Alameda County, California - The whole text, 1883 (part 11 of 38)
From History of Alameda County, California : Including Its Geology, Topography, Soil, and Productions : Together with a Full and Particular Record of the Spanish Grants : the Early History and Settlement, Compiled from the Most Authentic Sources, the Names of Original Spanish and American Pioneers, a Full Political History, Comprising a Tabular Statement of Officers of the County Since Its Formation : Separate Histories of Each of the Townships, Showing Their Advancement and Progress : Also Incidents of Pioneer Life, the Raising of the Bear Flag, and Prominent Citizens and Representative Men : and of Its Cities, Towns, Churches, Schools, Secret Societies, Etc, published 1883. 15,997 words, reproduced complete and unedited. Source changes inside the text are labelled in place.
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15,997 wordsMachine-read from scans of History of Alameda County, California : Including Its Geology, Topography, Soil, and Productions : Together with a Full and Particular Record of the Spanish Grants : the Early History and Settlement, Compiled from the Most Authentic Sources, the Names of Original Spanish and American Pioneers, a Full Political History, Comprising a Tabular Statement of Officers of the County Since Its Formation : Separate Histories of Each of the Townships, Showing Their Advancement and Progress : Also Incidents of Pioneer Life, the Raising of the Bear Flag, and Prominent Citizens and Representative Men : and of Its Cities, Towns, Churches, Schools, Secret Societies, Etc, published 1883. Nothing has been corrected: fixing what looks like a misspelled name is how an invented one gets published. Source changes are marked where they occur.
$223,444 66 On June i, 1880, the Board issued orders to have prisoners confined in the County Jail made to perform eight hours work daily in and about public buildings, roads and highways, under Section one thousand six hundred and thirteen of the Political Code. On June 14th, a resolution consolidating the offices of County Clerk and Recorder, Tax Collector and Treasurer, on and after July ist, was referred to a Committee of the Whole. The salaries of deputies of each county and township officer were fixed at one hundred and twenty-five dollars per month, June 21st; while, the Building Committee having had under advisement the advisability of establishing a Receiving Hospital in Oakland, on June 21st reported favorably to the scheme, which on being adopted was handed over to the Hospital Committee, who, at the following meeting of the Boards recommended the fitting up of rooms in the basement of the new Hall of Records. On July 19th, a resolution to fund thei debt and issue bonds therefor was referred to a Committee of the Whole, but the matter fell through on account of the County Government Bill being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. On the same date the county was re- partitioned into Supervisor Districts under Section four thousand and twenty- five of the Act of 1879-80, the same districts being re-established with the boundaries heretofore designated. On July 31st the Board adopted a seal; and a communication was received from Sidney Sanders, attorney, setting forth that James M. Goggins owns six-thirty-sixths undivided interest in Washington and Franklin Squares in the city of Oakland, and wished to know what action the Supervisors would take in the premises. The document was " laid on the table." .Under date the 15th October, J. J. Hanifin, Supervisor elect from the Sixth District, appeared with his certificate of election and claimed his seat. Mr. Smith, the incumbent, declined to give it up, stating that the election of a Supervisor in that district was illegal. After an adjournment for consideration, Mr. Smith, in a communication to the Board, desired that Mr. Hanifin be allowed to take the seat of the Supervisor for the Sixth District, reserving to himself the right to resume it in case the Supreme Court should hold the election illegal. Mr. Myers was then called to the Chair, while Mr. Smith introduced Mr. Hanifin as his successor; after which the Board then re-organized as follows: John Green, District No. i; Henry Dusterberry, District No. 2; J. B. Marlin, District No. 3; W. B. Clement, District No. 4; F. F. Myers, District No. 5; J. J. Hanifin, District No. 6; W. S. McClane, District No. 7. Mr. Dusterberry was unanimously chosen Chairman.
1881. - On January 10, 1881, a resolution introduced by Supervisor Hanifin was adopted that the Clerk of the Board immediately indorse upon every bill or account allowed the fact of such allowance, the amount ordered paid, the date of such action, and sign his name thereto at the time; also, that all bills allowed be signed by at least two members of the Auditing Committee. On the 21st a former order offering a thousand dollars reward in the matter of incendiarism was rescinded. On May 9th, the Central Pacific Railroad Company were called upon to render less dangerous their crossings on public roads. The Northern Railway having been assessed by the State Board of Equalization at one million, five hundred and forty-three thousand and fifty dollars, the proportion allotted to Alameda County was ninety-two thousand four hundred and seventy- five dollars; that of the Central Pacific Railroad, was fifteen millions, fifty-five thousand, five hundred dollars, and the county proportion, two millions, eighty-eight thousand dollars. July Sth, the School Superintendent reported, as per census, fifteen thousand six hundred and seventy-seven children between the ages of five and seventeen years, eight thousand two hundred and forty-two of whom were in Oakland Township. On September 6th, the California and Nevada Railroad Company were authorized to build their road on Adeline Street from its junction with Spring Street, northerly to its junction with Lowell Street, produced southerly to Adeline Street. On the 19th of the same month. County Treasurer Palmer resigned to take the position of Cashier of the Union Bank, when complimentary resolutions were passed, spread upon the minutes, and J. A. Webster appointed in his stead. On the 26th September, the proper condolatory resolutions were passed on the death of President Garfield; while, on October 31st, the County Board of Horticultural Commissioners were appointed as follows: A. D. Pryal, A. P. Crane, and Martin Mendenhall, who were to receive four dollars per day while actually on duty, but no member would be permitted to charge for more than thirty days during the year. On November 2 1st, the Committee of the Whole report adversely as to crossing Webster-street Bridge with horse railroad, signed by Supervisors Dusterberry, Marlin, Green, Mc-
Clane. A minority report by Supervisor Hanifin favoring the scheme, which had to give way to the majority report, the only votes in the negative being those of Messrs. Clement and Hanifin. On December 5th, a communication was received from C. O. Rockwell expressing Mrs. Garfield's "grateful acknowledgments for the resolutions of the Board of Supervisors."
1882. - On January 3, 1882, D. C. Brown having presented his certificate of election as Supervisor elect from Fifth District, Supervisor Hanifin proposed that Mr. Brown's name be called by the Clerk on all questions and that the Board recognize the prima facie right of that gentleman to a seat at the Board. The subject was, however, laid over to enable Mr. Myers, the incumbent of the contested seat, to have legal counsel. On the 4th, Mr. Brown again demanded to have his name called at roll call, when he was informed by Chairman Dusterberry that the matter was a private one between him and Mr. Myers to be adjudicated by the Courts. Again on the i6th the same demand was made by Mr. Brown, and finally he made his appearance with an appointment signed by Judges Crane and Hamilton, whereupon Supervisor Hanifin introduced a resolution that his name be called and his vote recorded, which was adopted by a full Board, Mr. Myers voting " No," and Mr. Green declining to vote; the Board then reorganized with Mr. Brown seated. The members were: John Green, District No. i; Henry Dusterberry, District No. 2; J. B. Marlin, District No. 3; W. B. Clement, District No. 4; Dudley C. Brown (vice Myers term expired). District No. 5; J. J. Hanifin, District No. 6; W. S. McClane, District No. 7. Mr. Clement being Chairman.
The chief matter of political interest that happened in the county of Alameda during the year 1882, is indubitably what has been termed the Democratic wave whose swell first rolling up large majorities in the cis-Atlantic States broke upon the Pacific Coast, carrying everything before it. It is not our province to enter into the causes of this wonderful reaction in politics, suffice it to say that' feelings ran high, and the Banner Republican county, Alameda, was appalled at the havoc made in her ranks. -The election of 1882 will long be remembered.
In closing this chapter we will call the attention of our readers to the tables herewith appended. In the first will be found a list of the taxes levied since the formation of the county, exclusive of the poll-tax, while in the second we have handed to posterity a list of all the officers who have served the county, from State Senator to Constable, with the votes received by each, and the dates upon which they were elected; also notes showing the appointments made by the Courts of Sessions, and Boards of Supervisors between each general election. This table is as complete as it is possible to make it, and all records of the county have been thoroughly searched for the purpose of having it perfect and reliable, while it is with no little degree of pride that we present to our patrons the result of our labors, feeling assured it will be well appreciated by all who may have occasion to refer to it.
T857, Oct. 5 - John R. Wares to be Justice of the Peace, Washington Township, vice Bacon, received certificate of election in error Nov, 2 - William Hoskins to be Constable, Oakland Township, vice Wall, failed to qualify.
" Nov. 3 - Hiram Keeney to be Justice of the Peace, Eden Township, vice John Marshall, failed to qualify. T858, Feb. 15 - Chas, Duerr to be Justice of the Peace, Murray Township, vice Pope, resigned.
1858, Nov. 9 - M. McCollier to be Constable, Murray Township, Constable-elect failing to qualify. iSsQ, Jan. 3 - A. O. Bowen to be Constable, Washington Township, vice Lowell, failed to qualify.
1863, Feb. 2 - W. H. Souther to be Justice of the Peace, Brooklyn Township, vice Farrelly, failed to qualify. " May 4^J. H. Atwell to be Constable, Washington. Township, vice Potter, resigned.
Nov. 16 - D. Cameron to be Justice of the Peace, Brooklyn Township, wzVrtf Walker, resigned. Nov. 16 - Stephen G. Nye to be Senator, vice W. W. Crane, Jr. " Oct. 19 - A. G. Catlin to be Justice of the Peace, Eden Township, vice Crane, failed to qualify. ."May 2, 1864 - Asa Walker to be Justice of the Peace, Brooklyn Township, rn'ce Cameron, resigned.
i86g, Feb. i - L. J. Rector to be Justice of the Peace, Brooklyn Township, vice Warren. " May 3 - R. B. Cooley to be Constable, Eden Township, vice Perkins, resigned. " " ~C. J. Bond to be Constable, Washington Township, vice Livermore. " '< 24 - Asa Howard to be Justice of the Peace, vice Walker, deceased. " Aug. S - S. P. Wright to be District Attorney, vice LaGrange, resigned. " ° - R. Faville to be Constable, Murray Township, vice Huff, failed to qualify.
1870, Jan. 10 - Thomas W. Millard to be Justice' of the Peace, Washington Township, vice Rogers, resigned. " Aug. I - O. Whipple to be Constable, Brooklyn Township, vice Lewis, resigned.
1872, Dec. 2 - G. E. Freeman to be Justice of the Peace, Eden Township, vice Smith, resigned. " '* 30 - Wm. Holtz to be Justice of the Peace, Alameda Township, vice Fitch.
1873, Feb. 5 - John Ball to be Constable, Alameda Township, vice Coombs, translated to the office of Justice of the Peace there. " Aug. 19 - Thos. W. Millard, Washington Township, vice Mills, resigned.
1873, Nov. II - Horace Hoag to be Justice of the Peace, Alameda Township, vice Coombs, deceased. " Dec. 8 - A. M. Church to be Justice of the Peace, Murray Township, z/^c^ Freeman, resigned.
1874, Oct. 5 - L. C. Morehouse to be Constable, Eden Townshp, vice Bryant, resigned. *' Nov. 2 - James Triplett to be Constable, Brooklyn Township.
*' " 15 - Ralph Faville to be Constable, Murray Township, vice Enwright, failed to q^ualify. " July 7 - Samuel Wooten to be Justice of the Peace, Eden Township, znce Graham, resigned.
1875, Nov. 15 - C. Nealto be Constable, Washington Township, y/c^, Henry, failed to qualify. Dec. 6 - Valentine Alviso to be Supervisor, District No. i, vice Beazell, resigned.
1876, May 8 - G. H. Moulton to be Constable, Alameda Township, vic^ Valentine, resigned. -' " 15 - Chas. E. Palmer to be Treasurer, vice Becht, deceased.
1877, Jan. 8 - Wm. Bolton to be Constable, Oakland City. Appointment declared informal and holder resigned. " Sep. zg - J. B. Woolsey to be Supervisor, District No. 7, vice Chase, resigned.
'* " - T. W. LeBallister to be Constable, Brooklyn Township, vice Triplett, resigned. i;78, Jan. 22 - John W. Bones elected State Senator, vice Porter, deceased.
1879, Feb. 3 - W. P. Byler to be Justice of the Peace, Alameda Township, vice Clark, lesigned. March 25 - A. B. Lawson to be Constable, Oakland Township, vice Buckley, resigned. *- April 3 - E. M. Gibson to be District Attorney, vice Vroomart, resigned.
Mexican Grants
IN glancing at the heading of this chapter, we must ask the reader not to indulge in the vain hope that a full history of the grants comprised within the confines of what is known as Alameda County will be found; such, indeed, would be beyond the limits of this work, even had we at hand the infinity of resources to be found in the hundreds of cases which have arisen out of them. Our compilation must of necessity be accepted in its crude form. We have striven to our utmost capacity to produce some information which would combine both usefulness and accuracy, and to this end have relied on the " Reports of Land Cases Determined in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, June Term, 1853, to June Term, 1858, Inclusive, by Ogden HoiTfipan, District Judge" - a work which is now nearly out of print.
In addition to the information therein contained we append a table most courteously supplied to us by the Surveyor-General of the State of California, and which no doubt will prove both valuable and interesting.
The United States, Appellants, vs. Antonio Sunol et al., claiming the Rancho El ValU de San Jose. - No objection made by the District Attorney to the confirmation of this claim.
, Claim for a tract of land, supposed to contain eleven leagues, in Alameda County, confirmed by the Board, and appealed by the United States.
The validity of this claim was proved by the production of the original grant and the expedjente from the archives. The expediente also shows that the grant was registered in the Secretary's office, and also, by order of the Governor, in the office of the Prefecture of the first district. Both the expediente and the grant produced by the claimant contain the certificate of registry, and of the approval of the grant by the Departmental Assembly.
The evidence shows a substantial compliance with the conditions, and the boundaries and extent of the granted land are clearly indicated by the description in the grant and the delineations on the map. No objection to the confirmation of this claim having been made by the District Attorney, we do not deem it necessary to recapitulate at length the preliminary proceedings before the Governor, nor to refer particularly to the evidence by which its validity has been established.
The United States, Appellants, vs. Josfi Maria Amador, claiming part of the Rancho San Ramon. - The confirmation of this claim not disputed, claim for four
The genuineness of the grant is not disputed, and it appears to have been approved by the Departmental Assembly. The conditions have been fully complied with, and the premises granted have been the family residence of the grantee from a period prior to the issuing of the grant, and he has continued to cultivate and improve his land down to the present time.
A part of his land has been conveyed by him to other parties, and he now asks for a confirmation of his claim to the remainder. A decree to that effect was made by the Board of Commissioners.
A decree must therefore be entered in this Court afifirming the decision of the Board and confirming the claimant's title to the extent solicited.
The United States, Appellants, vs. Barbara Soto, et al., claiming the Rantho San Lorenzo. This claim is valid for the land included within the boundaries named in the grant. Claim for one league and a half of land in Contra Costa (now Alameda) County, confirmed by the Board, and appealed by the United States. The claim in this .case is founded on two grants - one by Alvarado, dated October 10,1842, and the other by Micheltorena, dated January 20, 1844, for the sobrante of half a league contained within the boundaries of the first. The land was described in the first grant as follows: "One league, a little more or less, in the tract called San Lorenzo, the limits of which are from the creek of that name to that called ' El Alto,' pertaining to Don Jesus Vallejo, and from this creek, drawing a right line to pass by the rodeo, to the beach, and from this point to the first ridge which the hills form, excepting the number of varas which have been conceded in said tract to Don Guillermo Castro, which shall be determined at the lime of the possession." At the time the grant issued Castro was owner of a tract of six hundred varas square, upon which he resided. He, in October, 1843, obtained a concession of a larger tract which was described as bounded by the rancho of Soto on the side next the main road, it being considered that there has already been made a concession to the said Soto on the side towards the beach. The main road alluded to crosses the tract from creek to creek, and it was contended by Castro that the main road was the western boundary of his land, and that the grant to him was a virtual settlement of the line between him and Soto, which in the grant to the latter had -been left for subsequent adjustment. Proceedings were instituted to settle this dispute, and it was finally determined by a compromise made with the approval of the 'Governor. The line as thus settled was described in a document drawn up for the purpose, which appears in the archives, and a copy of which is indorsed on both expe- The boundary of Castro, as thus settled, is as follows: ' Commencing on the sanjon (or ditch) where it is parallel with the southern side of Castro's house, and 'down the sanjon towards the main road six hundred varas, from which point where <they conclude by a straight line to the San Lorenzo Creek. The boundary on the other side of the sanjon is the margin (orilla) of the hills towards the plain, measuring ten varas up on the hills." These proceedings must be taken as a final and definite settlement of the eastern line of Sot6's ranch, and as such it was acquiesced in and recognized by the parties. The line thus designated can, as appears from the proofs, be readily located, and the testimony of the neighbors, particularly that of Guillermo Castro, shows that the location as determined from the description in the agreement in no respect diflTers from the line as understood and recognized by the parties themselves and neighboring rancheros. On the 20th of January, 1844, Soto addressed a petition to the Governor, setting forth that the concession of the tract which he occupies, called San Lorenzo, expresses to have an extension of one sitio (league square), a little more or less; that the overplus which it may have towards the beach may be half a sitio, which he begs may be conceded to him, as, united with the other, it would be of much benefit to him. On this petition the Secretary reports that there is no objection to granting it, but that the petitioner must subject himself to the limits which his first title calls for, and to the agreement celebrated with Don Carlos Castro. On receiving this report the Governor acceded to the petition in the following words: " In conformity with the foregoing. Micheltorena." It is objected that this was not a valid grant of the sobrante or overplus. But, in the first place, it appears from the archives that the same formalities were rarely, if ever, observed in relinquishing a sobrante to the grantee within the general limits of whose grant it was found, as were deemed necessary in making an, original concession or a grant of a sobrante to a stranger. The grant of a sobrante, to him within whose limits it was found was little more than a waiver or release of the condition of the original grant, which restricted him to a specific quantity, and the original grant (that condition being struck out) would by its terms convey the whole land within the limits designated. At all events, there can be no doubt in this case that the Governor intended to accede to the petition, and the land having, under this grant, or promise to grant, been long occupied and enjoyed, and on all hands recognized as belonging to the grantee, the latter has, in any view, an equitable right which the United States are bound to respect. The important question, however, in the case, is as to the location of the southern boundary. The tract included within the original limits is claimed by the appellees to be in the form of a square, or parallelogram, and bounded on the east by the line between Castro and Soto as it was fixed by the agreement heretofore alluded to; on the south by the Alta and a line through the rodeo to the beach; on the west by the beach, and on the north by the San Lorenzo. It is contended on the part of the United States that neither the San Lorenzo nor the beach is a boundary of the tract, but that the southern line must be run from the point where the rodeo line or northern boundary strikes the beach, to the first ridge which the hills form. If such a line be drawn, it would form a diagonal to the square claimed by the appellees, and the tract would have a triangular shape, with the agreed line between Soto and Castro as its base on the east, and with its apex touching the beach at a mathematical point. The language of the grant has already been quoted, The words, which, it is contended, call for this location, are as follows: "And from this creek (El Alto) drawing a right line, to pass by the rodeo to the beach, and from this point to the first ridge which the hills form, excepting," etc. It is claimed, and with much apparent reason, that the last line must be drawn from the "point" where the rodeo here strikes the beach to the first cuchilla, or ridge: If the word "punta" had precisely the signification of the English word " point,'' as used in surveying, or if the grant had specified the " point" where the rodeo line strikes the beach as the point from which a straight line was to be drawn to the cuchilla for the sourthern boundary, the construction contended for would be unavoidable. But the language is " a straight line drawn to the beach, and from that point," etc. It does not in terms say " and from the point where said line strikes the beach;" it merely says "from that point" namely, from the beach. A reference to the beach generally by the term " punta" is certainly not in accordance with our use of language; but so far as I have been able to discover, such a construction of the term is not admissible in Spanish. If, however, there were no other guide to the intentions of the grantor, this construction might probably be deemed forced and unnatural. There are other considerations, however, which I think remove any reasonable doubt as to its propriety. In fixing the limits of land to be granted, both the law and usage of the Californians required them to adopt, as nearly as possible,, a rectangular or square figure. This was not in all cases practicable, but in a country used almost exclusively for grazing, and where no fences were built, it became necessary to designate great natural objects as the boundaries of the tracts conceded. It seems therefore extremely improbable that in this instance the natural and obvious boundary afforded by the shore of a great estuary should be wholly neglected, and the land should assume the form of a triangle, having only a mathematical point at its apex resting on the beach, while one of the sides should diagonall)'- cross the center of a large plain with no visible object throughout its length, except at its extremities, to determine its location. This is the more improbable as the whole of the neighboring land had been before, or was subsequently, granted, and the piece of land excluded by the diagonal line alluded to, if not embraced within the grant to Soto, has remained from some unexplained reason the only piece of ungranted land in the vicinity. The original grant to Soto was for one league, within the limits specified. He subsequently, as we have seen, obtained the sobrante of about half a league more. This was after the boundary between him and Castro had been fixed. Taking, then, that boundary as. determined, there is found within the limits as claimed by him, about one square league and a half, precisely the quantity granted to him in the two grants. But if the diagonal line be drawn as proposed, he would have but about two-thirds of a league in all, leaving his sobrante grant wholly' inoperative, for even his first grant of one league could not be satisfied out of the tract so limited. It is to be borne in mind that Soto did not petition for an augmentation or extension, but for a sobrante or overplus - the excess within the original boundaries over and above the quantity to which he was restricted. This excess he states to be about half a league, while he also mentions that his first grant was for one league. If, then, the limits of the land as designated in his grant, after the Castro line was fixed, included less than a league, as is now contended, the petition for a sobrante of half a league more within those limits was absurd. Had he or the Governor supposed that the quantity already granted could not be found within the limits of the tract, it is not to be imagined that one would have asked for and the other conceded half a league more within those limits. In such case he would have asked for, not a sobrante, but an augmentation, and would have obtained his additional quintity outside of and beyond his original boundaries. The fact that the land, according to the boundaries he contends for, is almost exactly the quantity (one league and a half) granted to him, seems to me almost conclusive as to what he intended to ask for, and the Governor to give. The value of land to the forrtier inhabitants of this country, in a great degree, depended upon the existence of abundant supplies of fresh water, or "agua dolce," for cattle. The line proposed would not only form an acute angle at the beach, but would touch the San Lorenzo Creek only at a single mathematical point, thus cutting off all access to that stream, and either depriving the ranchotaltogether of fresh water, or else affording it at the El Alto alone for a short distance. The adjoining rancho at the south is bounded by the San Lorenzo, and it is impossible that in iixing the limits of a cattle rancho access to that stream should have been denied to Soto, when the land between his rancho and it was unoccupied and ungranted, and the Governor was willing, on his mere suggestion, to increase the quantity given him by an additional half league. If with these considerations in our minds we recur to the grant, its intention is obvious. It does not profess to give the boundary lines except on one side of the tract, but "its limits." Its longitudinal limits are declared to be from the San Lorenzo to the Alto, and the rodeo line to the beach. Having thus determined its length, the grantor indicates its breadth, viz.: from the beach to the first crest of the hills. He does not mention any point in the crest of the hills, which would have been natural if he had intended to fix as a southern boundary an imaginary straight line drawn from the point where the rodeo line struck the beach to the crest; and the indefiniteness of his description, referring as it does to a line on the summit of a range of hills, rather than to a point on those hills, seems to show that the intention of the grantor was merely to fix the latitudinal limits of th:: tract, viz.: the beach and the crest; rather than to describe a line as a precise boundary. But all doubt on this subject is removed, if the diseno produced be received as the original on which the grant was made. It is shown beyond any reasonable doubt that it was, with the other title-papers, placed in the hands of eminent counsel in this city, in whose custody it has ever since remained. By some oversight it was not put in evidence before the Board, but A. M. Pico, Francisco Arce, and G. Castro, testify that it is either the identical map or one exactly resembling that which was handed to Pico when about to give judicial possession to Soto. This map is unusually rude, but the form of the tract is sufficiently indicated to show it to be a square or parallelogram, with the beach as its western boundary. A further confirmation of these views is found in the report of Jimeno, at the time of the dispute between the Governor and Castro. " It appears to him," he says, " convenient to measure to Soto the league, more or less, which has been granted him from the beach to the ' lomas,' or hills, but always on the side of the Arroyo del Alto, because those are the limits which have been marked out, and from these limits he should follow those of Don G. Castro." He was thus, according to Jimeno, to have a league on the side of the Alto, from the beach to the hill, and from the Alto to the San Lorenzo, following Castro's boundary. The sobrante, after measuring the league, would have lain between the beach and the San Lorenzo, and would have been, as the testimony shows, about half a league in extent, if measured after the Castro line was deter- mined, and it was precisely this sobrante of half a league which Soto asked for and obtained. If to all this be added the fact that Soto himself always claimed, and was regarded by his neighbors as owning, the whole tract between the beach and the Castro line, and between the Alto and rodeo line and the San Lorenzo, the conclusion is irresistible that such are the true boundaries of the grant. The Board confirmed the claim to the land within these boundaries, and I see no reason to reverse their decree.
The United States, Appellants, vs. The heirs of Jos6 Joaquin EstudillO, claiming the Rancho San Leandro. Where the description contained in a grant, and the circumstances of the case, justify the belief that the intention was to grant all the land included within the boundaries named. Then the words " poco mas 6 menos " (a little more or less) must be construed as operative to pass to the grantee such fractional part of a league as may be found in excess of the quantity named in the grant.
This claim was confirmed by the Board. It has recently undergone so full an examination in the ejectment suit brought in the Circuit Court, that I conceive it unnecessary to consider at length the testimony by which its genuineness is established. On the whole, after an attentive consideration of the additional testimony taken in this Court, I incline to the belief that the grant issued as alleged by the claimant, although the non-production of the original grant and the fact that the order of concession is unsigned, leaves some room for doubt on this point. It appears to me evident that the grantor intended to fix as the limits of the tract, the San Leandro, the sea, and the diramaderos or overflowing of the springs. On the fourth side the boundary is designated as "a straight line from the diramaderos to the San Lorenzo, but so drawn as not to include the Indian cultivations." This line was, from the terms of the grant, to be a straight line, and should be drawn to the nearest point of the San Lorenzo to which it can be drawn without including the Indian cultivations; whether that line will thus take a southerly or a southwesterly direction will depend upon the extent of the Indian cultivations. Such has seemed to me,, after much consideration, the true construction of the grant and diseno in this case, and such was the view taken of it by the Circuit Court and by the Board of Commissioners. But the difficult question in the case is that presented by the words " pocomas 6 menos." It is certainly not easy to say what precise effect they were intended to have. Some operation should clearly be given them, unless they are so hopelesslyvague and uncertain as to admit of no definite construction. The grant surveys ta the grantee " a part of the land known as San Leandro," and proceeds to define the boundaries with more than ordinary precision. The third condition states the land of which donation is made to be one square league, a little more or less, (poco mas d menos), directs it to be measured, and reserves the surplus. The quantity of land contained within the boundai'ies will probably exceed one league by a considerable fraction. Ought then the words "poco mas 6 menos " to be rejected for uncertainty, and the grantee in this and all similar cases to be limited to the precise quantity of one league, no matter how small the gore or strip of land in excess may on measure- ment be found to be; or are we at liberty to construe the words referred to as embracing such fractional part of a league as may be found within the boundaries ?- The question is one of intention on the part of the grantor. In most instances the description in these grants was obviously intended to designate the tract out of which the granted quantity was to be taken, rather than to indicate the limits of the land granted. In some cases, on the other hand, the boundaries are indicated with much precision, and the mention of quantity is obviously rather a conjectural estimate of its extent than intended as a limitation of the grant to the quantity mentioned; and yet in these cases the sobrante clause is added apparently from habit, or because no pains were taken to vary the form of the grant according to the circumstances of particular cases. The English equivalent for the words "un sitio, poco mas 6 menos," would perhaps be given by the phrase " about one square league." - Where under our system a grant specifies the boundaries of the land which it conveys in absolute terms, the subsequent mention of its extent as of "about one square league," with a reservation of the surplus, would probably be inoperative. It may plausibly be argued, that if any part of the grant is rejected for uncertainty, the whole phrase (un sitio, poco mas 6 menos) should be rejected, and not merely the indefinite words which terminate it. Certainly, if the expression were in English "about one league," the Court would hardly strike out the word " about " and construe the words "one league" as indicating that precise quantity - not to be exceeded by a foot. It has on the whole seemed to me that where the grant describes in its granting clause a particular piece of land, with definite or ascertainable boundaries, and the condition mentions the extent of the land so granted as of so many leagues, " more or less," the latter expression should be so construed as to embrace such additional fractional part of a league as may on measurement be found within the boundaries. There is certainly some difficulty in determining what quantity shall by this clause be deemed to pass. To allow under a grant of one league, more or less, three or four or five leagues to pass, would evidently be unreasonable, unless the condition be rejected in toto. It would seem equally unreasonable to restrict the grantee to the precise quantity of one league as determined by an accurate survey, and to take from him a gore pf land, perhaps a few yards in width, along one side of his rancho, and which is clearly embraced within the boundaries as mentioned in his grant. I think the words should be allowed a reasonable operation, and that where the description contained in the grant, the previous proceedings, and the circumstances of the case justify the belief that the grantor's general intention was to grant all the land within the boundaries, the words " poco mas 6 menos " should be construed to embrace such fractional part of a league as might be found to be in excess of the specified quantity. The Circuit Court and the Board were of opinion that in the grant under consideration, the excess, such as it was shown to be, passed to the grantee, and in that opinion I concur. A decree must be entered afiSrming the decision of the Board.
iNOCENCio Romero et al., claiming El Sobrante, Appellants, vs. The United States. - Claim for five leagues of land in Contra Costa County, rejected by the Board, and appealed by the United States. It appears from the expediente on file in the archives, that on the i8th day of January, 1844, the brothers Romero petitioned the Governor in the usual form for a grant of land, being a sobrante lying between the ranchos of Moraga, Pacheco, and Welch. This petition was by a marginal order referred to the Honorable Secretary for his report. The Secretary referred the papers to the First Alcade of San Jos^ with directions to summon Moraga, Pacheco, and Welch, hear their allegations, and return the papers to the office. On the ist of February, 1844, the First Alcalde reports that the owners of the lands bounded by the tract have been confronted with the petitioners, and that the former are willing and desirous that the land be granted. He adds that it had come to his knowledge that one Francisco Soto claimed the tract some six or seven years ago, but as he had never used nor cultivated it, the petitioners appeared to him to be entitled to the favor they ask. On the 4th of February, 1844, Manuel Jimeno, the Secretary, reports to the Governor that, in view of the report of the First Alcalde, there would seem to be no obstacle to making the grant. On this report of the Secretary, the Governor makes the following order: " Let the Judge of the proper district take measurement of the unoccupied land that is claimed, in presence of the neighbors, and certify the result, so that it may be granted to the petitioners. - Micheltorena." On the 21st of March, 1844, the claimants addressed a petition to the Governor, representing that, owing to the absence of the owners of the neighboring lands, the Judge of the Pueblo of San Jos^ had been unable to execute the superior order (above recited), and soliciting that his Excellency would grant the tract to them, " either provisionally, or in such way as he would deem fit," while there was yet time for planting, etc. On this petition Jimeno reports (March 23, 1844) that the original order should be carried into effect as to the measurement of the land, and that "as soon as that was accomplished, Seiior Romero can present himself with Senor Soto, who says he has a right to the same tract." The Governor thereupon made the following report: "Let' everything be done agreeably to the foregoing report. - Micheltorena." The above documents constitute the whole expediente on file in the archives. From the documents produced by the claimant from the files of the Alcalde's office, it appears that on the same day, March 23, 1844, Jimeno communicated to the Alcalde the order of the Governor that the sobrante solicited by the Romeros should be measured, and that if it should be necessary a measurement of the adjoining ranchos should also be made - with the understanding that those parties who should become "agraciados" should bear the expense. It is evident that up to the date of the last order of Micheltorena no grant of the land had issued. That pursuant to the recommendation of Jimeno, the Governor declined to mike even a provisional grant as solicited, and that final action in the matter was deferred until a measurement should be made, and until Romero and Soto should present themselves. Jimeno does not seem to have finally adopted the opinion of the Alcalde that Soto had forfeited his rights to the land, for he recommends to the Governor, as we have seen, that the land should be measured without delay, and that then " Romero should present himself, joined with Sefior Soto, who saj/s he has a right to the same land!' In this recommendation the Governor concurs. There is certainly nothing in these proceedings which indicate that the Governor had finally determined to grant the land, though it is evident that he regarded the application with favor; still less can any of the orders made by him be construed to import a present grant. On the contrary, it is clear that the Governor refuses to make even a provisional grant, but insists that a measurement shall first be made, and then that Romero and Soto shall appear before him, evidently with the view of determining the rights of the latter.
The subsequent proceedings, as shown by documents exhibited by the claimants, confirm this view. On the isth of January, 1847, Romero and Garcia, the present claimants, appeared before John Burton, the Alcalde of San Jose, and executed a paper in the presence of the Alcalde and two witnesses, reciting a sale by Romero to Garcia of one-half of the land, and stipulating that both parties should remain subject to the final result, " if the Governor grant it in ownership." And if the contrary should be "the case, then Garcia should lose equally with Romero, without any right to reclaim the consideration paid." This paper is signed by the parties, the Alcalde, and the witnesses. On the 28th of May, 1847, Josd Romero addressed a petition to John Burton, Alcalde of San Jos^, .representing that, as early as 1844, an order from the former Governor had been sent to the Alcalde's Court requiring a measurement of the land called "Juntas;" that such measurement had not yet been made. He therefore solicits the Alcalde to give him a testimonial of the reports, which, in the year 1844, were sent to the Government, so " that we can be granted said land." The Alcalde in a marginal order directs that the lands should be measured according to the original order of the Supreme Government. In the margin of the order transmitted by Jimeno, under date of March 23, 1844, the Alcalde writes: "Be it done accordingly on the 9th of April, 1847. The interested parties will proceed to take possession of the menti land according to the order of the Governor. I further order, that in case any bordering land-owner demand it, a measurement of his land be ordered. John Burton, J. P." It appears, moreover, that about two months before the date of their last petition, viz.: on the 31st of March, 1847, Jos^ Romero had addressed a petition to the same Alcalde, representing that some years before he had solicited a piece of land in the Cailada de San Ramon, and bordering upon lands of Don M. Castro, and that His Excellency had ordered the lands of Castro to be measured, which had never been done. The petitioners further stated that tiiey were two brothers, with a numerous family, and were without any piece of land whatever to raise cattle; they therefore begged the Alcalde to provide for them as soon as possible, that they might retain and locate their stock. The Alcalde on the Sth of April orders that the fulfillment of the superior order should be at once proceeded to. The entry in the marginal order transmitted by Jimeno was made on the Romeros' petition of the 23d of March, and not on that of the 28th of May, above referred to; for it directs the measurement to be proceeded to on the 9th of April. And, finally, on the 27th of December, 1847, K. H. Dimmick, then Alcalde, makes an order in which, after reciting that disputes as to the boundaries existed between the Romeros and Domingo Peralta, he directs that the boundaries be established and adjusted in the manner specified in the order of the Governor, dated 23d of March, 1844. I have stated the contents of these various documents with some particularity, because an attempt has been made since the rejection of the claim by the Board, to show by parol evidence that a final grant issued to the Romeros, which has been lost. We have seen that the last document in the expediente is the order of the Governor of the 23d of March, 1844, adopting Jimeno's recommendation .that a measurement should be made before issuing the final grant, or even a provisional one, as solicited by Romero; and even then it does not seem that the grant was certainly to be made, for Romero and Soto were to "present themselves," evidently for the purpose of enabling the Governor to ascertain their respective rights. Nothing further seems to have been done, either by the Government or the petitioners, until 1 847 On the 3 1 st of March of that year we find the Romeros representing to the Alcalde that the Governor had some years before ordered the land to be measured, which had not been done; and that they were without any piece of land whatever, and they begged the Alcalde to provide for them. The Alcalde thereupon directs that the superior order of Marcli 23, 1844, be proceeded to. On the 28th of May, 1 847, the Romeros again petition the Alcalde, representing that as early as 1844, the Governor had sent to the Alcalde's Court an order requiring a measurement of the land; they therefore ask a testimonial of the reports and orders in his office, " so that we may be granted the land!' The Alcalde again directs the superior order of March 23, 1844, to be complied with, and on the following day a declaration is made before the Alcalde by Antonio M. Pico, that Don J. Moraga and Don L. Pacheco, the colindantes, had declared that for their parts the surplus of land which does not belong to them '' could be granted to the Romeros." And, finally, the deed from Romero to Garcia of January 15, 1847, expressly stipulates that both the parties to it should remain subject to the final result, '^ if the Governor grant it in ownership, and if the contrary should be the case, then Garcia should lose equally with Romero without reclamation." These documents appear to me to establish beyond doubt that all action of the Government on the application of the Romeros terminated with the order of.March 23, 1844, directing the measurement as an indispensable preliminary to a grant, either final or provisional. That during the year 1847, the petitioners made several attempts to have that measurement effected, but apparently without success; and that up to December, 1847, neither they nor any one else pretended that the order of March 23, 1844, was not the last Act of the Government in the premises. The parol testimony offered to prove that a grant issued will be briefly adverted to. C. Brown swears that the Romeros have lived on the rancho since 1840, and that he always understood they had a grant. He does not pretend to have seen it. James M. Tice swears that he has searched for the title-papers, but has been unable to find them. J. J. P. Mesa saw a bundle of papers in Romero's hands on his return from Monterey, in 1844. The bundle was not opened, but Romero said they were his titlepapers. He subsequently saw Micheltorena's order for the measurement of the land. He does not pretend to have seen any grant. It is to be observed that Mesa was examined before the Board, and did not mention this circumstance; and that he can neither read nor write., Inocencio Romero, who disclaims any present interest in the land, swears that he had a grant; that he gave it to Mr. Tingley to be presented to the Board, and that since then he has not seen it. He' also states that the grant was made by Micheltorena a short time after he arrived in the country, and that Area, who was then his Secretary, delivered it to him. The expediente, however, shows that Jimeno was the Secretary, at least until March 23, 1844. And as it is clear that at that date the grant was suspended until a measurement should be made, the titlepapers seen by Mesa in the hands of Romero on his return from Monterey in 1844, must have been the papers now produced.
The testimony of Mr. G. B Tingley is the only evidence in the cause which approaches proof that a grant issued. This witness swears that on the trial of a suit between Domingo Peralta and the Romeros, a grant from Micheltorena to the latter was produced in evidence; that the petition was for a sobrante; that the signatures were genuine; and that one Sanford took the papers, and he has never seen them since. On his cross-examination he states that the papers produced were the original petition, and the marginal order of reference an information signed by A. M. Pico, then a decree of concession, and final a title in form, with a condition that the grant should not interfere with the adjoining grants. If these papers were produced, they must all, with the exception of the grant, have been procured from the archives, for the petition, the informes, and the decree of concession form part of the expediente which remains on file. That expediente is in evidence in this cause, and contains no decree of concession whatever, nor any draft or "borrador" of the formal title delivered to the party, as is almost invariably the case where such a document issued; on the contrary, the last order of the Governor, in effect, refuses, as we have seen, to grant the petition for even a provisional title until a measurement was made, which clearly was not done until after December, 1847, if at all. Besides, if all these papers were produced from the archives and were delivered to Sanford, how does it happen that only a part of them were restored to the archives, and are now produced? ]os6 Ramon Mesa, a witness produced on the part ot the United States, testifies that he was present at the trial of the suit referred to by Mr. Tingley; that no formal title was produced by the Romeros, but only a provisional license to occupy, subject to the boundaries of the neighboring proprietors, during the pendency of the proceedings to obtain a title. The witness further swore that he heard Inocencio Romero state to Domingo Peralta, in reply to an inquiry as to what title he had, that he had no title; and that he had intended to take steps to get one, but that all he had was a "provisional license." This provisional license is in all probability the order made by John Burton, Justice of the Jeace, in April, 1847, on the margin of the Governor's order of March 23, 1844, for the measurement of the land, and was in compliance with Romero's petition to him of the 3 ist of March, 1847. The Justice of the Peace directs that "the interested party will proceed to take possession of the land, according to the order of the Government," etc. As a copy of Jimeno's order, with this marginal entry of Burton's, appears to have been furnished to Romero, and by him sent to Garcia, it is in all probability the "license" referred to. It will not be pretended that any rights could be conferred by such an order of an American Justice of the Peace in April, 1847. The record of the suit between; Peralta and the Romeros has been produced. It contains no evidence whatever even tending to show that a grant was produced at the trial. Antonio M. Pico, a witness produced by the claimants, swears that he received an order from the Governor to put the coterminous neighbors, Pacheco and Moraga, into possession of their land, and to measure the same for the purpose of separating them from those of the Romeros; that he was directed by the same order to put the Romeros in possession of the surplus; that he summoned the colindantes, but they did not appear; that he did not then execute the order, but repeated the summons to them; that the Romeros made a complaint to the Governor, and he, the witness, received from the latter a new order to carry the former into effect, upon which he told the Romeros to go there - which they did in 1844. This witness explicitly states that no title to the land in favor of the Romeros was ever exhibited to him. The orders referred to by Pico are obviously those contained in the expediente. The first order did not, as he supposes, direct him to put the Romeros in possession, but only to measure the land and certify the result, " so that it might be granted." Romero's complaint or petition to the Governor stating the failure of che Alcalde to measure the land, and asking for a provisional grant, we also find in the expediente, and also the second order of the Governor, which, like the former, only directs the measurement of the land - the Governor having, as we have seen, adopted Jimeno's recommendation that the land should be measured, and Soto and Romero should present themselves before any grant should issue. On the parol proofs alone I should come to the conclusion that Mr. Tingley is mistaken in supposing that a grant for the land was ever produced. But the evidence afforded not only by the expediente, but by the repeated declarations of the Romeros themselves in their various petitions and in the conveyance to Garcia, removes every possible doubt on the question. The facts of the case are unmistakable. The Romeros solicited land, which the Governor was disposed to grant. He directed a measurement preparatory to making the grant, and this measurement never was effected. I cannot perceive how this Court can recognize these proceedings as giving any title to the lands. It may be admitted that in 1844 they went upon the land, as stated by Pico - though, if so, it is singular that John Burton, Alcalde, should, in April, 1847, have ordered "the interested parties to proceed to take possession of the mentioned lands, according to the order of the Government." But this occupation, not authorized, so far as it appears, by the Government, and only made in pursuance of a verbal permission of Pico, and without the measurement of the land, as required by both orders of Micheltorena, can hardly be deemed to have conferred any title, either legal or equitable, upon the claimants. The case is, perhaps, a hard one, for there seems no reason to suppose that the grant would have been refused if the measurement had been made and Soto's rights had been found to have been forfeited. But no grant, either perfect or inchoate, was made, nor any promise given that one should be made. The petitions were favorably received, a provisional grant refused, and a measurement directed. There the action of the Government ended, and certainly such proceedings did not confer such a right of property in the land as this Court can recognize. The claim must be rejected. (June Term, 1857.)
Department of the Interior, ) Washington, February 23, 1882.1 To the Commissioner of the General Land Office - Sir: I have considered, on appeal from the decision of your office of February 26, 1881, the matter of the survey of the California private land claim known as El Sobrante Rancho, situate in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda, and confirmed to Juan Jos^ and Victor Castro by the Board of Land Commissioners and the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, under the Act of Congress approved March 3, 185 1 (9 Stats., 631).
Such facts appearing of record in your office, as are necessary to a proper understanding of the main questions presented for consideration, will be stated as briefly as practicable.
On the 26th of May, 1852, the said Juan Jos^ and Victor Castro, by their attorneys, H. W. Carpentier and John Wilson, filed in the office of the said Board of Land Commissioners a petition in which they set forth, among other things, that on the 22d of April, 1841, they presented their joint petition to Juan B. Alvarado, then Governor of Upper California, "for a grant of all the vacant {sobrante) land lying between the Ranchos San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Valencia, and Moraga, being the surplus or overplus left between the said ranchos after the boundaries to the Ranchos" should "be ascertained and settled;" that "on the 23d of April, 1841, the said Alvarado, so being Governor, and having full power and authority to do so, granted the land as prayed for in the said petition," and directed the petitioners " to appear anpw before the proper authority with a map of the land so asked * * * as soon as the boundaries of the Ranchos named in said petition * * * should be ascertained, regulated and settled ;" that they had always been ready to comply with the direction of the Governor to present themselves anew to the proper authority, with a map of the land thus conceded to them, but that the boundaries of the ranchos named had not b^en ascertained and settled; that "the said Victor, several years before the date of the grant, had settled upon the land so granted them, had built and resided in a house, and cultivated fields thereon;" that both the petitioners "pastured their cattle, horses, etc., upon it," the land granted, "before the grant was made," and had continued to do so ever since; that the said Victor had "constantly since resided thereon," and had cultivated three different ranchos thereon, and had> for the last fourteen years (prior to presentation of the petition to the Board), "had and held (and which was known to the owners of the neighboring ranchos mentioned in the grant * * *) exclusive and continued possession thereof;" and the petitioners prayed that they might "be allow.ed to intervene in the cases arising out of the said ranchos when the boundaries thereof" were to be investigated, so that justice might be done them and they obtain "all the vacant {sobrante) land lying between the said ranchos after their boundaries are properly adjudged and regulated," and that their grant might be confirmed and made valid to them "according to the full intent of the grant at the time the same was made." (Record of Petitions, vol. i, p. 460, et seq.. Land Commission of California.)
On the same day, to wit. May 26, 1852, the Castros filed another petition, in which they represented, as before, that they had petitioned for a grant April 22, 1841,. of " all the vacant {sobrante) land lying in between the Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, the ranch of Valencia, and the ranch of Moraga, being the overplus lying between these several ranchos, which lie in the county of Contra Costa ;" that on the 23d of April, 1841, the Governor granted the same tOjthem, "as they petitioned," and directed them to "present themselves anew before the proper author! ty> accompanied by a map of the land so granted, so soon as the boundaries of the ranchos named should be ascertained and settled; * * * but that the boundaries of the said ranchos " had never been ascertained and settled. They therefore prayed the Board to ascertain and settle said boundaries, and then they would comply with all their duty in the premises. They also stated that they would prove that they had been " in the actual possession of said sobrante, or vacant, land so granted them ever since the date of the said grant," and that they had " had on it a large stock of cattle, horses, sheep, etc.''
They further alleged that the grant had not been approved by the Departmental Assembly, "because the boundaries of the adjoining ranches had not been ascertained," and set forth other matters not necessary to be stated here.
Whether this petition was to amend the one first herein referred to, or vice- versa, does not appear; but the two may be taken together as the petition of the" Castros to the Board of Land Commissioners.
It may be well here to state that about the year 1853, after said petition to the Board was filed, and before the claim was confirmed, the county of Contra Costa, in which the petitioners alleged their land to be situated, was divided, and part of it included in the county of Alameda. There is, consequently, no variance between the general location called for in the petition as in Contra Costa County, and that in the Board's decree as in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda.
In support of their claim the petitioners introduced in evidence the original petitition and concession, or grant, and a translation thereof, which translation was certified as correct by George Fisher, Secretary to the Board. This official translation of said petition and grant reads as follows: -
Petition
To His Excellency, the Governor: The citizens, Juan Jos^ and Victor Castro, natives of this Department, and residents within the jurisdiction of San Jose de Alvarado, present ourselves before your Excellency in the most proper and respectful manner, and represent that, being desirous of being finally settled upon land of our own, for the purpose of devoting ourselves to the labors of agriculture and the raising of cattle, in order by these means to obtain the very necessary means of subsistence for our numerous increased families, which is of such vital importance, we beseech your Excellency that you will deign to grant unto us a piece of vacant land which is situate on the immediate limits (inmediaciones) of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, the farm (ranch) of Valencia, and the farm of Moraga, which land is the overplus {sobrante) of the ranches aforesaid.
Monterey,. April 23, 1841. As the parties interested petition for in this representation so the land of which they make mention is granted unto them, they remaining under obligation to present themselves anew, accompanied by a map of the land, so .soon as the boundaries of the neighboring land-owners shall be regulated. AlvaKADO.
(Record of evidence, vol. 19, p. 107, Land Commission, California.) Testimony was introduced to prove the genuineness of the grant, its character the settlement of Victor Castro thereon, the possession of the Castros as alleged in the petition, and also some testimony concerning the boundaries of the Peraltas' grant of San Antonio, and the case was submitted for decision, whereupon, on the 3d day of July, 1855, the following opinion and decree were rendered by the Board of Land Commissioners : -
Opinion
The evidence in this case establishes the following facts: That the petitioners presented their expediente for a sobrante of land lying between ranchos named in said expediente, and in pursuance of said expediente,- Juan B. Alvarado, Governor of California, on the 23d day of April, 1841, issued a grant to the petitioners, and requiring them to report a plat of the same as soon as the adjoining ranchos could be surveyed and the extent of the sobrante ascertained, which survey has not been had of said ranchos so as to enable the petitioners herein to define with certainty the boundaries of their said sobrante, and a large amount of testimony has been taken for the purpose of settling the boundaries, which is rendered inapplicable to the merits of this claim by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Fremont.
The grant offered in evidence is proven to be genuine, and the proofs in the case go to show that it was issued to the grantees in consideration of services rendered to the nation, and for supplies furnished for the use of the Mexican Government.
In this case, on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is adjudged by the Commission that the claim of the said petitioners is valid, and it is therefore decreed that the same be and hereby is confirmed.
The land of which confirmation is hereby made is situated in the counties of Contra Costa and Alameda, and is the surplus (sobrante) which on the 23d day of April, A. D. 1841, the date of the decree of concession to the present claimants, existed, lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia, reference being had to the original expediente on file in this case. (Record of Decisions, vol. 3, pp. I06 and 107, L4nd Commission, California.)
The case was taken to the proper United States District- Court, as provided in section 9 of the Act of 1851, above referred to, and such proceedings were had before, and decree entered by the Court as made the decree entered by the Board the final decree in the matter.
The contest now here on appeal arose over a survey of the claim thus confirmed, which was executed by Deputy Surveyor William Minto, in 1878, under contract with the Surveyor-General of California, c^pproved by your ofifice. The field notes of the survey were returned to the Surveyor-General's office August 26, 1878, and from them a plat was made, after which, in September and October, 1878, notice of the execution of the survey and plat was duly published under section i of the Act of July i, i864> (13 Stats., 332), and the survey and plat were retained in the office of the Surveyor- General for inspection, as required by law.
Many objections to the survey, protests against the surveying of the claim as demanded by the owners thereof, and interventions in the case were filed, some before and others after the period of ninety days from the first publication of notice had expired; and thereunder a vast amount of testimony was introduced before the Surveyor-General, which was forwarded with the appeal. It is unnecessary to pass upon the status of the various objectors, protestants, .interveners, or to specify those who appeared in time and showed such interest as entitled them to be heard, and to dismiss the proceedings of all others, under the rule laid down by the Department May 28, 1879, in the matter of the survey of the rancho El Corte de Madera del Presidio (Copp's L. O., vol. 6, p. 52), for the reason that the case is appealed by parties having a proper standing therein, who have raised every point, it seems to me, that the circumstances of the case admit, or that arises in the case.
I need not further recite connectedly the history or facts of the case, enough having already been stated to develop the principal questions involved; but such other matters of record in your office as shall seem proper to be considered will be referred to and discussed as occasion may require.
It is proper here to state my reasons for not using and discussing the testimony of witnesses taken before the Surveyor-General. I have not done so for the reason as to one branch of the case no such testimony is admissible, and as to the other, from my view of the case, none of it is needed. The explanation is this: The decree is said to be ambiguous. Now, if there is a patent ambiguity, it cannot be explained by testimony unless the terms used are wholly indefinite and equivocal, and convey on their face no certain or explicit meaning, and the decree itself furnishes no materials by which the ambiguity thus arising can be removed. In such a case, rather than the claim which has been adjudicated upon the principles of equity (Sec. 11, Act of 185 1, 9 Stats., 633), should entirely fail, the light of intrinsic evidence may be brought in to ascertain the intention of the Board. But, in my opinion, the decree is not in such a condition. I think that any patent ambiguity in the expressed decree can be explained by reference to such matters, as under the rules of interpretation applicable to this case, may properly be examined for that purpose as a part of the decree. It follows, therefore, that any ambiguity appearing upon the face of the decree itself must be removed by construction and not by averment, and hence upon this branch of the case the testimony aforesaid is inadmissible.
The latent ambiguity of the decree can, in my opinion, be sufficiently explained by the records of your office or those of the Surveyor-General's office, and therefore the testimony of witnesses was not, and is not, needed in this case. In other words, that which was confirmed by the decree of the Board can be so surveyed as to do substantial justice from light afforded by the' records of the Land Department, and no testimony dehors the records would make the matter more certain.
United States and the Castros, or those claiming under them. If there were error or mistake in it, the only remedy was by appeal. The appeal from the decree of the Board having been dismissed by the District Court, the decree must forever stand as the Court thus made and left it. There is no authority or jurisdiction in any tribunal to correct, altar, amend, or annul it. Nothing remains to be done except to execute it according to its true intent as the law provides. If it is ambiguous and requires construction, then this must be done under the rules of the common law. The decree must serve as the guide to the Surveyor-General in making a survey in execution of the same. It is the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to see to it that the survey conforms as nearly as practicable to the decree, and finally, the Secretary of the Interior, by virtue of his supervisory powers and appellate jurisdiction, has authority to review the action of the Commissioner in the premises and direct how the survey shall be made. Each of these several propositions of law will be found fully sustained by some one or more of the following authorities: Higueras vs. The United States (s Wall, 827, 828, 830, 832, 834); United States vs. Halleck (i Wall., 439); United States vs. Billings (2 Wall., 444); the Fossatt case {ibid., 649); United States vs. Fossatt (21 How., 447); United States vs. Sepulveda (i Wall, 107); 12 Opins. Attorneys-General, 250; Snyder z's. Sickels (8 Otto., 203); sections 13 and 15, Act of 1851, 9 Stats., 633, 634; sections i, 6, 7, Act of 1864, 13 Stats., 333, 334; section i. Act of 1812, 2 Stats., 716; section i. Act of 1836, S Stats., 107; section 3, Act of 1849, 9 Stats., 395; section 453 Revised Statutes; and decisions of this Department of March 3, 188 J, in the matter of the survey of the pueblo lands of San Francisco, and of May 21, 1881, in the matter of the survey of the Rancho San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero.
It has been contended in argument by some of the able counsel that the claim of the Castros was not such as, according to the decision of the Supreme Court in numerous cases, should have been confirmed; because the paper constituting the petition and concession was in the hands of the Castros until the organization of the Board of Land Commissioners, and until it was filed in the office of the Board; because there was no map accompanying the petition, no reference by the Governor of the petition for information, no report upon the petition by any Government officer, and the grant was not made matter of record in the archives of the Mexican Government; and hence, that the only title to consideration which the claim has is the decree of confirmation. For these reasons it is contended that, as to the claim, the construction of the decree should be strictissimi juris. Others contend that the doctrine applicable to public or legislative grants should be applied in construing this decree; that it should be strictly construed as against the confirmees. On the other hand, counsel for claimants contend that the doctrine above mentioned does not apply to decrees especially not to a decree under the Act of 185 1, founded upon the principles of equity, and that as to such a decree the doctrine of liberal or equitable construction should be applied.
provided by section ii of the said Act of 1851, and hence, that the decree is vaHd and binding upon all parties thereto. Therefore, if construction is necessary, the decree must be considered as entitled to the same respect and consideration as any other final decree of confirmation under said Act.
As to all the foregoing propositions it may be said that the decree must be executed according to its true intent and meaning, and that construction should not be employed to any other end.
Sedgwick, in his work upon Construction of Statutes, etc., after having examined many decisions of courts bearing upon the subject of strict and liberal construction, concludes a long chapter by giving the judiciary and the legal profession, in the form of rules, the benefit of his extended researches, from which I make the following quotations: -
"The intent of the Legislature should control absolutely the action of the judiciary; where the intention is clearly ascertained, the Courts have no other duty to perform than to execute the legislative will, without any regard to their own views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment.
" The idea that an act may be strictly or liberally construed without regard to the legislative intent, according as it is viewed either as a penal or a remedial statute, either as in derogation of the common law or beneficial innovation, is, in its very nature, delusive and fallacious.
"In cases where the intent of the legislation is ambiguous, and the effort to arrive at it is hopeless, and in these cases only, does the power of construing a statute strictly or liberally exist." (Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 325 and 326.)
The Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the doctrine of strict construction as applicable to legislative grants, held that the grant being considered by them could not extend beyond the intent it expresssd; that -
" It should be neither enlarged by ingenious reasoning, nor dimini Aed by strained construction. The interpretation must be reasonable, and such as will give effect to the intention of Congress. This is to be ascertained from the terms employed, the situation of the parties, and the nature of the grant. If these terms are plain and unambiguous, there can be no difficulty in interpreting them; but if they admit of different meanings - one of extension, and the other of limitation - they must be accepted in a sense favorable to the grantor." (Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co. vs. U. S., 2 Otto, 740.)
The harmony between the doctrine expressed by the Court and that referred to above is at once apparent. Both agree that the intention must prevail, but when the terms employed are so anjbiguous as to render it impossible to ascertain the intention of the framers of the act, then the doctrine' of strict' or liberal construction may be applied according to the nature of the case. The Supreme Court, in the particular case, held that when the terms admitted of different meanings, one of extension and the other of limitation, they must be accepted in the sense favorable to the grantor. The Court supposed a case wherein it was hopeless, from the ambiguity of the terms employed, to arrive at the intent of the Legislature, in which case it was authorized to employ the doctrine of strict construction as. to the grantee, or to take that meaning which was favorable to the grantor. A meaning of extension and another of hmitation are certainly diametrically opposed to each other, in which case one could be taken to the exclusion of the other. But where no such condition of affairs exists - where the intent can be reasonably ascertained from the whole act or instrument being interpreted - then there is no choice left, and the intent must govern.
In this connection it may be well to advert to the fact that the decree refers to "the original expediente and grant on file in this case." That instrument, therefore, may be read with the decree as a part of it (Sedgwick on Construction, &c., 2d edit, 229 and 230; and Broom's Legal Maxims, 7th edit, 673 et seq., and the numerous cases cited therein); not, however, for the purpose of opening anew any question adjudicated by the Board and District Court, nor for giving to the instrument referred to any other construction or force than that given by the Board and Court, as expressed in their decree; hence, not for the purpose of changing the meaning of terms that are clear and unambiguous in the expressed decree, but only to explain any ambiguity in the decree itself (U. S. vs. Halleck, i Wall., 455; decision of this Department of May 21, 1881, in riiatter of survey of Rancho San Jacinto Nuevo y Potrero.) Wherein the decree, on its face, is clear so far as it relates to the subject matter or the original petition and grant, it must be held to be the construction of the Board and Court upon those instruments, which cannot be questioned here. Furthermore, in referring to the petition and grant in this decree, we can only look to the official translation thereof; we cannot take any other translation, and by it undertake to explain any dubious expression of the decree. The Board had the services of a Secretary "skilled in the Spanish and English languages," a part of whose duty it was to act as interpreter to the Board, as the law provided. (Sec. i. Act of 1851, 9 Stats., 631.) The Secretary certified the translation of the petition and grant above given to be correct. The Board and District Court gave consideration to the petition and grant, and adjudicated the case in view of that official translation. It follows, upon reasons too apparent to require explanation, that the expert testimony of witnesses before the Surveyor-General, giving a different translation to some of the words in the original petition and concession than that certified by Secretary Fisher, is wholly inadmissible, and that all efforts to inject into the case now any other translation than that which the Board and Court adopted, must fail.
The points raised by the objectors, protestants, etc., are very numerous, and need not be recited here. They are all, in some way, embraced in the three following general questions or propositions:
First. It is contended by the owners of the grant that the decree confirmed to them all the land within the exterior boundaries of the five ranchos named as colindantes, which should be left or result as surplus upon the final survey of said ranchos; that their grant is not limited, except as by the exterior boundaries of said ranchos and their finally surveyed limits, and therefore that the locative call in the decree for land "lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia" should be disregarded in making a survey under the decree.
Second. Some of the contestants insist that the claim confirmed was a piece of vacant land, never within the exterior boundaries of the five ranchos referred to, nor any of them, but outside thereof and bounded by them.
Third. Other contestants admit that the land confirmed was surplus of said five ranches, or some of them, but insist that it must, from the terms of the decree, lie between those ranches as finallj' surveyed, in the sense of being surrounded or partlysurrounded and bounded by them.
The San Antonio Rancho has the Bay of San Francisco for its western boundary, the ridge of the Coast Range mainly for its eastern boundary, and extends from a small stream called the Cerrito Creek, on the north, to the San Leandro Creek, on the south, a distance of about twelve miles. This was a grant by specific boundaries, and was surveyed and patented as such.
To the north and northeast of San Antonio, at a distance of about five miles, is the Rancho El Pinole. This, as confirmed, surveyed, and patented, was a grant of quantity within larger exterior boundaries. The calls for the exterior boundaries of this grant were natural fixed objects, leaving no uncertainty as to the lines thereof
San Pablo was a grant of quantity to be located within the boundaries mentioned in the grant, which were the Ranchos of San Antonio, El Pinole, and the Bay of San Francisco; the southeastern boundary being thus necessarily uncertain.
To the east of San Antonio, southeast of San Pablo, and south of El Pinole, was. the Rancho of Valencia, called Acalanes. It was a grant of quantity, to be measured within the general boundaries mentioned in the grant as San Pablo, San Antonio, and El Pinole.
South of the Acalanes and east of San Antonio was the Moraga Rancho, called Laguna de los Palos Colorados. It was a grant of quantity, to be measured within the exterior boundaries described in the Governor's formal grant, which virtually,, though not expressly, called for San Antonio and Acalanes as colindantes.
The foregoing brief explanation, and the connected map prepared by the Surveyor-General in compliance with telegraphic order from your predecessor of October 24, 1878, from data on file in his office, which map was certified by the Surveyor-General November 22, 1878, or the map subsequently subS'tituted therefor by the Surveyor-General, will give a tolerably correct idea of the country occupied by said ranchos, and their relative situation both as regards their exterior and their finally surveyed boundaries; but as to a part of the exterior boundaries there is some question as to their being accurately delineated on said maps, which will be discussed hereafter.
It will be seen that a large tract of land is left nearly surrounded and bounded by said ranchos as finally surveyed and patented, in addition to which there were numerous other smaller tracts excluded by final surveys, not surrounded by nor lying betweeii said ranchos, but within the exterior limits of some of them, most of said tracts being entirely disconnected with the large tract and with each other, and scattered about in various parts, mainly on the outskirts of the general tract embraced by the exterior boundaries of the five ranchos mentioned in the decree.
Your predecessor, having decided that the decree confirmed to the Castros all the surplus lands of the ranchos aforesaid - that is, all the land within their exterior boundaries excluded by final survey - and that the said rarichos were coterminous as.
to their exterior boundaries in the central portion in the general tract embraced by them all, set aside the Minto survey, and directed a new survey to be made, which should include not only the large tract nearly surrounded by the ranchos as finally surveyed, but all the other tracts excluded from the final surveys, limiting his award only by the quantity of twenty-two square leagues.
In this, it seems to me, your office did not follow the decree of confirmation, assuming that the tract confirmed was surplus of some of the said ranchos resulting upon final survey thereof
The error in the decision proceeds from premises, which, to my mind, are not supported by the relevant facts and the law of the case, to wit, first, that the word " sobrante,'' as used in the grant and decree of confirmation, necessarily meant all of the sobrante of said ranchos, and could not be limited by the words designating the particular location of the sobrante, nor by the words designating it as a piece - one piece - of land; and, secondly, that it was a grant by name of the sobrante, and hence included all of the sobrante.
It cannot be maintained upon general principles that power was wanting in the Governor to grant, or in the Board and Court to confirm, as sobrante any portion of the surplus of grants of quantity, and define its location and boundaries. As a matter of fact the records of your office will show that more than one such grant has been made of the sobrante of a single grant, and the grants thus made have been confirmed and patented accordingly. Now, that the tract confirmed in this case, admitting it to be sobrante of some of the ranchos mentioned in the decree, was limited, seems clear to me,. and that the Surveyor has no authority to locate or survey any land in any other locality than that mentioned in the decree, cannot be successfully questioned. In view of the authorities hereinbefore mentioned no one will deny that the decree of confirmation must be the guide in making the survey, or that the Surveyor must follow it. In the United States vs. Fossatt (2 1 How., 449), the Supreme Court, in speaking of the powers and duties of the Board and Courts under the Act of 1 82 1, said: -
" But, in addition to these questions upon the validity of the title, there may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of a claim."
" It is true, for the determination of the validity of claims presented, some consideration must have been had of their extent, location, and boundaries. The petition of the claimants must necessarily have designated, with more or less precision, such extent and location."
In the light of these decisions rio one can consistently say that the Surveyor- General, your office, or this Department can disregard the words of the decree that point out the locus of the land confirmed, in making or directing a survey thereof The decree recites that the land of which confirmation is thereby made "is the surplus (sobrante) which, on the 23d day of April, A. D. 1841, * * * existed lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia."
Is it possible that any land that does not lie between those ranches can be surveyed under this decree ? By what authority can the Surveyor-General look for land under this decree, except in that locality ?
But the Commissioner suggests that the words " lying between," etc , constitute a false description of the land, and that it grew out of the mistaken meaning of the words " en las inmediaciones," in the petition for the grant, which he says were carelessly taken to be translatable by the word " between;" and he further says that the Board did well to refer for greater certainty to the original grant.
The answer to this has already been anticipated. The Board having thus translated and interpreted the grant, there is no tribunal that has thepower to change it. Certainly it does not lie with the claimants to object to the translation, for the record shows it to be their own, notwithstanding it was adopted as the official translation. The regulations of the Commissioners, found in journal, vol. i, p. 24, required every claimant to accompany his petition " by a copy of the original grant and a translation," and the petition of the Castros shows that this regulation was complied with, and the records do not show that said copy and translation were rejected or objected to. Unless the Board was to adopt the translation, if found correct, there was no object in requiring it to be filed.
But the idea that there is repugnance in the language of the grant and that of the decree on this point is not well founded. Referring to the official translation of the petition and grant, it will be found that the Castros petitioned for '^apiece of vacant land which is situated on " (not " m " as the Commissioner has it) " the immediate limits (inmediaciones) of San Antonio," etc., "which land is the overplus (sobrante) of the ranchos aforesaid."
Here we find that this tract must be " on the immediate limits of" the said ranchos. Now, from the very meaning of these words, taking the actual situations of the grants named, the land must lie between them all in the sense of being surrounded, or partly surrounded, and bounded by them. The word " immediate," as here used, means " not separated in respect to place by anything intervening." (See any standard dictionary.) It was one tract that was granted and the same tract was confirmed; and it was not a tract of land, vacant or otherwise, that surrounded all these ranchos and bounded their outer limits. The Bays of San Francisco and San Pablo and the Straits of Carquinez put an end to such an idea, even if the absurdity of the proposition in itself does not. Where else, then, than in the midst of these ranchos can a tract of land be found that can lie on the immediate limits of each and all of the ranchos named in actual contact with all of them. There is not the slightest repugnancy between the description in the grant and that of the decree, so far as the words " lying between " are concerned.
But it is urged the word "between" can refer to but two objects, and hence was not the proper expression to use to convey the idea above expressed. Perhaps in a literal narrow sense this may be true; but a definition is given it in dictionaries like this, " in the immediate space of ;" "having mutual relation to two or more o^-" in fact the word is quite commonly used with respect to more than two persons or things, as "between us, to go no further, I will tell you something," the pronoun "us" embracing, perhaps, twenty individuals. But, ''qui hcerret in litera hceret in coriice."
Such verbal criticisms as are indulged in upon the words " lying between," as used in the decree, are of little value in the interpretation of written instruments. The wellknown general and comprehensive rule for .the interpretation of written instruments is that where the intention is clear, too great a stress should not be laid on the strict and precise signification of words. One who will consider for a moment what other word can be found to describe the locality of a tract of land surrounded, or nearly so, by a number of ranchos, will soon discover that no form of expression in the English language is better adapted briefly but clearly to define its location than that it lies between them. But if there could be any doubt as to what the Board meant by the use of the words "lying between," in the connection in' which they were employed, it would be at once resolved by reference to the petition and grant, as has already been demonstrated.
Suppose, however, that the petition and grant did not make clear the terms in the written decree, and that the Department were required to look beyond them, then I should turn to the Board's finding of facts in the opinion preceding the decree. The Board there says that the evidence establishes the fact that the petitioners presented their expediente for a "sobrante" of land "lying between ranchos named in said expediente." If this were not satisfactory, then I should read the petitions of the Castros to the Board. In the first one they describe the land as "lying between" the said ranchos, and, as if to leave no room for doubt as to what they really meant, in their other petition to the Board they describe it as "lying in between" said ranchos. No one knew better than the Castros where the land was for which they petitioned. Now, with this expression, so oft-repeated, it seems to me that no other locality than the intervening space inclosed (or partially inclosed) by all these ranchos, could be sought for the location of the piece of land confirmed, even if the original grant did not so effectually settle the question.
But there is no confusion in the decree about this matter. The meaning of the Board and Court as to the locality of the land is plain, especially when the papers referred to in the decree are read.
It is hardly necessary to say more on this point. The mere mention of the rule, which is applicable to this decree as well as to other written instruments, that the whole instrument must be construed together, so that, if possible, every part shall stand, that no words are to be rejected as meaningless and none interpolated or added, would perhaps have been sufficient to answer all that has been said in favor of the rights of the owners of El Sobrante to have other land surveyed than that found to lie between the five ranchos in the sense in which the Board clearly employed the word "between," that is, within the surroundings of the five ranchos; not between any two, or three, or four of them, but between all of them.
.Whatever the land may be, whether an independent, vacant tract (vacant in the sense of never having been included within the exterior limits of any of the ranchos named) or vacant surplus land (sobrante, in the sense of having been included in some of the exterior boundaries named in the grants, and vacant in the sense of being subject to grant), it must be found in the locality designated in the decree as above defined.
of Tewksbury vs. Derosier, decided November ii, 1881 (The Pacific Coast Law Journal, vol. 8, No. 17, p. 683), the Court, speaking of this very decree, said : -
"The confirmation of El Sobrante was of lands 'lying between the tracts known as Ranchos of San Antonio, San Pablo, Pinole, Moraga, and Valencia.' The lands in controversy are not between the ranchos above named, or any of them. On the contrary, they are on the shore of the Bay of San Francisco, and between it and the Rancho San Pablo. They are not even in the vicinity of any of said ranchos, unless it be the Ranchos San Pablo and San Antonio."
Provenance
Text from History of Alameda County, California : Including Its Geology, Topography, Soil, and Productions : Together with a Full and Particular Record of the Spanish Grants : the Early History and Settlement, Compiled from the Most Authentic Sources, the Names of Original Spanish and American Pioneers, a Full Political History, Comprising a Tabular Statement of Officers of the County Since Its Formation : Separate Histories of Each of the Townships, Showing Their Advancement and Progress : Also Incidents of Pioneer Life, the Raising of the Bear Flag, and Prominent Citizens and Representative Men : and of Its Cities, Towns, Churches, Schools, Secret Societies, Etc, published 1883, in the public domain in the United States and digitised by the Internet Archive.