morning of the 16th ; his general plan of campaign as distinguished from his particular plan for the day ; modification of his morning plan to suit the circumstances of the afternoon. - VII. Respective dispositions of Bliicher and Napoleon for the battle of Ligny ; Napoleon's plan of battle ; positions and numbers of the forces engaged .... 50-84

Chapter Vi

I. The Battle of Ligny. - II. The Battle of Quatre Bras. - III. Napoleon's delay in beginning battle. - IV. The D'Erlon Episode. - V. Summary . . . 85-114

Chapter Vii

I. The Line of Blucher's Retreat. - II. Wellington's determination to Retreat. - III. Position of the French Army on the morning of the 17th; delay at Quatre Bras and on the Right. - IV. The Retreat on Waterloo. - V. The position at Waterloo ; Wellington's dispositions. - VI. Views and expectations of Wellington in standing at Waterloo. - VII. Anticipations of Napoleon in taking position. - VIII. Summary . . . 1 15-143

Chapter Viii The Opening Of The Battle Of Waterloo

I. Grouchy despatched in pursuit of the Prussians. - II. Arrangements and instructions which governed his march. - III. Grouchy at Gembloux ; the two versions of the 10 p.m. despatch. - IV. Grouchy's determination to advance on Wavre. - V. The sound of the Cannonade at Waterloo. - VI. General criticisms and observations on Grouchy's movements . . . 144-175

Page

I. Napoleon's Formation in Order of Battle on the 18th. - II. Wellington's Formation. - III. Analysis of the Duke's Force and Position. - IV. Delay in beginning the Battle. - V. Napoleon's Despatch to Grouchy before the Battle. - VI. Prussian Movements on the Morning of the 1 8th ..... 176-196

The Battle Of Waterloo

I. Napoleon's general plan and the attack on Hougomont. - II. D'Erlon's infantry attack. - III. First appearance of the Prussians at St Lambert. - IV. Observations on Napoleon's conduct of the battle and on the difficulties of ascertaining the facts. - V. The attack on La Haie Sainte. - VI. Cavalry charges on the British right and centre. - VII. The battle with the Prussians around Planchenoit. - VIII. The charge of the Imperial Guard. - IX. Wellington's advance and rout of the French. - X. Lobau at Planchenoit protects the line of retreat for the main army. - XI. Pursuit of the French by the Prussians ..... 197-245

Chapter Xi Critical Examination Of The Battle Of Waterloo

I. Napoleon's delay in beginning the battle. - II. His methods of attack at Hougomont and La Haie Sainte. III. D'Erlon's formation in columns of attack. - IV. Ney's employment of the cavalry. - V. The expediency of retreat at various periods of the battle. - VI. The attack by the Imperial Guard. - VII. Napoleon's physical condition at Waterloo. - VIII. Napoleon's generals at Waterloo ..... 246-272

Chapter Xii Critical Examination Of The Battle Of Waterloo

I. Wellington's Defence. - II. Colville's Division at Hal. - III. Bliicher's Co-operation ; could it have been earlier or more effective ? .... 273-289

Grouchy At Wavre

Grouchy follows the Prussians to Wavre - Receipt of Napoleon's 10 a.m. despatch - Grouchy confirmed in his design of attacking the Prussians - Prussian dispositions at Wavre - The battle at Wavre on the 1 8th - Receipt of Napoleon's 1 p.m. despatch - Its effect on Grouchy's dispositions - Early morning of the 19th - Thielemann's determination to attack - Success of the French on the 19th - Grouchy receives the news of Waterloo - Determination to retreat on Namur - Grouchy's conduct of the retreat - Conclusion .... 303-310

Introductory

The reappearance of Napoleon in the early spring of 1815 was to all Europe as if the Devil were unchained. It is indeed as the Arch-Fiend, in various aspects, that he is presented to us in numerous contemporary caricatures. Few things are more extraordinary than that concentration of European hatred which, in the early part of this century, was focussed upon a single individual. The passions he had roused, the fear and detestation with which he was regarded, had accomplished the apparently impossible. They had brought about, ^ if only for a moment, a real European union. The jeighteenth century is strewn with the remains of Definitive Treaties, Leagues, and Sanctions. The incurable jealousies among the great powers had played Napoleon's game in 1805, in 1806, and in 1809 no less effectually than his own victories, but the European union which a century had failed to effect was accomplished by five years of Napoleonic domination. The coalition of 18 14 marched against one man, to the cry of " War to the Emperor, peace to the nation." The jnnethods of the French Revolution had taught the crowned heads of Europe the value of specious cries, and " Peace to the cottage, war to the palace/' was now parodied against its authors. But the coalition of 1814 was not merely an association of crowned heads and governments. It was a coalition of peoples. It had been the peculiar work of the French Revolution to rouse the spirit of nationality in Europe. " The Genius of Freedom," which Goldsmith had seen in 1755 "entering France in disguise," had seized upon the French people. From France it penetrated far and wide, and everywhere, in the early flush of revolutionary enthusiasm, the French were received as deliverers, carrying to down-trodden and oppressed peoples the unknown blessings of "Liberty, Fraternity, and .Equality" Fired at first by genuine sympathy for the oppressed, the French were nearly as good as their watch-words; but human nature is stronger than watchwords, andj aggrandisement, if it be easy, is irresistiblei Napoleon was not the author of the infamous policy which enslaved nations while pretending v to liberate them, but he was an apt pupil in that j school. In his treatment of Venice in 1797 he bettered his teachers, though later he far outdid his own early efforts by his policy in Northern Italy, in the German States, and in Spain.

Such a policy brings with it its own retribution. " Quisque suos patimur manes" and the spirit of nationality, once invoked, can hardly be allayed #

In Napoleon we see the victim of poetic justice, a conqueror conquered by the weapons he had himself thrust into his enemies' hands. The familiar name given to the battle of Leipsic - " The Battle of the Nations "- - is not only a commentary upon some of the most important aspects of the French Revolution, - it also expresses the net result of Napoleon's career.

The European unity which Napoleon's own mistakes had produced was not, however, proof against success. To overthrow Napoleon was its only object, but that accomplished, forthwith the old international jealousies reappear. After Napoleon's first abdication the Congress of Vienna had to reconstruct Europe. Each power had its own separate interests to secure; each feared the aggrandisement of the other. The epigram of Talleyrand - " Le Congres danse, mais * ne s'avance pas" - points to the fate of coalitions when their main purpose has been effected. No sooner did the Congress get to business than it got to quarrelling, and it seemed as if open hostilities between the negotiating powers could scarcely be averted. It was at this moment that Napoleon landed from Elba, and the reappearance of the common danger drew the coalition together again in order to avert it.

It is beyond the purpose of this investigation to relate the personal or political details of this adventurous quest - how a majority of the French people acquiesced in Napoleon's reinstatement - how the army rushed to his standard - how the generals who had been sent against him rallied to his cause - how the Bourbon King, Louis XVIIL, so newly established, fled to Belgiumhow, in three weeks from the time of landing, Napoleon was once more in possession of the Tuileries.

The fact was that the Bourbons "had learned nothing and had forgotten nothing." They thought that to put back the hands of the clock was to put back the march of time, that to ignore the Revolution and all the new forces and ideas which it had stirred up was to make it as though it had. never been. Thus the Bourbon princes, Louis XVI 1 1, and Charles of Artois, were utterly out , of touch with the new lines of thought which twenty years of Revolution had established, utterly behind the times which they were called upon to control. Moreover, Louis XVI II., disguise it how he might, was a foreign-made Sovereign. He was imposed upon France, not freely chosen of the French people. In the nature of things there could be little sympathy between the France of 1814 and a Bourbon of 1789; while equally in the nature of things, Napoleon, so long as he lived, could scarcely fail to have a strong hold on France. In spite of the conscription, in spite of the heavy weight of his taxation, in spite of the blood and treasure which he squandered, France could not forget that in her hour of turmoil it was Napoleon who had given her what she chiefly neededrepose ; that it was 1 Napoleon who, in the great years of European war, had given her what she chiefly craved - glory.

He also brought to the situation a prestige with which no Bourbon could vie ; with his personality was associated the splendour of continued victories and of territorial aggrandisement; to him attached the recollection that, while he ruled, France had gained a position of preponderance in Europe such as she had never known under any Bourbon - not even under Louis XIV.

Though it was perhaps natural that the Bourbons should fly and that Napoleon should be received, yet the real difficulty was to maintain ^permanently the position thus easily acquired. Looking at Napoleon's chances, it may perhaps be said that they were desperate from the outset. He found himself confronted once more by Europe in arms. Unity succeeded discord in the councils of the Congress of Vienna. An Anglo-Dutch army of over 100,000 men was already in Belgium, co-operating with a Prussian army even larger. Of the great powers, Russia, Austria, Spain, of the lesser powers, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and the minor German States required but a short period to enable them to put armies into the field proportionate to their European status. In course of time Napoleon would have to reckon with about three-quarters of a million of men, irrespective of those already arrayed against him.

Waterloo

His first step, therefore, after his re-establishment, was to negotiate for peace. "A noble arena," he declares in his letter to the allied Powers, " is now opened to sovereigns. I will be the first to descend into it. After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great combating, it will be sweeter henceforth to exhibit no other rivalry but that of the advantages of peace, no other strife but that of the felicity of nations." Such negotiations, however, were hollow to the core. No one can have been more convinced of their futility than the Emperor himself. Europe had already sufficient experience of what Napoleon, firmly seated upon the Imperial throne, meant for her ; she was already sufficiently versed in the value of Napoleonic assurances. Apart from this, Napoleon's hold over France had always been based upon military success. A continued series of great military achievements had alone maintained him even in his season of unlimited power ; it was impossible to maintain a position intrinsically weaker without victories even greater than those of the past. Yet as a move in the game of politics his pacific negotiations were shrewd and strengthening. Their rejection seemed to throw the onus of the renewal of hostilities off his shoulders on to those of the allies, and he was able to pose as the defender of the Liberties of France against the foreign enemies who would dictate to her both a policy and a king. It is from 1814 and 181 5 that the Napoleonic legend dates. The hopes which the French people so long continued to entertain of the Imperial house, the easy confidence with which they permitted themselves to be gulled in 1851, alike take their origin from the days when Napoleon the Great put off the rdle of conqueror for that of " Liberator."

The issue then could be decided only by war, and the question for Napoleon was whether the ensuing campaign should be conducted on offensive or defensive principles. Though his military career had been mainly an offensive one, yet the campaigns of 18 14, which closed it, had displayed him as a master of defensive tactics. A definite invasion of French territory by hostile forces presented certain political advantages were he to permit such an invasion to take place. It might be possible thereby to rouse the national spirit of France in a way that would recall the days of '92 and '93. The cry of " La Patrie en danger " might work the same wonders as it had worked then, and delay would offer further facilities to his talents as a diplomatist. Napoleon did not forget that he was the son-in-law of the Emperor of Austria, and he perhaps imagined that Austria would show the same tardiness to combine against him as she had shown in 181 3. With delay the European coalition might break up - in any case he might foment the jealousies, conflicting interests, and mutual fears of the Powers which had played his game in the past, and

But, on the other hand, delay, whatever its advantages, was impossible. The odds against him were so enormous that his only hope of reducing them lay in promptly defeating his enemies seriatim and at once. It is doubtful if France would have submitted herself voluntarily to another invasion. To test her endurance , again was to court a second fall, while prompt success in offensive operations would render her attachment to the Imperial cause doubly secure. If startling victories could be gained at the outset over enemies already in the field, the effect upon enemies not yet in the field might be incalculable. If only England and Prussia could be routed, it was at least doubtful whether Austria and Russia would continue the contest.

In estimating the military position of Napoleon and the allies respectively, just before the Waterloo Campaign began, it is evident that, however formidable in appearance were the forces already in the field to oppose him, there were on the other hand many chances in his favour against them. War waged by armies acting in combination can never present that unity of action and singleness of purpose which a sole commander can bring to bear upon the conduct of his operations. And yet never in warfare are unity of action and singleness of purpose more essential than in the direction of a combined movement, such as Wellington and Bliicher had agreed upon. Napoleon was one, and uncontrolled. All the resources of France could be moved by the absolute power of his single will, and his army, however inferior, in numbers, was infinitely more coherent than the armies opposed to him. Napoleon was a keen student of the campaigns of Frederick the Great, and doubtless had before his mind that crisis in the Seven Years' War, when his master in the military art was confronted by a situation not dissimilar to his own. Just as supreme military genius, acting alone, had gained the advantage then over a cumbrous and ill-assorted coalition, so genius now, equally unimpeded, might secure similar results.

Thus a determination to adopt offensive tactics might prove decisive of the issue. While Napoleon's main plan and its general details would be preconceived, prearranged, and certain, the operations of the allied commanders must depend on his movements. While it might be rash for them to concentrate in expectation of attack on any given point, it might on the other hand be fatal not to do so. There was no certainty that, take what step they might, it would not be fraught with disaster. Moreover, the allied lines of communication offered so many alternative points of attack, each holding out such solid advantages to an enemy, that the element of uncertainty must be regarded as an important

Having spent two months in reorganising the military forces of the country, and having posted all his available troops in convenient positions on the Belgian frontier, on June 12th he left Paris to conduct in person the campaign of Waterloo.

The superiority consisted not so much in numerical force as in the quality of the troops. The first step towards a proper comprehension of the campaign is to know the respective efficiency of the troops engaged in it, and for this purpose an examination of the composition of the three armies must necessarily preface an account of the work which they were called upon to perform.

Little complaint could be made as to the quality of these troops. It is true that, during Napoleon's absence in Elba, the army was undergoing a process of reorganisation, and that Napoleon himself had occupied the brief period since his return in moulding this work of reconstruction to his own advantage. The army, therefore, was to some extent in a transition state, and had other circumstances rendered such a course possible, Napoleon would doubtless have delayed the campaign until this work of reorganisation was completed. But while admitting that Napoleon had commanded better armies than this one, on the whole he must have regarded himself as fortunate in being able to collect so numerous a force, and of such excellent quality. The Peace had brought back into France a large body of veterans who had been confined in the various prisons of Europe, and it was of these that Napoleon's Waterloo army was largely composed. In all the ranks there was scarcely a man who had not served before. The troops were well-trained, well-tried, and efficient.

But the value of troops is in a large measure dependent on the officers who command them. Napoleon himself was commander-in-chief. The advantage which his presence in the field gave to his side has been variously calculated. A contemporary estimated his absence as worth

The French Army

Certainly his personal presence was of immense value, though perhaps not to be exactly calculated in round numbers. It is often said that Napoleon was not himself at Waterloo - that physical incapacity made it impossible for him to exhibit his true qualities as a leader, and it is undoubted that he had become increasingly subject to strange fits of lassitude and depression, which seized him even in the heat and excitement of an engagement. This is a matter deserving of attention, and further reference will in due course be made to it, but the rapidity, readiness, skill, and resource which he displayed throughout the campaign, give conclusive proof that when his strange malady was not actually upon him, his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated.

Of his lieutenants, Ney, Duke of Elchingen and Prince of Moskowa, played by far the most active ipart throughout the campaign, but Ney only joined the army on the 15th June, when the advance on Belgium had already begun. He was therefore , strange to his command and to his subordinates, and was, moreover, lamentably deficient in stafTofficers. Considering the importance of the position allotted to Ney - he was given the command of the left wing - disadvantages more trifling than these were capable of exercising an important influence upon the conduct of the campaign.

Far more serious, however, was a certain want of harmony between the views of Ney and Napoleon as the campaign proceeded. Each commanded throughout the 16th and during part of the 17th June an independent force acting in combination with the other. Perfect unity of plan, perfect harmony of mind, should have existed between the commanders. This was not the case, and despite the personal bravery repeatedly displayed by Ney, even to the point of recklessness, a considerable share of Napoleon's failure must be laid at his door.

Napoleon's chief of the staff was Soult, Duke of Dalmatia. It is odd to find in this position a man who for years had held independent command. In the Peninsula Soult had been Napoleon's second self, and had frequently met the Duke of Wellington on equal terms of command. But whatever his skill as a responsible leader, in his new position as chief of the staff he failed to display that activity and capacity which might have been expected of him.

Davoust, who had been for so many years Napoleon's lieutenant in North Germany, was a man of great initiative, skill, vigour, and resolution. He was probably a better soldier than either Soult or Ney. Napoleon, however, refused to avail himself of Davoust's services on this campaign, for he considered it essential to leave as Governor of Paris, during his absence, a man of tried capacity in civil as well as military affairs. It may well be doubted if this decision was a wise one, for on many occasions during these momentous days, the dominating force and energy of Davoust might have been exhibited to the lasting advantage of the Imperial cause.

Not only was Davoust absent, but Napoleon was further weakened by the loss of Berthier, his former well-tried chief of the staff, who had now joined his fortunes to those of Louis XVIIL, and of Marshal Mortier, the Commander of the ^Imperial Guard, who was seized with illness as the ^ampaign opened. Lannes was dead. Massena, jgorged with wealth, thought only of preserving it, jand his cautious trimming between the Bourbons f and the Empire was rewarded by the undisguised mistrust of both. Murat was at Naples. It pmst be admitted that more perhaps depended ion Napoleon's personal activity and control than was usual in his campaigns, for he was wont to Jrely upon his lieutenants not merely for obedience, ibut for co-operation - for an intelligent insight, into the full meaning of his plans - and cooperation such as this was not forthcoming in the Waterloo Campaign.

In command of the cavalry, and very shortly to be raised to the more responsible position of commander of the right wing, was the Comte de Grouchy, Marshal of France, a man whom an evil

Grouchy could boast of thirty-five years' service in the cause of France. Appointed second lieutenant in the regiment La Fere in 1780, when he was only fourteen years old, he was a captain four years later, and for the thre,e years immediately preceding the Revolution he held a commission in the " Gardes du Corps " of the king.

On the outbreak of the Revolution he gave immediate evidence of his political sympathies by resigning his post in the King's Guards and takihg service in the army as newly organised by tfye Constituent Assembly. When the monarchy wa^ overthrown, Grouchy served the Republic, anc^ when, by a decree of the Convention, nobles were( excluded from holding commissions in the Republic' can armies, he at once enlisted in the ranks, declaring with much spirit that he could not b§ debarred from shedding his blood, as a private* soldier, in the interests of his country. The reaction which followed the death of Robespierre proved favourable to Grouchy, and he was restored to his command, being gazetted General of division at, the same time as Massena, Soult, and Moreau. In the wars of La Vendee he rendered conspicuous services against Stofflet and Charette, and being here associated with General Hoche, Grouchy from the first conceived an unbounded admiration for the personal and military qualities of that best servant of the Republic. As second in command under Hoche he played an important part in the expedition to Ireland in 1796, and it was certainly through no fault of his that that enterprise had so grotesque and disastrous an issue for France.

He watched the rise of Napoleon with suspicion, and was not included in the list of officers who accompanied the Egyptian expedition of 1798. He was thus available for service against the Austrians in Italy, where, as second in command to Joubert, he exhibited considerable talent both in the field of diplomacy and of war. At Novi he fought desperately, was badly wounded and made prisoner, nor did he return to France until after Marengo had been won by Napoleon, now first Consul of France. Profoundly suspicious of the Napoleonic dispensation, he had even from his place of captivity protested against the coup detat of Brumaire, which he regarded as the enslavement df the Republic. Upon his return to France he attached himself as firmly to Moreau as he had previously attached himself to Hoche. But notwithstanding his distrust of the Consular system, his undoubted military capacity secured hhn the position of Inspector-General of Cavalry, and from this time Napoleon, though regarding Grouchy 's political principles with suspicion and dislike, never failed to find him high employment in his successive campaigns. He was at JUlm in 1805. He commanded the cavalry at Jena in 1806, he received the Grand Cross of Bavaria 1 B for his gallantry at Eylau, and the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour upon the battlefield of Friedland. In 1808 he was Governor of Madrid, and covered the retreat of the French army when King Joseph evacuated the capital, but like Talleyrand, Caulaincourt, and all far-sighted politicians, he dissented strongly from Napoleon's Spanish policy, nor did he hesitate to express the dissatisfaction which he felt. He obtained his recall from Spain in order to serve in Italy under Prince Eugene, and his skilful manoeuvres, which brought him with his army over the Italian frontier on to the field of Wagram, secured a due recognition when he was appointed Commander of the Iron Crown, Colonel-General of the Chasseurs, and a Grand Officer of the Empire. In the Russian Campaign of 18 12 he contributed to the victory of the Moskowa. He covered the retreat of the army from Moscow, holding a position of peculiar trust and dignity as commander of the " escadron sacre? that squadron in which all the private soldiers were officers of the grand army, and whose special mission it was to guard the person of the Emperor. In 181 3 he declined the commands which Napoleon offered him, for he judged the cause of the Emperor to be now dissociated from the cause of his country, but after the disasters of that year, when he saw France threatened t?y invasion, he proffered his sword for the defence Sf followed he conspicuously proved his worth, and it was in return for a series of brilliant services rendered " in other circumstances, and notably at Friedland, at Wagram, and on the plains of Champagne," that he was named Marshal of France in April 1815.

This summary of the chief events in Grouchy's military career, brief though it is, is nevertheless somewhat out of proportion to the notices contained in these pages of the other commanders in Napoleon's Waterloo army. But Grouchy looms so large in the history of the campaign, that a peculiar - even if misplaced - interest attaches to him. To the public, not only in England but in France, he is known by a single episode in his career, by his association with Napoleon's overthrow at Waterloo. A somewhat wider knowledge of the man explains the conduct of Napoleon in committing to Grouchy so great a weight of responsibility in the campaign, and also enables us to form a sounder judgment as to Grouchy's own fitness for the task imposed upon him.

these nearly 12,000 were cavalry. There were 312 guns. Most of these troops had served before, and may be regarded as efficient soldiers. Some of them were animated by something of Bliicher's enthusiasm against Napoleon, but some, on the other hand, had served under the Emperor in his campaigns of 181 1 and 18 12. These men had come under his spell, and their fidelity when acting against him was doubtful. As a fact, however, the Prussian army maintained its cohesion well throughout the campaign, and no dangers arose from the disaffection of any considerable number of the troops. The ^commanderin-chief, Marshal Prince Bllicher, was a dashing officer, who dated his military experience from the Seven Years' War. He had commanded against Napoleon in person with success at the Katzbach in 181 3, but had sustained a succession of defeats on the French frontier in the campaign of 18 14. As a strategist he was defective and old-fashioned as compared with Napoleon or Wellington, but he was heartily beloved by his men, who appreciated his pluck and daring, and he was ably served by his chief of staff, Gneisenau, on whom fell much of the responsibility for the conduct of affairs.

Gneisenau worked out upon the field the plans which he had developed in the study. He was the Moltke of 18 15. A master of detail, he never allowed detail to master him at the expense of general principles. To him has been assigned the credit, perhaps on insufficient grounds, of the decision,* after Ligny, to conduct the retreat on a line parallel with that of the British Army - thus maintaining communications with Wellington, though sacrificing the Prussian base at Namur, - a decision which practically decided the fate of the Campaign.

The Corps Commanders were steady, sterling soldiers, who knew their duties and discharged them well - Biilow, indeed, had exercised independent command successfully at Dennewitz in 1 8 13 - and there existed between them a spirit of co-operation and good-feeling which was to exercise important effects upon the issue of Waterloo.

The Anglo-Dutch Army f was a heterogeneous collection of British, Germans, Dutch-Belgian, Brunswick, and Hanoverian troops, all under the command-in-chief of the Duke of Wellington,

The Duke called it "the worst army that had ever been got together," and indeed it was unreliable as regards each component part. The British contingent did not include, except to a very small extent, those troops who had served with such credit in the Peninsula, for they had not yet returned from the seat of war in America. The Dutch-Belgians and Brunswickers were of doubtful loyalty, and of as doubtful value in the field. The men of the King's German Legion were fit to rank with the British contingent, but there were very few of them, and of the British contingent only a small number had served before. The army in the field numbered in all about 94,000 men, of whom 14,500 were cavalry. There were 196 guns.

The burden of controlling this motley force fell solely upon the shoulders of the Duke of Wellington. He assumed all the responsibility, but his powers were absolute. His confidence in himself was great though quiet, and he neither asked for advice nor allowed it to be offered. He was of the school which holds that genius consists in the capacity for taking pains, and from the first beginning of his military career he had studied the art of war in its minutest details. " One must understand," he said, " the mechanism and power of the individual soldier - then that of a company, a battalion, or brigade, and so on - before one can venture to group divisions and move an army. I believe I owe most of my success to the attention I always paid to the inferior part of tactics as a regimental officer. There were few men in the army who knew those details better than I did. It is the foundation of all military knowledge." He had practised his principles of warfare in India and in the Peninsula with eminent success, and though he had never met Napoleon, he had beaten with ease all the French marshals who had been sent against him. If Napoleon's absence was equivalent to the loss of 40,000 men, the Duke of Wellington's presence was certainly worth much. Sir William Fraser relates a story, which is not, it is hoped, beneath the dignity of history, to illustrate the Duke's value in terms of men. A sentry in the Peninsula was keeping guard for a detachment of troops exposed in a position of great danger. The Duke unexpectedly appearing, the sentry cried out, "God bliss your crooked nose ! I'd rather see it than 10,000 min." Possessed of the absolute confidence of the allied sovereigns, of his officers and men, and with a corresponding confidence in himself, it was certain that even with his unpromising materials the Duke would make a bold stand for victory. He was a master of defensive as Napoleon was of offensive tactics, and a contest between them under conditions favourable to the development of the highest powers of both was certain to afford a military spectacle of more than ordinary interest,

The force commanded by the Duke was, however, entirely inadequate to the task of destroying Bonaparte. Nor was such a task ever assigned to it by the Allied Powers or undertaken by Wellington. The duty of defeating him lay with the two allied armies acting in combination. Just as the hopes of Napoleon lay in frustrating this combination, so the hopes of the allies were dependent upon maintaining it.

Of the other commanders in the Anglo-Dutch army it is unnecessary to speak. None held any independent position of command such as that occupied by Ney or Grouchy in the French army. Their duties were to obey orders, and this, with the Duke in command, they were willing and prompt to do. No particular military capacities have ever been claimed for the Prince of Orange or for the Duke of Brunswick. Lord Hill was a sound divisional officer, Lord Uxbridge a dashing cavalry leader ; Sir Thomas Picton, though unfortunately out of favour with the Duke in 1815, was worshipped by his men and very capable in the handling of them.

The Scheme Of Operations

The Anglo-Dutch forces lay in cantonments around Brussels, extending westward to Ghent, Oudenarde, and Tournay; southward to Nivelles and Mons. Wellington's base of supplies was Ostend, a port which offered him favourable .jmeans of communication with the fleet and with England. The Prussian base was Namur, but the cantonments of the Prussian army extended far beyond that point - to the westward as far as Charleroi, southward to Dinant and Rochefort, and eastward to Liege.

The distance from Namur to Ghent is 70 miles, from Namur to Brussels about 40 miles, from Tournay to Liege more than 100 miles ; and thus at the outset we are struck by the wide extent of country covered by the allied troops, and the extreme length of their lines of communication. As a consequence of this, rapid concentration in the event of a surprise or any other emergency would be difficult. A skilful and energetic either or both of the allied armies before half their troops could be rallied to the field, thus affording a chance of cutting the communications on which they were dependent for any combined operations, or of defeating each in detail before any concentration in force could be effected. Moreover, in the event of such a contingency, it was probable that the defeated army would retire upon its base. Now the bases of the Anglo- Dutch and Prussian armies were divergent. Every step towards Ghent and Ostend would take Wellington further away from Namur : every step towards Namur would take Blucher further away from Ghent and Ostend. Thus, in the event of defeat, there would be small chance of combining again, and the loss of combination involved the loss of the campaign.

But, on the other hand, so many alternative routes, as lines of attack, were open to Napoleon, that any premature concentration on the part of the allied generals might be fatal. He might attempt to intervene between the two armies by marching direct upon Brussels, and this was very much the course which he actually adopted, or he might attempt to sever the communications between Blucher and his base by marching towards his right or those between Wellington and his base by marching towards his left. This latter course was the one which the Duke consistently maintained to the end of his life would have been, strategically speaking, the

The Scheme Of Operations 27

2. That to concentrate within a more limited circuit of ground, until the line of attack was definitely declared, was perhaps more dangerous.

3. That the situation offered to Napoleon several alternative courses, the uncertainty as to which of them he would take being a distinct source of disadvantage to the allied generals.

It has often been stated that Napoleon's plan was to separate the allied armies : it should rather be said that his object was to annihilate them in detail.

The situation of Blucher's forces, nearer by some miles to the French frontier than the army of the Duke of Wellington, rendered it probable that the Prussians would be the first to concentrate upon news of Napoleon's advance. The character of Prince Blucher rendered it probable - though by no means certain - that, once concentrated or even partially concentrated, he would fight. The scattered dispositions of the Anglo-Dutch army in their cantonments rendered it improbable that they could be concentrated in any efficient force in less than two days. A strong detachment from the main French army could at any rate hold them in check, while Napoleon was disposing of the Prussians - and the Prussians once out of the way, he could then turn his uninterrupted attention upon Wellington. Thus there were very good chances that, with secrecy and rapidity combined, Napoleon might be able to fall upon the Prussian army, with a force little inferior to it (perhaps an even greater force if the Prussian concentration was only partially effected), and cripple it severely, if not annihilate it altogether, before any support could be rendered by its Anglo-Dutch allies. If these possibilities were realised, the Prussian army would be either incapacitated for further service in the campaign or separated from its allies, for it was fairly presumable that, if defeated, it would retreat in the direction of its base, leaving Wellington's army entirely unsupported.

Thus a movement direct upon Brussels by the main chaussee from Charleroi offered to the French many advantages over the alternative lines of attack. An advance by the right or by the left, with a view of cutting off either Wellington or Blucher from their respective bases, might undoubtedly have secured great results, but one result must inevitably have been to bring the allied armies together. Together they would have numbered nearly 230,000 men, to whom Napoleon could oppose little more than half that number. Whatever advantages he might gain would quickly be recovered from him, and he would find himself compelled to accept battle, in a position probably not of his own choosing and against enormous odds, whereas his actual plan offered him a distinct prospect of engaging the allies separately with forces in each case superior or very little inferior to their own.

The Scheme Of Operations 29

Napoleon's design, as just stated, is not quite the one with which he is commonly credited. The general supposition is that his scheme was first to separate -and then to fight. We have the authority of Wellington and Bonaparte himself for stating that his scheme really was to fight first, believing that separation would naturally follow. It is true that Napoleon's line of march, straight up the Charleroi-Brussels road, seems to indicate an intention of getting between the armies. Hence it has been assumed that he intended to operate in the space between them, and to seize crucial points in their line of communications, but "the space intervening between two armies cannot be an object of operation. It would be very unfortunate if a commander like Bonaparte, having to do with an enemy of twice his strength, instead of falling upon the one half with his united force, were to light on the empty interval and thus deal a blow in the air. . . . Bonaparte chooses therefore the direction between the two armies, not in order to separate them by wedging himself between them, but because he might reasonably expect to find Blucher's force in this direction and to fall upon it, either united or in separate corps."*

One further fact may be stated in support of this view of Napoleon's general idea. Had he desired to seize the crucial points in the allied line of communication with a view merely to separate them, he would, as a glance at the map will show, have seized Sombref and Quatre Bras. * Clausewitz. Der Feldzug von 1815. Kap. 22.

Not only did he not occupy Sombref, but he took good care "above all not to occupy Sombref."* Neither was Quatre Bras occupied on the first day of the campaign (15th June), though it would have been easy, and for other reasons very advisable, to occupy it. The essential thing was that Blucher should fight with his communications with Wellington open. It was probable that he could be induced to fight, for he would have hopes of being supported ; but with his communications closed, it was probable that he would withdraw, to concentrate again in a position more favourable to combined operations.f The occupation of Sombref " would have caused the failure of all (Napoleon's) movements, for then Marshal Blucher would have been obliged to make Wavre the place for the concentration of his army, the battle of Ligny would not have taken place, and the Prussian army would not have been obliged to give battle."

The truth of Napoleon's own statements, particularly after the event, is of course open to doubt, but where his subsequent statements tally with his action at the time, there is no reason for treating them with suspicion.

Having now considered the numerical force, calibre, and moral of the three armies, the strategy which Napoleon determined to adopt, the position of the allies in their cantonments, and the general plan of operations which the Emperor hoped to carry out, we are able to proceed to the campaign itself. * Napoleon. Correspondence. f Ibid.

The I5Th Of June

I. Napoleon's order of movement and the passage of the Sambre. - II. The Prussian dispositions. Zieten's corps retrogrades on Fleurus. - III. Wellington's dispositions in view of the French advance. - IV. Further progress of the French left and centre. - V. Ney and the occupation of Quatre Bras. - VI. Concentration of the Anglo-Dutch Army. - VII. Summary.

NAPOLEON had ordered the concentration of his troops around Charleroi, and in the early days of the month of June the various corps of which his army was composed broke camp and marched to the rendezvous. By the 14th the concentration was effected skilfully, silently, and with great rapidity. Military critics are agreed as to the magnitude of this operation and the ability with which it was directed. Chesney calls the arrangements " simple in theory, but a mighty problem to work out in practice." It is certain that at the beginning of the campaign, at any rate, Napoleon exhibited no falling-off from his own high standard of military science.

the 14th. He now issued to the troops his famous manifesto, in which he calls upon them to remember the glories of the past, the unequal odds under which at Jena and Montmirail he beat " these same Prussians, to-day so arrogant," and the horrors of the English prisons. He reminds them that the coalition is insatiable, but that like madmen, they are blinded by a moment's prosperity. If they enter France it will be but to find a tomb. Perils and hardships have to be encountered, but with constancy all will be well. "Pour tout Frangais qui a du coeur^ le moment est arrive de vaincre ou de ptrir"

From Beaumont on the same day Napoleon issued his "order of movement," in which, with great detail, he explained the order of march for the morrow. The precise hour at which each corps was to move, the disposition of its baggage, and its situation relative to the rest, is here carefully pointed out. The 1st and 2nd corps, under D'Erlon and Reille respectively, forming the left wing of the army, were to advance, the one at 2.30 A.M., the other at 3 A.M., upon Marchienne-au-Pont and Thuin. The 3rd and 6th corps, forming the centre, were to march at 2.30 A.M. upon Charleroi. The 6th corps was to support the 3rd, while the Young Guard was to follow the movements of the 6th.

The 4th corps, which constituted the right, was also ordered to advance upon Charleroi at three o'clock, though, by^a later order, it was to cross the river at CMtelet some way to the right. It was to take care to direct its movement in line with that of the 3rd corps, so as to arrive in front of Charleroi as nearly as possible at the same time as that corps, and the Commanders of the three leading columns, Reille, Vandamme, and Gerard, with Pajol, commanding the 1st Cavalry Corps, were to be in constant communication one with the other, so as to arrive before Charleroi en masse.

Accordingly, in the early morning of the 1 5th, the movement thus prescribed was begun. The left advanced at the appointed hour, and at Thuin fell in with the Prussian outposts. These fell back beyond Charleroi, and the bridge across the Sambre at Marchiennes was by ten o'clock in the hands of the French.

The advance of the centre column was delayed and thrown into some confusion by the fact that Vandamme did not get his orders. He was to have started at 2.30 A.M., but, as a fact, he did not set out till 7 A.M. Pajol's cavalry, therefore, which was at the head of the column, found itself unsupported, and it was not until the afternoon that the error was fully rectified. This contretemps^ however, did not prevent the capture of the bridge at Charleroi before noon.

The right, under Gerard, moved more slowly. Its start was delayed by the fact that some of the divisions composing it had not yet been fully concentrated. When at length its march began, fresh confusion arose by the defection to the enemy of Bourmont, who commanded the leading division. Gerard did not, therefore, reach the river till late in the afternoon, and certainly did not cross it till evening - perhaps one half of his corps did not cross until the early morning of the 16th.

But, on the whole, due allowance being made for errors in execution and for accidents, Napoleon's order was effectively carried out upon the 1 5th. Before proceeding to trace the movements of the columns further we must pause to examine the positions of the allies and their movements consequent upon Napoleon's advance.

At 2.30 A.M. on June 15th, the hour of the French advance, the allied armies were still in their cantonments. The first Prussian corps (Ziethen) was at Charleroi and beyond it at Fontaine-PEv6que, Marchiennes, and Thuin, and therefore was the first to come into collision with the enemy. Bliicher was at Namur, and upon receipt of information that the French were in motion, he immediately gave orders for the concentration of his army in the neighbourhood of Sombref. A glance at the map, however, will show that this concentration could not be effected completely in less than forty-eight hours, for Btilow, with the 4th corps, was at Li£ge, and the distance between Liege and Sombref is about fifty miles. Thus Napoleon's hopes of confronting the Prussian army before it was fully collected seemed in a fair way to be realised. The 3rd corps (Thielemann), cantoned on the Meuse around Dinant, and the 2nd corps (Pirch) at Namur were equally in positions of isolation as regards Ziethen. Consequently, while concentration was in process, it rested upon Ziethen and upon Ziethen alone to resist the advance of the French army in force. Ziethen's corps consisted of less than 33,000 men, and was thus wholly inadequate for purposes of effective resistance. Its only course was to fall back, which it did, upon Sombref, thus taking up its part in the general movement for concentration. This retrograde movement by a corps in the face of an army was an operation of extreme delicacy and attended by great risks. Ziethen was equal to his responsibilities, and though, perhaps, he may be accused of some degree of negligence in not destroying the bridges at Marchiennes and Chatelet, yet in the conduct of the retreat itself he was never at fault, and his operations on this occasion are cited as a model for future commanders to follow under similar circumstances.* Fortune certainly favoured him materially in the failure of Gerard, with the French 4th corps, to fulfil his part in the general movement. Had G6rard come up upon Ziethen's left flank while the centre column was pressing him in front, his orderly withdrawal would certainly have been impossible, * Sir E. Hamley. < ' Art of War."

It is impossible to over-estimate, in the study of campaigns, the importance of apparently trifling details. Speculation on what might have been is, in a sense, an empty amusement, but, on the other hand, it may be legitimately indulged in for the purposes of illustration.

Gerard's delay was partly due to Bourmont's defection, but it was due much more to the fact that his corps was not properly concentrated at' the moment prescribed for its advance. Some of the divisions were half-a-day's march behind time. Had Gerard been properly concentrated, he might have reached the river in line with the centre column " a la hauteur du 3^ corps" as Napoleon put it. Thus situated, he would have been in a position to fall on the flank of Ziethen's retreating force. This movement might have destroyed an entire Prussian corps, discomposed Blucher's whole scheme of concentration, and perhaps rendered the battle of Ligny impossible. Such speculations are useful if they serve to emphasise the fact that, on the loss of half-a-day's march somewhere between the 7th and 14th of June, depended the chance of destroying one-fourth of the Prussian army. Illustrations of the same essential principle in war, the importance of minute detail in the conduct of a campaign, will be multiplied in the course of this study.

The 15Th Of June

army - always excepting Billow's corps - was duly effected in the neighbourhood of Sombref in the course of the 15th and early morning hours of the 16th of June.

Wellington's army was also in its cantonments at the moment of the French advance. No concentration whatever of the Anglo-Dutch troops had taken place up to the 15th. Napoleon was thus allowed to cross the river, to advance his columns, and to interpose between the allies practically without any opposition from the Anglo-Dutch army. Hence arises the story that the allied generals were taken by surprise. It has, however, already been explained that the Duke of Wellington acted upon a deliberate principle. He determined to maintain his position round Brussels, because upon Brussels the Netherlands depended. He covered a wide extent of ground by his dispositions, because he was uncertain what Napoleon's line of attack would be, and because he was desirous of being prepared for any event. Whether he was wise in his policy of delay is one matter, whether he was taken by surprise by Napoleon's rapidity is another. There is sufficient to account for delay without the theory of surprise. The Duke consistently maintained that his action was right. Critics are now almost unanimous in holding that he was wrong : "in place of waiting to see where the blow actually fell, the armies should have been instantly put in motion to assemble

The plan of combination between the two sections of the allied armies was also very loosely defined. We have seen that from his knowledge of the man, Napoleon expected that Blucher would accept battle, even with no definite assurance of support from Wellington, and this, at Ligny, Blucher actually did.f On the other hand, it was most improbable that Wellington would stand against the French without definite assurances of support from Blucher. It is obvious that neither should have risked a decisive engagement - unless positively compelled to do so - without the support of the other. And yet no agreement to this effect had been come to beforehand, and at the outset' of the campaign the armies were so placed that they could not help each other even if they would. The ultimate results should not blind us to the defects of those who won the victory, and great as the Duke of Wellington's genius undoubtedly was, there is an unpleasant spice of truth - as far as this campaign, at any rate, is concerned - in Napoleon's dictum, that " La Fortune a fait plus pour lui qu'il ria fait pour elle"

* Sir J. Shaw Kennedy. But, on the other hand, premature concentration on Wellington's part towards his left would exactly play Napoleon's game if he were advancing by way of Mons to cut the Duke's communications with his base of supplies.

15th that the Duke received information that the French were in movement, and had attacked Ziethen before Charleroi. This was all the news which he received up to ten o'clock in the evening of that day. These reports, however, led the Duke to issue a Memorandum for the movements of the army. Orders were given to concentrate the troops in certain situations, such as Ninhove, Grammont, Braine-le-Comte, Nivelles, and Enghien - all of them well to the westward of Napoleon's line of advance, while later orders, supplementary to these, definitely ordered the 3rd division of British Infantry to Nivelles, where the Prince of Orange was to have already collected his 2nd and 3rd divisions. These orders show us the Duke still doubtful whether Napoleon's attack on Charleroi was not a feint, and still maintaining his troops in such a position as to admit of ready concentration south-west of Brussels in the event of the main attack being directed towards his right.

In the meantime the leading French columns had pressed steadily forward beyond the river. The centre, which was under the immediate control of the Emperor in person, passed through Charleroi in the afternoon, drove the Prussians from the position they had taken up at Gilly, and by night-time was bivouacked to the south of Fleurus - " maitres de toute la position de Fleurus? as the bulletin of the day states.

The progress of Gerard upon the right has already been traced, and the effects of his partial failure demonstrated. The operations of the left have been traced up to the fulfilment of Napoleon's first orders. The bridge at Marchiennes had been seized, and the Prussian outposts at that point and at Thuin driven in. Further orders were now given to Reille to cross the river, to take position on the Brussels road, and to advance on Gosselies. D'Erlon, with the ist corps, was to support him and second his operations. Later orders to D'Erlon were more emphatic, - he was to join himself to the 2nd corps at Gosselies. These instructions Reille proceeded to obey, and it was while he was moving on Gosselies that Marshal Ney, who had arrived at Charleroi a few hours before, took command of the whole left wing, composed of the corps of Reille and D'Erlon. He promptly carried the advance still further to Frasne, driving Prince Bernard of Saxe- Weimar's brigade back to Quatre Bras, and a body of Prussians which had been stationed at Gosselies, to Fleurus.

D'Erlon, however, with the ist corps, was by no means so active in executing his instructions. At the moment when the 2nd corps was bivouacked at Frasne, D'Erlon, far from supporting it, was not yet entirely across the river. In fact, there now began that system of delay, for it can be characterised by no milder term, on the part of the ist corps, which was to have

Marshal Ney, who, at the eleventh hour, was entrusted with a capital command, possessed a reputation second to none as a brilliant and daring leader. Few people recognise him under his Imperial title of Marshal " Prince of Moskowa." Everyone knows who is meant by "the bravest of the brave." It would be untrue, in view of the services which he rendered in this campaign, to say that he was half-hearted in Napoleon's cause, but certainly his adherence to it was tardy, and it is obvious from his conduct in the campaign that his reliance upon the judgment of his chief was no longer implicit. He was, moreover, under a disadvantage, from the fact that he joined the army late, and that he was deficient in staff officers, as already stated. But most of all, perhaps his reputation has suffered from the fact that the first orders he received from Napoleon at Charleroi were verbal orders, and so no authoritative documentary evidence is before us whereby we may test exactly how far he obeyed his instructions and how far he disregarded them. At the very outset of the campaign a controversy meets us upon the subject of Ney's action on the 15th. It has been seen that, immediately on assuming his command, he pushed on the pursuit of the Prussians from Gosselies to Frasne, but it is contended that this was not enough, that Quatre Bras was his true objective point that evening, that he had been ordered to seize it, that no difficulties interposed to prevent him, and that yet he refrained from carrying out his instructions. The stern fight for the possession of Quatre Bras which occupied the following day is pointed to as a commentary upon his negligence the evening before - an effect of wilful disobedience, a cause, or part of the cause, of subsequent disasters at Waterloo.

This question takes us back to Napoleon's general plan of campaign. Quatre Bras and Sombref are the two points on the Nivelles-Namur road by which communications were maintained between the allied armies. It has been seen that to seize both these points of communication was no part of Napoleon's general plan. He indeed "took good care not to occupy Sombref/' for reasons already stated. Why, then, should he desire to occupy Quatre Bras ? If the occupation of Sombref was likely to prevent Blucher from fighting because his communication with Wellington would be cut, logically the occupation of Quatre Bras would have had a like effect. Jf, in view of an engagement with the Prussians, Napoleon's only demand upon his left wing was that it should prevent Wellington from bringing assistance to Blucher, Ney, at Frasne, on the night of the 1 5th, was sufficiently near to Quatre Bras to ensure his occupying Wellington on the following day. If, however, Napoleon expected that Ney should not only occupy Wellington, but should be able to detach a reinforcement to the assistance of the main army in the coming battle with the Prussians, the question of the occupation of Quatre Bras on the 15th assumes another aspect. Ney in possession would be in a much stronger position than Ney trying to gain possession. Comparatively few troops would be sufficient to hold the place already won, and the surplus might then readily be detached along the Namur road in order to take the Prussians on the flank at the crisis of the morrow's battle. The advantage of such a manoeuvre might more than compensate for any possible disadvantage which the occupation of Quatre Bras might imply. If Blucher, as a direct consequence of that occupation, should determine not to fight - his logical and wisest course - then the Emperor's whole plan was dislocated ; but if he were true to his character,* he was sure to fight, if only his communications at Sombref were undisturbed, and in this event a French detachment marching from Quatre Bras along the Namur road would take Blucher in flank and rear at the moment when he was heavily engaged with Napoleon on his front, and thus the defeat of the Prussians would be rendered certain and decisive. The occupation of

* I am unable to accept Herr Delbruck's view, expressed in his "Life of Gneisenau," and emphasised in the " Preussische Jahrbuch" Nov. 1894, that Blucher yielded unhesitating and absolute obedience to Gneisenau throughout this campaign. This view, if accepted, would oblige us to leave Blucher's own personality entirely out of account. But Delbruck's whole article is audacious rather than conclusive.

Quatre Bras was therefore worth risking, and Ney was certainly expected to occupy it. The argument thus far does little more than prove that, if there were strong reasons for not occupying the place, there were reasons equally strong for doing so. It does not help us to a decision respecting the instructions which Napoleon gave to Ney. And, indeed, to argue this point of instructions is like beating the air, for there is only one single piece of contemporary documentary evidence which is of service in guiding our views. This is the bulletin of the army for the 15th June, published in the Moniteur upon the 18th June. In this bulletin it is stated amid a large mass of information as to the positions of the army, that Ney's headquarters that evening were at Quatre Bras. Here is a statement strictly official, drawn up long before any controversy was raised, and therefore entirely impartial - a paper, moreover, which is undoubtedly authentic - and which seems to be conclusive. It is inconceivable that such a statement could have been made if orders to occupy Quatre Bras that evening had not been given. All the hearsay evidence of after years, which with so much toil has been raked together for the purpose of exonerating Ney and supporting the facts as put forward by his family, is as nothing when compared with this one written piece. We are therefore forced to the conclusion that Napoleon's verbal orders to Ney on the 1 5th were to occupy Quatre Bras, and that Ney

Apart from the fact that it shows Ney in a hesitating and cautious mood - not entirely confident in the soundness of the Emperor's judgment - the matter in truth has not that importance which has been attributed to it. So long as the position was in the hands of the French before Wellington had time to move to the support of Blucher, it mattered little whether it were seized on the 1 5th or early on the 16th. Therefore we need feel no surprise that, as far as the manoeuvres of the first day went, the Emperor was entirely satisfied. The dilatoriness of D'Erlon with the 1st corps, and of G6rard with the 4th, was, of course, to be regretted, but, with this exception,! "all the Emperor's manoeuvres had succeeded in accordance with his wishes."

* The argument in the text has been directed as far as possible to the question of Ney's instructions, and whether he fulfilled them or not. The argument of Clausewitz, which is very forcible, is directed to the strategy of the movement on Quatre Bras, and on strategical grounds he shows that Napoleon expected far more from Ney than the Marshal could possibly accomplish. We have not, however, to deal at present with the abstract question as to which of the two, Napoleon or Ney, was in the right according to the theory and practice of war, but are concerned only with Ney's orders, and how far he fulfilled them. The more general bearings of the case will be discussed in the next chapter.

after a hard day's march, in the Anglo-Dutch army all was astir, and the troops were rapidly concentrating upon the points specified in the Duke's orders.

But these points - Ninhove, Grammont, Brainele-Comte, Nivelles, Enghien, etc., were far away from Quatre Bras, which was to be assaulted next day by the French, and it was necessary, therefore, for the Duke to issue still further orders to direct his various divisions to concentrate there. Everyone knows that this concentration was effected, as far as it was effected at all, in a very straggling sort of way - that the troops were not at Quatre Bras massed to withstand the enemy at the moment when the attack began, but that some were there, and that others kept arriving all through the afternoon, until at last a very respectable force was collected upon the field, though not amounting to much more than three-eighths of the Duke's whole available strength. These facts certainly confirm the opinion, already quoted, that the English line of cantonments was "much too extended," and they also tend to create an impression that the Duke must have delayed considerably in issuing those supplementary orders which resulted in a partial concentration on Quatre Bras. It is indeed difficult to fix upon the exact time when his determination so to concentrate was arrived at. There is evidence to show that all was settled, and the orders despatched, before the Duke went to the Duchess of Richmond's ball that night, but if this was so, why did the troops arrive so tardily? The Duke's own words to Lord Bathurst are : " In the meantime I had directed the whole army to march on Les Quatre Bras," but this expression is very indefinite. Judging only by the way in which the troops arrived upon the field on the afternoon of the 16th, it may be strongly inferred that the Duke's orders for concentration at Quatre Bras were not issued till after he returned from the ball, shortly before leaving Brussels, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning. There are indeed two orders to Lord Hill, dated "Brussels, June 16th," which seem to contradict the assertion that the Duke had "directed the whole army to march on Les Quatre Chemins." Being dated "Brussels," they must have been written before the Duke left the city - that is, early in the morning - and they direct Lord Hill " to move the 2nd division of infantry upon Braine-le-Comte immediately," whither the cavalry had already been ordered, and "the first division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade ... to Enghien." Now these orders do not indicate an intention of concentrating at Quatre Bras, but are rather in harmony with the orders of the evening before, which seem to mark Nivelles as the point fixed upon in the Duke's mind. The whole matter is complicated by the fact that no definite orders to concentrate at Quatre Bras are anywhere to be found ; we have to rest upon the Duke's assertions and reports, and upon that evidence which is better even than written orders, the fact that in course of time troops to a considerable number did put in an appearance there. It is difficult, however, to escape the conviction (i) that the Duke was badly served by his intelligence department on the 15th, for he did not receive news from the front till the evening ; (2) That, misconceiving Napoleon's plan, the concentration at Quatre Bras was perilously delayed, and was indeed in the nature of an after-thought, orders for concentration elsewhere having already been issued. It is certain that on the night of the I5th-i6th June, the only troops actually at Quatre Bras in position to oppose Ney were the brigade of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, 4000 strong, and that they were there, not as a consequence of the Duke's orders, but in direct opposition to them, the Prince of Orange having been instructed on the 15th, "to collect his 2nd and 3rd divisions (of which Prince Bernard's brigade formed a part) at Nivelles " - a point six miles to the westward of Quatre Bras.

taken position to the south of Fleurus, ready for an engagement with Bliicher next day : that owing to accidents the centre was not supported by the right in such a manner as Napoleon had directed and hoped, but that by night-time the right was collected and in position, - that the left, under Ney, had, as far as the 2nd corps was concerned, acted with energy, driving Prince Bernard from Frasne, and occupying that position, though it is questionable whether Ney should not have pushed still further, and occupied Quatre Bras, - that the first corps was unaccountably slow in its progress, and entirely failed to fulfil its instructions to support and join itself to the second.

2. That three out of the four Prussian corps t were in course of concentration in the neighbourhood of Sombref, Biilow being at such a distance that he would require, reckoning from midnight of the 15th, at least twenty-four hours to join the main army.

3. That the Duke of Wellington, only hearing the news from the front in the evening, issued orders for the concentration of his army in the neighbourhood of Nivelles - only 4000 troops being at Quatre Bras, and those by accident - but that subsequent orders were issued, though copies are not forthcoming, some time in the night or early morning of the 16th, directing a concentration on Quatre Bras.

I. Wellington and his army on the morning of the 1 6th ; his statements to Blucher ; their value. - II. Blucher's stand at Ligny. - III. Advance of the French right on Ligny. - IV. Attitude and conduct of Ney on the morning of the 16th. - V. Ney's dispositions before Quatre Bras. - VI. Napoleon on the morning of the 1 6th ; his general plan of campaign as distinguished from his particular plan for the day ; modification of his morning plan to suit the circumstances of the afternoon. - VII. Respective dispositions of Blucher and Napoleon for the battle of Ligny ; Napoleon's plan of battle ; positions and numbers of the forces engaged.

The Duke of Wellington rode out of Brussels between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, but before leaving he had received from his Deputy Quarter-Master-General, Sir W. De Lancey, a Memorandum purporting to state the actual situation of the army at seven o'clock A.M. Fortified with this information, the Duke rode to Waterloo, passed Picton's brigade, which was halted there, and had not yet received orders to advance, and arrived at Quatre Bras about ten o'clock. Having surveyed the position, he despatched a letter to

The Morning Of June 16Th 51

" I do not see much of the enemy in front of us, and I await news of Your Highness and the arrival of troops in order to decide my operations for the day.

A comparison between this document and the Memorandum of Sir W. De Lancey shows that Wellington, in giving information to Bliicher, depended almost implicitly upon the Memorandum. It becomes a matter of the first importance therefore to see if the situation of the army really was what Sir William's "Disposition" and Wellington's letter to Bliicher stated it to be.

joined, and notes attached to each paragraph, with a view of estimating its accuracy. (Black print denotes the document ; small print, notes.)

Disposition Of The British Army At

By the supplementary orders of the previous evening, 10 P.M., June 15th, the first division (Cooke's) was to move from Enghien upon Braine-lerComte. It arrived there at 9 A.M., halted till noon, awaiting orders. Cooke, on his own responsibility, ordered the advance to Nivelles ; arrived there at 3 p.m. Thence ordered to Quatre Bras, a seven miles' march ; came up about 7 P.M.

The 2nd division (Clinton) by 10 p,m. orders was to move from Ath to Enghien. These orders only arrived at 10 A.M., 1 6th ; division reached Enghien at 2 P.M ; Braine-le- Comte at 12 (midnight). Thus the 2nd division was nowhere near Quatre Bras on the day of the battle.

By the 10 p.m. orders the 3rd division (Alten) was "to continue its movement from Braine-le-Comte upon Nivelles." It arrived at Nivelles at noon.

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Oudenarde to Enghien 40 miles, and on to Braine 5 5. This division was quite unavailable for service at Quatre Bras, and probably was not reckoned upon by the Duke for that action.

The 5th division (Picton) left Brussels about 5 A.M. Waterloo is 1 1 miles distant. It certainly was not " marching to Genappe " at 7 A.M., for it did not leave Waterloo till 1 P.M.

These divisions (Prince of Orange) were ordered, at 10 P.M. on the 15th, to collect at Nivelles. The 2nd division (Perponcher) was at Quatre Bras, but the 3rd (Chasse*) only reached Nivelles about noon.

ist Dutch-Belgians (Bylandt) and 7th Dutch-Belgians (Anthing, or the Indian Brigade), were situated as stated, and perhaps were so marching.

These troops had been ordered on 1 5th " to march upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high-road near to that town." They had to come from Mons, 45 miles. They could not have reached Vilvorde, much less be "beyond Waterloo," at 7 A.M.

The 10 P.M. orders of the 15th had directed the Cavalry on Enghien. These orders received at 6 A.M. on the 16th. At 7 A.M., therefore, these troops were still close to their cantonments at Ninhove, and did not reach Quatre Bras till the fight was over.

The Duke of Brunswick's contingent arrived shortly after Picton's division to the support of Prince Bernard's Brigade at Quatre Bras. It left Brussels at 5 a.m.

Kruse's Nassau contingent did not arrive to take part in the action. The Nassauers engaged were a part of Prince Bernard's Brigade. Kruse's division could not have been " beyond Waterloo," therefore, at the hour mentioned.

It should now be clear, and reference to the maps will make it clearer still, that the Duke of Wellington's army was by no means situated as the Duke stated that it was in his letter to Bliicher. Doubtless he had a right to expect that his chief-of-staff would supply him with correct information, and to this extent he was justified in his announcements to the Prussian leader ; but, at the same time, very little reflection was required to demonstrate to him convincingly that in some particulars it was erroneous even in the case of those troops which were nearest at hand, and whose movements and position were therefore capable of the most accurate definition. To take one example only, the Duke had himself passed Picton's division at Waterloo as he rode to Quatre Bras. It was halted there to await orders to march either on Quatre Bras or Nivelles as the Duke, from his observations at the front, might decide. It was not moved forward from Waterloo till one o'clock. Nevertheless, the Duke informs Bliicher that at 10.30 "the Reserve (of which Picton's division was a part) " is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, where it will arrive at noon? The same kind of criticism may be extended to most of the other statements in the Duke's letter. We can, therefore, scarcely be surprised if Gneisenau, who never cordially trusted the Duke of Wellington, believed that it was his intention deliberately to deceive the Prussians as to his ability to support them in the coming battle in order to induce them to fight, and so hold the French in check while the Anglo- Dutch concentration was being effected.* Such a course of conduct is entirely foreign to the Duke's character, nor has any evidence, other than the Memorandum, been brought forward to support it, but it was not unnatural or improbable that such a suspicion should be entertained, especially in the mind of one not cordially disposed to the Duke.

There cannot be a doubt that Wellington was himself deceived by Sir W. De Lancey's Memorandum. Serious consequences might have followed from the mistake. The Duke himself determined to stand at Quatre Bras under the impression that a sufficiency of troops would be upon the ground in time. Had he known the real state of the case, he probably would have come to a different decision, for at no time during that engagement were there forces enough on the field to withstand Ney's united command, and of course Wellington could not reckon upon the accident, which, as will be seen, kept that force disunited, one-half of it being altogether unavailable for the battle. Thus, from too confident reliance upon mistaken information, the Duke ran the risk of a serious defeat at Quatre Bras ; while Blticher, at Ligny, was induced to hope for assistance from his ally, which, in fact, it was impossible to render.

In view of the charges still made by Prussian authorities against the Duke of Wellington, a * Delbriick's "Life of Gneisenau," published 1880,

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Having surveyed the front at Quatre Bras, Wellington rode over to Bry for the purpose of holding personal communication with Blucher. Baron Muffling, the Prussian attach^ on the Duke's staff, and Gneisenau were present at the interview. Muffling has given an account of what took place, and it appears that the Duke reiterated the statements of his letter. The question arose as to the support to be rendered by the Anglo-Dutch army to the Prussians in the coming engagement, and the Duke, it is said, undertook to come if he were not himself attacked. It is evident that he expected nothing serious from the French upon his own front, for as he left Blucher he said, " I will overthrow what is before me at Frasne, and will direct myself on Cossets," thus clearly indicating that he either entirely misconceived the strength of the French under Marshal Ney, or else that he was confident of finding practically his whole army at Quatre Bras upon his return from the interview. The Duke then rode back to Quatre Bras, where, upon his arrival at three o'clock, he found the battle already in progress.

Shortly after dawn Ziethen was under orders to march, and he withdrew from Fleurus to take up position at St Amand. The 2nd corps moved up to support the ist, and occupied a position behind it. Thus these two corps formed the Prussian right and centre. The 3rd corps took position later in the day, extending from Sombref to Balatre, and formed the left of the Prussian army. These movements were on the point of completion when the Duke of Wellington came over to Bry, and they lead to the conclusion that Blucher had already determined to stand his ground, before any personal consultation with the Duke had taken place. This fact has an important bearing upon another vexed question of the campaign. Did Wellington promise to support Blucher in the battle of Ligny, and did Blucher fight relying upon that promise ? *

There can be no doubt that help was expected, and that Wellington expected to be able to render it. The conversation which took place between him and Blucher at Bry ran chiefly upon the direction from which that help should come, and we have heard Wellington declaring his intention of overthrowing whatever was before him, and promising to come " if I am not attacked myself." But all this does not constitute evid- * See Appendix.

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ence to prove that Bliicher would not have taken position for battle at all but for Wellington's assurance. If so, why did he not gain the assurance before taking position ? There is no document of either the 15 th or 16th conveying any such assurance. The Duke's letter of 10.30, already quoted, may have given rise to an expectation of assistance, but it could have done no more. It is reasonable to suppose that after his defeat Bliicher would have alluded to Wellington's failure to redeem his promise, had such a promise been actually made, and that he would have felt some personal resentment against Wellington as the man who had played him false and exposed him to disaster, but it is notorious that no such feelings existed in Bliicher's mind, and no such allusions appear in his report,

The whole arrangements, in fact, were of a piece with that loose system of combination under which the allies had acted all along. They were to act together, but the terms of their cooperation and the methods of effecting it had never been denned.

At the same time, it would appear to be extreme rashness on Bliicher's part to engage the enemy with one whole corps of 30,000 men absent from the field, and with no assistance to count upon from his ally, - to oppose his 80,000 men to what he supposed to be Napoleon's whole force. Bliicher was, however, of an impulsive character, apt to mistake hopes for realities, and there is no doubt that he both expected the arrival of his missing corps in time to take part in the battle, and also some degree of assistance from the Duke of Wellington. This being so, he was perhaps justified in determining to fight rather than to retreat still further in the face of the enemy, and thus disspirit his troops at the very opening of the campaign.

Dealing first with the right and centre, whose movements involve little subject for controversy, and which were under Napoleon's more immediate control, we find that upon the morning of the 1 6th, the Emperor wrote a letter from Charleroi to Marshal Grouchy, entrusting him with the command of the 3rd and 4th corps, "as commander of the right wing" of the army. This letter could not have been written later than eight o'clock A.M. To these troops were added the cavalry of Pajol, Milhaud, and Excelmans, and with them Grouchy is directed to advance forthwith to Sombref - the cavalry and the 3rd corps (Vandamme) leading - the 4th corps (Gerard) to follow immediately, though by a different road, in order to avoid any crowding {encombrements) at Fleurus, whither the Emperor was about to direct the Reserve. Napoleon expresses his intention of attacking the enemy if at Sombref, or even if it was to be found as far back as Gembloux, in order that it might be cleared out of the way. He would then be able with no loss of time to combine his operations with those of the left wing, and be free to march on Brussels next morning, or possibly the same evening. He concludes by telling Grouchy that he has no reason to expect, from reports to hand, that the Prussians will be able to oppose to him more than 40,000 men.

These movements Grouchy proceeded to effect, the Emperor himself with the Guard coming up to Fleurus before one o'clock, and the left wing was promptly formed in order of battle, in accordance with Napoleon's plan of attacking the enemy wherever he should find him.

The 6th corps (Lobau), numbering rather more than 10,000 men, seems to have been strangely neglected in Napoleon's orders. It had bivouacked the evening before close to Charleroi, and, indeed, was not across the river. It was allowed to remain there throughout the morning of the 16th, no orders for its advance being despatched till the battle of Ligny had actually begun. Eventually it was directed to move to the support of Napoleon, but only arrived on the field as the battle was ending, and it took no active part in the engagement. Thus Napoleon, apparently with deliberation, refused to avail himself of the services of 10,000 men, whose prompt interposition at a critical moment might have been of inestimable value. It is even stated by Charras that Lobau was left a discretion as to which wing of the army he should follow, though eventually instructed to attach himself to the right and centre.

Several inferences maybe drawn from Napoleon's conduct in respect to this corps. Taken together with the statement to Grouchy, that the Prussians could not oppose to the French more than 40,000 men, it may be regarded as an indication that Napoleon, being deceived as to the strength of the enemy which he was about to meet, neglected to bring up Lobau because he supposed he would have no use for him, or that, as is more probable, at a moment when his whole army was engaged against the allies, the Emperor may have thought it prudent to retain a reserve of 10,000 fresh troops which he might employ as occasion should direct, in case of disaster on either wing. Further allusion will be made to this matter in discussing the battle of Ligny itself ; for the moment it is sufficient to note that throughout the morning of the 16th the 6th corps was in bivouac near Charleroi.

After conducting the operations of his wing until the close of the 15th, the Marshal returned to the Emperor's headquarters, where, over supper, a lengthy interview took place. Whatever may have been the exact tenor of Napoleon's earlier verbal instructions as to the occupation of Quatre Bras, there can be no doubt that Ney reported at this interview what he had actually done - that Quatre Bras had not been occupied - that only his advance columns had got as far as Frasne, and that D'Erlon was scarcely yet across the river. If Grouchy was present at this interview, this must be the occasion to which he refers when he says that he had himself heard Napoleon * " blame Ney for having suspended the movement of his troops upon the 15th, instead of keeping himself to the execution, pure and simple, of his instructions, which ordered him to march on Quatre Bras. ,, None the less the blame, if blame there was, cannot have been very severe, nor can it have interrupted the friendly relations existing between Ney and his master. It may be assumed that Napoleon gave the Marshal an outline of the operations he proposed for the day which was about to dawn, for upon his departure we find Ney conferring with Reille at Gosselies, and ordering him to set out as soon as he could, and get his troops together at Frasne. This may or may not have been in consequence of Napoleon's instructions. No written instructions reached Ney till after 10 A.M., and it was not till an hour later that Reille actually moved forward from Gosselies. We have therefore to consider whether, in the absence of definite written instructions, Ney was fulfilling his duty in * Observations by Grouchy on Gourgand's Narrative (Philadelphia, 1 818).

If, throughout this campaign, nothing more was expected from such commanders as Ney and Grouchy than a blind adherence to the letter of their instructions, then it will not be difficult to justify in the main their entire course of action ; but, as has been said, Napoleon looked to his immediate subordinates for co-operation as much as for obedience. He took them very completely into his confidence, explained to them his hopes and projects in terms very different from those of peremptory command, and expected, and had much right to expect, as full an appreciation of the spirit as of the letter of his instructions. Assuming that a certain latitude was allowed to Ney over and beyond his formal orders, it cannot be maintained that, even on abstract grounds, the Marshal was justified in adopting a course of inaction from sunrise until eleven o'clock A.M. For there was definite work to be done, left over from the day before, to which the instructions of the day before, in the absence of others, clearly applied, and this work was to collect the tardy corps of D'Erlon, and bring it up to the support of Reille. Here there can be no question as to orders. Every order given to D'Erlon on the day before was to the effect that he was to keep close to Reille, "vous prendrez des positions qui vous rapprocheront de Reille - pour appuyer Reille et le seconder dans ses operations - Vintention est que

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Nor can there be any question that these precise orders had not been carried out. We left the 1st corps at Marchiennes, upon the Sambre. There it remained throughout the remainder of the 15th, three of its divisions bivouacking on the north bank of the river, but one division, at evening time, had not yet come up, and so was not across the Sambre that day.

The work of Ney, therefore, was clear. If there were no fresh instructions from the Emperor, there were the incompleted instructions of the day before to fulfil.

The first communication which passed between Napoleon and Ney shows the anxiety of the former upon this very matter. He wishes to know " if the first corps has operated its movement, and what is this morning the exact position of the 1st and 2nd Corps d'Armee!' The Emperor had to learn that, far from seconding, supporting, or joining Reille, at 6 A.M. in the morning the whole of the 1st corps was not yet across the river, and no part of it was more than a short march in advance of Marchiennes. There is no intention here of fixing upon Ney the original backwardness of this corps. His responsibilities did not begin till five o'clock in the evening of the 1 5 th, but from that moment he was bound to use every effort to consolidate his force, for as long as it was disunited it

At the same time it is impossible to attribute Ney's inaction to any natural dilatoriness or want of energy. We may presume that he was acting on general principles, and must look at each part of his conduct in relation to the whole. Upon the 1 6th, while the battle of Quatre Bras was in progress, in spite of precise instructions to the contrary, Ney proposed to keep half his available force in reserve at Frasnes. It may therefore be inferred, with very considerable probability, that throughout there was a deliberate intention on Ney's part to keep the ist corps well in the rear, in order that it might act as a reserve to his wing, ready to support him in the event of disaster to the 2nd corps. In his judgment such a course was safe and prudent. It was such a course as Napoleon himself adopted in regard to the 6th corps. We must not quarrel with Ney for having a judgment of his own. It has been specially claimed for Napoleon's generals that they were expected to co-operate with their master, not merely to obey blindly. But when Ney, on his own judgment, ventured deliberately to follow a course opposed to his instructions from head-quarters, it is certainly not unfair that he should be called upon to bear the responsibility for any ill effects which followed from such a determination.

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to. They evince Napoleon's anxiety to know exactly how it stood with the 1st corps. In this first letter, which arrived about 6 A.M., there is, it is true, no word about Quatre Bras, no suggestion that it is to be occupied immediately, much less any precise orders to that effect. But then in this letter there are no orders at all. It is a letter conveying and demanding information. Ney is told that Kellermann's cavalry has been directed on his wing, and is asked for information as to the position of his own force ; and the answer to the question, why no definite instructions were given to seize Quatre Bras, is that Napoleon wanted definite information before he could issue definite instructions.