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Alameda County, California - The whole text, 1883 (part 19 of 38)

From History of Alameda County, California : Including Its Geology, Topography, Soil, and Productions : Together with a Full and Particular Record of the Spanish Grants : the Early History and Settlement, Compiled from the Most Authentic Sources, the Names of Original Spanish and American Pioneers, a Full Political History, Comprising a Tabular Statement of Officers of the County Since Its Formation : Separate Histories of Each of the Townships, Showing Their Advancement and Progress : Also Incidents of Pioneer Life, the Raising of the Bear Flag, and Prominent Citizens and Representative Men : and of Its Cities, Towns, Churches, Schools, Secret Societies, Etc, published 1883. 15,958 words, reproduced complete and unedited. Source changes inside the text are labelled in place.

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Machine-read from scans of History of Alameda County, California : Including Its Geology, Topography, Soil, and Productions : Together with a Full and Particular Record of the Spanish Grants : the Early History and Settlement, Compiled from the Most Authentic Sources, the Names of Original Spanish and American Pioneers, a Full Political History, Comprising a Tabular Statement of Officers of the County Since Its Formation : Separate Histories of Each of the Townships, Showing Their Advancement and Progress : Also Incidents of Pioneer Life, the Raising of the Bear Flag, and Prominent Citizens and Representative Men : and of Its Cities, Towns, Churches, Schools, Secret Societies, Etc, published 1883. Nothing has been corrected: fixing what looks like a misspelled name is how an invented one gets published. Source changes are marked where they occur.

Whereas, The City Council of Oakland did, on the 14th day of January, A. D. l85l, pass an ordinance granting the right of way to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company to construct their road through the city of Oakland, and, as a further inducement for the construction of their road, granted to said company the use of a portion of the overflowed lands situated at the western terminus of said road; and

Whereas, Said City Council did, on the 21st day of January, 1863, prepare a bill and forward the same to the Alameda delegation in the Legislature, ratifying and confirming said ordinance and the deed executed in pursuance thereof, which bill is now pending in the Senate; and

Whereas, Opposition to the passage of said bill has been made by parties claiming all the overflowed lands within the limits of the city, and whose aim is to defeat the construction of said road or of any other similar enterprise, and thereby securing a monopoly of the transportation of passengers and freight to and from the city, under an ordinance improperly obtained from, and, as we believe, illegally passed by, the Board of Trustees of the town of Oakland, in the year 1852; therefore, be it

Resolved, That the City Council of Oakland regard the construction of said road as of such vital importance to the interests of this community and of the people of Alameda County, that the city of Oakland can well afford to grant the use of said lands to said company as an inducement for its construction, and we respectfully represerit to the Honorable Legislature that the passage of said bill will destroy rather than establish a monopoly and give almost universal satisfaction to the people of this city and county.

A copy of this resolution was sent to the Honorable A. M. Crane, Member for Alameda County. On April 21, 1863, Eugene Casserly was retained to represent the city of Oakland, and arrangements made with him to draw up a brief and conduct the case of the City versus Carpentier at the time pending, on appeal, in the Supreme Court. The city was ultimately defeated. Carpentier was defeated on all material points, but on legal technicalities he prevented any final judgment of ejection from being recorded against him. The case had been commenced in the Third District Court in Oakland, and, on application for a change of venue, was transferred to the Fourth District Court in San Francisco. A demurrer had been entered by Carpentier, and was tried before Judge Campbell. When the case was appealed, Judge Baldwin of the Supreme Court gave judgment against the city. The demurrer was on the question of the power of the town of Oakland to grant an ejiclusi've right or franchise of the water front to any one person. The city failed to set up in its complaint the deed and the ordinance, as they should have been, therefore the demurrer

The city set up an action for fraud when it was an equitable action, and on the first hearing of the demurrer, Judge Baldwin held that the grant of the exclusive right of the franchise by the Town Trustees was absolutely void. But he could not reach the power of the question of the water front, by reason of the defective pleadings. There was a rehearing granted in the Supreme Court, and the case was sent back to the Court below, with the suggestion that the complaint be aniended on the part of the city. But the city refused to amend. The result was, although on trial in the District Court, a judgment was given for the city. When it went again to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed in favor of Carpentier.

" This is a bill in equity filed by a municipal corporation to set aside a contract or lease made of certain franchises and real estate. The bill charges that the city of Oakland is the legal successor of the town of Oakland by Act of the Legislature passed March 25, 1854; that the town of Oakland was incorporated by law on the 4th of May, 1852, and, by the same Act, was vested with a title to certain lands comprising the water front within the corporate limits; also, with certain privileges touching the erection of wharves, docks, etc.; that by the Act incorporating the town of Oakland, the corporate and municipal powers were lodged in a Board of Trustees to consist of five members, whose election was given to the qualified voters of the town, the election fixed on the second Monday in May in each year, and the term of office one year, and until their successors were qualified; that an election for Trustees occurred in pursuance of the Act, but only four of them qualified as Trustees; and, at a meeting of the four persons so elected and qualified, a resolution, purporting to be an ordinance, was passed, whereby the Trustees pretended to convey to one Horace W. Carpentier and his representatives the exclusive right and privilege of constructing wharves, piers, and docks at any point within the corporate limits of the town of Oakland, with the right of collecting wharfage and dockage as he might deem reasonable, upon certain conditions expressed in the ordinance; that by this pretended ordinance, and for the considerations therein set forth, a pretended grant was made to the said Carpentier and his assigns or legal representatives, with all the improvements, rights, and interests belonging to said town, in and to the lands lying within the limits of the town of Oakland ; that Carpentier afterwards, by fraud, procured certain men to be elected again as the Board, who ratified this contract; that the first ordinance was fraudulent, Carpentier having procured himself to be elected Trustee for the purpose of getting it and having his agents on the Board of Trustees. Various other charges of fraud are made, some of which will be noticed in the course of the opinion.

state facts sufficient to show a cause of action, and that the claim of the plaintiff, as stated, is barred by the statute of limitations. Final judgment was rendered on the demurrer in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff declining to amend his bill. " Several important questions are raised by the record.

"I. Had the Trustees of the town of Oakland power to grant to Carpentier the exclusive right and privilege of constructing wharves, piers, and docks at any pomt within the corporate limits of the town, with the right of collecting wharfage and dockage, at such rates as he might deem reasonable, for the period of thirty-seven years?

"The charter of the town of Oakland is to be found in the Acts of 1852, page 180. By section third of that Act it is provided: 'The Board of Trustees shall have power to make such by-laws and ordinances as they may deem proper and necessary: to regulate, improve, sell, or otherwise dispose of the common property; to prevent and extinguish fires; to lay out, make, open, widen, regulate, and keep in repair all streets, roads, bridges, ferries, public places and grounds, wharves, docks, piers, slips, sewers, wells, and alleys, and to authorize the construction of the same, and, .with a view to facilitate the wharves and other improvements, the lands lying within the limits aforesaid, between high tide and ship channel, are hereby granted and released to said town; provided that said lands shall be retained by said town as common property, or disposed of for the purposes aforesaid; to regulate and collect wharfage and dockage; to secure the health, cleanliness, ornament, peace, and good order of said town; to organize and support common schools; to license and suppress dramshops, horse-racing gambling-houses, and houses of ill-fame, and all indecent or immoral practices, shows and amusements; to regulate the location of slaughterhouses, stables, and places for the storage of gunpowder; and to pass such other laws and ordinances as, in their opinion, the order, good government, and general welfare of the town may require.'

"The rules in relation to the construction of charters of corporations are familiar. They are special grants of power, emanating from the paramount authority. The corporation owing its existence to the law, is precisely what the law makes it. It has no powers except those expressly given, or which are necessary to the exercise of those expressly given. The general legislative power residing in the State Government may delegate to a municipal government some portion of its own powers; but those grants are held in subordination to the general power, and are not construed as taking from that Government any other powers or rights than those clearly granted. These delegated powers, given for local objects, are regarded as trusts confided to the hands in which they are placed, and are not subject to be delegated by the repositories of them. To ihis Board of Trustees, as has been seen, was given power to 'lay out, make, open, widen, and regulate, and keep in repair all streets, roads, bridges, ferries, public places and grounds, wharves, docks, piers, slips, sewers, and alleys, and to authorize the construction of the same.' Under these general terms it is claimed that this Board had a right to authorize Carpentier to enjoy the exclusive privilege of laying out, establishing, and constructing wharves within the city at pleasure, and fix the charges, for a period of thirty-seven years. It is not difficult to see that such a construction is not warranted by the provisions of this Act. The charge in the bill is not that Carpentier agreed, or was allowed, to construct a wharf, or any number of wharves; that by contract he was authorized and bound himself, on certain terms and conditions, to do this; but that to him, in exclusion of the right of everybody else, and of the corporation itself was imparted the sole privilege, not only of constructing all wharves," but of laying out, establishing, and regulating them too. This amounts, not to the grant of a license or privilege to erect a wharf, or all the wharves, laid out or ordered by the Council, but the grant of an exclusive right to lay out and construct them at his own convenience, in his own way, and to hold and use them on his own terms; and if he did not choose to exercise this privilege, the corporation is prevented from giving the privilege to any one else; and so of docks, piers, and the like. If, by a sweeping ordinance of this sort, an exclusive and comprehensive privilege like this could be given to Carpentier, it is hard to see why the opening, repairing, and regulating of streets and roads should not be given to him exclusively, as a privilege with the right to charge and collect what tolls or charges for using them he might please, since, as has been seen, the very same words apply to these public easements as to docks, and piers, and wharves. We do not regard this ordinance as an exercise of a power under the charter, but as a transfer of the corporate powers intrusted to this Board, to this favored grantee. What power of regulation is left, after an unconditional grant of the exclusive privilege of all the wharves, and docks, and piers, and a lease for thirtyseven years of all the lands, and a right to fix such tolls as the grantees please, and this without any obligation to build or construct any, it is not easy to see. If the grant had been to the city of San Francisco, in the same words, and the city authoriities had granted the exclusive privilege to one man to construct all the wharves along the line of the bay, and fix his own toll, we suppose no one would question that the grant exceeded the powers of the agents of the corporation.

"The general power over the wharves and docks is like the general power over the streets and highways. The corporation must exercise the general powers which the term 'regulate' implies. This general power involves the determination of the questions whether a wharf shall be constructed, when, how, in what places, on what terms, how kept, and what charges shall be exacted for their use. These police regulations are essential to the interest of the city, its commerce, its health possibly, certainly its convenience and general prosperity. It might, as we have intimated, just as well be said that the Board could by ordinance delegate to Carpentier the power of opening all streets and alleys anywhere in the town, where he chose, or widening them where he chose; to run an alley through any one's lot, or to make a sewer near any man's door, at his pleasure; but it would be rather a startling proposition to say that he would hold - through an ordinance - the exclusive privilege to do all these things, and charge for them what he chose, and that no one else - nor the town itself - had any right to do any of them. And the same reason precisely which denies the power to make this grant, applies to the grant of the exclusive privilege of constructing all the wharves he may choose, he determining, of course, where these wharves shall be, the number, the dimensions, the kind, the toll, and every matter concerning them - comprehended with the term 'regulation.' The reason is that this power of regulation is a political power, and therefore the transfer of it is the transfer of a power of municipal legislation; which authority is not, in its nature, alienable. It is not the transfer of so much property; it is the transfer of a power to create, and control, and regulate, a certain species of franchise, the creation, control, and regulation of which are powers of the political department. It is no answer to say that after a wharf is constructed by the authority of the corporation, it might be sold as property: the reply to this is, that the establishment of it is of the promise of the corporation; and that it can no more give a general privilege to one man to establish wharves, when, where, and as he chos'e, within the limits of the city - the privilege being given for his own profit, use, and benefit.

" The principle upon which these general views rest, has been fully supported by the United States Circuit Court for the districts of California, in the case of Minturn vs. Larue* (i McAll. 370), involving the construction of this charter.

"The former is given the Board 'to regulate and collect wharfage and dockage;' but this power is not exercised, but ceded, by a grant allowing the grantee to regulate it as he pleases.

" It will not do to say that the lands lying between high tide and ship channel are ceded to the city; this does not deprive the argument of its force, that the establishment of wharves, docks, etc., is one of its corporate powers, and that no wharf can be so constructed, unless each wharf be so laid out by the order, or with the leave of the corporation - which cannot be by the general session of a privilege to another to establish, when, where, and how he pleases. We understand the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Fay, Petitioner (15 Pick. 256), to intimate this doctrine, when it is said - speaking of the right of the city of Boston to grant a ferry - 'Even if the city, by their authorized agents, had made a grant of a ferry or other franchise, claiming to be owners thereof, with express or implied covenants for an exclusive enjoyment of such franchise, this would not prohibit or restrain the Mayor or Aldermen from exercising the powers vested in them by statute, to license a ferry required by public convenience and necessity. Such authority is vested in them as Trustees for the public, to be exercised for the public good, and cannot be restrained by the covenant of the city, though such covenant happens to be executed by the same agents.' But how much stronger would have been the statement of the venerable Judge C. J. Shaw, if in that case a general grant had been made of the exclusive privilege of establishing all the ferries on a river, or between the shores of Boston and Chelsea, with the right to select the places at which to exercise the privilege, or, if exercised, to charge what ferriage they chose. This would be, not to make the grantee a license of a ferry right, but the assignee of the privilege of making arul unmaking ferry franchises at pleasure; indeed it would be transferring all the powers of government over the subject, to one individual.

" We see no distinction in this charter between a wharf or dock, in or upon a navigable stream, and a ferry right or bridge. They are all of the same class of interests, and the same powers over all of them are given in the same words.

" But if there was a difference, the charter giving the power of right and regulation to thi^ corporation over the subject, it is held as a political power, and must be exercised by those to whom it is confided. The power to lay out and regulate wharves being given to the Council, cannot be exercised by Carpentier.

" We think, then, that this general grant of this exchisive privilege is wholly void, as exceeding the powers of the corporation; and that the plaintiff, the successor of the old town, has a right to come into equity to remove this impediment, constituted by these proceedings, from the free and beneficial exercise of its corporate functions and property. The plaintiff stands here as a Trustee, administering important trusts, and charged with responsible duties to the public, which cannot be safely discharged so long as doubts hang upon its title to property, and to the exercise of its control over its franchises; and, like any other Trustee, has the right to seek the aid of equity to remove obstructions to the performance of its duties. It is difficult to see how else the plaintiff could vindicate its right. The claim of the defendants is in this case incorporeal. They assert that certain franchises have been ceded to them, and that the plaintiff has parted with them; the plaintiff, claiming only to hold these franchises and the administration of them in trust for the public, would be without any relief, if equity could not aid in removing this difficulty; for it could neither build wharves nor authorize others to build them, as long as its powers and rights were denied. Nor do we perceive what form of legal action would give an adequate remedy.

"This view disposes of the demurrer, for it is general - going to the whole bill; and if the bill contains in any part, a complete cause of action the general objection to it for want of equity, fails.

" What effect the invalidity of this has upon the grant of the land, the bill does not enable us to determine. Neither the ordinance nor the deed is s'et out as they should have been in the bill. It is charged in the complaint, it is true, that the land between high tide and ship channel, and this exclusive privilege, were conveyed in the same instrument; but in what relation the land stood to this privilege, or what were the particular considerations or inducements to the grant of the land, we are not distinctly informed. If the land were conveyed merely or mainly to give effect to this illegal purpose, probably the incident would fall with its principal.

" The charter is, perhaps, the most defective upon the statute book, and this is saying a great deal. A perverse ingenuity seems to have been exercised to make it as lame and loose as possible. The joint labors of Malaprop and Partington could scarcely have made such a collocation or dislocation of words and sentences. Among other things, it gives the Board of Trustees power ' to license and suppress dram-shops, horse-racing, gambling-houses, and houses of ill-fame, and all indecent and immoral practices, shows, and amusements.' However general the words of this charter, the received rules of construction require us to construe them in reference to the substantive purposes expressed. The Act gives power ' to regulate, im prove, sell, or otherwise dispose of the common property; to prevent and extinguish fires; to lay out, make, open, widen, regulate, and keep in repair all streets, roads, bridges, ferries, public places and grounds, wharves, docks, piers, slips, sewers, mills and alleys, and to authorize the construction of the same, and with a view to facilitate the construction of wharves and other improvements, the lands lying within the limits aforesaid, between high tide and ship channel, are hereby granted and released to said town, provided, the said lands shall be retained by said town as common property, or disposed of for the purposes aforesaid.' Now, looking into this jumble of incoherent and contradictory verbiage, the questions arise : To what ' other ' improvements besides wharves, was it designed that this water front should be appHed ? or, what are 'the purposes aforesaid for which it might be disposed of, and how disposed of? It may well be doubted whether, under this charter, the Town Council, being bound to lay out and regulate these wharves, streets, and docks, an unconditional sale or lease of the land necessary to be ret uned, to accomplish and give effect to this power, could be made, especially if accompanied with this was a renunciation of all dominion or control over the land necessary for the site of these docks, streets, or wharves. But perhaps it is not necessary to decide these points now, as they can be presented more satisfactorily where the facts are better developed.

" 2. It is contended by the appellant that this ordinance and deed are void, for the reason that the Board of Trustees were not legally organized; that though five were elected (Carpentier being one), all did not qualify; and that though a majority of the members of such a public body may act after the organization, it requires all the members to make the organization.

"Section second of the charter is in these words: 'The corporate powers and duties of said town shall be vested in a Board of Trustees, to consist of five members who shall be elected,' etc. Nothing is said in this Act further, as to the number required or mode of corporate action. In the first section, the town is declared to be incorporated under the provisions of the Act of 1850, to provide for the incorporation of towns. (C. L. 114.) The third section of this last Act provides that the Board of Trustees shall assemble within ten days after their election, etc., and, section fourth : ' At all meetings of the Board a majority of the Trustees shall constitute a quorum to do business.'

"We can see no reason for holding that a majority of the members elected to this Board should not as well be held empowered to act at the first as at any subsequent meeting of it.

" 3. The next question is as to the alleged fraud in procuring this grant by Carpentier. Some astute and forcible criticism is employed by the counsel for the respondent upon the complaint. The facts are not as fully stated as is desirable in such cases. The complaint is defective in not averring fully the terms of the ordinance and the contract, and the particular injury resulting to the plaintiff from the alleged fraud; nor are the fraudulent practices of the defendent, Carpentier, in procuring the election of the first Board, or his procuring the election of the second, nor the circumstances attending the ratification of the first contract, nor the promises or agreements made by him on or inducing the execution and delivery of the de^d fully set out. But as the bill may be amended, on the return of the cause, in these particulars, and as the general questions have been discussed, we proceed to consider them.

" It is alleged that Carpentier procured men, who were his agents or conspirators with him, to be elected to this Board, for the purpose of getting them to defraud the town, for his benefit, of all this property and these franchises; and if he got himself elected to this place, in order to help the contrivance through, whether by his influence, or by keeping out some one else who might have exposed the scheme, then this was sufficient to brand the whole transaction with illegality. Nay, more - if Carpentier put himself in the position of a member elect of this Board, neither resigning nor qualifying, and took advantage of this position to advance his personal interests, at the expense of those of the corporation, this was a fraud for which a Court of Equity would hold him responsible. He would occupy the position, really, of a Trustee dealing for his own profit with the subject of the trust, and his conduct would be scrutinized with the jealousy with which equity regards the interested dealings of an agent with the principal, in respect to the subject of the trust. Nor would a ratification by a subsequent Board, if the members were fraudulently elected, or procured to be elected, by Carpentier, have any effect in validating the transaction. Carpentier could not protect this fraud by the sanction of his own associates united in effect, together, an illegal enterprise.

" If these facts be made to appear, the statute of limitation would not begin to run until after the corporation thus defrauded got out of the hands of the confederates, and an opportunity were afforded innocent agents, coming to the management of the affairs of the town, to look into and ascertain the true state of things. Knowledge on the part of the guilty agents of the corporation of the criminal fact is not notice to the corporation of such fraud, so as to give the advantage of this notice to the equally guilty associate of those agents. If this were the law, an agent could always protect himself by joining in a conspiracy to defraud his principal with a convenient friend, who received the principal's property, and who might claim against the principal that the agent had notice of the fraud.

" 4. The next and last point is, the statute of limitations of three years applies and bars the claim of the plaintiff to set aside this deed. By article seventeenth, section seventeen (Wood's Digest, 47), is given the limitations of certain actions. The section is ' Actions other than those for the real property, can be commenced as follows: * * * within three years. An action for. relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discoveiy by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.'

'- We think that this provision has no relation to an equitable proceeding to set aside a fraudulent deed or real estate when the effect of it is to restore the possession of the premises to the defrauded party. In such a case, the action is substantially an action for the recovery of the real estate; indeed, it is literally. Express fraud, genera'ly, as well avoids a deed at law as in equity, and it would be strange if, after three years, a party could set up the fraud in avoidance of the deed at law, and a different rule prevail in equity. This is really an action for the recovery of real estate, and the plaintiff is no worse off because fraud has been committed upon him, nor the defendant in any better situation than if the latter had innocently bought and entered under an imperfect title.

" For the reasons assigned, the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in accordance with this opinion."

" Petition for rehearing denied. The opinion modified so as to leave open for future revision 'the question of the validity of the contract with Carpentier under the ordinance referred to in the opinion."

" The facts are stated in the opinion. The case was before this Court at the April term, 1857, on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint,' a report of which will be found in 13 Cal., 154. A trial was subsequently had in the lower Court, resulting in a judgment to the plaintiff, from which the present appeal is taken by defendants."

"By an Act of the Legislature passed May 4, 1852, the town of Oakland was created a municipal corporation, the corporate powers being vested in a Board of Trustees, consisting of five members, to be elected on the second Monday of May of each year. By the third section of the Act, the Trustees were clothed with certain powers in relation to wharves, piers, and docks; and with a view to facilitate the construction of wharves and other improvements, the town was invested with the title to lands within the corporate limits lying between high tide and ship channel of the bay of San Francisco. On the second Monday of the same month, pursuant to the Act of Incorporation, an election was held, and five Trustees were chosen. Of these only four ever qualified; and at a meeting of the Trustees, consisting of this number, an ordinance was passed granting, in its first section, to the defendant, Horace W Carpentier, and his legal representatives, for the period of thirty-seven years, the exclusive right and privilege of constructing wharves, piers, and docks at any point within the corporate limits of the town, with the right of collecting wharfage and dockage at such rates as he might deem reasonable, subject to certain provisions as to the erection of particular wharves, and the payment to the town of a certain percentage of the receipts of the wharfage; and granting to him in its second section, with a view, as expressed therein, the more speedily to carry out intentions and purposes of the Act of Incorporation, and in consideration of a contract on his part to build a public school house for the town, all the land lying within the corporate limits between high tide and the ship channel. The ordinance also charged the President of the Board of Trustees with the duty of executing, on behalf of the town, a grant or conveyance to Carpentier, in accordance with its provisions. Under this ordinance the President executed to Carpentier the grant or conveyance designated, reciting in the instrument the authority under which he acted.

"In May, 1853, at the second election under the Act of Incorporation, five Trustees were again elected, and of them also only four ever qualified. The Board, consisting of the four who qualified, by an ordinance, passed in August, 1853, ratified and confirmed the ordinance of the previous Board, reciting that the consideration upon which such previous ordinance had been passed had been 'in chief satisfactorily paid and performed,' and also regranted to Carpentier, and his legal representatives, the water front of the town, with the right to erect wharves, piers, docks, and buildings at any and all points thereon not obstructing navigation.

" By an Act of the Legislature, passed March 25, 1854, a municipal corporation by the name of the ' City of Oakland ' v.'as erected, and invested with all the rights, claims, and privileges, and subjected to all the obligations and liabilities of the ' Town of Oakland.' The present suit is brought by the new corporation, and its object is to set aside and cancel the grant or conveyance to Carpentier, and enforce a surrender of the interests and property transferred, or claims to be transferred thereby.

" The suit is, of course, for equitable relief, and the grounds alleged for the interposition of equity are that the grant or conveyance was obtained by fraud on the part of Carpentier, and was made without authority on the part of the Trustees, and that it constitues a cloud upon the title of the city, and embarrasses her in the exercise of her legitimate functions.

"The fraud alleged is that Carpentier obtained the Act of Incorporating the town of Oakland without the consent or knowledge of the people of the town, and for the purpose of acquiring .the franchises and lands subsequently granted to him; that at the election held under the Act of Incorporation he procured the election of himself and ' partners in land speculations ' as members of the Board of Trustees, and declined to qualify himself, in order to remove a legal obstacle to his obtaining the grant in question; and the conveyance to him by the President of the Board was according to an understanding with the Board, to be executed upon the delivery of a bond to reconvey the franchises and lands to the town when requested, but that it was obtained without such bond, upon representations that it was important to the interests of the town that it should be executed at once, in order to be filed before the Board of Land Commissioners, then in session, and that he would give the bond at some future period. No matters are stated in support of the allegation that he ' fraudulently procured the election of his tools and agents' in the year, 1853, when the confirmation of the ordinance was obtained. It is very evident that the matters thus alleged, in order to taint and vitiate the ordinance of the Board of Trustees and defeat the grant to Carpentier, are on their face too vague and general to merit serious consideration. It is of no consequence whether the Act of Incorporation was procured with or without the knowledge of the people of Oakland. The validity of the public acts of the Legislature is in no respect impaired by the knowledge or ignorance of the parties who may be affected by their operation. And the general charges referring to the election of members of the Board of 1852 and of 1853, so far as the complaint is .concerned, rest in mere averment. And in relation to the bond for conveyance, which it is alleged Carpentier, by an understanding with the Board, vi^as to execute, it is sufficient to observe that the ordinance itself, to which the complaint refers, negatives any understanding of the kind. The allegations of the complaint are, as a whole, of so vague and indefinite a character that no relief can be based thereon. When the case was here upon the demurrer to the complaint, the Court observed that the alleged fraudulent practices of Carpentier, in procuring the election of the first, or of the second Board, or the promises or agreements made to induce the execution and delivery of the conveyance from the President, were not fully set out; but as the complaint might be amended on the return of the cause in these particulars, it proceeded to consider the general questions discussed by' the counsel. It is sufficient to say that the complaint was not amended; and aside from this consideration, the answer fully meets and denies the charges of fraud or fraudulent interest in the acts of Carpentier; and what is of more consequence, the charges are wholly unsustained by the proof

" Stripped of the charges of fraud, the whole claim for equitable relief falls to the ground. The grant was either valid, or void, or voidable. If valid, as contended by the counsel of the Respondent, there can be no occasion for the interference of a Court of Equity. If void, the condition of things - of the rights, privileges, and estate of the city - remains as though no transfer had been attempted. No cloud is cast upon the title, and no embarrassment can attend the exercise of her legitimate functions. She has only to proceed and assert her privileges and claim her interests, and whoever interferes with them will be a trespasser. If, however, the grant is only voidable, and not void, the plaintiff seeking th; aid of a Court of Equit)^ by doing equity - that is, she can only obtain relief from the acts of agents of the town, by tendering compensation to the defendant, who has relied upon them, for his expenditures. One of the counsel of the plaintiff, in a brief exhibiting ability and learning, takes the same position, in answer- to the defendant, who urges his principle against the relief prayed. ' The principle invoked,' says the counsel, ' is not applicable to a case like the present. It is a rule only in cases where a plaintiff is -in Court seeking to set aside some act or contract voidable, but not void, as for fraud, mistake, etc. ; or to rid himself of a liability, otherwise valid, upon a ground which is against good conscience, and not favorably regarded in equity, as usury, gaming, etc. Here our case is that there never was a grant, contract, or act of any sort, o.i the part of the town, whatever might have been attempted by her unfaithful agents. As already remarked, she was an artificial being, endowed by the law of her creation and existence with certain limited functions, and utterly incapable of acting or even of being beyond or against these, to any intent or purpose whatever.'

"The conclusion which follows from the views we have expressed is evident. The charges of fraud, as a ground for the equitable interposition of the Court, are fully answered, and must be left out of the case. If the ordinances of the Board, granting the franchises and lands to Carpentier are void, there is no occasion for the interference of equity. If they are only voidable, that interference cannot be invoked until equity is done by the party claiming it - that is, by placing or offering to place the party relying upon the acts of the agents of the town in the same position which he would have occupied but for his reliance upon their validity. These views dispose of the case, and render it unnecessary to consider the other point made by the appellants.

The Plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing, upon which Justice Norton delivered the opinion of the Court - Chief Justice Cope concurring.

"The plaintiff asks a rehearing in this case, upon the ground that when the case was before this Court on a former occasion, it was decided: first, that the action could be sustained without an offer by the plaintiffs to do equity; and, second, that although the transfer to the defendant was void, it was a proper case tb ask the transfer to be set aside by the equity powers of the Court, and that these decisions have become the law of the case and cannot now be reversed.

that the transfer was absolutely void. Nothing was said as to whether it would have been sufficient without an offer to do equity, if the court had considered the transfer not void, but only voidable. Afterwards the opinion was modified, by reserving for future revision the question of the validity of the contract with Carpentier. This was a reservation of the whole question as to its validity, as well whether it was voidable as whether it was void. The question whether or not the transfer was voidable being thus withdrawn, no decision can be inferred as to what would have been necessary to render the complaint sufficient, in case the Court should consider the transfer- only voidable.

" It may be argued that when this question was withdrawn from the opinion, there was no ground specified in the opinion upon which the decision was made, but it' may be so, it does not follow that the decision necessarily involves a determination of a question which was not only not mentioned, but the basis for which was withdrawn from the opinion; and so, although it was said in that opinion that it was a proper case for equitable relief, considering the transfer absolutely void, yet when the ruling that the transfer was void was withdrawn from the opinion, the remark that it was a proper case for equitable relief became merely ' obiter ' and decided nothing. At most, it could be considered as only saying what would be the opinion of the Court in case, upon a revision of the question on some future occasion, the Court should hold the transfer void. Rehearing denied. Filed June 1864."

It remains a mystery why it was that the city, by her attorneys, never amended the complaint referred to above. It is evident that the Court was on the side of the city, for it held that so far as the right of the question was concerned, the city was correct in its reasonableness. Had their pleadings been perfected and their case been properly conducted, there is but little doubt that the finding of the lower Court would have been sustained; but as it was the water front was given to Carpentier and the law to the city of Oakland.

On August 25, 1863, we find it on record that D. P. 8e A. Barstow were paid fifteen hundred dollars for services as counsel in the case of The City of Oakland versus H. W. Carpentier, these rendered being: " Trying the cause in the District Court; settling statement for new trial and appeal; arguing cause in the Supreme Court and preparing and filing brief; the same extending over a period of two years."

During the expiring days of the month of August an ordinance was introduced for the purpose of taking immediate action in the Courts to regain, if possible, the water front. The Council made arrangements with the late Hon. John B. Felton, then a lawyer of San Francisco, but the terms being illegal - that they should give and deed to him a certain portion of the public property - ^nothing was consummated, for such an act was especially forbidden by the charter.

On March 5, 1866, the thirteenth Council was elected, with the late J. W. Dwinelle in the civic chair, and on March 12th, Mr. Barstow introduced a bill granting to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company the privilege of constructing and maintaining a wharf for the landing of ferry-boats, and a marine railway for the repair of the boats belonging to the company, the wharf and railway to be located on the San Antonio Creek, at the foot of Franklin Street, the franchise to continue for a term of fifty years; all of which was referred to a special committee consisting of

Aldermen Jayne and Wilcox, who, March 13th, reported: "That whereas, the property embraced in the bill was long since granted by the Legislature to the city of Oakland, thereby divesting the State of all its rights, title, and interest, the State has no interest to grant; therefore it would be asking the Legislature to commit a moral wrong - a breach of faith - besides interfering with vested rights, in recommending it to grant again to other parties that which it has once already granted. Believing such to be the fact, we report against the recommendation asked for;'' thereupon Alderman Barstow introduced the following resolution: -

Resolved, That the Alameda delegation in the Legislature be requested to use their endeavors to procure the passage by the Legislature of the bill as amended by the Council authorizing the city of Oakland to grant to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company the right to build a wharf and marine railway on the water front in the city of Oakland, and that a copy of this resolution, together with an engrossed copy of the bill, be forwarded by the Clerk to the delegation,

After the decision of the Supreme Court, water-front matters remained quiescent until November 21, 1866, on which date the Council, at a general meeting, passed the accompanying resolution: -

Resolved, That the Judiciary Committee, in conjunction with the Mayor and the President of the Council, be authorized to take the opinion of counsel on behalf of the city, at an expense not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars in gold coin, as to the rights of the city to the water front heretofore granted to the town of Oakland, and as to the proper mode of enforcing the same, and that they report thereon to this Board.

And on January 23, 1867, the same Council received a communication from the Mayor, advising the employment of Messrs. Wilson & Crittenden, Counselors-at-Law, to give their written opinion as to the right of the city to her water front, which was placed on file.

On March 4, 1867, a new (the fourteenth) Council was elected, with W. W. Crane, Jr., as Mayor. On July 30th, Aldermen Moody, Barstow, and Wilcox were appointed a Committee to investigate and report to the Council as to the interest of the city in the water-front property, who, August 24th, represented by Mr. Moody, moved that the Council adjourn and resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole, for hearing the report of the Committee and for discussion. For this purpose a special meeting was convened on August 31st, when Alderman Moody made a verbal report and subsequently introduced " An Ordinance Providing for a Suit to Settle the Title of the City to the Water Front and for the employment of Counsel therein." The ordinance, which was passed, reads: -

Section One. - A suit shall be prosecuted in the proper Court to determine the rights of the city to the water front, against the persons claiming the same adversely, and John B. Felton is hereby retained to act for the city in said suit, to be paid for his services by a conveyance of an interest equal to fifteen per cent, of the property and franchises recovered by the city; but to receive no compensation for his services in case nothing shall be recovered.

Section Two. - The Mayor of the city is hereby requested to execute the contract hereto annexed on behalf of the city, which is in the following words, viz. ;

Whereas, The city of Oakland claims title to that portion of the tide lands situated within the limits of said city, and lying between high tide and ship channel, and also certain franchises connected therewith, by virtue of a grant to the town of Oakland made by the State of California, by an Act of the Legislature of said State, approved on thd 4th day of March, 1852, and

Whereas, Certain persons claim said lands and franchises by virtue of pretended grants made by the pretended Board of Trustees of the town of Oakland, to Horace W. Carpentier, in the years 1852 and 1853. Now,

Witnesseth, That for the consideration hereinafter mentioned, the party of the first part undertakes and agrees, as the Attorney-at-Law of said city, to institute and prosecute to final judgment, a suit or suits in the proper Courts against the person or persons so claiming said lands and franchises, adversely to said city; to render his personal services therein until the title and right to the cause shall be finally settled and determined By the Supreme Court; and the city of Oakland promises and agrees to pay said Felton for such services by conveying to him an interest equal to fifteen per cent, of all the property recovered by the city in said litigation, after the same shall have been finally terminated, and a like interest in the franchises, which shall be adjudged, as against the persons so claiming them, to belong to the city; it being understood that, in case nothing is recovered, the city is to pay the necessary court costs and disbursements incurred in said litigation.

In his message, dated September 28, 1867, Mayor Crane observes on the waterfront question: " The right of the city to its water front will very soon be tested, and I hope finally settled. It may be that the fraud which deprived the city of this valuable property has been so carefully covered as to now be effectual in preventing a recovery, but it will at least be satisfactory to our citizens to have such a conclusion judicially reached."

Save two petitions for certain portions of the water front from William Surrhyne and A. A. Cohen, made in the month of September, we cannot find that any action was taken by the City Council until the 19th October, 1867, on which date the Committee, to whom Cohen's application was referred, reported favorably on the granting of that portion of the water front lying between Webster and Franklin Streets, subject to certain conditions; while, on the 26th of the same month, the report on Surrhyne's application was made; but owing to the absence of the documents for that year, it is impossible to state whether it was favorable or otherwise. There was passed November 1st, "An Ordinance granting to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company the use of a Portion of the Water Front for the erection of a Marine Railroad," which we quote: -

Section One. - That portion of the water front lying below high- water mark, between the easterly line of Franklin Street and the westerly line of Webster Street extended, being three hundred feet in width, and running into San Antonio Creek for a distance of three hundred and fifty feet, is hereby granted to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company, during the corporate existence of said Company, for the purpose of erecting and maintaining a marine railway and wharf, at the annual rent of one hundred dollars, in gold coin, for the first five years, and, at the expiration thereof, and every ten years thereafter, the rent shall be fixed by three Commissioners, one to be chosen by the Council, one by said Company, and the third shall be appointed by the County Judge of Alameda County, provided, that said Company shall not collect tolls, or wharfage, or dockage, for the use of said wharf, without the consent of the Council of the city of Oakland; axiA provided, further, that said marine railway and wharf shall be so constructed as not to interfere with the free navigation, nor obstruct the channel of said creek.

Section Two. - Said Company shall commence the construction of said improvements within three months from the date of the passage of this ordinance, and complete the same within six months thereafter; and it is made a condition of this grant that said company shall, in good faith, contest any claim made to said premises by any person, under a pretended grant of the water front, made by the Board of Trustees of the late town of Oakland, to Horace W. Carpentier; and shall not, upon any terms, compromise such claim, provided, that the time herein provided for commencing and completing said improvements shall be extended to a period equal to the time said work shall be delayed by legal proceedings; ani provided, further, that said improvements shall be subject to the payment of city taxes as personal property of said company.

And now that well-known resident of Oakland, Doctor Samuel Merritt,. appears on the scene. On November 2, 1867, he succeeded to the mayoralty on the resig-

At this period the advisability of making a change in the charter commenced ta engross the attention of the City Council. Several special meetings were had for the purpose of discussing the subject, and citizens were invited to suggest amendmemts thereto, and it was then that the section giving the city the power to compromise and settle all causes of action and legal proceedings then pending was embraced into it. On the 9th Alderman Miller offered a resolution to the effect that the city charter be referred to the proper committee for revision, with the intent of applying to the Legislature for the necessary amendments, and that the committee be instructed tO' report at the earliest possible rnoment. On December i6th they were granted further time, and on the following day, the 17th, on motion of Alderman Pendleton, the Council resolved to go into a Committee of the Whole, for the purpose of taking into consideration the proposed amendments to the charter; but the original committee was not yet ready to report, and further time had to be given them. On the i8th and 19th special meetings were held, but no report came from the committee. The 26th December was settled as the day on which they should make their report, but still none came, therefore, a motion was subsequently made by Alderman Moody, that the charter, with amendments, when ready, should be referred to a committee, which was instructed to put them into shape, and have two hundred copies of them printed. But the Committee on Amendments had made no progress towards a report on the 30th December, and although special meetings were called on January 2, 4, 6, and 8,. 1868, it was not until the 13th of that month that their report was made. On January 22d, at a special meeting, the Council proceeded to take final action with regard to the amended charter. The first seven sections of it, with certain emendations, were adopted, while citizens wei'e invited to note amendments which they wished to submit to the Council, on the margin of the pamphlet, and to present them at the next meeting; at which, all the sections having been passed upon, the charter, as amended, was, on motion of Alderman Moody, given into the hands of a committee, with instructions to engross the same.

The amended charter having been accepted by the people it was forwarded to the Legislature, where it was so roughly handled that its original drafters would have failed to recognize their handiwork. The most earnest protests were entered against this action of the legislative body, and the Alameda representative was urged to strenuously oppose its passage. On March 9, 1868, the. Council received a communication from Hon. J. W. Dwinelle, the Alameda Delegate, in relation to the city charter and proposed amendments,- which resulted in the action mentioned above and embodied in the following resolution: "That it is the unanimous desire of the city of Oakland, that the Oakland Charter Bill, now before the Legislature, should not pass that body, the charter having been so altered and amended since it left our hands, as no longer to bedesirable," while at the same meeting it was, on motion of Alderman Hobart, resolved: "That the Senator and Assemblymen for Alameda County be requested to urge the passage of the bill left with Senator Robinson, entitled 'An Act Supplemental to an Act, etc., incorporating the City of Oakland,' passed in the year 1862." A resolution was also offered by Alderman Hobart, requesting the Mayor ta inform the Council in regard to the present state of the suit for the recovery of the water front and of the contemplated compromise, which was laid upon the table; while, on the same date, Alderman Campbell offered a resolution, requesting John B. Felton to inform the Council as to his powers in the compromise matter, which, too, was laid over.

We have seen how the charter was sent to the Legislature, and how it was treated there. It should be mentioned that tacked on to the end of the instrument was the Act, authorizing the city to settle all causes of action and dispute, which was' subsequently segregated, duly approved March 21, 1868, and became known in history as "The Compromise Act." It is entitled "An Act to enable the City of Oakland to settle its Controversies," and is as follows : -

Section One. - The Council of the city of Oakland, with the concurrence of the Mayor of said city, is hereby authorized and empowered to compromise, settle, and adjust any and all claims, demands, controversies, and causes of action in which the said city is interested.

On March 27, 1868, there sprung into existence an incorporation called the "'Water Front Company," whose first Board of Trustees consisted of E. R. Carpentier, Horace W. Carpentier, Leland Stanford, John B. Felton, Samuel Merritt, and Lloyd Tevis. The articles of incorporation of this company we now append : -

This certifies that we, whose names are hereunto subscribed, do hereby associate ourselves together, and form a company, under the provisions of the Act of the Legislature of the State of California, passed April 14, 1853, entitled "An Act to Provide for the-Ftrmation of Corporations for certain Purposes." and the Acts amendatory thereto and supplemental thereto.

The objects for which the said company is formed are, to acquire, build, construct, own, hold, manage, use, -and control wharves, docks, basins, dry-docks, piers, and warehouses in the city of Oakland, and in the vicinity thereof, in the State of California, and to lease, sell, convey, grant, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate, or otherwise dispose of the same; to borrow and loan money; to engage in and carry on the business of commerce, foreign and domestic; to purchase, acquire, manage, hold, and control, or to lease, sell, convey, grant, mortgage, hypothecate, alienate, or otherwise dispose of the water front of said city, or any part thereof, and any submerged tide and other lands in and about the bay of San Francisco, or elsewhere, together with the rights and franchises connected therewith or appurtenant thereto; and also all other property, real, personal, or mixed, choses in action, rights, privileges, or franchises.

The corporate name of the said company shall be "The Oakland Water Front Company;" the time of its existence fifty years, and its principal place of business shall be located in the city of Oakland, in the county of Alameda, and State of California.

The amount of the capital stock of said company shall be five million dollars, and shall consist of fifty thou" sand shares, of one hundred dollars.

The number of the Trustees of said company shall be six, and the names of those who shall manage the concerns of the company for the first three months are Edward R. Carpentier, Lloyd Tevis, Horace W. Carpentier, Samuel Merritt, John B. Felton, and Leland Stanford.

On behalf of the Committee on Water Front, April i, 1868, Alderman Moody introduced "An Ordinance for the Settlement of Controversies and Disputes concerning the Water Front of the City of Oakland, the Franchise thereof and other

Section One. - The claims, demands, controversies, disputes, litigations, and causes of action heretofore existing between the city of Oakland, on the one part, and Horace W. Carpentier, and his assigns, on the other part, relating to the force, validity, and e6rect of a certain ordinance passed by the Board of Trustees of the town of Oakland, on the i8th day of May, a. d. 1S52, and enrolled May 27, 1852, signed by A. Marier, President of the said Board of Trustees, and F. K. Shattuck, Clerk of said Board, entitled "An Ordinance for the Disposal of the Water Front belonging to the Town of Oakland, and to Provide for the construction of "Wharves," wherein and whereby, for the consideration therein named, "the water front of said town, that is to say, all the lands lying within the limits of the town of Oakland, between high tide and ship channel," as described in theAct of the Legislature for the incorporation of said town, passed May 4, 1852, together with all the. right, title, arid interest of said town therein, together with all the privileges, rights, and franchists therein mentioned, were sold, granted, and released to Horace W. Carpentier and his assigns.

And also in relation to the validity, force, and effect of a certain conveyance, executed and delivered to the said Carpentier, of the said water front, dated May 31, 1852, by the said Am(5dSe Marier, President of said Board of Trustees, under and in pursuance of said ordinance.

And also in relation to the force, validity, and effect of a certain other ordinance, passed by the Board of Trustees on the 30th day of December, A. D. 1852, entitled "An ordinance to approve the wharf at the foot of Main Street, and to extend the time for constructing the other wharves," which said ordinance was enrolled January I, A. D. 1853, and signed by the said President and Clerk of the said Board of Trustees, wherein and whereby the said first-mentioned ordinance and the said deed of conve)ance was recognized and approved.

And also in relation to the force, validity, and effect of a certain other ordinance entitled "An Ordinance concerning Wharves and the Water Front," passed on the 27th day of August, A. D. 1853, by the said Board of Trustees, which said ordinance was eniolled, dated August 27, 1S53, and was signed by A. W. Burrell, President, and A. S. Hurlburt, Clerk of the said Board of Trustees, wherein and whereby the said first-mentioned ordinance was in all things satisfied and confirmed, and the said water front again granted, sold, and conveyed to the said Carpentier in fee simple forever: - are hereby compromised, settled, and adjusted, and the said above-mentioned ordinance and conveyance are made valid, binding, and ratified and confirmed, and all disputes, litigations, controversies, and claims in and to the franchises and property described in said ordinances and deed of conveyance, and every part thereof, are abandoned and released to the said city of Oakland, to the said Carpentier and his assigns, upon the following conditions, to wit: -

That the said Carpentier and his assigns shall convey, by proper and sufficient deeds of conveyance, all the property and franchises mentioned and described in said ordinances and deed of conveyance hereiti before referred to, to the Oakland Water Front Company, to be used and applied in accordance with the terms, conditions, stipula" tions, and agreement contained in certain contracts between the said Oakland Water Front Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company, and other parties, bearing even date herewith, with the exceptions in the said agreement specified.

But nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any rights of the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company, derived under an ordinance of the city of Oakland, passed the 20th day of November, 1861.

In pursuance of the foregoing ordinance the said Horace W. Carpentier executed and delivered to the said Water Front Company a deed of which the following is a copy : -

This Indenture, made the 31st day of March, 1868, between Horace W. Carpentier, party of the first part, and the Oakland Water Front Company, party of the seccnd part, witnesselh: 'Ihat the said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars to him paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby gives, grants, sells, and conveys to the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, the following described premise."-, to wit: All of the water front of the city of Oakland - that is to say, all the lands, and the lands covered with water, lying within the limits of the said city between high tide and ship channel, being the water-front lands within the boundaries described and granted in and defined by the Act entitled "An Act to Incorporate the Town of Oakland and to Provide for the Construction of Wharves thereat," approved May 4, 1852, and the Act entitled "An Act tt) Incorporate the City of Oakland," passed March 25, 1854, and repealing certain other Acts in relation to said city, approved April 24, 1862, together with all the privileges and appurtenances, rights, and franchises thereunto appertaining and belonging, together with all rights to collect tolls, wharfage, and dockage thereon and therefrom, and all lands, rights, pris'ileges, and franchises of every kind and nature which have been heretofore acquired by the party of the first part, from the town of Oakland and the city of Oakland or either of them, and all the rights to the above-mentioned lands, franchises, and privileges which he may hereafter acquire from the said city of Oakland, excepting therefrom, however, so much of the said water front as lies between the middle of Washington Street and the middle of Franklin Street, and extending southerly to a line parallel to Front Street and two hundred feet southerly from the present wharf, according to the map of the city of Oakland, with the rights of wharfage, dockage, and tolls thereon, to have and to hold the aforesaid and aforegranted premises to the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, to their use and behoof forever, in witness whereof the said party of the first part has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year aforesaid.

On the 1st day of April, 1868, the agreement and indentures, of which the following are copies, were made, executed, and delivered by and between the parties therein named, to wit: -

This indenture made the 1st day of April, 1868, between the Oakland Water Front Company, party of the first part; the Western Pacific Railroad Company party of the second part; the city of Oakland, party of the third part; Horace W. Carpentier, party of the fourth part; John B. Felton, party of the fifth part; and Leland Stanford, party of the sixth part. Whereas the said Horace W. Carpentier by deed bearing date March 31, 1868, conveyed to the said Oakland Water Front Company the water front of the city of Oakland, and certain rights, privileges, and franchises, as by reference to said deed will more fully appear; and whereas the said deed was executed and delivered to the said Oakland Water Front Company, upon the express trusts and subject to the covenants therein set forth. Now, know all men by these presents that the said Oakland W ater Front Company, in consideration of the said conveyance, and the said premises, and in further consideration of the sum of one dollar to be paid by the other parties herein named, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, doth hereby declare and make known that it holds the said premises conveyed by the said deed upon the following express trusts, and subject to the following covenants and agreements, to wit: First: The said Western Pacific Railroad shall, with reasonable diligence, and within three months from this date, select from and locate on the premises described in said five hundred acres thereof, in one or two parcels in the form of squares or parallelograms with right, acute, or obtuse angles, but not so as to include an aggregate frontage on ship channel exceeding one-half mile in length; also to select and locate within said time, over the remainder of said premises, not exceeding two strips of land, each strip not to be more than one hundred feet wide, as grade for the track or tracks of its railroad from highwater mark to such parcel or parcels, and between the same; and the said Oakland Water Front Company hereby covenants and agrees with the said party of the second part that it will at any time after such selection and location, upon demand, convey by proper conveyance or conveyances the said five hundred acres and the exclusive right of way over the said strips of land thus selected and located, to the said party of the second part, which said conveyance or conveyances shall contain a covenant or agreement that if the said parcels or either of them shall be located out to a westerly water front of twenty-four feet depth of water at low tide, no land shall be sold westerly therefrom, and no obstruction or impediment shall ever be placed or put in front or westerly of the same, or anything done to prevent the free and unobstructed approach and access of vessels to said parcels.

Second. - And the said party of the first part hereby further covenants and agrees that it shall and will, upon demand, convey to the city of Oakland so much of the said premises as lies betw een the middle of Franklin Street and the easterly line of Webster Street, and extending out to a line parallel with First Street, and two hundred feet southerly of the present wharf at the foot of Broadway in the city of Oakland, according to the map of said city, with the right of dockage and wharfage and tolls thereon. And said party of the first part further covenants and agrees that it will, within a reasonable time, designate and dedicate, as a navigable water-course for public use, the channel of San Antonio Creek, from ship channel to the town of San Antonio, to a width of not less than two hundred feet, over the shallow water at the bar, and three hundred feet wide above that place, subject to, and reserving the right, however, to build bridges across said channel with suitable draws.

Third. - The said party of the first part hereby further covenants and agrees that it will issue to the said Horace W. Carpentier fifty one-hundredths, equal to twenty-five thousand shares of its capital stock, also issue to the said John B. Felton ten one-hundredths, equal to five thousand shares of its capital stock, and also issue to the said Leland Stanford the remaining forty one-hundredths, equal to twerjt)' thousand shares of its capital stock.

Fourth. - The said party of the first part hereby further covenants and agrees that it will and does hereby authorize the city of Oakland or other parties to construct a dam above the "Oakland Bridge'' across the estuary of San Antonio, which lies between Oakland and Clinton, so as to retain the water and keep the land above submerged to high-tide mark, for the use of the owners of the adjoining lands and the public.

By Horace W. Carpentier, President, Lloyd Tevis, Secretary. The Western Pacific Railroad Company, By Leland Stanford, President, E. H. Miller, Jr., Secretary. Horace W. Carpentier, John B. Felton, Lf.land Stanford.

Articles of Agreement made this ist day of April, 1868, between the Western Pacific Railroad Company, party of the first part, and Leland Stanford, party of the second part, and the Oakland Water Front Company, party of the third part.

Whereas, Horace W. Carpentier has by deed bearing date of March 31, 1868, conveyed the water front of the city of Oakland, and certain rights, privileges, and franchises to the said party of the third part. And, whereas, the said party of the third part has executed and delivered to the said party of the first part, bearing even date herewith an agreement to convey certain portions of said premises to the said party of the first part, which deed and agreement are hereby referred to for greater certainty.

Now, the said party of the first part hereby covenants and agrees in consideration of such conveyance of said premises, that, upon such conveyance or conveyances being made so as to vest a good title in fee simple in said premises in said party of the first part, and upon the performance and execution by the municipal authorities of the city of Oakland, of all instruments, ordinances, acts, and proceedings necessary to perfect, complete, and make good the title to said premises described in the said deed from the said Carpentier to the said Oakland Water Front Company, and which is to be done within a reasonable time from this date, it will, within eighteen months thereafter, and with reasonable dispatch proceed and construct or purchase and complete a railroad connection from its main line to the said parcel or parcels thus selected by it, or one of them, and will, within said time complete such connecting railroad thereto; and, further, will erect and construct on said selected parcels, or one of them, the necessary buildings and structures for a passenger and freight depot for the use of its said railroad, expending upon its said premises, within three years, not less than five hundred thousand dollars in gold coin, but not including therein the purchase of existing improvements thereon. And if the said party of the first part shall fail, neglect, and refuse to provide such connecting railroad, and to make such depot buildings, and expend the said sum of money within the said three years; the said five hundred acres thus conveyed shall be forfeited and the same shall be conveyed by said party of the first part to the city of Oakland.

And the said party of the first part further covenants and agrees that it will not convey to any person or corporation any portion of the said five hundred acres, at any time within two years from this date.

And the said party of the second part hereby covenants and agrees that the said party of the first part shall and will faithfully do and perform its said covenants and agreements herein set forth.

And the said party of the first part hereby further covenants and agrees that in constructing its bridges across that portion of the estuary of San Antonio which lies between Oakland and Clinton, between San Antonio Creek and the Oakland Bridge, it will leave a space under each of said bridges" of not less than forty feet in width free and unobstructed by piers or otherwise, for the passage of flatboats,. scows, barges, and vessels without masts, and will not place any obstructions in said estuary between said points, except what may be necessary for such bridges - such bridges to be without draws or openings.

By Leland Stanford, President. E. H. Miller, Jr., Secretary. Leland Stanford. The Oakland Water Front Company, By Horace W. Carpe.n'tier. President. Lloyd Tevis, Secretary.

From the foregoing documents it will need no remarkable penetration to solve the riddle and find that the Oakland Water Front Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company were one and the same in their interests. They put forth their octopus arms and drew everything within their vise-Hke clutches. It mattered not whether it was marsh or tide lands, all must be held so that their position should be strengthened, while a line of demarkation was quietly but surely being drawn around the doomed city. The transparent transfers on record will expose the weakness they felt, as well as display the grasping greed that governed their actions.

Resolved, That it is the unanimous desire of the Council that Samuel Merritt, Esq., the Mayor of Oakland, accept the position of Trustee of the Oakland Water Front Company.

A resolution that was carried without a dissentient voice, while, on the same date an ordinance entitled "An Ordinance for the Settlement of Controversies and Disputes, concerning the Water Front of the City of Oakland, the Franchises thereof, and other Matters relating thereto, passed, and approved, April i, 1868, was finally voted for and passed. This was followed by the passage of "An Ordinance Finally Settling. Adjusting, and Compromising the Question of the Water Front." This instrument was as follows : -

Section One. - It appearing to the satisfaction of the Council, that all the terms and conditions of a certain ordinance heretofore passed, entitled *' An Ordinance for the Settlement of Controversies and Disputes concerning the Water Front of the City of Oakland, the Franchises thereof, and other Matters Relating thereto" have been fully satisfied and complied vi^ith by Horace W. Carpentier and his assigns, all the ordinances and deeds therein mentioned and described are hereby finally ratified and confirmed, and all disputes, controversies, claims, demands, and causes of action heretofore existing between the city of Oakland on the one part and Horace W. Carpentier and his assigns of the other part, relating to the force and validity of the said ordinances and deeds are hereby abandoned and released by the said city of Oakland to the said Carpentier and his assigns - Provided : That noth_ ing herein contained shall release the right of the city of Oakland to the reversion of the property, franchises, and rights released, as provided in the contract between the Western Pacific Railroad Company and the Oakland Water Front Company, in case said city of Oakland shall become entitled to the same under said contract.

About this time John B. Felton addressed the citizens of Oakland on the subject of the water front, and being possessed of a noble intellect and logical mind it was no difficult task for him to cast a halo around the subject, which they found out only after the compromise had been indorsed by them and the actions of the Council fully confirmed.

At the meeting of the 6th April, Alderman Hobart introduced "An Ordinance to repeal the Ordinance granting to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company the use of a portion of the Water Front," which was duly carried; after which it was

Resolved, That the City Clerk be instructed to return to A. A. Cohen, President of the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company, the sum of one hundred dollars, which amounfwas received by him from said Cohen, as rent of the portion of the water front lying below high- water mark between the easterly line of Franklin Street and the westerly line of Webster Street, extended, being three hundred feet in width and running into San Antonio Creek for a distance of three hundred and fifty feet.

Resolved, That a committee of three be appointed to investigate the conflicting interests of the city and the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company to certain water-front rights between Webster and Franklin Streets, and to report at the next meeting of the Council some method of adjusting and compromising the same if possible.

A. A. Cohen, who was present, then made some explanatory statements in regard to the subject, after which, on motion of Mr. Hobart, anit some discussion, the resolu- tion was finally passed with the emendation that all should be omitted after the word " Council." Messrs . Moody, Barnes, and Pendleton, of the Council, having been appointed such committee, through the first-named gentleman made the following report : " That m October last, the Council, with the approval of the Mayor, granted to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company the use for fifty years of that portion of the water front lying between Franklin and Webster Streets, that in the settlement of the general water-front interests in the current month one only reservation of four hundred and twenty feet was made upon the water front to give to the city at least one place for free egress and ingress : - that this reservation includes the same property granted to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company.

"Your Committee believes that if it was necessary to make a reservation for the benefit of the city, it is equally necessary to so protect that reservation as that no one shall enjoy any exclusive rights, but that the benefits of the reservation should be equally enjoyed by all. In particular your Committee believe that the ferry interests should be especially fostered, and that every ferry should be afforded the fullest accommodation at the least possible cost, or, better still, free from all cost. That though the reservation is quite limited in extent, your Committee believe that with proper economy it will be found sufficient to protect our most important interests. With the view of giving the best possible facilities for a landing upon the creek and for space for a marine railway upon which to repair and clean boats, your Committee would recommend the adoption of some such plan as that accompanying this report by which the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company may obtain all the accommodations required, and at the same time the same facilities may be afforded to any other ferry and to transient shipping.

" This recommendation is made under the supposition that the grant to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company will not be confirmed, and that the property will not be disposed of by sale or lease to any other party; but that it will ever remain the property, and under the full control of the city; in which case it will be necessary for the city to make some arrangement for the control and improvement of the same.

"We would recommend that all ferries have slip and landing privileges free of all costs, and that the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company be granted the right to lay a marine railway between Franklin and Webster Streets upon the most equitable terms.

" The question as to the legality of the grant to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company is one which properly belongs to the Court; the Council has already given its verdict in making the grant. But still we believe our true interests will be consulted, and all ferry interests be satisfied by the adoption of the plan proposed." The foregoing was the minority report: the majority, Messrs. Barnes and Pendleton, stated, " We believe that said Company has no right nor shadow of claim to one foot of the water front at the place described above, and your Committee believe it would not be good policy for the city to dispose of all the little outlet it has by water at this time, and when it is deemed proper by the Council to dispose of a part or the whole thereof, the sale or lease must conform to the statute and be sold or leased to the highest bidder; we therefore recommend that no portion of said water front be sold or leased at this time."

In his message of March 15, 1869, Mayor Merritt says on this subject: "At the time of the organization of the Water Front Company, I was elected a Director, which position I accepted, the City Council having passed a resolution requesting me to do so. One share of the stock of the company was transferred to enable me to fill that position. Soon after the company was organized, Mr. Calvin Brown, an engineer of skill and reputation, was employed by the company to make a survey of the entire water front of Oakland and to report to that Board his views on the most advisable plan of improvements to be adopted. That gentleman entered upon his duties with zeal, made a hydrographical survey of the creek, the bar, and the entire water front, and presented a very elaborate and interesting report accompanied with a map. Not having that report at hand I can only state some facts which it establishes beyond controversy. I will allude to some of the more important. The water in the creek for miles in extent is of sufficient depth to accommodate vessels of ordinary size at any time of tide. To dredge the bar and convert the creek into a safe and commodious harbor, will cost not exceeding two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. But little dredging will be required to keep the passage open, when the channel is once cut, as the constant flow of the tide will prevent considerable deposit, etc.

" I am informed that a suitable dredger has been purchased and is now about due from the Atlantic States, and will be put to work soon after its arrival.

" I know the policy which the Water Front Company designs to pursue is a liberal one, and will tend to encourage improvements on the water front, stimulate manufacturing business, and thereby add to the existing growth and prosperity of Oakland. The interests of the Water Front Company and the citizens of Oakland are so nicely blended that the two cannot be separated; the line of demarkation cannot be drawn; whatever promotes the interests of the one must reflect its advantages upon the ether. It is not easy for any one to fully appreciate or comprehend the many advantages which Oakland will derive from the dredging of thenar, thereby converting the creek into a safe and commodious harbor for vessels; one of these which I regard as the most important to Oakland is the opening up of a new route by giving additional facilities of communication with San Francisco." Certainly the dredging of the creek and the bar at its mouth were highly important to the city of Oakland; but there was another matter of still more importance to it, namely, action to recover the entire water front, a subject which the worshipful Mayor has rather ingeniously burked in the eibove remarks.

On March i, 1869, John B. Felton was elected Mayor of the city of Oakland. When put in nomination, the News, a periodical published in Oakland, says of Mr. Felton's candidature: " We were somewhat amused by a remark made by a ' sovereign ' in reply to a question as to how he liked the ticket headed by John B. Felton. ' Too much water front ! Too much water front ! ' said the voter, who, by the way, is a property-holder, who pays considerable taxes. We reflected a moment and our memory brought us back to the night when land-owner and laborer, mechanic and business man, crowded Shattuck & Hillegass' Hall to suffocation for the purpose of - petitioning the Legislature to pass an enabling Act so that the title to the water front should be forever settled, and the terminus of the Pacific Railroad thus secured for Oakland. We do not recollect of seeing at that meeting the particular individual whose objection to the Felton ticket we have quoted above; but as it was worth a man's life to say a word in opposition to the ' compromise ' at that time, we are confident that his voice was in accord with that of the entire community. At the time we speak of - about a year ago - every man who owned a twenty-five foot lot was ready to hug and kiss his neighbor, in view of the glorious prospects in store for Oakland. Rejoicing was observed on every hand; old animosities were forgotten, and even the sins of Carpentier were, by the action and voice of the people, absolved unconditionally, and the ' monster whose blighting influence had retarded our prosperity ' for years and years previously was reinstated in the good opinions of the community for his efforts to secure the terminus. This glorious feeling and general prosperity was attributed, at the time, to the fact that the location of the Pacific Railroad terminus was about to be fixed in Oakland, through negotiations then pending and about to be closed satisfactorily. Every one said, secure the terminus at all hazards, even if to do so the entire water front, so far as the city's interests are concerned, has to be deeded to the company In order to induce the Legislature to empower the Council to settle the controversy, an invitation to visit this city and accept its hospitalities was tendered to that body, and on February 22, 1868, that mob came down here, and after feasting and carousing at municipal expense, went back determined to help Oakland to get the upper hand of San Francisco in securing what was regarded as the greatest prize ever offered to any city on the continent. The bills for this banquet were freely and ungrudgingly paid; and well they might be, since, as if by magic, the moment the Bill passed the Legislature, property doubled in value and men who had been for years impoverishing themselves in paying taxes on uproductive lands, suddenly found themselves transformed into millionaires. And this transformation of values was mainly effected by the prospect of having the railroad terminus located here.

" One of the principal agents in these negotiations was John B. Felton. , Employed by the Council and instructed by the people, he bartered the city's interest in the water front to a corporation, getting in return therefor that which has trebled in value every foot of property within our city limits. When, therefore, we hear a man objecting to Felton because the latter was one of the main instruments in enriching him, we are obliged to remain indignantly silent. We trust that Mr. Felton will spike the guns of his enemies by addressing a meeting some evening during the present week, and give an account of his stewardship in the water-front transaction. His connection with that business is being misrepresented every day by the very men who made most out of it in the way of speculation, and it would be an act of retributive justice to get them together some evening and explain to them the fortuitous circumstances which has changed their condition from comparative pauperism to plethoric wealth."

Consequent on the action of the Council in taking possession of the water-front lot formerly granted to the San Francisco and Oakland Railroad Company, that corporation brought suit in the Third District Court against the city of Oakland, when the following judgment was rendered by Judge S. B. McKee: -

"The central question of the controversy between the parties of this action involves the consideration and construction of an ordinance passed by the Common Council of the city of Oakland on the 20th of October, 1867, by which the plaintiff claims to have become vested with the rights of property to the land in controversy, which have been invaded and violated by the defendants. Many lesser' questions revolve around this central question which have been discussed by counsel, but it is only necessary to examine and adjudicate thevalidity of the ordinance itself.

"By the ordinance the Common Council granted to the plaintiff, during its corporate existence, a block of land in the city of Oakland, three hundred and fifty feet wide, between what is described on the map of the city as Webster and Franklin Streets, and extending three'hundred and fifty feet into the San Antonio Creek, for the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon a marine railway and Wharf

" For this the plaintiff covenanted to pay the city annually for five years, one hundred dollars gold coin; and thereafter for every ten years, annually, such sum of money as should be agreed upon by three Commissioners to be appointed as provided by the ordinance.

" After the passage and approval of the ordinance, the servants and workmen of the plaintiff entered upon the land and commenced the construction of the improvements, when they were interfered with and prevented from continuing their work by the officers of the city, who took possession of the property. The Common Council afterwards repealed the ordinance. If the rights of property vested in the plaintiff, by the ordinance of course they could not be divested by a subsequent repeal of it.

"Counsel of plaintiff attempt to sustain the validity of the ordinance by the exercise of a power ' to construct and keep in repair wharves, docks, ferries, piers, slips,' etc., conferred upon the City Council by the fourth section of the charter of the city. But such a' power can only be exercised for the city and not for the plaintiff, nor any one else. The Council have no authority under it to make improvements of any kind or nature whatsoever, for the use and benefit of a railroad company. If the Council should consider the building of a wharf on property of the city, required by public necessity, it might in exercise of such a power, contract for the construction of it if it had in hand the necessary means. Or, if it had no money and it could substitute the use of the land and the improvement to be constructed on it, for a number of years, as a consideration to induce another to construct such an improvement for the city, the Council might exercise the power in that way; for every power carries with it such incidents as are necessary to make it effectual. But in such a case it must plainly appear that the improvement to be constructed was for the city; and, that when the use of the land which formed the consideration for the improvement ended, the land and improvements would revert to the city as its property. It must also appear that the title to the property remained in the city.

" No such intentions ' crop out ' of the ordinance in question, nor are they to be found in any part of it. The object was to build a marine railway and wharf, not for the use and benefit of the city, for the necessity for such an improvement for the city is nowhere apparent. But the plaintiff, as a railroad company, needed it for its own purposes, and it has authority under the general law of its corporation to receive and take by purchase, voluntary grant, or donation such lands as might be necessary for the maintenance of its railroad, and for such uses and purposes as might be considered necessary for accomplishing the object for which it was created. The construction of this marine railway and wharf, therefore, could only have been intended for the use ' and benefit of the plaintiff, not of the city, and there is nothing of the elements of a contract, direct or indirect, between the plaintiff and the Common Council for the construction of this improvement for the city.

" The ordinance aims at a disposition of the land to the plaintiff for its sole use and benefit; the word ' grant ' used in it is a comprehensive term which may be construed so as to include a conveyance of the fee. The plaintiff obtains by its terms the absolute use and enjoyment of the land and of tlfe rents and profits of it; for, although the plaintiff is prohibited from collecting wharfage, without permission of the Council, this does not interfere with the use and profits of the land. The money agreed to be paid for this is in the shape of annual rent, and in that respect the ordinance has the feature of a lease; but, as a lease, it might be considered void, because it has an uncertain term. But whether the ordinance amounts to a sale or lease of the property, or is, as contended by the plaintiff, simply an act done in the exercise of a power to build wharves, piers, slips, etc., it is void, because the act was not done, nor the sale or lease made, in the manner prescribed by the city charter. All sales or leases of property belonging to the city must be by public auction, upon such terms and conditions as may by ordinance be prescribed, and all contracts for work must be let to the lowest responsible bidder, after publication made. A municipal corporation can only exercise such powers as have been conferred upon it, and in the manner prescribed by its charter. I, therefore, think that the ordinance in question vested in the plaintiff no right of property to the land in controversy, and the defendants are entitled to judgment. Let judgment be entered accordingly.

Provenance

Text from History of Alameda County, California : Including Its Geology, Topography, Soil, and Productions : Together with a Full and Particular Record of the Spanish Grants : the Early History and Settlement, Compiled from the Most Authentic Sources, the Names of Original Spanish and American Pioneers, a Full Political History, Comprising a Tabular Statement of Officers of the County Since Its Formation : Separate Histories of Each of the Townships, Showing Their Advancement and Progress : Also Incidents of Pioneer Life, the Raising of the Bear Flag, and Prominent Citizens and Representative Men : and of Its Cities, Towns, Churches, Schools, Secret Societies, Etc, published 1883, in the public domain in the United States and digitised by the Internet Archive.