Waterloo Township (part 4 of 5)

D'Erlon was supported in his advance by a considerable body of Cuirassiers, though his was essentially an infantry attack. A more generous measure of cavalry support, in which arm Napoleons superiority over Wellington particularly lay, would undoubtedly have rendered the movement more effective. Scarcely had D'Erlon's charge traversed the intervening ground between his position and the enemy than the Dutch-Belgians broke and fled. Exposed as they had been to the fire of the French battery, this was scarcely surprising, and the charge of cowardice urged so frequently against them will scarcely bear examination when their exposed situation and their political temper are fairly taken into consideration. The duty of repelling the French charge now fell upon Piack's Highland Regiments. These troops had suffered severely at Quatre Bras, but their courage and spirit were unimpaired, and taking up their line in rear of a cross-road, the bank of which served to some degree as a protection to them, they prepared to meet the enemy's advance. Formed up in squares, they met the shock with invincible determination not to yield an inch, and when at last the enemy began to give way before the deadly volleys poured in upon their front, with 'fixed bayonets the Scotch brigade rushed upon the right flank of the column, and the fight was waged hand-to-hand with desperate bravery on botii sides - the muskets almost muzzle to muzzle, and the colours of the 32nd Regiment being for a moment in danger. It was now that Kempt's Brigade ^as ordered to charge, an order conveyed by the v/oice of Sir Thomas Picton, who was shot down | and killed at the moment of uttering it. D'Erlon's men resisted with the greatest steadiness and determination, but, unable to deploy, and huddlejd to- gether in unwieldy masses, they were forced to give ground, while the Highlanders and English Regiments rushed over the bank of the road in pursuit. There was, however, great danger of the British being taken in the flanks by the immense masses who composed D'Erlon's right and left columns, and to avert this disaster Lord Uxbridge ordered up the Union Brigade of heavy Dragoons, commanded by Sir William Ponsonby. The Highland infantry opened out its ranks to let the Dragoons pass, some of the 92nd in their enthusiasm seizing the stirrup-leathers of the horses that they might be carried along to share in the glories of the cavalry charge. The shriek of the bagpipes contended with shouts of "Scotland for ever," and above all, the roar of artillery, and the cries of the wounded, combined to make a music in harmony with the wild rush of battle which now began. The Greys were directed against the centre columns, and nothing could stand against their impetuosity. The Eagle of the 45th Regiment was captured, and the enemy fled in confusion up the incline, down which they had just charged, to regain their original positions. In the meantime the Royals were equally active upon the French left columns, and not to be outdone by the Scots Greys, the Eagle of the 105th Regiment was captured by Sergeant Styles. On this side the enemy offered a less determined resistance. Numbers threw down their arms, and the Inniskilling Dragoons, sweeping them upon the flank, those who were not killed were taken prisoners, to the number in all of between 2000 . and 3000 men. The rout of D'Erlon's columns was, however, to some extent checked by the French Cuirassiers, who formed to receive the charge of the heavy brigade, and the effect of the British success was also materially diminished by the fact that enthusiasm carried it beyond the limits of discretion. The British cavalry followed their beaten enemy almost up to their lines, sabring the gunners and disabling many guns ; thus they fell victims in great numbers to the cavalry of Milhaud, which took them in a position of isolation. Sir William Ponsonby, getting separated from the Royals, was killed by a detachment of Polish Lancers, and when eventually, after three-quarters of an hour of dreadful carnage, the remains of the regiments engaged were collected under cover of a small wood to the left, it was found that the Royals were almost completely destroyed, and of the Inniskillings and Scots Greys scarcely one-half remained. Td cover the pursuit of the broken British cavalry, the Light Dragoons of Vandeleur were advanced from the left, and they handled severely some of the French infantry still in the hollow between the contending lines. They then advanced against the pursuing Lancers and Chasseurs. Durutte's column, however, which had not shared in the general rout of D'Erlon's corps, directed a heavy fire from a protected position behind a ridge upon the advancing light troops,

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Three out of the four French columns had, however, been thrown into confusion, and the main attack, which, if successful, would have broken the English line and surrendered Wellington's central position into the hands of the enemy, had failed. It failed partly because of its unwieldy formation, partly because it was not efficiently supported by cavalry, but chiefly because of the steadiness and splendid pluck of the troops opposed to it. The least wavering at the moment when the French were upon the crest of the British position, and the battle would have been compromised, if not lost. At any rate, a great measure of success would have been won by the French, which, coming at the very beginning of the engagement, would have animated them for further efforts in proportion as it would have dispirited the British for further resistance. In fact, D'Erlon's charge was critical in the extreme. The Duke of Wellington regarded it as the most serious attack made during the day, and though its repulse must not be taken as absolutely decisive of the general issue, yet its influence upon the final victory can scarcely be over-estimated.

i In the meantime, while the Highlanders were repelling the attack of the centre columns, Quiot was assailing La Haie Sainte, which was held by Baring with the light troops of the King's German Legion,

The ground in the neighbourhood of the farm was intersected by sand-pits, from which the riflemen could keep up an unseen and deadly fire upon the French should they occupy the walls. The King's Germans resisted desperately, but none the less the French occupied the orchard, and were pressing up to the buildings, driving the riflemen to seek refuge from their rifle-pits among their own ranks. At this moment a reinforcement was despatched by the Duke to the support of Baring, who, thus strengthened, sought to regain the orchard and garden which had been lost. The French Cuirassiers now dashed in, and were carrying all before them, when Lord Uxbridge ordered the advance of the Household troops under Lord Edward Somerset, consisting of the ist and 2nd Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards Blue, and the ist Dragoons. The impact of the opposing bodies of cavalry was terrific, the troops engaging hand-to-hand, the steel clashing and flashing upon helmets, casques, and cuirasses. The French were compelled to give way, the Household troops in hot pursuit, until the high road, off which La Haie Sainte stands, was choked with a seething mass of horses and of men, penned in between the high banks on each side. In such a situation it was difficult to recognise friend or foe. Many of the Life Guards fell victims to the fire of the French infantry gathered on the banks above, while the British artillery was sending in a heavy fire upon the serried masses of the enemy gathered in the high road. La Haie Sainte, however) was for the time relieved, and the repulse of D'Erlon's left by this operation was made even more complete*

This great general movement, beginning between 1 and 1.30, was not over 'till 3 o'clock. While preparations for it were being made, and before D'Erlon had advanced from his position, Napoleon had seen upon his right some troops advancing by way of St Lambert. He believed them, or affected to believe them, to be the troops of Grouchy advancing to his support, and seems at first to have had no apprehension that they were the advance guard of the Prussian army. He was at the moment writing a despatch to Grouchy, which is dated, "The Field of Waterloo, June 18, 1 P.M.," and he therein acknowledged the receipt of Grouchy's letter of 2 A.M. " You have written this morning at two o'clock that you would march on Sart-a- Walhain. Your design, then, is to move on Corbaix or Wavre. This movement is conformable to his Majesty's arrangements, which have been made known to you. However, the Emperor orders me to tell you that you should constantly manoeuvre in our direction, . . . and be always prepared to fall upon any of the enemy's troops which may endeavour to annoy our right and crush them.

This letter serves to illustrate the confusion in Napoleon's mind relative to Grouchy's march. When he sees troops at I P.M. at St Lambert, he imagines them to be Grouchy's, though at the moment he is writing to Grouchy, supposing him to be directing his march from Gembloux by way of Sart-a-Walhain and Corbaix or Wavre. Assuming that the Marshal started from Gembloux at 4 A.M., an eight hours' march could not have brought his leading columns to St Lambert by noon. Again, the directions to manoeuvre towards the right of the main body are repeated twice over, conveying the impression that there was some uneasiness on the Emperor's part lest his previous instructions should not have been sufficiently precise. When, therefore, he saw the strange troops at St Lambert, he ought to have been certain that they were not Grouchy's, or, at any rate, he should have had so much doubt upon the subject as to justify the detachment of a considerable body of men from his own right to observe their movements, and, if necessary, impede their progress. Instead of this he merely sent a part of Domon's and Subervie's light cavalry, amounting to about 2400 men, to act purely as a corps of observation. In a very short time a Prussian hussar was brought in as a prisoner, and it was found that he was the bearer of a despatch from Biilow, announcing the arrival of his corps at St Lambert, 30,000 strong, and asking Wellington's instructions as to the disposition of it. Napoleon immediately added a postscript to his letter to Grouchy, which ran thus -

" P.S. - A letter, which has just been intercepted, tells that General Biilow is about to attack our flank. We believe we see this corps on the heights of St Lambert, so lose not an instant in drawing near and joining us in order to crush Biilow, whom you will catch red-handed (en flagrant delity

The divisions of Lobau's 6th corps, about 7000 men, were now detached in support of Subervie's cavalry, and thus the force which was to have supported D'Erlon found itself, at the moment when it was wanted for that purpose, actively engaged on quite another part of the field.

This letter, addressed to Grouchy, could have no influence upon his movements. It is an indication that Napoleon needed his assistance sorely, but is in no way an indication that Grouchy could have come. Had that Marshal, very early in the morning, directed himself upon the Bridges of the Dyle he might have been to some extent within touch of the main army by the afternoon, but he had adopted a different course, believing that by marching direct upon Wavre he was best fulfilling the Emperor's intentions, and by the time the I P.M. despatch reached him, at a late hour in the evening, he was fully engaged with Thiele-

Still, even without Grouchy's assistance, the Emperor had an opportunity, which he entirely let slip, of delaying the Prussian advance materially. The ground between St Lambert and the battlefield was intersected by the Lasne stream and its various tributary rivulets, and was rendered peculiarly difficult by the heavy rains of the preceding days. The Prussian march had already been arduous, and its last stages were to be more arduous still. A comparatively small body of men detached as far as the main stream could have easily occupied 30,000 men for a very considerable time, even if insufficient to stop their progress altogether. The artillery could have been thrown into confusion before Bulow could place it in position, and the weary Prussian soldiers, knee-deep in mud, would have been ill-fitted to break their way through troops refreshed by food and sleep, and animated by a due sense of the importance of their mission upon the main operations of the day. The Anglo-Dutch left was originally weak, and Wellington was in no position to detach a portion of it to take the French marching to the Lasne in flank and rear. Instead of adopting a plan which could scarcely have been more disastrous than that actually adopted, and which offered, at any rate, very fair chances of delaying the Prussians, the Emperor allowed them, practically unchecked, to take position in the field, and limited his own movements to detaching 10,000 men to oppose them only when actually in position. The Prussians were descried at 1, were recognised by 1.30, but were not upon the field, ready to begin, till 4.30. Why were they permitted a period of three hours in which to move unmolested without any serious attempt being made to impede their advance ?

But in the interval between the repulse of D'Erlon's corps and the active intervention of the Prussians, the battle continued to rage along the whole line, and two episodes between the hours of three and six conspicuously demand attention. The first is the renewed attack by the French on La Haie Sainte. and their eventual occupation of it. The second is the great cavalry charge under the command of Ney, which offers many points of analogy with D'Erlon's grand infantry charge a few hours before. Having described these movements and their effects, it will then be time to relate the story of the Prussian attack, and the final scene of all, the advance of the Imperial Guard and its overthrow, involving the overthrow of the whole army.

But there is one fact which must be noticed in regard to all the movements of the battle, - that they were conducted outside the immediate control of the Emperor in person. One of the first effects of the Prussian advance, as soon as it was recognised, was to fully occupy Napoleon's attention. The orders to Lobau to prepare to meet this flank attack, the careful observation of his movements which led to the despatch of the Young Guard as a reinforcement, the consequent repulse of the corps of Btilow, all this closely engaged the Emperor till six in the afternoon, and the movements of the battle in front were left to the conduct of Marshal Ney. If those movements were brilliant or were faulty, it is to Ney that the credit or the blame is chiefly due; and brilliant as they undoubtedly were, it must be acknowledged that they are not altogether beyond the reach of hostile criticism. This fact of the absence of Napoleon from the main battle is duly noted in almost every account, whether contemporary or otherwise, but the natural inference from it is seldom drawn with sufficient force. From three o'clock in the afternoon we must regard the action at Waterloo as two battles and not as one, requiring two commanders and not one, demanding their presence in very different parts of the field, and rendering any superintendence by one of them over the operations of the other practically impossible.

Any further description of these two battles, which were taking place at the same time upon the same field, must be prefaced by a remark, which is doubtless of general application to all battles, but which, in a special degree, applies to the engagement at Waterloo. It is almost impossible to be sure that any view of the fight is absolutely correct. This uncertainty arises not from any lack of materials, but from the multiplicity of materials by which the subject is overlaid. The ultimate testimony must of necessity be that of those who were present on the occasion, and in the multitude of eye-witnesses there is confusion.

To the common soldier, fighting in the ranks, everything outside the little circuit of his own operations is chaos. His impression of the whole is distorted by his experience of a very small part, and at the moment of a general victory, he may be under the impression that defeat stares him in the face.* Even the regimental officers know little beyond that which immediately concerns them, and their narratives must be received with the greatest caution. And with the generals in command, and even with the general-in-chief, it is much the same. On matters of detail they speak with many and with contradictory voices, and yet it is on details that campaigns are lost and won. The relations of eye-witnesses, in short, are in a large degree untrustworthy, but it is from such relations alone that descriptions of battles are compiled. The fierce excitement of the fray annihilates time and space, and hence discrepancies, which are little short of grotesque, invalidate the evidence on which, perforce, we must form our judgments. A simple illustration of this maybe found in the various statements given by those most competent to speak with authority as to the time when the action began. Contemporary letters say, " towards eleven " or " about half-past eleven." Wellington says, "at about 10." Alava, the Spanish attach^ on Wellington's staff, says " at 10.30." "Towards noon," says Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian attach^. "About 1," says Alten, and Ney corroborates his statement. " About noon " is the statement of Napoleon.

When there are such variations of opinion about a matter open to the accurate observation of all, we must expect to find even greater discrepancies as to the occurrences which took place in the heat of action, and so it is that in reference to the occupation of La Haie Sainte by the French, we have the testimony of eye-witnesses to the effect that it took place at 2 o'clock, at 3.30, about 5 o'clock, while Lord Wolseley is convinced that it was about 6 P.M.

Thus, in attempting to describe the defence and capture of this important post, we are met at the outset by difficulties and doubts exactly where certainty is the first essential, for the hour at which La Haie Sainte was captured by the French is the very governing point of subsequent criticism. If the French were in possession of the place before their grand cavalry charge, Ney is open to the imputation of neglecting to profit by all the opportunities which the position afforded fgr the support of that charge. If, on the other hand, the charge was made before the occupation, it is obvious that La Haie Sainte could not be used as a support to the French cavalry. The Duke of Wellington, of all men on the field, was likely to know best when the place was taken. Writing to a correspondent two months after the battle, he says, " This (position) they got, I think, at about two o'clock. ... At about two in the afternoon, as I have before said, they got possession of the farm-house on the high-road, . . . and they then took possession of a small mound on the left of the high-road going from Brussels, immediately opposite the gate of the farm, and they were never removed from thence till I commenced the attack in the evening." *

Yet, if this be true, it implies that La Haie Sainte was seized by D'Erlon's left column, which, as a fact, was driven back by the charges of the Household troops. A non-commissioned cavalry officer, who was engaged in the action round the farm, declares that it fell into the hands of the French "soon after five o'clock." Critics are as much at variance as eye-witnesses, and this being so, it is well to walk circumspectly through the details of Waterloo, and to temper judgment with some amount of prudent doubt as to whether it all was as we suppose it to have been. " In an action such as Waterloo," says Quinet, " it seems that the

* The Duke, believing the battle began about 10, means to say that La Haie Sainte was captured when the fight had been in progress about four hours.

most decisive incidents should to-day be known with sufficient exactness to make mistake impossible, and it is the contrary which is the case. However superficially one enters into the history of that day, it is astonishing to see how many obscurities and contradictions still remain, how many uncertainties in the relation of important events. Did such a phase of the battle precede or follow another phase ? Was such a village taken ? or such a farm occupied? At what moment was it lost or regained ? Each narrative differs on each of these points, and yet it is on the interconnexion of causes and effects that the real character of a battle depends. Throughout these hundred days there is a chronology which is implacable. Invert it for a moment and everything escapes you."

M. Quinet then proceeds to give a most vivid description of the fight. His chronology - so implacable - adapts itself to his glowing picture, and not a sign betrays the man who, a few pages before, has so clearly warned us that when we think we know, then, perhaps, we are most mistaken. "The history of a battle/' wrote the Duke of Wellington, six weeks after Waterloo, " is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individual may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost, but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which, they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value and importance."

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But as to the hour when La Haie Sainte was occupied there are certain probabilities which must be taken into account, and it is certainly more incredible that Ney, in possession of the farm, should have neglected to use it in support of his cavalry charges than that he was not in possession of the place at the hour when the charges were made. The statements, too, of Sir J. Shaw Kennedy, who was throughout the battle upon the English right centre, and of Heymes, who was Ney's chief-of-staff, and therefore close to him all day, should carry more weight on such a point than even the testimony of the Duke himself, whose mind was occupied with the direction of the whole action, and who, while repelling an attack, would probably be oblivious of time. These officers state that it was after the cavalry charges that La Haie Sainte fell. Though with much diffidence and hesitation of judgment, we may conclude, with strong probability of being correct, that there was no fixed and formal interval between the one operation and the other ; that the attack on La Haye was contemporaneous, at any rate to some extent, with the charges of the cavalry ; that both movements were cheered on and stimulated by the enthusiasm of Ney, and that the moment the farm was seized, he made use of it to the best advantage as a point d'apptii against the English centre. Just as the attack on Hougomont is a distinct phase of the battle, though it went on all day and at times blended with other movements, so the atack upon and capture of La Haie Sainte is a distinct phase, though other operations in the battle were being carried on side by side with it.

The repulse of D'Erlon's columns was followed up by a tremendous cannonade from each side, and by the descent of clouds of skirmishers into the hollow ground between the positions. Further operations against Wellington's left were impossible until the French right wing had some time allowed it to re-establish itself, and the reserves which might have supported it in its renewed attack were now needed for the battle on the flank. Moreover, there still stood, immediately fronting the allied centre, the stronghold of La Haie Sainte, occupied by Baring's Hanoverians, now reduced to a mere handful of men.

It was then, to the roar and thunder of the cannonade, that Ney collected first of all such infantry as might be efficient for his purpose. There were but few of these, for the right had not yet recovered from its repulse, the left was too hotly engaged at Hougomont, the reserves were marching to confront Btilow. He had to rely upon D'Erlon's left division, or such part of it as was available, and upon two battalions of Donzelot's division, which had already suffered severely. With these La Haie Sainte was vigorously beset. The garden and orchard were carried at the first assault, but no sooner were the French in possession than Baring's Hanoverians drove them out. Again they returned to the attack, and seized the ground once more, the Hanoverians retreating step bystep and contesting every inch of the way. As they advanced within the protecting walls of the building, a deadly fire was poured in upon the French from the crenellated walls, and from scaffoldings erected hastily for purposes of cover and defence, but the undaunted enemy pressed on up to the very muskets as they protruded, seeking to snatch them from the hands of the besieged. In the meantime Baring was sorely in need of reinforcements and ammunition. The last was hard to obtain, for ammunition was running short all along the line, and the road which would bring it to La Haie Sainte was full under fire of the French batteries. Each shot, therefore, was carefully husbanded and aimed with deadly effect. Help at length arrived in the shape of some Nassauers, but the besiegers, now as five to one, were hammering upon the main doors, which opened on to the high-road, with axes and crowbars, while the gates on the western side were being forced in the same manner. In addition to the work of defence, the defenders were called upon to extinguish the flames which were blazing up in the farm buildings. The great camp kettles of the Nassauers served as buckets, and under a constant stream pouring from them the flames were extinguished ; but, the work of active resistance being for a brief space intermitted, the Hanoverians and their supporters were unable to check the rush of the French upon the western door. It was broken in, and La Haie Sainte was in the hands of Ney, Baring and his little band retreating under fire upon the main position. At once great masses of men poured in through the open doors and took up their positions immediately under the ridge which defined the British line. By this time it must have been between five and six o'clock, when Wellington was hard put to it to find men to resist the cavalry attack. Accordingly the 5th and 8th battalions of the King's German Legion were advanced down the ridge in order to check the fire from La Haie Sainte. A small body of Lord Edward Somerset's cavalry was sent in support of the 5th, so that regiment suffered but slightly, but the 8th battalion was terribly mauled, losing more than half its men and its colours.

But, on the side of the French, the cost of gaining and maintaining the position was enormous. Two thousand of their men were reported to have fallen in the operations at and around La Haie Sainte, though these figures probably represent the total number, French and allies, who fell there. In any case the French loss was enormous, and what was more serious, to a large extent unnecessary. For here, as at Hougomont, the impetuous ardour of the French blinded them to considerations ,of prudence. A hand-to-hand attack, however gallant, against an enemy defended by stone walls is never economical of time or life, and time and men were, at this juncture, what Napoleon chiefly required. If, instead of trying to carry La Haie Sainte by assault, the walls had first been demolished by artillery, the capture of the place must have been more easily effected and at much less cost. The French justly pride themselves upon their elan in the field, but reckless impetuosity dissociated from wise precaution, unquestionably cost them dear upon the field of Waterloo.

However, La Haie Sainte was won, and general success began to attend upon the French right. The troops of Donzelot and Marcognet, now resting on La Haie Sainte, were engaging Kempt, Pack, and Bylandt, while Durutte was successful in driving Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar from Papelotte and making himself master of that position.

While the French were gaining these advantages upon the right, Ney in the meantime was organising a grand cavalry movement upon the allied right-centre. The infantry of Reille's corps should have occupied the space intervening between Hougomont and La Haie Sainte, but it was already so fully engaged at Hougomont that no part of it could be spared for operations elsewhere. Lobau's divisions, which might have sup- ported Reille, were already moving against the Prussians towards Planchenoit. Accordingly this space was unoccupied, and a considerable gap left in the French line of attack between these two positions.

Shortly after 3 P.M. Milhaud's Cuirassiers were ordered to take position upon this open ground. With them were the light cavalry of Lefebvre- Desnouettes and Kellermann, and Guyot's dragoons were also advanced forward in support. The attack was heralded by thunders of artillery from the French batteries, which maintained a continuous fire, while Ney was receiving the cavalry squadrons which defiled in the hollow on the left of La Haie Sainte. To avoid the cannonade, which was dealing serious destruction in his ranks, the Duke of Wellington withdrew his troops from the summit of the ridge and formed them in squares en echiquier upon the sloping ground behind it. The artillery alone were left upon the crest, and an incessant fire was poured in upon the advancing cavalry until the gunners were compelled to abandon their guns and take refuge in the protecting British squares. Cuirassiers and lancers dashed up the slope, and soon held the summit of the ridge, which a moment before had been the allied position, but their task was only now begun. In front of them were the infantry of Alten's and Cooke's divisions, formed in impenetrable squares, constituting two lines - seven squares in the first line, six in the second - each resting upon the other as the spaces on a chess-board. The redcoats of the English guards alternated with the dark uniforms of the Hanoverian and King's German Legion. All alike, as the flashing torrent broke upon them, held firm as if rooted to the ground, " pouring in a deadly fire of musketry from the lines and of small shot from the guns posted at the corners of each square." The ground was heavy from the recent rains, and this took off something from the impetuosity of the French charge, but none the less it was tremendous in its intensity and earnestness, and the fate of Europe at this crisis hung trembling in the balance. The short stern order " Close up the ranks " mingled with the sharp rattle of the musketry and the fierce shouts of "Vive rEmpereur," and if a breach was made, at once the ranks were closed and the serried front remained, still impenetrable. And now trie French horsemen, exposed to the pitiless fire, front and flank, of the allied squares, began to fall into confusion. They had gained the plateau, but there was no supporting infantry to maintain it^ Herein lay the cause which rendered the cavalry charge ineffectual. Unsupported by infantry there was no alternative between breaking the line and retreat, and the line could not be broken. Ney recognised the inevitable and sounded the rally. At once the Duke of Wellington seized the favourable moment, and while the French were still in disorder they were charged by the allied cavalry under Somerset. As they descended the slope,

Wellington's artillerymen at once sprang from the protection of the squares to their guns, which still crowned the ridge, and directed a heavy fire upon the discomfited mass below. The danger, however, was only averted for a moment. Though the cuirassiers had failed, Lefebvre Desnouettes still commanded two thousand sabres, while the heavy dragoons under Kellermann and Guyot remained untouched. Ney promptly put himself at the head of the lancers and charged the pursuing cavalry of the allies, which paid the penalty of an over-rash impetuosity by fearful losses, and by a forced retreat behind the English lines. And now, refreshed by a short breathing space, cuirassiers and lancers once more invaded the plateau, nerved for an effort more strenuous than before. The attack was characterised by all the features of the former one, and the result was the same. The want of infantry was fatal to success, unless the squares could be broken. "Infantry!" said Napoleon bitterly, in answer to Ney's urgent request, " where can I get them from ? - Would you have me make them ? " It is at this juncture of the battle that we can first form an estimate of the influence of the Prussian advance. Had Lobau's ten thousand men been now available, to hold the plateau which the cavalry had won, there can be no doubt that Wellington's line would have been broken and that he would have experienced a disastrous defeat. But Lobau was now holding Planchenoit against Biilow, and failing his or other support, these repeated cavalry charges ought not to have been made. The issue, however, was now definitely committed to the touch of cavalry, and every available man was called upon for a supreme effort. Even the brief respite between the attacks was charged with destruction, for the artillery fire from the English position kept plunging in upon the ranks below, cutting deep pathways through them. Inaction was as fatal as action, and the English squares must be broken. Accordingly Guyot and Kellermann were ordered to support the remnant of Milhaud's and Lefebvre's men, and for two hours cuirassiers alternated with dragoons in desperate assault against the allies. The Duke of Wellington had anticipated these renewed onsets by reforming and materially strengthening his position. Glasses division of light infantry was drawn in from Braine LAlleud and formed behind the Brunswick contingent: two brigades of Clinton's division were brought up from around Merbe Braine and posted upon the right flank : Maitland's guards, together with Mitchell's brigade of Colville's division, hitherto stationed in the rear as a reserve, were brought forward to the front, while Vincke's Hanoverian brigade was moved across the Charleroi road in support of Alten's division, which had especially suffered from the repeated charges of the French.

The resources of each army were now employed to the fully and each was resolute for victory. If the Duke's position were forced, the day was lost.

His left was barely holding its own, and unless Ziethen's column arrived soon, it must give way. Hougomont was in flames ; the centre was menaced by the full force of Ney's cavalry, and Bulow's corps was held by Lobau. No further reserves were to be had. " Tell him," said the Duke to Halkett's request for relief, " that we must stay where we are while one man remains alive." Disaster at any one point meant disaster everywhere, while successful resistance to Ney meant victory all along the line. Delay in winning implied for the French ultimate defeat, for Ziethen's arrival must soon re-establish the allied left, while the co-operation of Pirch, who was rapidly marching to support BUlow, would render the main Prussian attack irresistible.

Ney was ignorant of the near approach of the Prussian reinforcements, but none the less he conducted the attack with more than his wonted ardour. The allied squares were beset on every side. " The cavalry surrounded us," wrote the Duke to Beresford, " as if it had been our own." The Duke himself, with the Prince of Orange and several other general officers, sought safety within the squares, and animated the men with stirring words of encouragement. " Stand firm, 95th," he cried ; " think what they will say of this in England ! "

A few isolated cavaliers succeeded in penetrating the position, and turned to charge it en revers. To a man they fell victims to their heroic temerity.

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The allied cavalry were once more brought into play, but were soon reduced to a force less than that of an ordinary regiment. Cumberland's Brunswick Hussars turned and fled ; not a man of them responded to Lord Uxbridge, as he called them on to the charge. Ompteda was killed, Alten seriously wounded, and scarcely a staff officer was left to carry the Duke's orders. Still the squares stood unbroken, and the force of the attack was wearing itself away. The French loss was as great as ours, if not greater; only the prompt support of infantry could render effective such success as had been attained. It was now that, having relieved Lobau at Planchenoit, Napoleon determined to advance the remaining battalions of the Imperial Guard - his last reserve - to clench the work that through so many hours his cavalry had been doing upon the plateau of Mont St Jean, and it was now, too, that upon the extreme left of the allies was heard the sharp rattle of musketry, which announced to Wellington that Ziethen had debouched upon the open ground, and was joining his forces to those of Prince Bernhard, to drive the French from Papelotte.

The Prussian dispositions on the morning of the 1 8th have already been shown. Between twelve and one Billow's corps was observed by the Emperor, and two squadrons of light cavalry were despatched to watch it. An order was sent to Grouchy to manoeuvre towards his left, so as to join forces with Napoleon, and catch Bulow en flagrant de'lit. Later still, Lobau's corps was moved upon Planchenoit, so as to guard against an attack from the rear, which, if successful, would cut Napoleon's communications and close his line of retreat. But while thus taking precautions against Billow, the Emperor by no means realised the full gravity of his situation. He knew nothing of Pirch, who was already well forward from Wavfe to support Biilow. He knew nothing of Ziethen, who was marching under cover of wood and undulating ground to co-operate directly with Wellington's left. He believed that he had before him an isolated corps, which would be taken between, two fires - Grouchy's and his own - and which would consequently soon be annihilated, thus rendering his victory on that day even more decisive than he had anticipated. Lulled by such false hopes, he omitted to intercept the Prussians at the passages of the Lasne, and allowed them to deploy, practically unmolested, upon the open ground beyond the wood of Paris towards Planchenoit. Billow's difficulties, however, were very great. His men had been marching since early morning, his divisions were not together, and the ground was so heavy as to be almost impassable for artillery. It was not, therefore, until 4.30 that two of Billow's four divisions were in position, together with their cavalry, under Prince William

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Lobau's command numbered rather less than 10,000 men, and consisted of two brigades of cavalry under Domon and Subervie, and two divisions of infantry under Simmer and Jeannin. Teste's division, which formed a part of the 6th corps, was with Grouchy. Billow's force was nearly three times as great, though of very inferior calibre. At first able to hold his own, and indeed to gain some success over the Prussians, yet when Billow's corps was consolidated, disparity of numbers compelled Lobau to retreat. This he did, in close order and with admirable steadiness, upon Planchenoit. Here he took position, determined to sacrifice the last man for the protection of the rear of the main army. Napoleon now despatched to his assistance eight battalions of the Young Guard, and these troops held the village, enabling Lobau to cover the entire flank of the main army, his right resting on Planchenoit, his left in touch with Durutte's division in and about Papelotte, a movement which had the effect of separating Bulow from Wellington, and which might have been decisive of the battle, but for the appearance of Ziethen later on in the day. And now this battle on the flank was carried on with desperate determination on both sides, but with doubtful fortunes almost to the end. Blucher's artillery, posted most advantageously upon the high ground which overlooked the field, poured a shower of shot and shell upon Planchenoit and its defenders. Under cover of this cannonade the Prussians vigorously assaulted the village, but were repulsed by the Young Guard. A second assault was more successful. Overpowered by numbers, the French were driven out, and several Prussian batteries were successfully posted in such close proximity to the main chaussee that Napoleon's reserve around La Belle Alliance was threatened by their shot. Three additional battalions were at once moved forward by the Emperor to the support of the Young Guard, and this timely reinforcement once more established the fight. Planchenoit was again invested by the French, the Prussians being driven from the village at the point of the sword, and rolled back as far as Maransart. The advantage thus won was followed up by Lobau upon the left, who, engaging Billow's remaining divisions, forced them also to retire in considerable confusion. The danger from the Prussians seemed now to be over. So long as the French held Planchenoit, Napoleon's position could not be turned, and while Lobau continued to present a steady front along the entire flank of the main army, any active co-operation with Wellington on the part of Bulow was impossible. But the real danger remained unseen. It was about seven o'clock that two divisions of Pirch's corps - some 15,000 strong - came up to the support of Biilow, and about the same hour, or a little later, Ziethen's columns effected a junction with Wei- lington's left. The arrival of these reinforcements turned the day against Napoleon. So far the intervention of 30,000 Prussians had but postponed his victory. They had, it is true, occupied the entire corps of Lobau, as well as several battalions of the Imperial Guard, which had been destined to support the earlier attacks upon the allies, but in their main object, to turn the Emperor's position and take him at once in flank and rear, they had entirely failed ; it even seemed as if they would be involved in the defeat which threatened to overtake the army of Wellington. But, reinforced by Pirch and Ziethen, the Prussians by mere weight of numbers became irresistible, and a battle which for eight hours had waged with indomitable steadiness on both sides, but on the whole with advantage to the French, was in an hour converted into a deplorable rout, into total ruin at the very moment when success seemed imminent.

At the moment when Napoleon judged the crisis of the battle to have arrived, he determined, as at Ligny, to put in the Imperial Guard, or rather those battalions of the Guard which still remained at his disposition.

glorious deed of all, when splendid gallantry and fine soldiership combined to repulse an attack made by the flower of Napoleon's armies, troops whose mere intervention in an engagement had hitherto been regarded as an assurance of victory.

The infantry of the Guard were all picked soldiers, distinguished by length of service and brilliant achievements. The Old Guard (Grenadiers) consisted exclusively of those who, in addition to distinguished exploits, could show twelve years' service in the army. Every member of the Middle Guard (Chasseurs) had served eight years, and of the Young Guard at least four years. Each of these corps of Guards contained eight battalions, with about 500 men to each battalion. At the beginning of the campaign of Waterloo the total muster of the infantry of the Guard was about 13,000 men.*

Of this number, however, only a small proportion was available for the final attack upon Wellington. Duhesme's eight battalions were already engaged at Planchenoit, and to these had been added one battalion of Grenadiers and two of Chasseurs under Morand. Thus eleven out of twenty-four battalions were fully occupied with the Prussians, and of five other battalions two were disposed between Planchenoit and the main chausse'e, one near Caillou, and two at La Belle Alliance. Thus but eight battalions were available for the final charge, numbering, when allowance has been made for losses at Ligny, at the most 3500 men, and probably little more than 3000. These were formed by Napoleon himself in columns of battalions, with a front of two companies in three ranks. As there were four companies to a battalion, the front of the column would consist of between seventy and eighty men - "about seventies in front," says Captain Powell of the English Guards. Halting in the dip by La Haie Sainte, the Emperor addressed his invincible bodyguard in a few stirring words, and then entrusted them to the hands of Ney, who led them in person against the English position. The point of attack for the head of the column was that part of the ridge just behind which Maitland's Guards were lying down. With drums beating and colours flying the French infantry moved steadily forward, " as if on parade," and reaching the foot of the ridge, dashed impetuously up it, seeing no enemy to contest their progress. Scarcely, however, had they reached the ridge, when the British Guards sprang to their feet, and from a front of 450 men, four deep, so deadly a volley was poured into the advancing column that it suddenly stopped, as if from the impact of an irresistible mass, then wavered and fell into confusion as the front ranks dropped under the British fire, and finally, when Lord Saltoun opportunely gave the word to charge, fled down the hill, hotly pursued by our Household troops. The rear battalions of the Imperial Guard were not, however, involved in this overthrow. They, as the advance column proceeded, inclined, according to Maitland's account, towards their own left, and proceeded in a line parallel with that of the leading battalions, and thus, as the English Guards charged down the hill, they found themselves exposed upon their flank to what they imagined to be a second column of the Imperial Guard, though, in reality, it was a part of the original column, deflected from the prescribed line of advance.* Thus menaced upon their flank, the English Guards withdrew to their original position behind the crest of the ridge.

* This seems to be the true solution of the problem which has vexed all writers upon the Battle of Waterloo from that time until now, and which will doubtless continue to vex the critics of the future - viz., Were there two separate columns of Guards or only one ? The solution, as given in the text, is simple ; it fairly reconciles much conflicting testimony, and it embodies Maitland's idea of what he saw himself. No other theory can pretend to harmonise all the facts to the same degree.

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British line which was held by Adams' Brigade, recently called up from their station in reserve at Merbe Braine. The brigade consisted of the 2nd battalion of the 95th Rifles, the 52nd Regiment, under Sir John Colborne, and the 71st, under Sir Thomas Reynell. As the enemy's column advanced, Colborne, on his own initiative, ordered his regiment to move directly forward to its front, and when its left at the foot of the slope was in line with the leading company of the French column, by a skilfully executed movement, the regiment was formed in line four - deep so as to flank the French column. The position thus assumed by Colborne was hazardous in the extreme, for the regiment was entirely unsupported - detached, in an exposed position, from the main army, liable to be rendered powerless for offensive purposes by a charge of cavalry, liable also to very rough handling from the French artillery if at that time any batteries had been mounted against them.

But the fatal error in the French dispositions for this last attack was now made apparent. The batteries which accompanied the Imperial Guard were rendered useless by the deflection of the rear battalions from their true line. There were no other batteries to do duty for them, and the left of the column was consequently entirely unsupported either by cavalry or artillery. Under these circumstances Colborne's advance was not a desperate act of rashness but an inspiration of genius, which knows how to seize the chance which the moment offers, and the claim of the 52nd - that their movement was decisive of the battle - must be allowed. For the Imperial column, thus taken on the flank, halted in its advance. " Then as many files as possible, on the left of each company of their leading column, faced outwards," and a furious musketry fire was exchanged, by which the gallant 52nd suffered severely, but which, on their own admission, simply overwhelmed the French (une attaque tres vive y qui nous ecrasa). The light troops followed up their fire by a charge, before which the French infantry broke and fled, the companies immediately exposed to the attack in a state of complete confusion - the rear battalions withdrawing in fairly good order towards their position in front of La Belle Alliance.

It was now eight o'clock. About half an hour earlier, distinct above the din of the main battle, there rose the roar of some new firing upon the extreme left of the allies. It could indicate nothing but the arrival of a reinforcement to one side or the other. If it were Grouchy, all was well for Napoleon - and indeed the rumour circulated that it was Grouchy, arrived in the nick of time - but if it were a fresh detachment of Prussians, then Napoleon's chance was gone. It was not Grouchy, but Ziethen with his corps of 20,000 men and 32 guns, who, debouching from the woods around Ohain, now at length, after incredible exertions, came to take his stand by the side of Kempts hardly-pressed division. Ziethen's leading battalions, under Steinmetz, after a brief moment of confusion, when friends were mistaken for foes, joined the troops of Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar, and they together renewed the assault against Papelotte, which, since the first irruption of the Prussians, had become the pivot of the French position, for upon it Durutte's right and Lobau's left respectively rested. The place had been gallantly forced by Durutte two hours before, and as gallantly held against all efforts to retake it ; but now, borne down by force of numbers, the French were compelled to retire, and thus the right of the main army and Lobau's position on its flank were simultaneously turned. Confusion rapidly spread all along the line. Marcognet, Quiot, and Donzelot, holding the crest from Papelotte to La Haie Sainte, were compelled to cease their attack in order to act on the defensive. The brigades of Lambert, Pack, and Kempt, animated with fresh courage by the arrival of the Prussians, drove the French down the slope, while Ziethen's guns, which now crowned the crest, carried destruction into their ranks. At this moment the cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, no longer needed as reserve upon the left, were brought over to the centre, and their charge completed the distress of the French infantry. Many of the battalions broke and fled, all semblance of discipline or of resistance was lost, and their line of flight, crossing as it did the retreat of the routed Imperial Guard, paralysed all the efforts' of the latter to rally, and completed the panic and confusion.

This was the moment chosen by the Duke of Wellington to order a general advance all along the line. His work was now accomplished, and the Prussians might well have been left to complete the victory, but the Duke had no desire to relinquish to his allies the full glory of dealing the last and crowning blow. The advance, therefore, was made by the whole allied force, on front and flank concurrently, and with overwhelming effect. The 52nd followed up their advantage over the Guard by an impetuous advance, which drove everything before it. " Well done, Colborne ! well done ! Go on, don't give them time to rally," was Wellington's greeting to his intrepid lieutenant. Exposing himself freely, the Duke was often in a position of imminent danger, but no remonstrances would induce him to retire, " until I see those fellows go." Lord Uxbridge, as he rode by Wellington's side, had his leg shot off, but the Duke himself and his good horse " Copenhagen " seemed proof against every danger, and remained unscathed throughout the day.

It is needless to dwell further on the last desultory efforts of the French main body to rally from the disasters which had overwhelmed them. Such of the battalions of the Imperial Guard as still retained any organisation did all that was possible, but nothing could now retrieve the demoralisation which prevailed. The Emperor himself was at last compelled to seek safety within one of the squares of the Guard, and thus sheltered he abandoned the field, passing through the wreck of his army along the great chaussee, through Genappe to Charleroi, scarcely drawing bridle. From Charleroi a letter was sent to Grouchy to announce the issue of the day. This was Napoleon's last military despatch. It is with a confession of hopeless and irreparable failure that the great warrior sinks down from the sphere of active affairs into the dull, pitiable obscurity of captivity and exile.

Great as was the overthrow of the French, it would have been even more complete but for the heroic resistance of the 6th corps and of the Guard at Planchenoit. Billow had signally failed in his attack against these gallant troops, and had been compelled to withdraw to some distance beyond his first position. Lobau, with his left resting on Papelotte, his right on the battalions of the Guard in possession of Planchenoit, completely covered the French main battle, and from five o'clock until after 7 P.M. relieved it from all anxiety in regard to the Prussians. The appearance of Ziethen, however, changed the situation, for his successful attack on Papelotte at 7.30 had the effect of turning the

French left and flank simultaneously, and almost at the same moment Pirch, with 1 5,000 fresh troops, came up to the support of Bulow. The situation of Lobau was now critical in the extreme. Turned upon the flank, attacked by 40,000 men in front, his own men by comparison a mere handful, the main army behind him utterly demoralised and in retreat, none the less he contested stubbornly and with a deliberate courage little less than sublime every foot of ground which the Prussians won. For he recognised to the full the responsibility which now lay upon him. He alone interposed between the Prussians and the French line of retreat, and if he failed retreat would be cut off, the army would be turned in rear as well as in front and flank, and scarcely a man could escape from the field. The fate of the army, the Emperor, and for aught he knew, of France, rested upon Lobau at this supreme moment of the day, and splendidly he did his duty. Dusk had given away to darkness, only illuminated by the blazing ruins of the village he had held so well, before Lobau retired from Planchenoit, but by that time the rear of the flying army had cleared that point, and comparative safety was assured. Still steady and in good order he took position on the high road to close the line of flight and block pursuit, and thus the gallant remnant of the 6th corps and of the Young Guard had to bear the full fury of the combined advance of the allies.

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Many deeds of splendid daring were done at Waterloo, but none can excel for coolness, courage, and devotion, the heroic resistance of Lobau.

The battle was over, the enemy in full retreat, and Wellington now felt that his share in the day's operations was done. His troops were in possession of the ground on which, in the morning Napoleon's lines had stood, and were thoroughly exhausted by the excessive labours of the day. The task of further pursuit was therefore surrendered to Bliicher, and it was a peculiarly congenial one. There was in Bliicher a depth of concentrated and venomous hatred against Napoleon and the French, nourished by years of defeat and humiliation, and the sentiments of the commander were fully shared by the men. Not a moment of respite was granted to the panic-stricken army, huddled together in pell-mell flight within the limits of a single road. Darkness was no protection to the vanquished, for the struggling moonlight lent its aid to the victors, rendering concealment impossible. At Genappe there was but one bridge across the Dyle, and this was thickly blocked with artillery waggons and surging masses of men too hopelessly disorganised to think of fords or other means of passage. The Prussian batteries, posted on the high ground above, poured destruction among the mass, and confusion became de- spair. There Lobau was made prisoner, Duhesme of the Young Guard died of his wounds, and Ney, reserved for an even more bitter fortune, barely escaped. Beyond Genappe to Quatre Bras, ghastly with its unburied corpses in the moonlight, from Quatre Bras to Frasne the work of vengeance was carried on, until even revenge yielded to exhausted nature, and the drama of Waterloo closed. So ended the greatest battle of our modern* epoch - great by virtue of the military skill, courage, and tenacity which distinguished all the actors in it ; greatest perhaps for the unparalleled career which thereby was brought to an end. An obscure Belgian village, till then unknown, has become the centre of the admiration of the world, and to it the eyes of all succeeding generations of Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Prussians will be turned when they desire to think on the stuff of which their forefathers was made. " All is lost but honour," said Francis at Pavia. Frenchmen, when they think of Waterloo, may still find consolation in the same reflection, for of glory they won full measure ; while Englishmen and Prussians may add to their pride in a hard-fought battle splendidly won the thought that that success was due, not to the single arms of either, but to the wellplanned and skilfully-conducted co-operation of both. The day of petty jealousies and acrimonious prejudice about Waterloo has gone by. We admit that without the timely intervention of the Prussians the battle would have gone against us, though to admit this detracts in no way from the gallantry which throughout the long day opposed unflinching resistance to a vastly superior army. Prussians admit that but for this unflinching resistance their intervention would have come too late, without detracting in the smallest degree from the stubborn constancy of BlQcher, by which all the immense difficulties of the march from Wavre were overcome. Instead of tending to divide the great Teutonic nations of the North, the recollection of Waterloo should serve to unite them as they were united then, should serve to remind them of the common origin of both, and strengthen the ties of kinship by the ties of a common glory.

I. Napoleon's delay in beginning the battle - II. His methods of attack at Hougomont and La Haie Sainte - III. D'Erlon's formation in columns of attack - IV. Ney's employment of the cavalry - V. The expediency of retreat at various periods of the battle - VI. The attack by the Imperial Guard - VII. Napoleon's physical condition at Waterloo - VIII. Napoleon's generals at Waterloo.

The losses in the battle of Waterloo were very heavy. In round numbers, 203,000 men took part in the engagement, and of these 48,000 were killed, wounded, or made prisoners - more than 23 per cent. The allies under Wellington lost over 15,000, the Prussians 7000, while of the French, Gourgaud, writing for the Emperor, admits a loss of 25,000 men. Such figures do more than prove the desperate character of the encounter. They suggest considerations as to whether the circumstances of the battle justified such a wanton destruction. Here it is obvious that the responsibility - and the blame, if any - rests not upon

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Wellington, who could do no less than defend himself to the utmost, nor upon the Prussians, whose attack was prescribed by the nature of things, but upon Napoleon ; and the question to be considered is this - Could his operations during the day have been as effectively carried on without such a sacrifice of human lives ?

The question is a convenient one as affording an opportunity to review in order the various movements of the fight, and we shall consider it under the following heads : - (a.) Napoleon's delay in beginning the battle, (b) The methods employed in the attacks on Hougomont and La Haie Sainte. (c.) The formation of the French right for D'Erlon's attack. (d.) Ney's cavalry charges, (e.) The expediency of retreat, (f.) The attack of the Guard.

The reasons which actuated Napoleon in deferring the engagement until noon have already been sufficiently explained.* With his mind at ease as to the enemy in front, and strangely oblivious of the dangers to be apprehended from the enemy on his flank, delay appeared to him to offer advantages without any corresponding drawbacks.

His original intention, however, was to open his attack at nine o'clock. He might certainly have done so at that hour, if not considerably earlier, and thereby he might have gained at least three hours upon the Prussians, for it is questionable if the Prussian movements would have been materially hastened by such a decision on Napoleon's part. Therefore we are confronted with the question whether Wellington could have maintained his resistance until the Prussians came up if three additional hours of resistance had been demanded of him. When we reflect that, in these changed conditions, Lobau's 10,000 men would have been used to second D'Erlon's attack - that the full strength of the Guard would have been available at Waterloo - as at Ligny - and that, as it was, the Duke's army at eight o'clock was in a state of extreme exhaustion, we may from these considerations conclude that, begun at 9 A.M., the battle would have been over at five in the afternoon, and Napoleon master of the field. The loss of the allies might have been greater, of the French certainly less, while of the Prussians there would have been no loss at all.

The methods adopted against the two positions of Hougomont and La Haie Sainte were both marked by lavish indifference to life. The troops of Jerome, then of Foy, and lastly those of Bachelu, were in turn employed against the former, and endeavoured to effect by reckless courage what the judicious employment of artillery might have accomplished more speedily, more effectually, and at infinitely less cost. The loss to both armies in and around Hougomont was certainly 6000 men, and of these the French lost considerably more than half. 1 500 fell in the first half-hour of the attack. The position was eventually fired by Reille's howitzers, and there is no reason why it should not have been stormed from the French batteries before such fearful loss was incurred. On a day when every available man was needed to support the main attacks upon the allied front, practically the whole of the Emperor's left was occupied in fruitless attempts against an advanced position, and was thus incapacitated from playing its due part in the general operations of the day.

A like criticism applies to the attack on La Haie Sainte. Hundreds of lives were sacrificed in an assault which might have been saved had the place been stormed by the fire of heavy guns. The French, indeed, may be said to have exhausted a superabundant courage upon brick walls and heavy doors, but against these artillery would have been as useful as impetuosity was futile.

The faulty formation of D'Erlon's attack has already been noted. It is a subject which has much engaged the attention of critics. There can be little doubt that it was some misunderstanding of orders which brought about a formation so cumbrous and unweildy, formidable indeed by virtue of the weight which thereby was concen- trated against the allied left, but far from possessing those qualities of strength which come from manageability, suppleness, and mutual support. Napoleon ordered but did not organise D'Erlon's attack.* The duty of organisation was left to Ney and to D'Erlon himself, and in such lieutenants the Emperor was justified by all past experience in placing implicit confidence. Yet it is almost impossible to conceive that the formation which they adopted was in conformity with Napoleon's intentions. What his intentions were we may perhaps surmise, as Quinet has well pointed out, by examining the formation of the Guard, which Napoleon personally supervised, for the last attack as the day was drawing to a close. There we see columns of battalions, formed in echelon, as in the case of the 1st corps, but instead of being massed one upon the other, without facilities for deploying or for forming square upon the flanks, so as to resist any cavalry charges which might be made upon them there, the column of the Guard advanced with its battalions in the centre deployed in line, supported on the flanks by battalions in columns in such a way as to secure the maximum of attacking force, of mobility, and of resisting capacity.

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army at that epoch. D'Erlon's formation was unusual, if not unheard of, and carried no advantages beyond that of weight to counteract its defects. It was vicious in its conception - une folie, says Charras - ineffective in execution, and disastrous in its results. For 5000 men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this movement alone.

Various conjectures have been hazarded to account for these unwonted dispositions. The materials before us, however, supply no sufficient explanation, though it seems most probable that, in the passage of orders from Napoleon to his lieutenants, a misconception as to his design in some way arose.

Another tactical point must be noticed as contributing to the failure of the attack of the 1st corps. The infantry battalions were altogether unsupported by cavalry. It may, indeed, be urged in addition that they were not supported by reinforcements of infantry, but this was owing to circumstances, not to negligence. Lobau was to have seconded D'Erlon's efforts, but the appearance of the Prussians necessitated his presence on the flank. There was, however, no sufficient reason to account for the absence of cavalry support. In this arm Napoleon was vastly the superior of Wellington. Sufficient cavalry were promptly forthcoming to retrieve disaster, but not to avert it. Had Milhaud's cuirassiers and the lancers of Jacquinot been employed directly in seconding the infantry, the French losses must at least have been appreciably diminished, while it is by no means impossible that the success of Picton's infantry and of the Union Brigade would never have been attained at all. When we consider that, notwithstanding its unwieldy formation, D'Erlon's corps did gain the crest of the allied position, it is something more than idle speculation, when estimating the chances and losses of the day, to enquire what results would have been likely to follow had the formation been sound and the cavalry advanced in support.

Want of proper support by infantry is the criticism which applies generally to Ney's cavalry charges. It is convenient to state this here and at once in order to emphasise Napoleon's essential fault throughout the battle of Waterloo. "In general/' says Brialmont, and Chesney endorses the remark, "all the attacks made during this day had the defect of being badly supported." Over and over again the French cavalry gained the crest of Wellington's position, but there was no infantry to maintain it when won. Napoleon petulantly exclaimed that he had no infantry, and could not manufacture it upon the spot. But a due economy of the infantry which he had would have rendered the process of manufacture unnecessary. As the afternoon wore on, in fact, he began to feel bitterly the unnecessary losses which he had already incurred. Moreover, Reille's corps was by no means employed to advantage. To maintain a whole wing of the French army at and around Hougomont was to waste the services of half of it. It may therefore be asserted that this deficiency of infantry to support the cavalry charges was not inevitable, but was due to faulty dispositions all along the line.

But these general observations by no means exhaust the adverse criticism which may be directed against the cavalry attacks upon Wellington's right centre. Napoleon consistently maintained that they were made too early in the day, that they were premature, and that Guyot's heavy cavalry were sent in without orders, thus depriving the army of its last cavalry reserve. Too much confidence, of course, is not to be given to Napoleon's statements after the event ; yet there is a concurrence of testimony upon this point which cannot be ignored. Gourgaud, who was by the Emperor's side all that day, says that the officers who surrounded Napoleon, observing the success of Ney's charges, shouted victory, and made every demonstration of joy. The Emperor did not share in this exultation. He observed to Marshal Soult, "this is a premature movement, which may be attended by fatal consequences." Soult expressed himself with considerable warmth respecting Ney, and said, " He is compromising us, as he did at J6na." That the attack was ill-timed was so generally conceded, that Ney himself disclaimed in part the responsibility for it, and declared, through Colonel Heymes, his aide-de-camp, that the heavy cavalry of the Guard went in, not by his orders, but independently of them. If we believe this we must conclude that the last reserve of cavalry engaged without orders from either of the responsible commanders - a conclusion which, when all allowances are made for the confusion incident to a battle, can leave us no very high opinion of the organisation and discipline which prevailed. The fact is that these cavalry charges were marked by the same reckless impetuosity which has already been noticed at Hougomont and La Haie Sainte. They supply another instance of splendid courage wasted for want of control Nor can they be properly understood without a due comprehension of the character and position of Ney on the day of Waterloo.

Michel Ney had long before worthily earned the title of " Le Brave des braves" In the long roll of Napoleon's generals none had displayed greater brilliancy in the field, or greater constancy in disaster. To him the cause of the Empire was the cause of France, and he had served it gloriously. But the time came, in 1814, when these two causes appeared to him distinct. The fatal issue of the Russian campaign, the disaster at Leipsic, and the hopeless struggle on the frontier, seemed to him to separate the interests of his master from those of his country, and he was consenting to Napoleon's abdication. He gave his allegiance to the Bour- bons and served Louis XVIII. But in the conditions of this new attachment there was much which was uncongenial to him. Regarding the course of events from the point of view of a soldier, not of a politician, he saw with disgust the humiliations which the new regime imposed upon the army, and keenly resented humiliations to which he was himself subject at Court. Still, upon the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba, he hurried to the King, and, governed by impulse rather than by studied reflection, declared that Bonaparte's attempt was that of a madman, and that, if taken, he deserved to be brought to Paris in an iron cage. Thereupon, at the head of 6000 men, he advanced to oppose the Emperor's progress. In proportion as he moved forward, the more the conviction grew upon him that the course of the Bourbons was lost. The co-operation of the troops under Monsieur, the King's brother, and under the Marshal Macdonald, was not forthcoming. " He was expecting reinforcements and artillery, but he received none. He hoped to be informed of Napoleon's march, and of the resolutions taken at Paris, but he obtained no information. What h^ did know was that the troops sent to fight ag xnst the invader were either uniting themselves to \n or beating a retreat." His situation was inde None of cruel embarrassment, and it is not surpi.jing that at such a juncture his personal griefs against the Bourbons should have recurred to his mind, and that placed between his oath of allegiance and civil war, which he had it in his power to avert, he should see duty, self-interest, and patriotism all combining to force him on to Napoleon's side. The result of this conflict was not long in doubt. The proclamation of Lens-le- Saunier declared frankly for Napoleon on the ground that the glory of the army and the liberties of France were alike in jeopardy under the Bourbon rule.

For Ney at Waterloo, therefore, the stake was nothing less than his fortune, his honour, and his life, and throughout the campaign he realised this fact to the full. " For you and me," he cried to D'Erlon, as his fourth horse was shot under him in the battle, "if we do not die here under the English bullets, there will remain nothing more than to perish miserably under the bullets of the emigres." It puts no strain upon the facts to conclude that the balance of his mind was disturbed by the tremendous consequences which depended on the game he was playing, and that the conditions at Waterloo would naturally tend to intensify a spirit of dare-devil impetuosity in a man at no time distinguished for restraint.

When, therefore, the responsibility for the movements in the front was imposed upon Ney, we are helped towards a comprehension of those movements by a knowledge of the man who conducted them.

Critical Examination 257

been performed with that arm, and that he was perhaps disposed to believe that more could be accomplished by cavalry than, in fact, they are capable of accomplishing in war.

In any case, the result of all these considerations taken together is clear. Throughout the day the cavalry was squandered. The loss in that arm was altogether out of proportion to the advantages they obtained. Incapable of securing victory, they were wanting to cover the retreat ; but, effectively supported, victory perhaps might have been won, or, if not, a sufficient force of cavalry would have been available to stem the tide of disaster and to prevent an orderly retreat from becoming a disorganised rout.

For the French the disaster of Waterloo lay not so much in the victory of the allies as in the nature of their own defeat. It was overwhelming, absolute, final. The army was the last hope of the Empire, and in the evening that army had ceased to exist. Scattered and demoralised groups of men flying pell-mell for safety, relaxed from discipline, their arms abandoned, their moral shattered, were all that remained of those splendid corps which had defiled so proudly before Napoleon in the morning. Was this the inevitable result of defeat ? Was catastrophe so great unavoidably associated with failure ?

It is urged by some critics that Napoleon's action Was that of a ruined gamester hazarding his last stake upon a desperate chance. He should, it is said, have recognised the true state of affairs either when the Prussians first appeared, or, at any rate, after the failure of his front to break the allied line. In the first case he might have withdrawn an effective army from the field, have operated a junction with Grouchy, and with his forces thus consolidated have carried on a war of manoeuvres against the allies until some favourable opportunity should occur for striking a great blow. In the second case, what remained of his army might have retired in good order under cover of the Imperial Guard. On the lowest reckoning, 40,000 men might thus have been withdrawn. Grouchy would have joined him with at least 25,000 more ; 3000 had been left behind at Ligny. Thus the Emperor would have found himself still at the head of nearly 70,000 men - as many as he had with him at Waterloo - and with these he might have carried on a war upon the frontier under better auspices than in 18 14, when, with a smaller army, he performed such prodigies of skill and daring.

The weakness of this criticism - if it be weakconsists in the fact that it comes after the event. Few things are more difficult than to abstract ourselves from theories which subsequent knowledge of events suggests, in order to limit ourselves to the actual facts of the case at the time. Theory and fact have a tendency to confuse themselves together, and to become in our minds one and the same thing. Seated in the study there are doubtless hundreds of persons - riot one of whom could dispose a regiment in the field - who could on paper defeat Napoleon with more ease and precision than did the Duke, - who could, theoretically, win the whole campaign ten times over for either side. The student, after the event, has all available documents before him - his coup cCceil ranges over the movements of all the antagonists together. He is independent of aides-de-camp, accidents, or mistakes. But in the field it is far different. There the commander, for the positions, resources, and intentions of his opponent, must depend largely upon divination. Even as to his own army his information must be limited, and the favourable moment has sometimes passed before he knows that it has arrived. He is in a measure the sport of circumstances, for his pieces are human beings and not pawns upon a chess-board. His critics, if their criticism is to apply, must recognise these limitations upon their subject. The question is not how, under ideal circumstances of information, a campaign may be conducted to the best advantage, but how, under the practical conditions of the moment, a commander should act.

Applying these principles of criticism to the question under consideration, we must first look at Napoleon's position at the time when the Prussians were sighted upon the heights of St Lambert. It is almost beyond question that he did not anticipate the intervention of any Prussians whatever in the battle between himself and Wellington. His measures had been taken to prevent such intervention, [and he supposed his measures to have been effectual. When, therefore, the Prussians actually appeared, he had to consider the effective capacity of this unexpected enemy, and his impression that it was the corps of Bulow, and of Bulow only, was strengthened by all his subsequent information and observation as the day wore on. The idea that three out of the four Prussian corps were in march for the field of Waterloo never occurred to him until the fact was declared by their presence. Confident that Blucher's retreat had been towards the Meuse, confident that Grouchy intervened between Blucher's main army and himself, Napoleon was forced to the conclusion that what he saw at St Lambert was merely a column, though perhaps a pretty strong one, detached from the main body, and that it represented the total amount of assistance which Blticher would be able to send to Wellington that day. If this was so, the appearance of even 30,000 additional antagonists was scarcely a sufficient reason for immediate retreat. On the contrary, it was a reason for pursuing the contest with redoubled vigour; for now not only the allied army under Wellington, but also a considerable detachment of Bluchers army as well, might be involved in a common destruction. Such an opinion was based on something more than arrogant self-confidence. Events were to show that it was very nearly, if not quite, the truth. Napoleon's army of 71,000 men was so vastly the superior of that of Wellington in calibre, moral, and experience, that he might well reckon himself a match for Wellington and Btilow combined. It is scarcely necessary to include here, as influencing Napoleon's decision, the anticipations which he had, or pretended to have, from Grouchy. Of course if Grouchy arrived almost simultaneously with Btilow, then matters remained as they were ; but leaving Grouchy entirely out of the calculation, the first appearance of the Prussians was rather a cause of congratulation for Napoleon than a circumstance to induce him to retreat.

If this be admitted, the case against retreat at a later period of the day is even stronger. All Napoleon's calculations were turning out correctly. The Anglo-Dutch army was being very severely pressed throughout the afternoon and evening. La Haie'Sainte had fallen, and Wellington's centre was dangerously threatened. The Dutch-Belgians had been driven from Papelotte and La Haye. Hougomont, though still a centre of obstinate resistance, was in flames. Billow's attack upon Planchenoit had been repulsed, and the Prussian contingent was thoroughly held by Lobau. The Imperial Guard was committed to its attack. In fact, at seven o'clock every known consideration influenced the Emperor to believe that victory was well within his grasp. Facts, which were unknown to him at this critical hour, were really decisive of the contest against him. The unperceived arrival of Ziethen's corps, the unsuspected advance of Pirch to the support of Btilow, turned a doubtful battle into a ruinous defeat, but it was then too late for an orderly retreat. The repulse of the Imperial Guard, taken by itself, was a disaster from which Napoleon might have recovered himself, but the repulse of the Guard, coming simultaneously with the irruption of Ziethen upon the right, and of Pirch upon the left, meant nothing else but irretrievable ruin. Had the Emperor known the true facts of the situation, then retreat, while yet there was time, was the only safe policy to adopt. He only knew a part of the facts, and the part which he knew justified him in resolutely maintaining the combat. He began the battle of Waterloo under grave misconceptions, and under a wholly false sense of security. That it was so was largely, if not entirely, his own fault, but with that, for the purposes of this argument, we have nothing to do. Given the position, as he understood it, on the 18th June, ought he, as events developed themselves> to have ordered a retreat? Is his action that of a desperate gamester or of a responsible commander ? With the issue thus narrowed it may be asserted with much confidence that retreat was at no time called for until it was too late advantageously to effect it*

Critical Examination 263

The attack by the Imperial Guard becomes, for purposes of criticism, two distinct questions. (1.) Ought such an attack to have been mad? at all ? (2.) Was the attack organised in the best ppssible manner to secure success ?

The first of these must be decided by much the same criticism as has already been applied above to the question of retreat. They must stand or fall together. If it be maintained that Napoleon's true policy was retreat early in the evening, then it follows that the Guard should not have been put in ; if it is conceded that retreat was uncalled for, then some such attack as that by the Imperial Guard was simply indispensable, for if successful it must be decisive of the battle, if unsuccessful the contest would still be an open one. Napoleon at least must so judge the situation, ignorant as he was of the Prussian reinforcements which were so close at hand.

When, however, we turn our attention to the dispositions of the attack, we see that it was. by no means so effective as it might have been. It could not be an attack in force, for owing to circumstances now beyond Napoleon's control, only a third of the battalions of the Guard ^ere available, but .such as it was it might have been rendered far more effective by due support upon its left. It was solely in consequence of this want of support that Colborne's flank movement was possible. A timely charge of cavalry would, even when the movement had been made, have compelled the 52nd regiment to form square, at once relieving the Imperial Guard from the pressure of its attack, but neither infantry was at hand to check Colbourne's movement in its inception, nor cavalry to thwart it when made. So too with the artillery. Two batteries, consisting in all of twelve pieces, accompanied the charge, but they were masked, and so rendered useless when the rear columns deviated from the true line of attack. In fact, in no particular, in infantry, cavalry, or artillery, was the Guard adequately backed up, and to this fact its repulse was due more than to any intrinsic deficiencies of its own. It is idle to assert that Napoleon did all that was possible, but that he had no cavalry or infantry available. If this be true, then the whole scheme of the attack stands condemned ipso facto. To hazard his last reserve in so desperate a venture would have been the work of a madman. But the assertion, at least as far as infantry is concerned, is untrue. Reille's corps was wasting itself away around Hougomont, and no compensating advantage was being gained. A part of it might have been employed with great effect to support the Guard, and it was undoubtedly Napoleon's intention that this should be done. But it was not done, " it does not seem to have been even attempted," and disaster was the inevitable consequence, A commander of course is not quit of all further responsibility because his intentions are good. It is his business as far as possible to enforce them. To shift the blame from himself on to the shoulders of his subordinates multiplies the blame but does not remove it. However, in this matter it may be said that the design was good but the execution of it faulty. The attack itself was imperative ; its details were adequately conceived, but it was very imperfectly executed.

It is perhaps impossible to explain satisfactorily the non-fulfilment of the Emperor's intentions in regard to this last charge of the Guard. The fault lay somewhere between Napoleon and his lieutenants, but it is difficult for lack of evidence to say exactly where.

It must not be forgotten that throughout the campaign Napoleon, though often so precise in his instructions, had yet for the fulfilment of them left a large latitude to his generals. Already at Quatre Bras Ney had exercised a semi-independent command. A command of like character had been given to Grouchy after Ligny. The organisation of D'Erlon's first attack had been left to Ney and D'Erlon himself, and throughout the afternoon of the 1 8th Ney had acted in a position of almost supreme command against the Duke of Wellington. The cavalry attacks had been prematurely engaged^ contrary to Napoleon's intentions, and had been pushed too far, against his will. A certain want of harmony and of efficient co-operation between the commander-in-chief and the commandersin-part marks the whole history of these days, and is an explanation in part of the blunders and disaster of the campaign. Allowance must be made for the fact that Napoleon himself was occupied very closely with the Prussian attack upon his flank, and was thus bound to delegate a large part of his authority in the front to others. It was, too, undoubtedly a misfortune for him that Mortier, the Commander of the Guard, had fallen ill and was unable to be present during the campaign, but when all this is said, the fact remains that it was before the eyes of the Emperor in person that the Guard moved forward to the charge, and that, if the organisation of their movement was faulty, upon Napoleon primarily must rest the blame. All generals must make mistakes, and Napoleon was at no time an exception to this rule; there are some kinds of error from which not even the greatest commanders can in the nature of things be exempt, but when we see in Napoleon's tactics precisely those faults which had always been most foreign to his practice in war, the very faults by which in his adversaries he had so often profited, and which he had taught them to discard, we are led to seek an explanation in the conditions personal to himself and to his lieutenants, and are forced to conclude that the Napoleon of Waterloo was, not the same Napoleon as in the old days of Austerlitz and Jena, and that his generals were not characterised by the same ardour as in the days when their batons and their fortunes had yet to be won.

Both these considerations demand attention from a student of the campaign, for both contributed largely to the loss of it. Exactly how largely it is perhaps impossible to determine, for critics arrive at very different conclusions when they attempt to solve the personal equation of Waterloo. Some, looking at the whole strategy of the campaign, consider that it exhibits Napoleon's military genius at its highest point, and maintain that such conceptions and combinations could not have emanated from the brain of a man who was physically unfit. Others, bringing forward many particular examples to prove their contention, urge that throughout the campaign Napoleon was incapacitated by disease and in a semi-comatose condition at the moment when energy was of all things the most needful. The truth seems to be that Napoleon was suffering under the influence of a strange and mysterious malady, the nature of which has not yet been accurately defined. A life such as his, spent in privations, fatigues, and exposure, so full of ^mental and physical labours, with brief flashes of dissipation, would not unnaturally generate diseases from which the ordinary man is free - diseases, therefore, which but rarely present themselves to the observation of medical men. There still * remains to be written a work, which would prove as interesting as it should be valuable, upon the maladies of great men, and scientific investigation might be worse employed than in examining the physical and mental condition of such men as Pope, Swift, and Napoleon Bonaparte.* What is certain in Napoleon's case is that his malady had been growing upon him with increasing force since 1806, that its attacks were notified by a sudden lethargy amounting to complete prostration, and that " its effects were that at some critical moment of a battle his wonderful power of quick and correct decision seemed to desert him ; so much so, that for the time being he almost abandoned the reins to chance." t At Wagram and at Bautzen he slept

* Since writing this I learn that a work entitled " Les Maladies de Napoleon " is to be produced this year (1895) by Dr Cabanes, author of " Marat Incounu."

It is not a mere supposition that Napoleon was attacked by his malady during the Waterloo campaign. There is ample evidence, apart from his lethargy during a critical period of the i8th ? to prove it.

Critical Examination 269

while the noise of battle was rolling around him ; at Waterloo, seated on a wooden chair, his head drooping upon his arms stretched on the cottagers table, which was brought out to accommodate his maps and papers, he slumbered heavily, oblivious for the moment, even at this crisis of his fortunes, of the events which were deciding his destiny.

But, on the other hand, these attacks, though tending in his later years to become more frequent and more severe, were passing in their character, and affected Napoleon only during the period of their duration. When not immediately under their influence, his intellect was as unclouded as ever, his genius as entirely unimpared. He was thus as capable in 181 5 of devising great military schemes as at any time in his life, but he was not so capable of effectively superintending their execution. His physical condition, in fact, gives us a clue to some of the anomalies of Waterloo. It explains that extraordinary combination of energy and prostration, of force and weakness, which is so conspicuous throughout the campaign. The delay in pursuing the Prussians after Ligny, the tardy despatch of Grouchy in search of them, the inade-

Thus, although the battle of Ligny continued till past eleven o'clock P. M. , Napoleon left the field at eight and went to bed. When Grouchy came for orders at twelve o'clock he was told that the Emperor " etait couche, souffrant, et avait defendu qu'on entrat chez lui." He remained in this state of strict seclusion, issuing no orders, till after 8 A.M. on the 17th, and was not really alive to the situation till twelve mid-day. - Lord Wolseley, "The Decline and Fall of Napoleon," Pall Mall Magazine, January 1894.

quate prosecution of his own conceptions for the conduct of the battle, become intelligible to us, if we regard them as the natural consequences of an untimely seizure.