Chicago City (part 24 of 57)

The railroad company and the City of Chicago appeared in the suit and filed their voluminous pleadings. The United States had not appeared, when in 1877 the Attorney- General of the United States called upon William G.Ewing, the United States District Attorney, for a report of the facts of the case, and the interest which the United States had in the controversy. His report, bearing date June, 1887, is a thorough and comprehensive statement of the facts bearing upon the acquisition of whatever title the railroad company had obtained, and a very able legal opinion,the conclusion of which was that the act of 1869, under which the company claimed its chief title, was void for various reasons, and recommending that the United States should institute a suit in chancery to settle the question, and vindicate what he deemed the public interest.

The case, after long delay, came on for trial, at a term of the United States Circuit Court, presided over by Justice Harlan, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

After a protracted trial and exhaustive argument, the Court entered its decree, adjudging that the fee to certain lands in the City of Chicago is in the City in trust for public use, and that said City as riparian proprietor of said lands on its lake front has power to erect public landing places, etc., and that the Illinois act of 1873, repealing the act of 1869, had the effect to withdraw from the Illinois Central railroad company the grant to it by the third section of the act of 1869, of the submerged lands in Lake Michigan, and reinvested the State with its right and title thereto, etc., and enjoining the railroad company from erecting structures in or filling up a certain portion of the bed of Lake Michigan.

The very elaborate opinion prepared by Justice Harlan will be found in 33d Federal Reporter 730, and it is interesting, besides its discussion of the law, as a complete statement of the historical facts and legislative acts bearing upon the subject.

The broad effect of the decree was to restore to the City of Chicago the con trol of the submerged lands along it8 lake front and to confine the ownership of the railroad company to the right of way, or to the property which it had purchased or acquired from its proprietors.

Each of the parties, the Illinois Central railroad company, the State of Illinois and the city of Chicago, appealed from the decree of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case came on for argument on the 12th of October, 1892, and three days were occupied with the hearing. The arguments were made by Messrs. B. F. Ayer and John N. Jewett, for the railroad company, by Messrs. John S. Miller and S.S. Gregory for the City, and by the Attorney General, Mr. George Hunt, for the State of Illinois. A final decision was made on the 5th of December, 1892. The opinion of the court was prepared by Mr. Justice Field, and may be found in full in 146 U. S. Reports 387-476.

on different grounds from those on which the Court below had placed it while in some of its minor details it was modified. The court took the broad ground that the act of the Illinois legislature of 1869 was void as ultra vires. Among the fifteen sections of the syllabi of the case all of which are important, but too long to be copied here, the following are selected.

2. The works of the Illinois Central railroad company constructed in the city of Chicago under the authority of law and by the requirement of the City as a condition of its consent that the company might locate its road within its limits, are not such an encroachment upon the domain of the State, as to require the interposition of the Court for their removal or for any restriction in their use.

3. The Illinois Central railroad company never by the reclamation from the waters of the lake of the land upon which its tracks are laid in the city of Chicago, or by the construction of its road and works connected therewith, obtained an absolute fee in the land reclaimed, nor a consequent right to dispose of the same to other parties,or to use it for any other purpose than the construction and operation of its railroad thereon.

4. The Illinois Central railroad company did not acquire by the mere construction of its road and other works in Chicago, any rights as riparian proprietor to reclaim still other lands from the waters of the lake for its use, or the construction of piers, docks and wharves in the furtherance of its business. It could only reclaim the land under the waters for the construction of a railroad on a track not to exceed a specified width, and of works connected therewith.

8. The trust devolving upon the State for the public and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, can not be relinquished by a transfer of the property

10. The bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the people of the State in their character of Sovereign in trust for public uses for which they are adapted.

11. The Illinois act of April 16, 1869,was in operative to affect, modify, or in any other respect to control the sovereignly or dominion of the State over the submerged lands in lake Michigan, or its ownership thereof, and any such attempted operation of the act was annulled by the repealing act of April 15, 1873.

14. The city of Chicago as riparian owner of the grounds on its east or lake front, between the north line of Randolph street and the north line of block twenty-three produced to lake Michigan, and by its charter, has power to construct and keep in repair on such lake front, public landing places, wharves, docks and levees, subject to the authority of the State to prescribe the lines beyond which such structure may not be extended into the navigable waters of the harbor, and to such supervision and control as the United States may rightfully exercise.

15. The State of Illinois is the owner in fee of the submerged lauds constituting the bed of lake Michigan, which the third section of the State act of April 15, 1869, purported to grant the Illinois Central railroad company, and the State act of April 15, 1873, repealing the same is valid and effective for the purpose of restoring to the State the same control, dominion and ownership of said lands that it had prior to the passage of the act of April 16, 1869.

Thus the long struggle ended by the Tailroad company acquiring a confirmation of its right to the possession, control and enjoyment of its tracks along its right of way, with stations, slips, warehouses and other works essential to the operation of its railway, which has never been seriously questioned; while all its other claims were disallowed and the control of the lake front, sub-

The status of this public ground remained for more than fifty years a subject of uncertainty. Its origin dates back to the time when Fort Dearborn Addition, a part of the Fort Dearborn Reservation, was platted by Mathew Birchard, as agent of Hon. E. Poinsett, Secretary of War, on the 6th of June, 1839. On the plat then made and recorded, the half block since known as Dearborn Park, lying west of Michigan avenue and between Randolph and Washington streets, as well as all property between Randolph and Madison streets, is designated as "public ground forever to remain vacant of buildings." The plat having been signed and acknowledged by a nominal agent, did not conform to the State statute, and did not constitute a statutory dedication for public use. The ground remained an open waste, the government made no claim to it, and the local authorities bestowed no care on it. It remained a waif, without parent or protector. Only one thing was certain - it must remain forever vacant of buildings. In 1852, the Illinois Central railroad company obtained a deed from the Secretary of War of the United States for its right of way along the lake front, for which it paid $45,000. In August, 1869, the question was brought to bar before Judge Drummond, of the U. S. Circuit Court, and on a bill in equity on behalf of the United States vs. the Illinois Central railroad company, he held that though never legally dedicated under the State statute, it had become public property by virtue of a common law dedication, but subject to the restriction of remaining vacant of buildings (2 Bissel C. C. Reports 174), and he issued an injunction prohibiting the railroad company from erecting a depot on a portion of the tract, for which it had obtained authority both from the State of Illinois and the City Council of Chicago.

At last, after fifty-four years of uncertainty as to what use to put the ground to, the city has solved the problem by devoting the half block lying west of Michigan Avenue as a site

While it may not be clear but that the prohibition against buildings is still in force, the use to which it is appropriated is so appropriate, and one in which every citizen has not only an interest, but a feeling of patriotic pride, that it is quite improbable that any question will ever be raised, or if raised, whether it may not be held that the condition has become obsolete. It is certain that the considerations which gave it pertinency in 1839 have lost their force in 1893.

Before proceeding to erect the library building, an act of the legislature of Illinois sanctioning it was obtained, and also the written consent of all the owners of property abutting the park.

The trial of eight persons indicted for murder committed in the riot at Haymarket Square in Chicago on the evening of May 4th, 1886, was in some aspects the most remarkable criminal trial which has occurred in this country. It was remarkable for the wide-spread interest which it excited among all classes of the immediate community and throughout the country, from the protracted duration of the proceedings, from the dignity and forensic ability with which they were conducted on both sides, and especially from the application of the law of Conspiracy to the case - seeking to charge as principals in the crime - which was the culmination of a popular tumult, the teachers and propogators of anarchistic theories, and the inciters of unlawful force in the columns of newspapers and in popular discussions.

The leading facts of the riot and trial have been narrated at pages 262 et seq.. of this volume. It is intended here to only treat of the legal principles involved and established by the Court of last resort in its affirmance of the judgment of the trial Court, and its sanction of the doctrines laid down by the learned Judge who presided at the trial.

Hon. Joseph Eastou Gary, of the Superior Court, was presiding Judge. The prosecu. tion was conducted by Mr. Julius S. Grinnell, the State's Attorney. The prisoners wer defended by W. P. Black and Messrs. Solomon and Zeister. The trial commenced June 21st and continued till August 20th, of which four weeks were consumed in obtaining a jury. Nearly one thousand talesmen were called and examined before the panel was made up.

The trial developed the factsthat in a time of much excitement and unrest, during which a large element of the wage workers were agitating their grievances, a public meeting was called and had convened on Haymarket Square, and while being addressed by one of the defendants, Fielding - was charged upon by a detachment of police, who commanded the meeting to disperse. Immediately the officers were set upon and missiles were thrown and some fire arms discharged, when a bomb, thrown by some unknown hand, exploded, killing the policeman Mathias Began, whose murder was charged in the indictment, together with seven or eight others, and wounding many more. The prisoner, Parsons, was editor of the Alarm, which had in recent issues published seditious articles, abounding with anarchistic doctrine and most atrocious sentiments, who was also present at the meeting. Another prisoner. Spies, was editor and publisher of a paper called Arbeiter Zeitung, which had lately published articles advising a resort to violence and force to overturn the oppressors of labor, and the upholders of what it called a system of oppression.

Another prisoner, Lingg, employed himself in the manufacture of dynamite bombs, though the one that made the fatal explosion was not traced to him. The other prisoners were identified by more or less conclusive testimony with the illegal conspiracy. The identity of the person who fired and threw the bomb was never established.

prisoners with it, and to connect it with the riot and explosion which occurred at the Haymarket meeting, was circumstantial. It embraced a multitude of particulars relating to the state of public feeling, the discussions of the time, the publication of seditious articles, the sentiments expressed and appeals made in public meetings, and the sentiments, demeanor and employment of the prisoners, which, altogether, was relied on to form a chain of proof that a crime had been devised, and that the prisoners were consciously and actively participants in committing the purposed crime.

Although demanding separate trials, they were jointly tried. It is quite impossible to gather up in the limits of a review the strands of testimony, which, twisted together, formed the rope of conviction, which in the judgment of the jury sealed the fate of the anarchists.

Since the heat and fervor of feeling which the massacre aroused and which the trial fanned to a flame has passed away, the permanent interest which attaches to the trial is in the doctrine which was applied, making persons responsible for their utterances and acts, through the law of conspiracy, in the ultimate convulsions and crimes which are traced to them.

To feel that the responsibility cast upon Judge Gary was a heavy one, it is only needful to recall the discussions which this law of Conspiracy has elicited from the time of its enunciation in England; the abuses into which it fell in times of Star Chamber trials and political prosecutions, and the care with which theframersof our American Constitutions have taken, to cut off the abuses haunting ex post facto laws, attainders and constructive treasons, and to guard the liberty of opinion and of the press, while holding all to the legitimate responsibility of their overt acts.

On the other hand, public feeling was wrought to a high degree of reprobation by the wild and visionary theories of the Anarchists shamelessly avowed in newspapers, pamphlets and speeches, and the atrocious measures which they advocated to subvert the law and institutions of the land - most of them being refugas spawned from the vilest mass of European theroists. The public sensibilities had been shocked by the violence of the Haymarket attack upon the officers, and by the great fatality which followed the explosion. The newspapers, those potent moulders of public opinion, were clamorous in identifying the accused with the worst class of anarchists, and in demanding their conviction. Surrounded with these influences, which filled all minds as pervasively and subtilely as the atmosphere fills the interstices of material bodies, the presiding Judge needed more than ordinary firmness, patience, and discernment to hold the scales of justice with an impartial hand, and grant to the accused that fair and unprejudiced trial, which it is the aim of our judicial administration to secure to all.

The trial was conducted on both sides with the ability which great learning, full comprehension of the complicated facts of the case, and professional zeal inspired, and in the main with a fair degree of courtesy. The verdict as has Deen stated found all the prisoners guilty of murder as charged, and passed sentence of death upon all but one, to whom a term of fifteen years in the penitentiary was allotted. It was received with almost universal acquiescence, as merited by the testimony and facts of the unprecedented case.

A case of such magnitude and importance could hardly be expected to go to judgment, without first being presented to the Appellate Court for review, and perchance the gaining a new trial.

Accordingly a writ of error was sued out, and the case came before the Supreme Court for argument. The same able attorneys represented the plaintiffs in error that had defended them at the trial, with the aid of Mr. Leonard Swett. The defendants in error were represented in addition to the State's Attorney, by Mr. George Hunt, Attorney-

General, Mr. Francis W.Walker, Mr. Edmund Furthman, and Mr. George C. Ingham. That the case was exhaustively argued, and as thoroughly considered by the High Court, is evident from the fact that the report of the case occupies 267 pages of Vol. 122 of tha Illinois Reports, and the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Magruder fills 168 pages of the same volume.

On the argument the Counsel for the condemned raised objections to the panel of jurors who were summoned by a special agent, who was alleged to have selected for jurors such men only as were known to be favorable to conviction. They objected to several of the jurors of the trial panel as confessing to opinions formed unfavorable to the prisoners. They made many criticisms upon the testimony admitted, especially to that large amount of documentary evidence, consisting of passages from anarchistical newspapers, pamphlets, and books of a general nature, as well as from papers conducted by two of the condemned. They laid great stress upon the instructions prepared by the prosecution, and approved by the Judge, especially the following :

The Court further instructs the jury as a matter of law, that if they believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants or any of them, conspired and agreed together or with others to overthrow the law by force, or to unlawfully resist the officers of the law; and if they further believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that in pursuance of such conspiracy and in furtherance of the common object, a bomb was thrown by a member of such conspiracy at the time, and that Matthew J. Began was killed, then such of the defendants that the jury believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, to have been parties to such conspiracy are guilty of murder, whether present at the killing or not, and whether the identity of the person throwing the bomb be established or nqt.

more of them conspired together with or not with any other person or persons, to excite the people or classes of people of the city to sedition, tumult and riot, to use deadly weapons against and take the lives of other persons, as a means to carry their designs and purposes into effect, and in pursuance of such conspiracy, and in furtherance of its objects, any of the persons so conspiring publicly by print or speech advised or encouraged the commission of murder, without designating time, place or occasion at which it should be done, and in pursuance of and produced by such advice or encouragement, murder was committed, then all of such conspirators are guilty of such murder, whether the person who perpetrated such murder can be identified or not. If such murder was committed in pursuance of such advice or encouragement and was induced thereby, it does not matter what change if any, in the order or condition of society, or what, if any, advantage to themselves or others, the conspirators proposed as the result of their conspiracy; nor does it matter whether such advice or encouragement had been frequent and long continued or not, except in determining whether the perpetrator was or was not acting in pursuance of such advice or encouragement, and was or was not induced thereby to commit murder. If there was such conspiracy as in this instruction is recited, such advice or encouragement was given, and murder was committed in pursuance of and induced thereby, then all such conspirators are guilty of murder. Nor does it matter if there was such conspiracy, how impracticable or impossible of success its ends and aims were, nor how foolish and ill arranged were the plans for its execution, except as bearing upon the question of whether there was or was not such conspiracy."

The Counsel further assigned as error the refusal of the Court to give instructions to the jury as requested by them, especially the refusal to give the following: into a conspiracy to bring about a change of government for the amelioration of the condition of the working classes, by peaceable means if possible, but if necessary, to resort to force for that purpose, and that in addition thereto in pursuance of that object, the Haymarket meeting was assembled by such conspirator or conspirators to discuss the best means to right the grievances of the working classes, without any intention of doing any unlawful act on that occasion, and when so assembled the bomb by which officer Began lost his life was thrown by a person outside of said conspiracy, and without the knowledge and approval of the defendant or defendants so found to have entered into said conspiracy, then and in that case, the Court instructs the jury that they are bound to acquit the defendants.

13. The court further instructs the jury that under the constitution of this State, it is the right of the people to assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for what they believe to be the common good, and that so long as such meeting is peaceably conducted, orderly, and not tending to riot or a breach of the peace, no official or authority has or can have any legal right to attempt the dispersion thereof in a forcible manner. Such attempt if made would be unwarranted and illegal, and might legally be resisted with such necessary and reasonable degree of force as to prevent the consummation of such dispersal. If the jury believe from the evidence in this cause, that the meeting of May 4, 1886, was called fora legal purpose, and at the time it was ordered to disperse by the police was being conducted in an orderly and peaceable manner, and was about peaceably to disperse, and that the defendants, or those participating in said meeting, had in connection therewith no illegal nor felonious purpose or design, then the order for the dispersal thereof was authorized illegal, and in violation of the rights of said assembly and of the people who were there gathered.

orderly meeting, lawfully convened, and that the order for the dispersal was unauthorized and illegal under the provisions of the constitution of this State referred to, and that upon such order being given, some person in said gathering, without the knowledge, aid, counsel procurement, encouragement, or abetting of the defendants, or any of them, then or theretofore given, and solely because of his own passion, fear, hatred, malice, or ill will, or in pursuance of his views of the right of self-defense, threw a bomb among the police, wherefrom resulted the murder or homicide charged in the indictment, then the defendants would not be liable for the results of such bomb, and your verdict should be not guilty.

The Court for reasons that are given at considerable length holds that the jury was constituted in accordance with the statutes, and that none of its members were disqualified from prejudice or opinions which would not yield to the force of evidence.

It considers the objections to the admission of certain parts of the testimony; which was stoutly opposed by the counsel for the defendants, and holds that the testimony was relevant to the case, and properly allowed to be presented to the jury, or if in any case not strictly pertinent, it was of such character as not to prejudice.

Coming to the main aspects of the case, after defining the crime of murder, and the Illinois statute abolishing the distinction between principal and accessory, the Court says, "The questions which present themselves at the threshold of the case, are these: Did the defendants have a common purpose or design to advise, encourage, aid or abet the murder of the police ?

Did they combine together with others with a view to carrying that purpose or design into effect? Did they or either or any of them do such acts or make such declarations in furtherance of the common purpose or design as did actually have the effect of encouraging, aiding or abetting the crime in question ?" For the solution of these quesn tions the evidence is elaborately examined. "The first inquiry which naturally suggests itself is, who made the bomb which killed Degan ?" The evidence reviewed in considerable detail is sufficient, "we think that the jury was warranted in believing from the evidence that the bomb which killed Degan, was one of the bombs made by the defendant Lingg.

"The next question to be considered is, why did the defendant Lingg make the bomb which killed Degan?" The court then reviews the testimony which depicts the international Workingmen's Association, generally called the Internationals, its principles as set forth in the columns of the Alarm a,r\d Arbeiter Zeitung, and in other publications, and its methods, and points out that all the defendants were members of some or several of the "groups" of the Association in Chicago. Also the Lehr and Wehr Verein, which had companies and armed sections in Chicago.

"There can be no doubt," says the court, "that the organization here described was an unlawful conspiracy. First. Its purpose was unlawful; it designed to bring about a social revolution. Second. Its methods were unlawful; " to-wit, arming and drilling in violation of the State Militia law. "Coming back to the defendant Lingg, we think it quite apparent from the testimony, that his efforts in the matter of constructing bombs, were made under the auspices of the International Association and in the furtherance of its objects and purposes."

The Court then traces the progress of the conspiracy from its general character to a specific purpose which culminated in the attack on the police at the Haymarket. They conclude " that the plan adopted on Monday night, with its provisions for bomb throwing, shooting, meeting places, signal committee, mass meeting, communication with absent members, etc., was an unlawful conspiracy, there can be no doubt."

following Tuesday night, with the preparations made at the Monday's meeting. They conclude this review. " Taking all the circumstances together the jury were justified in finding that the actors upon the stage of Tuesday night's tragedy were playing the parts assigned to them in the conspiracy of the previous night, and that the death of Began occurred as a part of the execution of that conspiracy, and while the parties to it were engaged in carrying it out."

The court next takes up the testimony which identified each of the defendants as connected with the conspiracy. Lingg, Engel and Fischer, Spies and Schawb, Fielden, Parsons and Neebe. As to the latter they say, "We can not say that the jury were not justified in holding him responsible, along with his confederates for the murder on Tuesday night of one of the very policemen, whose death he was urging and advocating on Monday night."

"In their lengthy argument counsel for the defence make some other points of minor importance, which are not here noticed. As to these it is sufficient to say that we have considered them and do not regard them as well taken."

"While I concur in the conclusion reached and also in the general view presented in the opinion filed, I do not wish to be understood as holding .that the record is free from error, for I do not think it is. I am, nevertheless, of opinion that none of the errors complained of are of so serious a character as to require a reversal of the judgment."

It must be confessed that the testimony as cited by the court with great minuteness, arranged in logical order, developing the progress of the conspiracy from its general character, to a specific purpose, leading by regular steps to the catastrophe, is a very strong if not impregnable chain, and conducts the reader to an almost inevitable conviction of the justness of the judgment. If it fails anywhere it is in suppressing that view of the case which the defense naturally adopted, that it was the irruption of the police upon a peaceable and orderly meeting which was on the point of dispersion, that maddened some cranky possessor of a bomb into launching it into the crowd of pursuers, and brought on, by a sudden onset of passion, a fatal melee.

After the judgment had been affirmed the counsel for the condemned made an application to the Supreme Court of the U. S. for a writ of error, which was refused, the court failing to find any federal question involved, 123 U. S. Reports 131.

Gov. Oglesby commuted the sentence of two to imprisonment for life, one committed suicide, and the penalty of death was quietly executed upon the remaining four.

Six years have passed, during which the awful tragedy has almost faded from the minds of men, and the memory of the dead Anarchists has only been revived by their admiring disciples in feeble demonstrations upon the anniversaries of their execution. In the meantime the cloud of Anarchism which loomed in the sky, an indefinable and portentious menace to the peace of society, has passed into an innocuous vapor.

Ordinarily the decision of a Court of last resort is final, and sets at rest all variant opinions. By a singular conjunction the decision in the Anarchist case has come under review in a competent tribunal, and its authority if not overthrown, has been seriously impeached. It happens that one of the former Judges of the Superior Court of Chicago - the court which took jurisdiction of the trial - has become Governor of Illinois. One of his late official acts has been to take under review the case, and as ti result to grant a pardon to Fielden, Neebe and Schwab, who were undergoing imprisonment. He has accompanied the granting of the pardons with a published and widely circulated pamphlet in which his view of the case, and his reasons are stated with judicial clearness and acumen. The positions taken

He premises that the prosecution could not discover who had thrown the bomb and could not bring the really guilty man to justice, and, as some of the men indicted were not at the Haymarket meeting and had nothing to do with it, the prosecution was forced to proceed on the theory that the men indicted were guilty of murder, because it was claimed they had at various times in the past printed and uttered incendiary and seditious language, practically advising the killing of policemen, of Pinkerton men and others acting in that capacity, and that they were, therefore, responsible for the murder of Mathias Began.

Second. That according to the law laid do-wn by the supreme court, both prior to and again since the trial of this case, the jurors, according to their own answers, were not competent jurors and the trial was therefore not a legal trial.

Fourth. That as to the defendant Neebe, the State's Attorney had declared at the close of the evidence that there was no case against him and yet he has been kept in prison all these years.

I. The record of the trial shows that the" jury in this case was not drawn in the manner that juries usually are drawn; that is, instead of having a number of names drawn out of a box that contained many hundred names, as the law contemplates shall be done in order to insure a fair jury and give neither side the advantage, the trial Judge appointed one, Henry L. Ryce as a special bailiff to go out and summon such men as he Ryce, might select to act as jurors. While this practice has been sustained in cases in which it did not appear that either side had been prejudiced thereby, it is always a dangerous practice, for it gives the bailiff absolute power to select a jury that will be favorable to one side or the other.

Upon the whole, therefore, considering. the facts brought to light since the trial, as well as the record of the trial and the answers of the jurors as given herein, it is clearly stated that while the counsel for the defendant agreed to it, Ryce was appointed special bailiff at the suggestion of the State's Attorney, and that he did summon a prejudiced jury which he believed would hang the defendants, and further, that the fact that Ryce was summoning only that kind of men was brought to the attention of the Court before the panel was full, and it was asked to stop it, but refused to pay any attention to the matter, but permitted Ryce to go on and then forced the defendants to go to trial before his jury.

While no collusion is proven between the Judge and State's Attorney, it is clearly shown that after the verdict and while amotion for a new trial was pending, a charge was filed in court that Ryce had packed the jury, and that the attorney for the State got Mr. Favor to refuse to make .an affidavit bearing on this point, which the defendant could use, and then the Court refused to take any notice of it unless the affidavit was obtained, although it, was informed that Mr. Favor would not make an affidavit, but stood ready to come into Court and make a full statement if the Court desired him to do so.

These facts alone would call for executive interference, especially as Mr. Favor's affidavit was not before the supreme court at the time it considered the case.

No matter what the defendants were charged with, they were entitled to a fair trial, and no greater danger could possibly threaten our institutions than to have the courts of justice run wild or give way to popular clamor, and when the trial judge in this case ruled that a relative of one of the men who was killed was a competent juror, and this after the man had candidly stated that he was deeply prejudiced and that his relationship caused him to feel more strongly than he otherwise might; and when in scores of instances he ruled that men who candidly declared that they believed the defendants to be guilty; that this was a deep conviction and would influence their verdict, and that it would require strong evidence to convince them that the defendants were innocent, when in all these instances the trial Judge ruled that these men were competent jurors, simply because they had, under his adroit manipulation been led to say that they believed they could try the case fairly on the evidence, then the proceedings lost all semblance of a fair trial.

III. The State has never discovered who it was that threw the bomb which killed the poilcemen, and the evidence does not show any connection whatever between the defendants . and the man who threw it. The trial Judge in overruling the motion for a new hearing, and again, recently in a magazine article, used this language:

" The conviction has not gone on the ground that they did have actually any personal participation in the particular act which caused the death of Began, but the conviction proceeds upon the ground that they had generally, by speech and print, advised large classes of the people, not partic" nlar individuals, but large classes, to commit murder, and had left the commission, the time and place and when, to the individual will and whim, or caprice, or whatever it may be, of each individual man who listened to their advice, and that in consequence of that advice, in pursuance of that advice, and influenced by that advice, somebody not known did throw the bomb that caused Degan's death. Now, if this is not a correct principle of the law, then the defendants, of course, are entitled to a new trial. This case is without precedent; there is no example in the law books of a case of this sort."

The Judge certainly told the truth when he stated that this case was without a precedent, and that no example could be found in the law books to sustain the law as above laid down. For, in all the centuries during which government has been maintained among men and crime has been punished, no judge in a civilized country has ever laid down such a rule before. The petitioners claim that it was laid down in this case, simply becaue the prosecution, not having discovered the real criminal, would otherwise not have been able to convict anybody; that this course was taken to appease the fury of the public, and that the judgment was allowed to stand for the same reason. I will not discuss this. But taking the law as above laid down, it was necessary under it to prove, and that beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person committing the violent deed, had at least heard or read the advice given to masses; for, until he either heard or read it, he did not receive it, and if he did not receive it, he did not commith te violent act in pursuance of that advice; and it is here that the case for the State fails. With all this apparent eagerness to force conviction in court and his efforts in defending his course, since the trial, the Judge, speaking on this point in his magazine article, made this statement: "It is probably true that Rudolph Schnaubelt threw the bomb," which statement is a mere surmise and is all that is known about it, and is certainly not sufficient to convict eight men on. In fact, until the State proves from whose hands the bomb came, it is impossible to show any connection between the man who threw it and these defendants.

University Of

length in the Judge's magazine article, showing the use of seditious and incendiary language, amounts to but little when its source is considered. The two papers in which articles appeared at intervals during the years were obscure little sheets having scarcely any circulation, and the articles themselves were written at times of great public excitement when an element in the community claimed to have been outraged, and the same is true of the speeches made by the defendants and others; the apparently seditious utterances were such as are always heard when men imagine that they have been wronged or are excited, or partially intoxicated, and the talk of a gigantic anarchistic conspiracy is not believed by the then chief of police, as will be shown hereafter; and it is not entitled to serious notice in view of the fact that, while Chicago had nearly a million inhabitants, the meetings held on the lake front on Sundays during the summer by these agitators rarely had fifty people present, and most of these went for mere curiosity, while the meetings held indoors during the winter were still smaller. The meetings held from time to time by the masses of the laboring people must not be confounded with the meetings above named, although in times of excitement and trouble much violent talk was indulged in by irresponsible parties, which was forgotten when the excitement was over.

Again, it is shown here that the bomb was, in all probability, thrown by some one seeking personal revenge; that a course had been pursued by the authorities which would naturally cause this; that for a number of years prior to the Haymarket affair there had been labor troubles, and in several cases a number of laboring people, guilty of no offense, had been shot down in cold blood -byPinkerton men and none of the murderers were brought to justice. The evidence taken at coroner's inquests and presented here shows that in at least two cases men were fired upon and killed when they were running away and there was consequently no occasion to shoot, yet nobody was punished; that in Chicago there had been a number of strikes in which some of the police not only took sides against the men, but without any authority of law invaded and broke up peaceable meetings, and in scores of cases brutally clubbed people who were guilty of no offense whatever.

Now, it is shown that peaceable meetings were invaded and broken up and inoffensive people were clubbed; that in 1885 there was a strike at the McCormick reaper factory on account of a reduction in wages, and some Pinkerton men, while on their way there, were hooted at by some people on the street, when they fired into the crowd and fatally wounded several people who had taken no part in any disturbance; that four of the Pinkerton men were indicted for this murder by the grand jury, but that the prosecuting officers apparently took no interest in the case and allowed it to be continued a number of times, until the witnesses were worn out, and in the end the murderers went free; that after this there was a strike on the West Division Street Kailway and that some of the police, under the leadership of Capt. John Bonfield, indulged in a brutality never equalled before; that even some merchants standing on their own door steps and having no interest in the strike were clubbed, then hustled into patrol wagons and thrown into prison on no charge and not even booked; that a petition, signed by about one thousand of the leading citizens living on and near West Madison street, was sent to the mayor and city council, praying for the dismissal of Bonfield from the force, but that on account of his political influence he was retained. Let me say here that the charge of brutality does not apply to all the policemen of Chicago. There are many able, honest and conscientious officers who do their duty quietly, thoroughly and humanely.

but all to no avail; that the laboring people always found the prisons open to receive them, but the courts of justice were practically closed to them; that the prosecuting officers vied with each otherinhuntingthem down,but were deaf to their appeals; that, in the spring of 1886 there were more labor disturbances in the city and particularly at the McCorniick factory; that under the leadership of Captain Bonfield the brutalities of the previous years were even exceeded. Some affidavits and other evidence is offered on this point which I cannot give for want of space. It appears that this was the year of the eight hour agitation and efforts were made to secure an eight hour day, about May 1st, and that a number of laboring men standing, not on the street but on a vacant lot, were quietly discussing the situation in regard to the movement, when suddenly a large body of police under orders from Bonfield charged on them and began to club them; that some of the men, angered at the unprovoked assault, at first resisted, but were soon dispersed; that some of the police fired on the men while they were running and wounded a large number who were already a hundred feet or more away and were running as fast as they could; that at least four of the number so shot down, died, that this was wanton and. unprovoked murder, but there was not even so much as an investigation.

While some men may tamely submit to being clubbed, and,*eeing their brothers shot down, there are some who will resent it and will nurture a spirit of hatred and seek revenge for themselves; and the occurrences that preceded the Haymarket tragedy indicate that the bomb was thrown by some one who, instead of acting on the advice of anybody, was simply seeking personal revenge for having been clubbeJ, and that Captain Bonfield is the man who is really responsible for the death of the police officers.

evidence shows there were only 800 to 1,000 people present, and that it was a peaceable and orderly meeting; that the mayor of the city was present and saw nothing out of the way, and that he remained until the crowd began to disperse, the meeting being practically over, and the crowd engaged in dispersing when he left; that had the police remained away for twenty minutes more there would have been nobody left there, but that as soon as Bonfield learned that the mayor had left, he could not resist the temptation to have some more people clubbed, and went up with the detachment of police to disperse the meeting, and that on the appearance of the police the bomb was thrown by some unknown person, and several innocent and faithful officers, who were simply obeying an uncalled for order of their superior, were killed; all of these facts tend to show the improbability of the theory of the prosecution that the bomb was thrown as the result of a conspiracy on the part of the defendants to commit murder; if the theory of the prosecution were correct there would have been many bombs thrown; and the fact that only one was thrown, shows that it was an act of personal revenge.

It is further shown here that much of the evidence given at the trial was a pure fabrication; that some of the prominent police officials in their zeal, not only terrorized ignorant men by throwing them into prison, and threatening them with torture if they refused to swear to anything desired, but that they offered money and employment to those who would consent to do this. Further, that they deliberately planned to have fictitious conspiracies formed, in order that they might get the glory of discovering them. In addition to the evidence in the record of some witnesses, who swore that they had been paid small sums of money, etc., several documents are here referred to.

I will simply say in conclusion on this branch of the case that the facts tend to show that the bomb was thrown as an act of personal revenge, and that the prosecution lias never discovered who threw it, and the evidence utterly fails to show that the man who did throw it ever heard or read a word coming from the defendants; consequently it fails to show that he acted on any advice given by them. And if he did not act on or hear any advice coming from the defendants, either in speeches or through the press, then there was no case against them, even under the law as laid down by Judge Gary.

With some pages of analysis of testimony pointing out how it failed to inculpate the prisoners in a conspiracy, the governor closes his remarkable review with some animadversions upon the conduct of the judge presiding upon the trial, which savoring of personal criticism, it would be discourteous to perpetuate here. As an official commentary by a collateral department of the State Government, it is an unusual if not unprecedented document.

The litigation which arose in the courts of Illinois and of the United States in the Sunday closing of summer of 1893, involving the world's Fair, the opening or closing of the gates of the World's Columbian Exposition on Sunday, presents a curious instance of the vacillation of the various courts, the opposing opinions of judges, and the uncertainty of the administration of the law on subjects of wide popular interest.

Ever since the project for holding the World's Fair at Chicago had been settled and preparations for the great event had been in progress, religious bodies of all sorts throughout the country had agitated the question of having the exhibition closed on the Lord's day; while, on the other hand, citizens and organizations of one kind and another were as strenuous in demanding that it be kept open on all days, making the plea especially in the interest of the laboring and wage earning classes of the community.

Jackson Park, one of the large public grounds in the southern part of the city of Chicago, had been designated as the place for holding the exhibition, and had been tendered by act of the Illinois legislature and by the commissioners of parks of Chicago. The Congress of the United States, in addition to other donations and aid, had appropriated $5,000,000 of souvenir coins, annexing to the gift the condition that the exhibition should be closed on Sunday. The gift was accepted by the directors of the World's Columbian Exposition, which is a corporation created under the laws of Illinois.

When the time came for the exhibition to open in May, the board of directors adopted a resolution to return to the government the value of the souvenir coins, and to open the Exposition on Sundays, and, in accordance with the resolution, the gates were kept open on the Sundays in May, and until the injunction hereafter mentioned was granted.

A bill in equity was filed in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in an action entitled The People exrel. vs. the World's Columbian Exposition, to restrain the defendant from keeping the Fair open on the first day of the week, and a temporary injunction was asked for.

The motion was elaborately argued on the part of the government by United States Attorney Milchrist, by the solicitor general of the United States - Chas. Aldrich, Judge Hunt, David Fales and James Z. Hirsh, Esqs. and by Edwin Walker, Esq., and Gen. St. Clair for the Exposition directors. From thegravity of the case United States Judge Woods called United States District Judges Jenkins and Grosscup to sit with him. On the 8th of June the decision of the circuit court was announced, granting the injunction asked for. Judges Woods and Jenkins filed an opinion in favor of granting the injunction, while Judge Grosscup dissented.

From the decision an appeal was taken to the United States Court of Appeals, which convened in Chicago in June to hear the case. Chief Justice Fuller of the supreme court of the United States presided at the term, assisted by Judges Brown and Allen. The case was again argued by the same eminent counsel. The chief justice announced the unanimous opinion of the court, dissolving the injunction on the ground that the case presented no proper grounds for the interposition of equity jurisdiction. That it presented simply a question of violation of contract and of property rights, for which an action at law might furnish an adequate remedy. The court declined to consider the moral or religious question thought to be involved on the ground that it did not properly arise in the case. The directors, now being free from any restraint, proceeded to open the gates of the Exposition on Sundays as well as on other days.

In the meantime other proceedings had been commenced and were in progress in the State Court. In May an action had been brought in the superior court of Cook county, by one Clingman, against the World's Columbian Exposition, having for its object to restrain the defendants from closing the gates of the Exposition on Sunday, as contrary to the uses to which Jackson Park had been devoted. He brought the action in the double capacity of stockholder in the Exposition company and a taxpayer of the city of Chicago.

The case came on for hearing on motion for a temporary injunction before Judge Stein on the 29th of May and was argued by Mr. William E. Mason for complainant and by Mr. Edwin Walker for the defendants, and by Messrs. Gault and Street for an intervenor who had petitioned to come into the case.

Judge Stein granted the injunction, on the ground that Jackson Park had been dedicated by an act of the legislature of Illinois, passed in 1869, to be held, managed and enjoyed as a public park, for the recreation and health of the public, and "to be open to all persons forever. " He held that this condition had not been invalidated by any of the legislation in reference to the Exposition, and indeed that it was beyond the power of the legislature to dispense with it.

of Illinois, by one Wanamaker, against the World's Columbian Exposition, having for its object to restrain the directors from keeping the Fair open on Sunday. Wanamaker made his application as a stockholder of the Exposition company. The case came to a hearing before Judge Jenkins on a demurrer to the complaint, and on the llth of July an order was made dismissing the action, for the reason that no sufficient reason existed for the interference of equity. That the Exposition company was amenable to local law, and if acting in violation of contract, or in disobedience of State laws, was subject to the local tribunals.

On the 14th of July, the directors of the Exposition, finding that the attendance of the public on Sundays was not sufficient to justify the expense of keeping the Failopen, voted to close the gates on Sunday. They had apparently lost sight of or were indifferent to Judge Stein's injunction.

Early in August the directors of the Exposition were cited to appear before Judge Stein to answer for contempt in disregarding the injunction which he had issued. Not being able to show an acceptable excuse, Lyman J. Gage, Chas. L. Hutchinson, Chas. Henrotin, Andrew McNally and William E. Kerfoot, directors who had voted in favor of closing the gates were fined $1,000 each. Victor F.Lawson was fined $100 and Director General George E. Davis $250, and all were ordered to be committed to the county jail until the fines were paid. From this decision an appeal was taken, which is still pending.

On the 31st of August the case was again brought up in the superior court on a motion to dissolve the injunction which had been granted by Judge Stein. The motion was heard by Judge Goggin, who called to sit with him as associates, Judges Dunne and Brentano. The two last named judges read opinions in favor of granting the motion to dissolve the injunction, holding that the directors of the Exposition were vested with full power to make all rules and regulations

Judge Goggin, on the contrary, had prepared a strong opinion in favor af sustaining the injunction. He held that the action of the South Park Commissioners in turning over Jackson Park to the World's Fair Columbian Exposition was without the sanction of the law and in flagrant violation of the constitution. Upon the announcement of the opinions considerable excitement was caused among the counsel, and some warm if not intemperate language was used. The three judges retired to their private room for consultation. Upon their return into court Judges Dunne and Brentano retired from further participation in the proceedings, leaving the presiding judge to enforce his own opinion. He continued the case, and no further action was taken while the Exposition continued.

The directors, in compliance with the mandate of the court, voted to open the gates on Sundays, but took no measure to attract the public. Most of the exhibits remained covered on Sundays; many of the Foreign and State buildings were closed. Some thousands of spectators resorted to the grounds each Sunday, but in no proportion to those who visited it on other days.

On the last Sunday of October, however, the last day but one, preparations were made for an open day, but the assassination of the Mayor of Chicago, Carter H. Harrison, who had taken so deep an interest and had been so prominently identified with the Exposition, on the Saturday night before the last Sunday, cast such a gloom over the city and the attendants upon the Fair, that the exexpectations for a large attendance were thwarted.

In a city where great fortunes have been accumulated and where population is so Testamentary heterogeneous in character as is Devises. that of Chicago, it is inevitable that contests should often arise over testamentary dispositions of property. These are of varied character, generally involve large values, and enlist in their settlement the best learning of the bar, and the most deliberate judgment of the courts. They are generally of interest only to the parties concerned, except as they serve to settle principles of law, and in some cases they affect the general interests and become in some sense historical.

Such was the case of Kehoe vs. Kehoe, which was determined in the circuit court. John W. Kehoe, a few weeks before his death, had made a deed of certain personal property to the complainant, upon oral trust, that the funds arising from a sale of the .property should be devoted to procuring masses to be said for the soul of his deceased mother, and for the repose of his own. The validity of the trust was assailed as against public policy, and as favoring a superstitious use of the property, rinding precedents in its support in ancient English law.

The trust was sustained by Judge Tuley, who held, in the face of ancient precedent, that the right of a person to devote his property to any purpose which he believes to be religious, is just as necessary to the religious liberty guaranteed to citizens by the constitution as is the right to believe and worship according to the dictates of his own conscience. He decreed that the wish of the donor should be carried out, and that the funds should be appropriated to the procuring of masses to be said in accordance with his instructions. The decision was so manifestly just and in accordance with the principles of religious liberty that it was acquiesced in, and did not reach the appelate court.

maintenance of free public libraries, which have, through the impatience and greed of heirs, been brought into litigation, and in one case the public interests have been seriously jeoparded.

The first of these cases which arose was over the will of the late Walter L. Newberry. The case is reported in 99 and 100 of Illinois State Keports, under the title of Eliphalet W. Blatchford et al., appellants, vs. Henry W. Newberry et al., appellees.

Mr. Newberry had made his will October 30, 1866, and died about two years afterwards, leaving a widow and two unmarried daughters. The will gave the whole estate, except some minor legacies, to two trustees to be held and administered by them under careful instructions as to its administration, until its final distribution should be made by them to the persons who should be ultimately entitled to receive it. To the widow was given certain real estate, the homestead, etc. in lieu of dower in his estate, and generous annuities were to be paid to the widow during her life, and to the daughters, and if they or their lawful issue should survive the mother, the estate was to descend to them.

The will contained this further residuary clause: " In case of the death of both of my said daughters, without leaving lawful issue, then immediately after the death of my wife, if she survives my daughters; but if not, then immediately after the decease of the last surviving one of my daughters, my said trustees shall divide my said estate into two equal shares, my said trustees being the sole judges of the equality and correctness of said division, and shall at once proceed to distribute one of such shares among the lawful surviving descendants of my own brothers and sisters, such descendants taking per stirpcs and not per capita. The other share of my estate shall be applied by my said trustees as soon as may be conveniently done, to the founding of a Free Public Library, to be located in that portion of the city of Chicago now known as the North Division.

After Mr. Newberry's decease his widow elected to receive her dower in his estate, and renounced the testamentary provisions which the will had made in her favor. The daughters died unmarried, one in February, 1874,

The complainants, being eight nieces and nephews, and ten grand nieces and nephews, filed a bill in equity in the circuit court oi Cook county, praying that a distribution oi the estate be made, to those who were entitled to receive it. Their contention was that the widow having renounced her testamentary rights, had no further interest in the trust estate, and although still alive, might be considered in respect to the estate as dead. That the doctrine of accelerated remainders was applicable to the case, and that no reason existed for delaying a distribution.

Judge E. S. Williams, of the circuit court held with the complainants, and decreed that the trustees should make a present distribution of the estate. The trustees appealed to the supreme court, where the case was argued on the part of the appellants by Mr. Edward S. Isham, of the firm of Isham & Lincoln, and on the part of the complainants by Messrs. Boutel, and by Messrs. Lawrence Campbell & Lawrence. The arguments were learned and exhaustive, especially in the citation of authorities. The analysis of the language of the will made by Mr. Isham, bringing its scattered phrases to support his view that the purpose of the testator was to delay the distribution until the death of his wife, was a fine specimen of verbal criticism and received the sanction of the court.

The opinion of the supreme court prepared by Mr. Justice Sheldon was filed June 14, 1878, and was withdrawn for a rehearing and again filed February 20, 1880. The court reversed the decree. It held that the persons who would be entitled to share in the distribution were not necessarily those who might be in being at the death of the last daughter, but those who might be living at the time of the final distribution, which was fixed by the testator at the death of his wife, and that a final distribution could not be made until the occurrence of that event. Mr. Justice Dickey filed a long and able dis- senting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Mulkey concurred. Mr. Justice Walker also filed a dissenting opinion. An able petition for a rehearing was filed by Mr. Wirt Dexter, but did not prevail.

No attack was made upon the devise for the free public library; the provisions of the will, which was drawn by Judge Mark Skinner, being too clear to admit of any dispute, and upon the death of Mrs. Newberry in 1889 the distribution was made, the share falling to the library exceeding $2,000,000.

A far more serious and determined attack was made upon the will of Mr. John Crerar, inasmuch as the provisions of the will were assailed, and if the controversy had succeeded the entire library endowment, amounting to $2,- 500,000, would have been lost.

The case is reported in 145 Illinois State Reports, under the title of Donald Crerar and others, appellants vs. Norman Williams and others, appellees.

The complainants, who were heirs at law of Mr. Crerar and remote relatives, as he left no descendants, filed their bill in equity in the circuit court of Cook county, praying that certain clauses in the last will of John Crerar, deceased, should be declared void, and the bequests made therein be decreed to the complainants as his heirs at law. A general demurrer to the bill was filed, and the court held by Hon. Murray F. Tuley sustained the demurrer and ordered the bill to be dismissed. Appeal was taken to the appellate court of the first district, which affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

On the hearing in the supreme court arguments were made by Messrs. F. A. Stertan, A. W. Brown, A. B. Jenks and W. A. Cunner for appellants, and by Mr. Delos Mc- Curdy, James L. High, John H. Mulkey and Messrs. Williams, Holt and Wheeler, and Messrs. Lyman and Jackson for appellees.

Mr. Justice Williams delivered the opinion of the court, affirming both the decisions of the lower courts and sustaining the trusts and provisions of the will. The will was a long and elaborate one, consisting of fiftytwo clauses. A number of these contained bequests for benevolent objects, in some cases giving to the executors and trustees a power of selection of the beneficiaries and of the time and amount of payments.

Section 49 authorized the executors and trustees to set apart so much of the estate as in their judgment may be sufficient or proper for the purposes of paying the expenses, charges, etc., of carrying out the will, and to devote the surplus income to the purposes set forth in the succeeding fiftieth clause. The estate consisted of both real and personal property.

50. Recognizing the fact that I have been a resident of Chicago since T862, and that the greater part of my fortune has been accumulated here, and acknowledging with hearty gratitude the kindness which has always been extended to me by many friends and by my business and social acquaintances and associates, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my estate, both real and personal, for the erection, creation, maintenance and endowment of a Free Public Library to be called the "John Crerar Library," and to be located in the city of Chicago, 111., a preference being given to the South Division of the city, inasmuch as the New. berry Library will be located in the North Division. I direct that my executors and trustees cause an act of incorporation under the laws of Illinois to be procured to carry out the purposes of this bequest, and I request that Norman Williams be made the first president thereof, and that in addition to my executors and trustees, the following named friends of mine will act as the first board of directors in such incorporation, and aid and assist my executors and trustees therein, namely: Marshall Field, E. W. Blatchford, T. B. Blackstone, Robert T. Lincoln, Henry W. Bishop, Edward G. Mason, Albert Keep, Edson Keith, Simon J. McPherson, John M. Clark and George A. Armour, or their survivors. I desire the building to be tasteful, substantial and fire-proof, and that sufficient funds be reserved over and above the cost of its construction to provide, maintain and support a library for all time. I desire the books and periodicals to be selected with a view to create and sustain a healthy moral and Christian sentiment in the community, and that all nastiness and immorality be excluded. I do not mean by this that there shall be nothing but hymn books and sermons, but

I mean that dirty French novels and all skeptical trash, and works of questionable moral tone, shall never be found in this library. I want its atmosphere that of Christian refinement, and its aim and object the building up of character, and I rest content that the friends I have named will carry out my wishes in those particulars.

The first attack was made upon the preliminary clauses of the will, which gave discretionary power and power of selection to the executors and trustees, which as the complainants contended made them void. They cited with apparent pertinency the case of the will of the late Gov. Tilden of N. Y. in which such powers of discretion and selection were held to invalidate the trusts which contained them.

They also assailed the library trust as being the creation of an unlawful perpetuity, and contended that such a corporation as the will directed to be formed to administrator the library could not be created under the laws of Illinois. These points were elaborated at great length and in detail by the learned and numerous counsel employed in the case, and supported with a copious array of precedents from both English and American cases. It is apparent that the argument, elaborate as it was, made little impression on the Court, which, while discussing them, gave them scant attention.

The Court held that the ultimate disposition of the property, was that of personal property, inasmuch as a valid provision directed the realty to be sold and converted into money. It did not enter into a consideration of whether the preliminary benevolent bequests are or are not valid, thus avoiding the whole effect of the decision in the Tilden case, holding that if invalid the amounts would fall into the residuary trust, argument-ing its amount.

As to the chief clause of the will providing for a library, the court held it to be "a charitable use," and not obnoxious to public policy, which forbids perpetuities. That even if the means prescribed should be impracticable, or should fail, or if the corporation contemplated should never be organized, still the "charitable devise" would not be allowed to fail, and would be sustained and carried out if need be by a Court of Equity.

In conclusion, the Court uses this emphatic language: "It is the fixed policy of the law to uphold charitable bequests " and, " that courts incline strongly in favor of charitable gifts, and take special care to enforce them.

No greater wrong could be done the giver of this magnificent bequest than to defeat his clearly expressed wish, that the greater part of his estate, amply sufficient for the purpose, should be expended in the erection, creation, maintenance, and endowment of a free public library in a great city to bear his name, because forsooth in an effort to direct the means of carrying out the purposes of that bequest, he may have misconceived the practicability of some of those means, or failed to prescribe with exactness, when and bow those means shall be put in operation."

The decision was only given on the 19th of June, 1893. The trustees are now free to go forward with the erection and equipment of the library which, if it shall be decided to make it a reference library as is probable, will give to the south part of the city such library facilities as the north side possesses, and in connection with the city library will give to the people of Chicago library accommodations unexcelled anywhere.

"Futures" and "Options." ]ier Board of Trade entertained deals daily involving millions of bushels and of dollars, and speculation at times ran to fever height, and "corners" were not of infrequent occurrence, the courts should be called upon to define the limits between legitimate and illegitimate dealing. This was early done and has been adhered to with uniformity and steadiness. The doctrine laid down in the case of Brown vs. Alexander, reported in 29th Ill's Ap. K. 626, is a fair statement of illegal trading. The court says, "a contract merely for speculating in differences; a contract f. e. for dealing in ' futures ' or ' options ' to be settled according to the rise or fall of the market, is void at common law, as contrary to public policy."

On the contrary legal trading is thus defined by the court, " a contract made in good faith for grain or other commodity is not invalid merely because it is for a future delivery;- it is not forbidden by the law, either common or statutory, nor is it contrary to sound policy." Walcott as Heath 78 Ills. 433. " Nor, where it is the intention that the seller shall deliver and the buyer receive the commodity sold, is it unlawful merely because the time of delivery is within fixed and reasonable limits, optional with one party or the other," Pixley as Boynton 79 Ills. 351.

Such are general principles laid down. In practical business a variety of facts may give to a transaction one character or another, the court holding that the intent of the parties characterizes a transaction as valid or void; that if even in terms a plain contract for delivery is entered into, yet if beneath it, there was an intention to settle differences only, it would be illegal.

It is believed that in the stupendous operations of the grain exchange in Chicago, the greater part consists of legitimate trading, and that it is "bucket shops" and the "curb" that have given to operations in grain an unsavory character.

Cansniracy to Falaify brought to light many sen- Election Returns. Sati0nal facts, and which attracted great interest throughout the country, not so much for any difficult legal questions involved as from the character and standing of at least one of the defendants in political circles, and the important political interests which depended upon the case. The latter were no less than the partisan complexion of the State legislature, and the resultant consequence of the election of a U. S. Senator of one or the other of the eading political parties.

When the votes which had been cast at the election held in November, 1884, were canvassed the grand jury of the II. S. District Court was in session, having been charged by the district judge to examine into any election frauds. On the llth of December it presented indictments against the judges and clerks of election of the second election district of the 18th ward of the city of Chicago, for malfeasance in office, and against Joseph C. Mackin, secretary of the Democratic State Central Committee, Arthur Gleason and Henry Bickle, deputies of the county clerk, for conspiracy to change the returns. As further investigations were made and new facts brought to light, the grand jury having adjourned on the 31st of December, the U. S. District Attorney filed a criminal information in the district court of the United States against Mackin, Gallagher, Gleason and Bickle for willfully conspiring together to break open the envelope containing the election returns, to alter the certificate of the count of votes which had been made, to destroy one of the tally sheets and substitute a false one, to break open and abstract the package of ballots, and to substitute spurious and false ones.

The trial came on in the district court before Judge Blodgett on the 5th of February, 1885, and lasted until the 25th, amid the intensest interest. The prosecution was conducted by Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, U. S. Attorney, assisted by Israel N. Stiles, Gen. Hawley and Judge James S. Doolittle. The defense was represented by Judge Turpie, of Indianapolis and Messrs. Leonard Swett, H. W. Thompson, F. D. Turner, Peter S. Grosscup and William S. Young, Jr.

The trial developed a most extraordinary state of facts, and was of dramatic interest. In its course there was brought to light and disclosed a most ingenious scheme based upon fraud and perjury to break the force of the principal facts, and give a show of fairness to the proceedings of the canvassing officers.

chosen from the sixth senatorial district, which included the twentieth election district of the eighteenth ward of Chicago. Henry W. Leman was the Republican candidate, and Rudolph Brand the Democratic. At the counting of the votes it was given out that Leman had received 420 votes and Brand 274. These, added to the votes cast in the other districts, gave Leman a majority. Upon the canvas of the returns, it was found that these figures in the certificates were reversed, and had apparently been altered. The word "four " in the first sum had been erased and "two" substituted, and in the second, the word "two" had been erased and "four" put in its place. This change gave the election to Brand by a majority of two, as the canvassers decided that they had no power to go behind the returns. The investigations of the Grand Jury had been obstructed by the refusal of the officers having the custody of the original ballots, tally lists, etc., to produce them, but Judge Blodgett ordered them to be produced. On examining them, the ballots were found to consist of 498 with Brand's name and 118 with Leman's. A closer scrutiny revealed that counterfeit Republican tickets containing the name of Brand had been prepared and substituted to a requisite number in the boxes for those that had been cast by the voters. During the trial the engraver and priuter of the forged tickets were produced, and showed that their work was done after the election.

On this branch of the case the hope of the prisoners lay and in the course of its development the most sensational scenes occurred. The engravers and printers after having testified at one session of the transactions, were recalled and confessed that they had sworn falsely through subornation, and gave another relation.

The defendants were examined in their own behalf and denied all the charges with calmness and apparent sincerity. The summing up by the able counsel occupied three flays; when the jury with little hesitation returned a verdict of guilty against Mackin,

Gallagher and Gleason. The prisoners were each sentenced to two years in the penitentiary, and to pay a fine of $5,000. The execution of sentence was stayed by a writ of error granted by Judge W. L. Gresham, of the United States Circuit Court. The case as presented in the circuit court involved chiefly a question of jurisdiction, from which through a certificate of division of opinion between Judges Blodgett and Gresham, the case was removed to the supreme court at Washington, where it has since been awaiting its turn on the long calendar of an overburdened court.

So prominent a politician as was Mackin, convicted of so heinous an offense against the suffrage, although he might evade justice through technicalities, could not escape political vengeance. He was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for perjury committed before the grand jury in testifying that he had never had to do with substituted ballots aud was brought to trial before Judge Moran. He was defended by the brilliant Emory A. Storrs, and the prosecution was conducted by States Atorney J. S. Grinnell and Messrs. Israel N. Stiles and Joel M. Longeuecker. The trial was of but two days' duration and brought out no new facts. Mackin was convicted, and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. An appeal was taken to the State Supreme Court by his indefatigable counsel and argued. It was while attending the Supreme Court at Ottawa for the argument of the case, that Mr. Storrs died.

The court declined to interfere with the verdict though it examined the proceedings of the trial with great minuteness, and Mackin was sent to the penitentiary.

It is not remarkable that twenty-five years ago the citizens of Chicago failed to appreciate with unanimity the advantages of a comprehensive park system. When it is remembered that less than fifteen years before, Central Park had been forced upon the protesting citizens of New York by the power of the State legislature, and iu putting it into operation commissioners had to be sought from the country districts, and that even then its advantages in respect to valuations and taxation, as well as its wonderful beauty and attractions, had not become as apparent as they now are, it is not at all strange that the less than three hundred thousand people then living in Chicago did not adequately consider what the needs of the million and a half that now dwell within its limits, to say nothing of the other millions yet to be added to them, would, in the development of the city, require for their health, refreshment and comfort.

The park legislation was secured at Springfield in the Session of 1869 by a few enthusiastic and far-seeing citizens without serious opposition. It contemplated a system of parks and boulevards, to extend through the three divisions of the city, and to be under the control ol boards of commissioners to be known as the commissioners of Lincoln Park, the board of West Park commissioners and the board of South Park Commissioners. The commissioners were named in the act, but vacancies were to be filled, and successors appointed by the judges of Cook County Court.

To the boards was given power to borrow money, to lay and collect taxes for park maintenance, the power of eminent domain, and to levy and collect special assessments.

The territory to be covered by the park system did not all lie within the boundaries of the city of Chicago. It extended into the towns of Hyde Park, Lake, Lake View, and perhaps some other. The act was submitted to a vote of the people inhabiting the territory affected, and was approved. The lines of the long boulevards extended through stretches of sparsely settled country, and the vast areas of the parks of the West and the South sides had little to distinguish them from the pleasant groves and flat reaches of the surrounding fields. No prophetic eye was keen enough to peer through the mist of twenty years and descry the "White City" which should arise like an enchantment and cover Jackson Park with gigantic palaces, wrought into beautiful forms, rivaling the sculptured ruins of Athens, Baalbeck and Palmyra; and open among them the glistening lagoons of Venice. No vision was sufficiently ideal to catch along the wastes traversed by the boulevards the vision of arboreal shade and floral loveliness that now freshens and perfumes them.

Not much opposition attended the opening of Lincoln Park. Its lower portion was a burying ground, that was seen to be too near an encroaching population, and terms were arranged with proprietors of burial lots for a removal of the remains. The tract lay along the shore of Lake Michigan, and was already beginning to attract a good class of residents and of improvements. Much of the land adjacent was held in large tracts by prominent citizens, who saw in the contemplated improvements an enhancement of the value of their own acres. But the favoring interest was not altogether mercenary. There were many of the best citizens who valued the sanitary and aesthetic influence of the park.

No sooner were the extensive powers of the park commissioners attempted to be put in operation than opposition appeared, which, as the act had passed all the stages of legislative and popular approval, took the shape of want of legal power, unconstitutionality, etc.

The most radical and formidable attack upon the validity of the park acts came in the form of a bill in chancery to restrain the county clerk from including the estimates of the park commissioners in the annual tax levy. The commissioners did not await the slow progress of a chancery suit, but themselves made an application for a mandamus to compel the clerk to include their requisitions. The case was soon in the supreme court, where it was argued by Messrs. Beckwith, Ayer and Kales, for the relator; and by Messrs. Storrs and Wilson, for the respondent. The opinion of the court, written by the strong hand of Chief Justice Breese, brushed away all the objections and ordered

The court held that each board of park commissioners was a "municipal corporation" within the use of that term in the State Constitution, although the district under its jurisdiction was not co-terminous with any existing city organization, and included territory situated in different municipalities. That their purposes were public and proper ones, and the powers necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes in view ; and that the act having been assented to by the people whose interests were affected, was valid and obligatory.

A few years later the legislature amended the park act by taking away from the judges of the county court the power to fill vacancies in the boards, and conferring it upon the governor of the State. Mr. Cornell having been appointed by the governor a commissioner of the South Park, his right to hold the office under such appointment was challenged in the case of the People ex rel Chas. Walsh vs. Paul Cornell, reported in 107 Illinois R. R. £72. Again Judge Breese upheld the original park act in its integrity, holding that after its terms, including the provisions made for filling vacancies, had been submitted to and ratified by the people, the legislature had no power to change it.

It would seem that the decisions of Judge Breese and his colleagues of the supreme court should have set at rest the question of the powers of the boards. But they were again brought into review in a case affecting the West Park Board, reported in 103 111. 33, and again upheld in all their amplitude, as applied to the boulevards, and the power of condemiug private property for park use with adequate compensation.

The legal principles incorporated into the Chicago park acts, were a great advance upon those of older acts, especially of the N. Y. Central Park act, and have been widely copied in similar legislation in other States.

boldly charged by the public press. The charges gained such credence that a committee of citizens undertook an investigation. They employed detectives who at great labor and expense gathered such a mass of proofs as to astound the committee at the magnitude and extent to which rascality had entered the public administration and tainted its officials. The evidence was laid before the grand jury, which found an indictment against eighteen of the commissioners and ex-commissioners for conspiracy to defraud the county. 'Before the omnibus case was brought to trial W. J. McGarigle and one McDonald who had been warden and engineer of the Normal School, were brought to trial on the charge of fraud in connection with the management of that institution, and had been convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary. McGarigle managed to elude the sheriff who had him in custody, and escaped to Canada.

The late Judge John A. Jamieson presided at the trial, which was conducted by Prosecuting Attorney Julius S. Grinnell, assisted by Gen. Stiles. The defendants were represented by Messrs. Birkee and Forest.

No difficult questions of law were involved in the trial. The proof of guilt was overwhelming, especially as some of the defendants turned State's evidence and gave their testimony in corroboration of the mass of proofs which had been collected from parties who had received contracts for supplies and had paid commissions or other considerations to obtain them.

The impaneling of a trial jury was a long and tedious operation, from the notoriety of the case and the full disclosures which had been made in the newspapers. Six hundred talesmen were summoned. The defendants exhausted the one hundred and twenty peremptory challenges to which they were entitled, while the prosecution used seventy. Two hundred challenges for cause were tried. The taking of testimony commenced July 26th and continued for ten days.

The jury, after a deliberation of eight hours, found eleven of the defendants guilty, and fixed a penalty of imprisonment in the penetentiary for two years for seven of them and a fine of $1,000 for each of the others.

The proof was so conclusive that the defendants submitted to their fate and did not seek to obtain new trials or a reversal of the conviction by appeal to a higher court.

elsewhere. In some of its features it resembles the Morgan case in New York that excited so wide an interest in the early part of the century. It is peculiar as the alleged result of a conspiracy among the members of a secret organization to remove one who had become obnoxious, as well as from the deliberation with which it was perpetrated, and the skill with which evidences of a crime had been concealed, until the discovery of the remains of the victim disclosed the astounding fact that a brutal murder had been committed.

The detection of the criminals from obscure indications, reflects great credit upon the detectives employed in the case; while the conviction of the prisoners, by weaving about them a web of circumstantial evidence, no single part of which was conclusive, but which taken together, constituted an irrefragable chain of certainty, was a triumph of legal skill and acumen.

The murder of Dr. Cronin has already found its place in the records of sensational crimes. It has been called ' ' the crime of the century," but for reckless savagery and brutal incidents more than one century of civilization would have to be searched for a prototype to its heartlessness. It was especially remarkable in that it was the gory outcome of a cool conspiracy among a people whose chief characteristic - some say fault - is that they know not how to conspire. Under an impulse, heated and intensified by wrongs, an Irishman will shoot an oppressive landlord or will kill a blatant reformer and glory in the deed, but to cooly concoct the murder of a prominent and professional citizen whose every act was in the sunlight was regarded as a new and strangely vicious feature in the Irish character.

At 8 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, May 4, 1889, Philip Patrick Henry Cronin was called from his office in the Windsor Theatre building on North Clark street, to attend an urgent surgical call in Lake View, where it was said an employe of Patrick O'Sullivan, an iceman, was dangerously injured in an accident. The messenger to avoid delay, had brought a horse and buggy with him, and showed the card of O'Sullivan as his authority for the visit and his identification. The horse was the animal now famous as Din an's white horse, and had been engaged that day at Dinan's stables on Clark street,near Chicago avenue, by Dan Coughlin, who said he wanted it for a friend of his, a stranger in the city. That friend, Conghlin afterward said, was a man named Smith, who knew his relatives in Hancock, Mich., but it has since been found out, according to Cronin's friends, that his name was not Smith, but that he was a trusted member of the Clan-na-Gael and one of the conspirators told off to commit the murder.

A short time previous Dr. Cronin had made a contract with O'Sullivan to attend to the men employed by him in the ice business, and so when the urgent call was made he hurriedly jumped into the buggy with his case of instruments, and was rapidly driven north toward Lake View, where the ice house was located. That was the last time that Dr. Cronin was seen alive by his friends.

He had lived for years with T. T. Conklin and his family, who at the time occupied a handsome flat in the building where the doctor had his office, and when he had not returned that night, and no tidings of him came with the Sunday's dawn, they naturally became alarmed. His habits had always been most punctual, and when they recalled that a certain element of the Clan-na-Gael had been his bitter enemies and traducers, and knew that his life had been threatened, their alarm ended in a belief that he had been assassinated. Inquiry from Patrick O'Sullivan himself showed that no accident had happened to any of his men, and then the belief of Dr. Cronin's murder became a certainty to his friends.

The police were told of the disappearance, and given reasons for the belief that a horrible crime had been committed. As the news spread this entire community became intensely aroused, and for some months the excitement continued.

A first link was found by the Lake View police in the discovery of a trunk on Sunday morning, with the lock burst open and blood-stained cotton batting and hair on the inside. ,

Its condition gave unmistakable evidence that it had been used to carry a human body or carcass of some kind. The key of this trunk was subsequently found on the floor of the Carlson cottage, and with other incidents led to the inevitable conclusion that it had been the receptacle for Dr. Cronin's body. Captain Villier's, chief of police of Lake View at that time, had not heard of the disappearance of Dr. Cronin, but, learning of some particulars, he went to O'Sullivan's house, questioned him, and got a plausible explanation. He then visited the Conklins, and was shown O'Sullivan's card and told of the contract, and their belief that it was used as a decoy to lead the doctor to his death. The Conklins were then shown the hair found in the trunk, and at once expressed their belief that it was Dr. Cronin's.

As an offset to these conclusions and facts, published in the next Monday's papers, a series of statements to throw discredit on them were given out by a number of people, chief among which was the story of Miss Annie Murphy and Street-car Conductor Dwyer, that they had seen the missing physician on a south-bound northside car Saturday night, with a gripsack in his hand. Then came the story of one Long, a Toronto reporter, who had formerly lived in Chicago and knew Cronin, that he had met him in Toronto under circumstances indicating that he had fled in consequence of some trouble with a woman. In corroboration of Long's statement came a series of stories from a horse-thief named Woodruff, having for their object the showing that Cronin was connected professionally with a criminal operation which resulted fatally, and making the theory of his flight a plausible one.

Following all this came a telegram from Michael Davitt to Patrick Egan, in care of Alexander Sullivan, stating that a certain man called by the cipher name of " Bunkum" was to sail May lith to testify for the London Times against Parnell before the royal commission then sitting, and the subsequent explanation was that the witness referred to was "your doctor." All this assisted in creating the belief that Dr. Croniii was not murdered but had crossed the ocean as a spy.

The next confirmation of the murder theory, following the discovery of the trunk, was the report of Patrick Dinan, the liveryman, that Daniel Coughlin had arranged for the hiring of the white horse and buggy by his friend Smith. The description of the driver of the buggy given by Dinan and his wife tallied exactly with that given by Mrs. Conklin, the Mclnerny girls, and Frank Scanlan of the man who presented P. O'Sul- livan's card and drove the doctor away. But his name was not Smith, but Dawn, a name not heretofore mentioned, and who was a member of the camp in Hancock, Mich. The body of Dr. Cronin was found May 12th in the catch-basin of a Lake View sewer, a-nd the excitement attending the story became increased and intensified. The remains were bare of clothing and partly decomposed, but the marks on the head plainly indicated death by violence. The body was carried to the Lake View Morgue where it was viewed by thousands of people, and identified by Cronin's brother and many of his personal and intimate friends.